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Foreword
“I have the public Memorials to write & worse than all constant matters of 
Arbitration”1
Coleridge’s Bandi (Proclamations) and Avvisi (Public Notices)2 appear to 
be of a minor, regulatory character dealing with such matters as licensing, 
cartwheels, mooring ropes, foreigners and excise duties. In fact, these 
legal and administrative texts reveal how Coleridge used and controlled 
government information to advance the dominant strategic purpose of 
British rule. They were intended not only to alter behaviour, but also to 
influence public opinion and secure the legitimacy of British rule.
As we shall discover, the British in Malta were explicitly directed by 
the British imperial government to achieve popularity with the Maltese 
and to ensure the stability of the islands as a British possession. A series 
of policies and decisions, whether ill-advised in conception or operation, 
some resulting from the incompetence of administrators, or the deliberate 
hoodwinking of the British by the Maltese, led to a temporary, but profound, 
decline in British popularity. Confidence in the British and, in particular, in 
the Civil Commissioner, Sir Alexander Ball, whose autocratic constitutional 
authority made him the embodiment of British purposes and values, was 
at a dangerously low ebb by the spring of 1805. Coleridge was compelled, 
not least in the laws and public notices, to mount a propaganda offensive 
to “re-engage” with the Maltese public. He had to portray a selfless, benign 
administration that, according to Coleridge’s narrative, prioritised Maltese 
interests, and acted merely to ensure the well-being of the local population. 
In fact, Malta, at that time, exposed the difficulties administrators 
faced when confronted with the inherent conflict of interest in the colonial 
project. In many instances, British imperial goals were not invariably 
1 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805 in Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
ed. E.L. Griggs, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956-71), 2, 1169-70. Hereafter 
referred to as CL. 
2 “Bando” and “avviso” in the singular.
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congruent with Maltese interests. The de-stabilising tensions, springing 
from this divided colonial relationship, had to be managed because, as the 
British knew, a disaffected Maltese population could be capable of violent 
insurrection. They had responded to a call to arms as recently as 1798 
to evict the unpopular French occupiers from their islands. A decline in 
popular support threatened continued British possession. In securing the 
long-term strategic goals of British rule, Coleridge was required to assume 
a weighty burden of responsibility. The evidence of depression, stress, over-
work and addiction shown in his Notebooks attest to his struggle to fulfil the 
demanding expectations of him in his public office as well as overcoming 
the well-known problems in his private life.
 
Preface
In 1804-1805 the English poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
stayed in Malta. He had travelled to Malta in pursuit of a cure for his drug 
addiction. He might have hoped for a petty colonial sinecure to defray the 
expenses of his travels. When, in January 1805, he became the acting Public 
Secretary under the Civil Commissioner, Sir Alexander Ball, he found 
himself burdened with a significant public role at the heart of government. 
Donald Sultana, in his major work Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Malta and Italy,1 
has written the fullest and most detailed general account of Coleridge’s 
life on the Island. This book, though indebted to Sultana’s study, has a 
more modest focus. It is a study of the Malta period predominantly from 
a legal and constitutional perspective. Its concern and focus is upon the 
“laws”, the legal instruments (Bandi and Avvisi), that were drafted and 
promulgated by Coleridge in his official capacity. Sultana deals with a 
selection of these, but this book aims to be a comprehensive study. These 
instruments (“Coleridge’s Laws”) are given  full descriptions and analyses, 
both critical and contextual. Their content is considered in the context 
of Maltese politics, economy and society and also of the British imperial 
ambition for the Island. This is done against the background of the Maltese 
constitution and the expectations of the  rule of law that British rule might 
have brought.
The approach has been to go to the original sources relating to these 
laws, both in Malta (at the National Library, Valletta and the National 
Archive, Rabat) and in Britain (at the National Archive). Assistance for the 
Malta part of the enquiry was given by grants from the British Academy, 
which the authors are pleased to acknowledge. Similarly, the assistance of 
the staff at the National Library and National Archive in Malta was of very 
great help, not only in identifying the texts of Coleridge’s laws but, also, in 
bringing to the authors’ attention material from the relevant period from 
which some extremely interesting evidence was obtained (see, in particular, 
1 D. Sultana, Samuel Taylor Coleridge in Malta and Italy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969).
 Preface xv
Chapter 5: public order and crime theme).
As we shall see, the British centralised model for the government in 
Malta vested supreme legislative, executive and judicial powers in the Civil 
Commissioner. The Public Secretary, whose role Coleridge assumed, served 
as the head of the Executive, and implemented the Civil Commissioner’s 
policies. The Public Secretary represented the authority of the Civil 
Commissioner in the day to day administration. The office (which had 
formally been merged with that of Treasurer in 1803) had burdensome and 
wide ranging responsibilities involving such matters as the supervision and 
direction of policy in a dozen government departments (which the Public 
Secretary also had to audit), the administration of oaths, the arbitration 
of disputes, the issue of passports, some advocacy in the Court of Vice-
Admiralty, as well as drafting the complex laws and public information 
notices which are the concern of this book. As we shall see, these instruments 
were not only used to create new law or bring some matter of importance 
to public attention but as a wider political engagement with the Maltese 
people, intended to manipulate and alter public opinion and behaviour.
Coleridge found himself in office at a critical time for the British, whose 
popularity underwent a decline as public expectations were disappointed, 
and poorly conceived policies failed. Sir Alexander Ball’s government had 
to arrest this decline or risk not achieving its primary objective – securing 
the “attachment” of the Maltese to British rule. Government information 
– propaganda – became critical to the public standing of the British 
administration and, ultimately, to the future British presence on the Island. 
How government information was communicated by Coleridge and how 
he used it to serve the dominant strategic goals of British imperial policy 
is an important matter which this book considers. As a corollary, we shall 
also explore the limited freedom Coleridge had to pursue the constitutional 
and rule of law values he had advocated in his journalism. We shall also see 
how his conceptions of political morality subordinated to British policies 
for securing Malta as a politically-stable military base. Falling outside the 
compass of this book is the fundamental question: how did Coleridge’s 
troubled experiences of government inform and enrich his later literary 
and philosophical work? It is, however, hoped that this book together with 
the first comprehensive translations into English of the Bandi and Avvisi 
will be of value to scholars in this respect. 
Barry Hough and Howard Davis January 2010
xvi Coleridge’s Laws
Introduction 
Coleridge and the Rule 
of Law 
by Michael John Kooy
Coleridge and law? Of all the professions Coleridge had dealings with 
during the course of his life – poetry, divinity, journalism, education, 
medicine – he had least patience with law. Though, as a young man, he 
once contemplated taking up law,1 and later regretted not having done so,2 
he tended to regard law as a profession driven by an anti-metaphysical 
bias,3 a prejudice that acquaintances like the jurists James Mackintosh and 
John Stoddart probably did little to dispel (Henry Crabb Robinson, friend 
of the German Romantics and later a lawyer, was a notable exception). 
Coleridge did of course study law, but on his own. There are references 
throughout his work to Manu, Montesquieu, Blackstone, among others, 
some as early as 1794,4 and he even had a copy of the Code Napoléon (which 
he annotated). Coleridge read law as an autodidact, and often in relation 
to his other interests such as theology, in the case of Warburton’s Divine 
Legation of Moses, or politics, in relation to the several versions of the French 
constitution he liked to comment on.
What is consistently characteristic of Coleridge’s relation to law is his 
suspicion of the kind of people who write laws. A stout defender of the 
constitution and so far as we know a law-abiding subject, he nonetheless 
made it a point relentlessly to harangue British legislators, both during his 
1 CL 1, 131. 
2 CL 3, 470.
3 CL 2, 703, 861.
4 CL 1, 251.
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radical years, when such actions risked indictment, and later, when his 
respectability allowed him to get away with it. Here he is in 1814, in a letter 
to his friend and Courier editor Daniel Stuart:
... our Parliament at home, or the faction of Landholders, are mad or idEOTic. 
The Corn Law Debates are more disgraceful than even the Bullion – I again 
affirm, what I have often affirmed, that take away from the Legislature the 
Merchants & Manufacturers, & I will stand on Blackfriars or Westminster 
Bridge, & take the first 800 decently drest men that pass over, & would 
pledge my life for more intellect, more real knowledge, than is congregated 
in the two Houses.5
Like most of Coleridge’s jeux d’espirit, this comment carries with it a 
complex subtext not entirely denied by the irony of its tone: beneath the 
healthy intolerance of corruption and parliamentarians’ self-interest lies a 
cynicism about the whole process by which statute law comes into being. 
Part of Coleridge really does believe that a handful of arbitrarily chosen 
ordinary men would make better legislators than the ones currently in post.
It’s one of the ironies of biography that this fanciful selection of 
legislators from among Westminster Bridge pedestrians describes, fairly 
nearly, what had happened to him ten years earlier in Malta. Landing at the 
port in Valletta on the morning of 18 May 1804, Coleridge, decently dressed 
and English, was picked up and introduced to the Civil Commissioner, Sir 
Alexander Ball. Hampered by a vacancy high in his administration, Ball 
promptly appointed him to his administration. Within a few months of 
his arrival on the Island Coleridge was drafting and then promulgating 
statute law for the native inhabitants. It’s hard to imagine a more unlikely 
candidate for the post, or one whose prejudices so clearly pointed against 
such a task. And yet he stuck with it for nine difficult months. 
How successfully he carried out that work is the subject of this 
remarkable book. Parts of the Malta story have been told before, notably by 
Donald Sultana in his detailed study Coleridge in Malta and Italy, but never 
quite like this. The story Hough and Davis tell makes for some disturbing 
reading. There is goodwill in the governor’s palace, but also political 
naiveté, administrative incompetence, and a fairly persistent disregard for 
the rule of law. Hough and Davis’s work will change how we understand 
Coleridge’s politics and how we read his oeuvre. It will also contribute to 
how historians understand the early period of British rule in Malta.
5 CL 3, 497.
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Reading Coleridge’s Laws
But first, why has it taken until now for this story to come to light? There 
are two reasons. One is that Coleridge’s work in Malta has never yet been 
analysed from the perspective of legal and constitutional history. No doubt 
such a perspective seemed to promise little: Coleridge became a law-maker 
by chance rather than choice, and anyway had many other things on his 
mind during his Malta years. The assumption has been that he carried out 
his duties with the moderate competency of any other well-meaning senior 
administrator in the colonial civil service, within the severe limitations such 
a post entailed. Yet, as Hough and Davis point out, he was no ordinary civil 
servant. He came to the job with an uncommon knowledge of British legal 
norms, picked up in his earlier work as a leader-writer for The Morning Post. 
Also, unusually for a man in his position, he enjoyed the full confidence of 
his superior. And, given the complexity of the political and constitutional 
situation in Malta in 1805, as well as its geographical distance from London, 
the path taken by the Ball administration was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. On the contrary, Ball and Coleridge enjoyed considerable room 
for exercising independent judgement. Taking a legal and constitutional 
interest in Coleridge’s work thus opens up new territory.
The other reason for the originality of this research has to do with the 
nature of the archive. Hough and Davis base their work on six Bandi and 
fifteen Avvisi that were published, in Italian, under Coleridge’s signature as 
Public Secretary to the Royal Commission between 29 January 1805 and 2 
September 1805 . Bandi were proclamations having the force of law (i.e. new 
statutes) while Avvisi were public notices that clarified or applied already 
existing laws or administrative arrangements. The existence of these public 
documents has been no secret. Their titles are listed as an appendix in the 
second volume of Coleridge’s Notebooks, edited by Kathleen Coburn and 
published in 1961, and are commented upon both there and, at somewhat 
greater length, by Donald Sultana in Coleridge in Malta and Italy. The 
documents have always been readily available in the National Library of 
Malta. That they are now published for the first time in translation – see 
Appendix 1 to this book – is a great boon for further researchers. What 
stood in the way of making any sense of these documents has been 
the presumed absence of an archival context, the supporting material 
necessary for scholars to place these documents in a political and socio-
historical context. Famously, many of Coleridge’s own letters, notes and 
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drafts never made it back to England: they were unluckily caught up in 
the plague-infested effects of his friend Major Adye, and destroyed.6 Some 
important policy papers written by Coleridge were preserved, such as the 
imperialistic Observations on Egypt (they are now in the British Library and 
the Victoria College Library, and are published in the Bollingen edition of 
Essays on his Times) but these do not touch upon Coleridge’s role in helping 
to govern Malta. Did any relevant papers remain on Malta? Perhaps, but 
parts of Valletta had been damaged during the Second World War and 
scholars working upon this material in the immediate post-war period 
tended to assume that nothing of significance remained. There was only 
the well-known official government correspondence, preserved at the 
National Archives at Kew. Without additional, detailed archival material, 
Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi remained stubbornly unrevealing at best, and 
at worst parochial. With their concerns about wine taxes, prize money, 
criminal convictions and cartwheels, the Bandi and Avvisi seemed, to most 
scholars, embarrassingly far beneath the attention of Coleridgean genius.
The authors of Coleridge’s Laws demonstrate that this is not the case, and 
they do so with the help of an immense amount of new material that has 
been scrupulously sifted from the archives in Malta and London, much of it 
identified here for the first time. What they have discovered is that, contrary 
to scholarly consensus, the archival record does indeed contain essential 
material, enough, indeed, to reconstruct government activity, almost on a 
week by week basis, during the early years of British rule in Malta. Further, 
it allows one to pinpoint, with considerable accuracy, Coleridge’s hand 
in that activity. This is an extraordinary achievement. Coleridge’s Bandi 
and Avvisi here come to life, each proclamation and notice a calculated 
intervention in the daily lives of the Maltese people with, alarmingly, an 
often destabilising impact upon the precarious political and constitutional 
arrangements that characterised early British rule in Malta.
Here we come to the sharp end of Coleridge’s Laws. Coleridge and Ball’s 
handling of a number of key domestic government issues was sometimes 
fair, far-sighted and in accordance with British legal norms. At other times, 
though, it was none of these. I won’t repeat the details of the argument here, 
but I will summarise Hough and Davis’s three main claims:
1805 was a year of crises. Hough and Davis show that the period in 1805 
that Coleridge spent working with Ball coincided with a range of social, 
political and economic crises unanticipated by the administration, notably 
6 CL 2, 159-60.
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the severe strain upon the Island’s public finances, social unrest (against 
foreigners and the resident Jewish population), and an increasingly vocal 
group of nationalists critical of Ball.
Poor administration. Tracing in minute detail the record of Ball’s 
administration, as found in contemporary witness accounts, in Ball’s own 
reports to Whitehall, and in the subsequent assessment by historians, 
Hough and Davis argue that a number of the most serious difficulties 
encountered by the administration arose from internal weaknesses. These 
include its own poor management structures, the problematic nature of 
its domestic policies and the absence of limitations on executive power. 
Specific shortcomings include the wilful disregard of the worsening public 
finances, wastage (through lack of accountability) in public projects, the 
use of patronage to curry favour with the local elite, and less than frank 
communication with Whitehall. In nearly all of these instances, Coleridge, 
as well as Ball, was implicated.
Exploiting the law for political purposes. By the terms of the Royal 
Instructions for the civil administration of Malta of 1801, the Civil 
Commissioner acquired extraordinary powers, the implicit understanding 
being that these would only be used in exceptional circumstances and 
only in the interests of the Maltese. In what is the most important part of 
their study, Hough and Davis argue that Ball – with the active support of 
Coleridge – routinely took advantage of these powers in order to increase 
the civil commissioner’s own personal standing among the Maltese and 
to strengthen British strategic control of the Island (which, for Ball and 
Coleridge, amounted to the same thing). As evidence of this, Hough and 
Davis point to the promulgation of edicts that fail to uphold rule of law 
principles, notably the separation of executive and judicial powers and nulla 
poena sine lege (“no penalty without a law”). We learn that Ball interfered in 
court judgements, and that, through Coleridge, he issued edicts that lacked 
legal clarity and sometimes manipulated the law to favour British strategic 
interests. In other words, Ball’s governing of the Island, not just generally 
but also specifically during the period when Coleridge worked for him, 
was at times autocratic and arbitrary.
While these three claims are interrelated, the last, regarding the disregard 
for rule of law principles, is most significant, and it is this point that will, 
accordingly, remain my focus in the rest of this Introduction. 
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Judging Coleridge
What is the Rule of Law? Conventionally, the Rule of Law holds that legal 
judgements should be made according to known laws and principles 
rather than arbitrary ones. In his classic work on the subject, the English 
constitutional historian and theorist A. V. Dicey wrote that the Rule of Law 
consisted of three main principles: equality before the law; no punishment 
except in cases where the law is breached; no set of laws above the 
jurisdiction of the court.7 Though Dicey first wrote in 1885, the principles 
he described were certainly found in the previous century, notably the view 
that the executive is not above the law and should itself not interfere in 
judicial processes, and the legal maxim nulla poena sine lege. As Hough and 
Davis point out, even in pre-Reform Britain these fundamental aspects of 
the Rule of Law had the status of broadly recognised legal norms.
The evidence that Ball’s administration, during Coleridge’s tenure 
of office, acted in ways that contravened these norms seems to me 
compelling: edicts were sometimes plainly used for political, rather than 
straightforwardly legal, purposes; Ball clearly interfered in the business of 
the courts; laws were promulgated in a haphazard fashion, sometimes with 
what can only be a deliberate attempt to create confusion, or to bolster the 
image of the Civil Commissioner. I find little to dispute in the evidence that 
Hough and Davis assemble. Yet one does feel, at times, that their standard 
is very high. If the Rule of Law was fragile in British-controlled Malta in 
1805, how much more so in Napoleonic France, imperial Russia or even 
Great Britain itself. Accorded the level of scrutiny here given to Ball and 
Coleridge, few in office anywhere in Europe in 1805 would escape censure. 
But that is not quite the point. Ball’s administration is measured against 
the British legal norms of the day (not contemporary practice), and by this 
measure its actions were clearly found wanting. It also seems clear to me, 
from the evidence, that one cannot exempt Coleridge from implication in 
at least some of these actions, given the responsibilities of his post and his 
personal proximity to Ball. Indeed, perhaps even more so, as Coleridge 
came to the job with the instincts of a civilian intact, and fresh from front-
line parliamentary reporting in London. Coleridge stands exposed to the 
judgement of history in a way he never had been until now. 
Defenders of Coleridge have a great deal of circumstantial material to 
draw upon, furnished by the research of Hough and Davis. I’ll mention 
7 Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 6th Ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1902).
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what seem to me the most important points. Firstly, the British “continuity” 
policy in Malta. According to this policy, the British administration in 
Malta would continue to observe the laws and customs of the Maltese 
as they had developed under the 250-year long rule of the Knights of St 
John. That sounds liberal and enlightened, and indeed Ball did not depart 
from this policy. But the policy had unintended consequences. The Knights 
of St John had reserved to themselves, and notably to the Grand Master, 
sweeping despotic powers. Ball, in agreeing to preserve local constitutional 
arrangements, found he had inherited the powers of a feudal lord. On a 
sympathetic reading, it looks like Ball, and Coleridge with him, was 
caught in a catch-22: observe the local laws and customs (as promised to 
the Maltese in 1801) at the cost of acquiring despotic powers, or renounce 
or simply suspend those powers at the cost of abandoning commitments 
to maintaining local constitutional arrangements. From this perspective, 
the weak Rule of Law in Malta under Ball’s administration seems to have 
systemic origins and was only secondarily affected by the personalities 
involved.
Secondly, the absence of international recognition of British rule 
in Malta. The failure of Britain to secure international recognition of its 
occupation of Malta, even though it occurred with the consent of the 
Maltese, was deeply problematic not only internationally (it led, after all, 
to the breaking of the Peace of Amiens and ushered in 12 more years of 
war) but locally. Ball, though he ruled by royal proclamation in the name 
of George III (see Chapter 2), nonetheless felt the insecurity of his position. 
Never fully backed by Whitehall on the one hand, nor by the Maltese on 
the other, his administration not only lacked legitimacy, it lacked the means 
by which it might gain legitimacy. Attempts on his and Coleridge’s part to 
foster an image of benevolent paternalism, albeit by tampering with legal 
instruments, was the only way to maintain the appearance of legitimacy 
given the closure by war of all normal means. Without that appearance 
of legitimacy, the British hold upon Malta would weaken, and, with it, its 
strategic interests during wartime. It’s unlikely Ball or Coleridge could 
have come up with a better response in the circumstances.
Thirdly, Coleridge’s own unpreparedness for power. The argument here 
is that Coleridge, having left poetry and The Morning Post for the corridors 
of power, found himself confronted with tasks that were far beyond his 
level of competency and experience. He could not fully master technical 
matters and, more problematically, could not adjust appropriately to the 
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real world of politics, where everyday one must trade off principles against 
real, if limited, material benefits. At the same time, he was under immense 
perceived pressure from his supervisors (both Ball and Whitehall) to keep 
the Maltese friendly, for British strategic reasons, during a period of rapid 
French imperial expansion. In his naiveté, and distracted by ill health, he 
abandoned too much for too little in return. Ultimately, his own latent 
respect for the Rule of Law resurfaced, and he managed to get himself 
released from a disagreeable post. Part of the disgust he later expressed, 
about the way British affairs were conducted abroad,8 might have been 
directed at himself, unwittingly caught up in a political snare not of his 
own making.
These are important points. Indeed, the first two were implicitly made 
by the 1812 Royal Commission which, following Ball’s death in 1809, 
attempted to place the Island on a proper legal and commercial footing. 
(The Royal Commission praised Ball and his successor for making the 
best of a difficult constitutional situation.) But each point has its weakness. 
Detractors will point out, regarding the first, that if Ball inherited arbitrary 
power from the outgoing Knights of St John, he needn’t have exercised it 
– and yet, clearly, he did. Regarding the second point, it is true that the 
international situation was beyond anyone’s control. And yet establishing 
legitimacy while maintaining Rule of Law might still have been possible. A 
wiser governor than Ball might have attempted constitutional reform, for 
instance by establishing a form of national assembly (the Consiglio Popolare). 
Ball and Coleridge might also have communicated the problem about 
legitimacy more clearly to Whitehall, seeking guidance instead of taking 
the matter into their own hands.
Finally, regarding Coleridge’s own unpreparedness for office. This 
is indisputable, and indeed one might say that it’s remarkable that he 
achieved so much considering how temperamentally unsuited he was 
to the job. But temperament and training don’t really weigh very much 
in what is, after all, an ethical issue. Coleridge was in a position to draft 
laws within the norms of the Rule of Law and it seems that he occasionally 
used that position to do the reverse. The claim that he didn’t know what he 
was doing doesn’t convince: if Coleridge could bend the law for political 
purposes, he was certainly capable of refusing to do so. The harder issue 
is that he felt compelled by the gravity of the circumstances to do so. 
Coleridge helped to manipulate Maltese law because Britain’s strategic war 
8 CL 2, 1178.
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aims in the Mediterranean required stable government on the Island, at 
whatever short-term cost to the local constitution and the Rule of Law. This 
reasoning is based upon a distinction between the ethical and the political 
that is sanctioned by so-called “realist” schools of political thought. It 
seems, however, out of keeping with the broadly Platonist orientation 
of Coleridge’s own political philosophy. Taken together with occasional 
expressions of jingoism and militant imperialism at this time, Coleridge’s 
willingness to assist in weakening the Rule of Law on Malta, for whatever 
perceived higher good, constitutes a disturbing departure from the liberal 
idealism he espoused both before and after.
Placing Malta in Coleridge’s Career
But what kind of departure? This brings us to the question of how Hough 
and Davis’s findings impact upon our understanding of Coleridge’s career 
and, more broadly, early nineteenth-century British colonial policy and 
practice.
Regarding the former, the Malta period must, surely, now be taken 
much more seriously than hitherto. Coleridge called it one of the most 
instructive periods of his life,9 but commentators have tended to regard 
that as an overstatement. That, now, appears to have been a mistake. We 
may not share Coleridge’s assessment of this period (the sympathetic “Life 
of Ball’ in The Friend appears to be even more of a projected fiction given 
Hough and Davis’s research) but we must share his sense of its significance.
Part of that significance relates, straightforwardly, to political 
commitment. The new details offered to us by Coleridge’s Laws, in particular 
Coleridge’s willingness to subordinate Rule of Law to British strategic 
interests show that his conservatorism could and did take an authoritarian 
form. The gradualism and nationalism of the first edition of The Friend 
(1809-1810) and of the Courier journalism (1809-1817) have their roots not 
only in Coleridge’s liberal critique of revolution in the 1798-1799 Morning 
Post essays, as many commentators suggest, but also in the authoritarism 
that first expressed itself in Malta in 1805. This may also sharpen the charge 
of apostasy.
Historically, questions about Coleridge’s integrity have focused upon 
his opium addiction, plagiarism and political apostasy. These debates have 
9 The Friend, ed. Barbara Rooke, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1969), 1, 533. Hereafter referred to as The Friend.
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now largely played themselves out and moral opprobrium has diminished 
accordingly. Opium addition is now generally regarded as a medical rather 
than moral issue; plagiarism, now that originality is no longer regarded as 
a Romantic virtue, is no longer as ethically suspect as it once was; apostasy 
is less transparently disreputable. These debates reveal more about the 
culture that sponsored them than about Coleridge’s integrity per se. Does 
our early twenty–first-century disappointment in his poor handling of 
Maltese legal and constitutional issues reveal, in the end, more about our 
own democratic aspirations than about Coleridge’s personal integrity?
Elsewhere I have critiqued the narrowness of reading Coleridge only 
in terms of the politics of left and right, as well as the commonplace 
insistence upon a narrative of political apostasy, which I have argued is 
both reductive and self-righteous.10 A richer understanding of Coleridge’s 
Malta experience requires a broader historical view. I’d like to suggest one 
such view regarding the Rule of Law.
The Rule of Law is, conventionally, held up as a protection against 
arbitrary government. In a legal system where all citizens are equal before 
the law, and can be punished only when the law is broken, the scope for 
arbitrary rule is severely limited. Such a formalist conception of the Rule 
of Law says nothing, however, about the justice of the laws themselves. 
Strictly speaking, an unjust law protects against arbitrary government 
as well as a just one, the only requirement being that it be scrupulously 
administered by the authorities. The Rule of Law, thus formally conceived, 
is, in fact, compatible with the worst forms of state oppression, indeed, can 
be a necessary condition of that oppression, and an amplifier of it. For this 
reason, Rule of Law theorists have often referred to the supplementary 
need for institutions to review and, if necessary, modify laws, guided 
by constitutional tradition and natural justice.11 In cases where these 
institutions are absent, not functioning, or themselves suspect, the appeal 
to justice may take place explicitly outside the Rule of Law. Thus, both the 
secular radical tradition, from Marx to Mao, as well as religious traditions, 
such as Protestant antinomianism (drawing upon Calvin’s thoughts on 
rebellion against unjust rulers in his Institutes) and, more recently, Catholic 
political theology, reserve to themselves the right to reject the Rule of Law, 
10 ‘Coleridge as Editor: The Watchman and The Friend’, The Oxford Handbook of 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Frederick Burwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 144-64. 
11 Paul Craig, “Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Ana-
lytical Framework’, Public Law, 33 (1997), 467–87.
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in order to achieve justice where the Rule of Law denies it.
The severing of justice from the Rule of Law is something that worried 
Coleridge throughout his career. It emerges clearly in his work as a radical 
journalist and lecturer, when he complained in the Watchman that simply 
to speak on certain subjects, such as imagining the king’s death, was 
actionable under new treason laws. But also later, in his life-long cynicism 
regarding the self-interested workings of the British parliament, referred to 
at the start of this essay. Perhaps most characteristically, it comes out in his 
suspicion that the equitable application of statute law was no protection 
from injustice. The case of the young Irish nationalist and radical Robert 
Emmett, tried for treason and executed in September 1803, was particularly 
revealing for Coleridge in this regard. Emmett was, for Coleridge, an image 
of his younger radical self and hardly deserved to pay for his radicalism 
with his life.12 He wrote to his friends the Beaumonts in October 1803: 
“poor young Emmett! O if our Ministers had saved him, had taken his Oath 
& word of honor, to have remained in America or some of our Colonies for 
the next 10 years of his Life, we might have had in him a sublimely great 
man”.13 In the case of Emmett, justice would have been served precisely by 
not applying equitably the full measure of the law. Sometimes the blind 
application of the law brings injustice. 
Another example is Coleridge’s response to the Corn Laws of 1815, 
which aimed to protect domestic agricultural production in the face of 
cheaper grain imports. Coleridge suspected – rightly, as it turned out – 
that the underlying causes of the economic distress were deeper than a 
single statute law ever could amend, and disparaged the attempt as an 
“elixir”.14 An example of legislation Coleridge supported suggests the same 
point. Robert Peel’s 1819 Act for the Regulation of Cotton Mills and Factories 
prohibited children under the age of nine years from work, and restricted 
those over that age to working 12 hours per day. Coleridge supported it 
on moral grounds, and because its modest economic and social goals were 
achievable by law.15 More ambitious improvements in social, political and 
economic conditions could only come about through gradual alterations 
in the vast terrain of collective ethical and religious life that statute law, 
12 See Timothy Webb, ‘Coleridge and Robert Emmet: Reading the Text of Irish 
Revolution’, Irish Studies Review, 8: 3 (2000), 304-24. 
13 CL 2, 1002-3.
14 CL 4, 565.
15 The pamphlets are reprinted in S. T. Coleridge, Shorter Works and Fragments, ed. 
H. J. Jackson and J. R. de J. Jackson, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995).
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because it is written by human beings touched by original sin (here is 
Coleridge’s Augustinianism), cannot, and, therefore, ought not, interfere 
with directly.
To the extent that Coleridge had a philosophy of law, it lies here, in his 
minimalist conception of statute law as a necessary but blunt instrument 
to contain the worst of human behaviour rather than as a favoured means 
of engineering social or ethical improvement. An 1814 letter to Daniel 
Stuart, perhaps Coleridge’s clearest statement of his view on normative 
jurisprudence, is worth quoting at length:
The view, which our Laws take of robbery and even murder, not as Guilt of 
which God alone is presumed to be the Judge, but as Crimes, depriving the 
King of one of his Subjects, rendering dangerous and abating the value of the 
King’s High-ways, &c, may suggest some notion of my meaning. Jack, Tom, 
and Harry have no existence in the eye of Law, except as included in some 
form or other of the permanent Property of the Realm — just as on the other 
Hand Religion has nothing to do with ranks, estates, or offices; but exerts 
itself wholly on what is personal — viz. our Souls, Consciences, and the 
morality of our actions as opposed to mere Legality. ... Human Jurisprudence 
wisely aware of it’s own weakness & sensible how incommensurate it’s 
powers are with so vast an object, as the Well-being of Individuals as 
Individuals ... knows nothing of Persons other than as Proprietors, Officiaries, 
Subjects. ... Guided by this spirit our ancestors repealed the Puritan Law, by 
which Adultery was to be punished with Death, & brought it back to a civil 
Damage — So too, actions for Seduction. — Not that the Judge or Legislator 
did not feel the guilt of such crimes; but that the Law knows nothing about 
Guilt —. So in the Exchequer common Debts are sued for on the plea, that 
the Creditor is less able to pay our Lord the King — &c &c —. Now contrast 
with this the Preamble to the first French Constitution, and I think, my 
meaning will become more intelligible — that the pretence of considering 
Persons not States, Happiness not Property, always has ended & always will 
end in making a new State or Corporation infinitely more oppressive than 
the former — and in which the real freedom of Persons is as much less, as 
the things interfered with are more numerous & more minute.16 
This is a conservative position. But, complexly, it is a conservatism that 
retains an allegiance to early Christian anarchism. The law’s relation to 
society is to act upon its margins, leaving untouched, at the centre, a self-
regulating collective. Coherent with this position is Coleridge’s defence of 
the Anglican settlement. The Church, in the widest sense of the term (lay 
members, clergy, tradition), was a institution expressive of that collective, 
16 CL 3, 537-38.
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a view Coleridge defended in a letter to his brother in 180217 and in 
remarkably similar terms in his 1829 On the Constitution of Church and State. 
The Church can have progressive social influence precisely because it is 
national by virtue of the constitution, and not by favour of the government.
What happened in Malta was a betrayal of this concept of jurisprudence. 
Coleridge was probably right in thinking that the Rule of Law on the 
Island had already been deeply compromised by the legacy of the Knights 
of St John (as he implied in The Friend). But he was wrong to correct the 
situation by taking matters into his own hands. He helped extend the 
arbitrary powers of his patron and manipulated statute law to achieve 
desired political and social ends, in both cases anticipating Carl Schmitt’s 
grim aperçu that sovereignty in a state lies with the one who can suspend 
the normal functioning of law. But as my comments have tried to suggest, 
Coleridge’s Malta experience was a betrayal not so much of the formalist 
conception of the Rule of Law, but, more profoundly, of his own conservative 
conception of the power and self-regulating potential of people acting and 
living collectively. That Coleridge later in life became, in spite of his Malta 
experience, an influential articulator of the constitutional tradition is the 
longer-lasting mark of his genius and the better test of his moral integrity.
There are other ways that this book will have an impact upon our 
conception of Coleridge’s work as well as topics wider afield. While 
constitutional and political matters are, probably, of the first significance, 
we will want to consider the relationship of his legal work to the writing 
of poetry, to the fluctuations in health (Hough and Davis make interesting 
forays into both these areas), and to the other, more widely recognised, 
aspect of the Malta period, Coleridge’s first-hand discovery of the art and 
literature of southern Europe. 
There is also the contribution to British colonial studies. The book’s 
analysis makes plain the fundamental antinomy of the colonial encounter. 
Colonisers occupy territory out of their own interests, and yet the appearance 
of a contiguity of interests must continually be maintained, such that both 
parties believe in it. This is no less the case in territories held by formal 
consent, such as Malta. Early Maltese history has, sometimes, been held 
back by the lack of detailed, archive-based studies. It is now enriched by 
this book’s lavish attention to detail, much of it seeing light for the first time.
17 CL 2, 806.
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Introduction
In 1809, when Coleridge was prompted to write about Malta, by the death 
of Sir Alexander Ball, the Civil Commissioner whom he so much admired, 
he concluded that he regarded his stay on the Island “in many respects, the 
most memorable and instructive period of [his] life”.2 This assessment, no 
doubt, justified the hazards that he had ventured in making this difficult 
expedition, especially when its primary purpose – the pursuit of a cure 
for his addiction – seemed publicly to have failed. Sultana, who regarded 
Coleridge as distracted in public office and overly introspective, articulated 
the kind of criticism that perhaps Coleridge wished to pre-empt.3 But, 
Coleridge’s decision to make the journey poses important questions. Why 
did he choose to make an extended visit to Malta of more than a year? The 
decision to remove himself, travelling alone, to such a distant place, far 
from his family, his friends, and his Lake District residence, needs to be 
explained. 
This chapter fulfils three aims. First, we shall trace the labyrinthine 
complexities in his family life and career in order to understand what led 
him to seek this self-imposed exile abroad; secondly, we shall touch upon 
aspects of his authorial career, most notably his political journalism, to 
1 K. Coburn, The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge 1804-1808 (New York: Bol-
lingen, 1961), 2, 1992. Hereafter referred to as CN. Coleridge grimly recorded some 
epitaphs of deceased soldiers after reaching Portsmouth at the end of March 1804. 
The voyage to Valletta would commence as soon as the adverse wind altered direc-
tion. This epitaph recorded that the “Battle of Self in the conquest of sin” was the 
“hardest engagement that [the deceased] was ever in”.
2 S. T. Coleridge, ‘The Friend’, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
general editor Kathleen Coburn, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Bollingen Se-
ries, 1969, vol 1, 533. Hereafter The Friend. Comments made whilst still in public 
office were, however, less enthusiastic: see e.g. To Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, Griggs, 
E.L., Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 6 vols., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1956- 71, vol 2, 1167. Hereafter CL 2.
3 See Sultana, xviii-x.
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indicate the views he expressed on constitutional principle and political 
morality before taking office. This background is important in assessing 
what Coleridge would bring to public office and helps us to understand 
his achievement. Finally, we shall explore his public roles in Malta, 
first as Under-Secretary, and, subsequently, as Public Secretary in the 
administration of Sir Alexander Ball. 
The Journey to Valletta 
“[P]erfect Tranquillity in a genial Climate”.4
The background to Coleridge’s Malta period is poignant. Loss of self-esteem 
as a poet, a problematic, asymmetric relationship with his collaborator, 
William Wordsworth, marital disharmony, declining health and an alarming 
drug addiction led him, at the age of thirty-one, to seek either death or 
renaissance abroad. Should he have recovered his health – for which 
the defeat of addiction was a sine qua non – he could return to England 
to pursue a literary career: if he failed, he could expire, almost unnoticed, 
amidst strangers on a distant Island, veiled in obscurity and far from public 
scrutiny. His reputation, and the good name of his family, might then be 
largely untarnished. Of these two possible outcomes, Coleridge may have 
hoped for the former, but he certainly expected the latter.5 The decision to 
leave England may have been dominated by his desire to pursue a cure, but 
this expedition was, perhaps, only possible because of the complexity and 
dilemmas associated with his close personal and professional relationships.
Seditionist
Coleridge’s early reputation had been earned as a political firebrand who 
interested himself, somewhat dangerously, in radical politics. The French 
Revolution had destroyed France’s former political and social order, 
replacing it with entirely pristine structures that even extended to the 
calendar. All social and political institutions were to be re-fashioned, as if 
no trace of the ancien regime deserved to be continued. Coleridge’s political 
and economic thought was stimulated by the reactionary forces all around 
him.
4 To Matthew Coates, postmark 8 December 1803, CL 2, 1021.
5 To William Sotheby, 27 March 1804, CL 2, 1106; see also to Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 1 
April 1804, CL 2, 1115.
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The philosophical energy underpinning the Revolution was responsible 
for a new conception of liberty based upon a vision of society in which 
all would be equal and where freedom was created and protected by the 
laws. According to this view, individual freedom flowed from, and was 
defined by, the state. Behind the ensuing war with France, from 1793, was 
the British determination to protect its rival conception of liberty, rooted in 
property and commerce, in which the main task of the state was to ensure 
peace and social stability. Individual freedom was comprised in all that 
which the law had not prohibited and not what the State cared to bestow. 
This contest of ideas immediately divided English intellectual opinion. 
In his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) Edmond Burke denounced 
the Revolution. He advocated a co-operative relationship between groups 
in society – the political élites and the less advantaged – in the belief that 
sudden constitutional upheaval risked destroying much of what was 
valued. It was an argument for continuity. 
Thomas Paine’s response, The Rights of Man (1791-1792), was founded 
upon the argument that it is the right of each generation to establish its 
own forms of government. Far from establishing peace and good order, 
governments that used force to perpetuate an unequal social and political 
system often destroyed it. He argued for equal political rights for all 
persons, since this was the natural state of all men, and a programme of 
social reform to address the plight of the poor. 
Joseph Priestley, a scientist, Unitarian and philosopher, published similar 
arguments advocating political reform6 – only he took the further, and 
dangerous step, of establishing a “Constitution Society”, in Birmingham, 
to advocate the reform of Parliament.7 Its inaugural dinner, held somewhat 
auspiciously on Bastille Day 1791, attracted a mob of “anti-Jacobins” who 
pelted the diners with mud and stones. The windows in the hotel were 
then smashed.8 Urged on by local Tories, comprising local justices of the 
peace, clergy and local landlords, the mob attacked and burned Priestley’s 
house, destroying his laboratory, his books and manuscripts and forcing 
him to flee, first to London but, ultimately, to the United States. The 
wave of organised violence resulted in the destruction of twenty-seven 
6 A Political Dialogue on the General Principles of Government, 1791. 
7 Coleridge had paid a fulsome tribute to Priestley (“patriot and saint and sage”) 
in his major poem Religious Musings, lines 371-6. Priestly (sic) was also the subject 
of a sonnet first published in the Morning Chronicle in December 1794. At one point, 
it seemed possible that Priestley might join Coleridge and his fellow Pantisocrats in 
America: see letter to Robert Southey, 1 September 1794, CL 1, 98.
8 Uglow, 440-1. 
4 Coleridge’s Laws
properties – all belonging to like-minded local intellectuals and reformers. 
Its slogan, chalked on the walls of Birmingham, was resounding: “No 
philosophers-Church and King For Ever”. According to Uglow, polemics 
and empirical science alike were tainted: “This, “ she wrote, “ was a 
riot against intellectualism, and its abiding image is of book burning”.9 
Inexorably, reform and revolution came to be seen as synonymous. And 
the Establishment was ready to fight back. The Edinburgh lawyer, Thomas 
Muir was sentenced to fourteen years transportation simply for advocating 
parliamentary reform. As far as the authorities were concerned, this was 
just the beginning. 
This was the turbulent context to Coleridge’s undergraduate years at 
Cambridge University. Together with Robert Southey – another progressive 
undergraduate – he considered removing himself from a conservative, 
reactionary Britain. With others, they would emigrate to America to form 
an ideal self-governing commune of “Pantisocrats”, sharing property and 
labour. The scheme eventually foundered but, whilst the possibilities of 
an ideal society were still under discussion, Coleridge left his University 
to undertake a walking tour of Wales. It was on this tour that he was 
exposed to the fervent, popular denunciation of political radicals. He 
was witnessing a flux of British public opinion toward conservatism.10 
At one inn, as a response to Coleridge’s “preaching of Pantisocracy and 
Asphetrism” a perplexed, burly, Welshman “called for a large Glass of 
Brandy, and drank off ….his own Toast-God save the King”. Coleridge 
with unabashed revolutionary sentiment wrote to Southey: “..may he be 
the Last”!11 Elsewhere on his travels, Coleridge was patronised as a “open-
hearted honest-speaking Fellow, tho’…a bit of a Democrat”.12 This reference 
to his politics suggested to him that, as far as his audiences were concerned, 
his opinions had fewer endearing qualities than his openness and honesty. 
Another enriching experience, for a young poet fresh from University, 
exposed him to the true state of the less privileged. Whilst he was about 
to dine at an inn, a young mother, bearing a “half-famished sickly baby”, 
intruded upon his meal by begging for food. Coleridge, rather pompously, 
claimed to have been annoyed by the intrusion, but he fully understood 
that what was on trial was not the conduct of the individual but the unequal 
social and political system that led, for so many, to paupery and starvation. 
9 Uglow, 448.
10 CL 1, 40; Holmes (1989) 44.
11 To Southey, 13 July 1794, CL 1, 85.
12 To Southey, ibid. at 98.
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Coleridge’s response to a similarly bifurcated society, on Malta, will be 
considered in the ensuing chapters.
One of his most powerful interventions was the delivery of three 
controversial lectures on political and religious themes, at Bristol, in 1795. 
In these, whilst renouncing, on moral and religious grounds, the violence 
practised in France, he associated himself with the democratic cause, 
and, particularly, with well-known radicals some of whom were tried for 
treason for their reformist principles. The public lectures took place at a 
time when the authorities had no scruples about seizing and detaining 
articulate political opponents. Such advocates of Parliamentary reform as 
Thomas Hardy, John Horne Tooke, John Thelwall13, Bonney, Joyce, Kyd, and 
Holcroft14 were each arrested and detained for high treason. Coleridge’s 
courageous campaign for social and political renewal was far from being 
risk free; indeed, after receiving death threats, he seems to have abandoned 
the lecture series.15 By then he had made his stand, but in doing so he had 
acquired the reputation as a young man “shamefully hot with Democratic 
rage as regards politics”.16 
In Malta, it would be a different story as Coleridge supported the Civil 
Commissioner in criminal trials arising from anti-Semitic disturbances. 
Even before Coleridge held public office on Malta, his commitment to 
popular suffrage had undoubtedly cooled as his political leaders, written 
for The Morning Post, revealed.17 
“Fire, Famine and Slaughter”
In January 1798 he published, pseudonymously, in The Morning Post, the 
poem Fire, Famine and Slaughter in which the three personifications of the 
poem explain that they have been sent to do work of misery by an individual 
13 John Thelwall was, of course, known and respected by Coleridge. He was a 
guest at Nether Stowey in July 1797. Fruitless efforts were made to find a cottage 
that he might rent in the vicinity.
14 Holcroft seems to have known Coleridge: see Holmes (1989), 84.
15 He was forced to publish the first lecture as a pamphlet in order to demonstrate 
that there was nothing treasonable about its contents: Letter to George Dyer. CL 1, 
152. A fourth lecture appears to have been planned, but threats to his life prevented 
him from delivering it: ibid. 
16 Sandford,Thomas Poole and His Friends, quoted in Lefebure (1977), 137.
17 See e.g., D. V. Erdman (ed.), Essays on His Times in ‘The Morning Post’ and ‘The 
Courier’, in The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, volumes, 3: 1-3 (General 
Editor: Kathleen Coburn) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 1, 32, 7, De-
cember 1799. Hereafter referred to as EOT.
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whose name is unspeakable. Somewhat dangerously, given the nervous 
political climate, Coleridge’s personifications of fire, famine and slaughter, 
each confide that “Letters four do form his name”. It was, of course, open 
to the readers to infer that the architect of the catastrophic evils, depicted in 
the poem, was none other than the Prime Minister, William Pitt the younger. 
This was all the more likely since Coleridge’s public position on the subject, 
Pitt, was already well-known: he had contributed a “vehement” sonnet on 
the Prime Minister to the Morning Chronicle in 1794.
In his maturity, Coleridge was to distance himself from some of the 
more inflammatory interpretations of this work. When, in 1817, in Sibylline 
Leaves, he republished the poem he did so with an explanation by way of an 
“Apologetic Preface”. His argument was that a passionate protagonist may 
be a passive one and that vivid poetic imagery provided for the venting of 
the passions by acting as a safety valve to release excess. Imagining Pitt’s 
death, he argued, virtually precluded realising Pitt’s demise. Danger, he 
thought, lay in cold-blooded reasoning, not heated utterances. 18
The Wordsworths and the “Dear Gutter of Stowey”19
Coleridge’s friendship with the Wordsworths was, at first, mutually 
fulfilling and supportive. In time, the bonds between them attenuated. The 
weakening bond played its role in Coleridge’s willingness to travel alone 
to Malta.
Coleridge and Wordsworth had met briefly, and had begun to notice 
each others’ work, in Bristol in late 1795. Coleridge soon concluded that 
Wordsworth was “the best poet of the age”.20 However, the unsatisfactory 
dynamic of the Coleridge/Wordsworth friendship and collaboration 
ultimately exerted a detrimental influence both upon Coleridge’s creative 
capacity, and his sense of identity as a poet. 
Following his alarming experiences in Bristol, Coleridge now sought 
a more secluded life in which he could devote himself to poetry. At the 
close of 1796, he settled with his family in a damp, mice-plagued, cottage 
18 See Barrell, Fire, Famine and Slaughter is discussed as an epilogue. However, 
as Barrell explains the argument depends entirely on Coleridge’s conception of the 
imagination.
19 To T. Poole 29 [28] May 1796, CL 1, 217, “Dear Gutter of Stowey (sic)! Were I 
transported to Italian Plains, and lay by the side of a streamlet which murmured 
thro’ an orange grove, I would think of thee, dear Gutter of Stowy, and wish that I 
were poring on thee!”
20 To John Thelwall, 13 May 1796, CL 1, 215-6.
 The Battle of Self 7
in the main street of Nether Stowey, Somerset, by which time Wordsworth 
and his sister, Dorothy, were living, rent-free, at Racedown Lodge, Dorset. 
A visit by Coleridge to Racedown the following June, was a profoundly 
significant moment in the lives of each of them. 
Coleridge remained with the Wordsworths for more than a fortnight, 
reading and discussing their respective poetry and dramatic works. Each 
of the poets had a profound effect upon the other; and Coleridge regarded 
Dorothy as “exquisite”. He wrote to Joseph Cottle, his publisher, that 
“her taste (is) a perfect electrometer – it bends, protrudes, and draws in at 
subtlest beauties and most recondite faults”.21 She was a woman true to the 
romantic beau ideal of the child of nature. Dorothy would describe Coleridge 
as fluent, intelligent and sensitive to his surroundings. She proclaimed that 
he had a “conversation that teems with soul, mind and spirit…he is so 
benevolent, so good tempered and cheerful”.22 
Coleridge heaped critical praise upon Wordsworth’s work. The chemistry 
of the relationship at this early stage had a deep, energising effect upon 
Coleridge’s imaginative life. A bond of mutual enchantment was formed 
that each poet wished to continue. Coleridge drove the Wordsworths 
back to his cottage in Stowey, where they remained for a fortnight. They 
impulsively determined to give up Racedown – Dorothy never returned 
to it. Thomas Poole, the “democrat” tanner whose yard was adjacent to the 
cottage, and who had assisted the Coleridges find their cottage, now did 
the same for the Wordsworths. Within a couple of weeks of their arrival in 
the area they were settled at Alfoxden House (now Alfoxton Park Hotel), 
near Holford, just three miles from Coleridge’s cottage. 
Coleridge and the Wordsworths enjoyed a nonpareil summer, out of 
doors, walking the Quantock Hills, gazing down, from the hill-tops, upon 
the sea, taking pleasure in the white sails of the ships that made their passage 
up and down the Channel from Bristol. Whether entertaining such political 
radicals as John Thelwall,23 wandering at night under the moon with the 
Wordsworths or dining in the open air under the broad-leafed trees of 
Alfoxden Park, Coleridge’s poetic imagination fed upon observations and 
endless, inquiring conversations. He experienced a heightened response 
21 To Joseph Cottle, circa 3 July 1797, CL 1, 195. 
22 To Mary Hutchinson (?) June 1797, De Selincourt, 188-9.
23 Thelwall arrived on 17 July 1797 after having walked from London. Earlier 
he had been arrested and tried under the Treasonable Practices Act 1794, but was 
acquitted at trial. With the intention of retreating from London and retiring from 
active political life he briefly considered settling with his family near Coleridge.
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to the landscape: the Quantocks, for example, supplied the topography 
for “This Lime Tree Bower”. Critics have commented upon how the shared 
experience of the three writers enriched their work. Coleridge’s imagery 
may, for example, have benefited from what they witnessed on their walks. 
The “restless gossameres” of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner may have 
been discovered together, and possibly found an alternative imaginative 
interpretation in Dorothy’s journal.24 Similarly, the “(t)he one red leaf, the 
last of its clan” that appeared in Christabel might have resulted from the joys 
of shared observation.25 Livingstone Lowes described these as “moments of 
exalted perception” from which each drew pleasure and inspiration.26 
Coleridge’s wife, Sara Coleridge, stood apart from these new friendships. 
She was left to take charge of Hartley, the Coleridge’s first-born child, and 
had to bear the brunt of menial and arduous house work. She began to 
tire of the Wordsworths and the manner in which they treated her.27 Sara’s 
reaction to being left at home when pregnant with Berkeley, the Coleridge’s 
second child, is easily imagined. 
Coleridge’s best known works, Khubla Khan and The Rime of the Ancient 
Mariner, were composed at this productive time. The Ancient Mariner 
was originally conceived as a collaborative work between the two poets. 
Although Wordsworth is likely to have suggested some of the imagery, he 
soon removed himself from the project on the grounds of artistic differences, 
leaving Coleridge to complete the poem early in 1798. As we shall see, 
Wordsworth’s response to Coleridge’s tour de force was, subsequently, to 
contribute to Coleridge’s loss of self-assurance and declining morale.
Nevertheless, all this lay in the future. Coleridge continued to ride the 
wave of his annus mirabilis. The great collaborative volume of the Lyrical 
Ballads, written with Wordsworth, appeared in 1798. On the whole, the 
poems were well-received, but, in an anonymous attack in the Critical 
Review, Southey (Coleridge’s brother in law) was highly dismissive of the 
Ancient Mariner. He condemned it as a poem of little merit. The real damage 
24 The “surface (of the heath) restless and glittering with the motion of the scat-
tered piles of withered grass and the waving of the spiders’ threads”. Knight, (ed.), 
Wordsworth, 8.
25 D. Wordsworth, ibid. recorded on 7 March 1798: “One only leaf upon the top 
of a tree-the sole remaining leaf-danced round and round like a rag blown by the 
wind”. Cf. Christabel, I, 49.
26 Livingstone Lowes, 191.
27 De Quincey, Works II, 64-5. It seems that Dorothy Wordsworth, when her own 
clothes were soaked after walking in the rain, would simply borrow Sara’s without 
asking her permission. 
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inflicted by Southey would emerge two years later when the second edition 
was in preparation.
Germany
Coleridge had long entertained an ambition to study at a German University, 
and the opportunity to do so arose following the offer of a life-time annuity 
by the Wedgewood brothers, Josiah and Thomas. His plan was to study 
German literature and write a life of Lessing. The Wordsworths agreed to 
accompany Coleridge on this adventure, although the party eventually 
separated when William and Dorothy chose to winter in Goslar. Sara 
Coleridge, who was by now nursing Berkley, was again excluded and 
remained in England on practical grounds. It was, however, suggested that 
she might join the party later, once it was established in Germany, if it could 
be afforded, and when the baby was old enough to make the journey.
During Coleridge’s absence, first at Ratzeburg and, subsequently, at 
Göttingen University, Sara endured a miserable time: she fell ill and then 
had to nurse her children through illness. Worse was to come. In February 
1799, Berkeley died. Such was her grief that Sara’s hair fell out, and she was 
obliged to wear a wig for the remainder of her life. 
Their family friend and neighbour, Tom Poole, persuaded Sara that 
Coleridge should, so far as possible, be prevented from receiving bad news 
as it would distract him from his studies. This injunction further isolated 
the grieving woman. Eventually, she succumbed to her instinctive need 
to communicate news of their bereavement to her husband. On 24 March 
1799, she wrote Coleridge a long, grief-stricken letter. It sought Coleridge’s 
return to his family: “Hartley…talks of his father every day….if you will 
try to come to us soon”. 
But Coleridge did not return immediately; indeed, for reasons that are 
not altogether clear, he seems to have procrastinated by taking a walking 
tour in the Harz mountains. Sara came to regard this behaviour with some 
bitterness. He remained in Germany for several more months; and when he 
eventually returned to Nether Stowey, in July 1799, husband and wife were 
soon in conflict.28 His health also deteriorated.29
Coleridge’s closest and most important professional relationship 
also came under strain at this period. During their stay in Germany, the 
28 To Southey, 29 July 1799, CL 1, 523.
29 Ibid.
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Wordsworths, who suffered from powerful homesickness, began to think 
of returning to their native country in the North of England.30 When they 
landed in England they went to stay with relatives at Gallow Hill, Sockburn-
on-Tees, rather than returning, with Coleridge, to Somerset. 
The Lake District
Once back in the small family home in Nether Stowey, Coleridge appears 
to have been restless and unable to settle. In September, the household was 
disrupted, and, worse still, stank of sulphur when Hartley was thought 
to have succumbed to scabies, then known as the “Itch”.31 Sara was 
forced to work herself to exhaustion fumigating, washing and scrubbing. 
Her emotional state only drew adverse comments from Coleridge, who 
reported her “hypersuperlative Grief”.32 Meanwhile, he withdrew from 
the furore, leaving her, it seems, to cope without the aid of a servant on her 
own. He wrote of himself, apparently without shame, “I however, sunk in 
Spinoza, remain as undisturbed as a Toad on a rock”. 33
Despite his ostensible tranquillity, Coleridge soon removed himself 
from Stowey. He pretended to Sara, no doubt to reconcile her to yet another 
absence, that he would travel to Bristol to locate his luggage because this 
had not yet reached him from Germany. This pretext probably disguised 
his ultimate purpose of visiting the Wordsworths. Sara did not hear directly 
from Coleridge that he had travelled from Bristol to join them in the North; 
indeed she did not hear from him for six weeks. 
Coleridge’s visit was propitious: he met Sara Hutchinson – soon to 
become “Asra”– with whom he was, subsequently, to fall in love; and he 
witnessed for the first time, whilst on a walking tour with Wordsworth, 
the impressive tarns, fells and Lakes of Cumbria. It was on this tour that 
Wordsworth discovered “Dove Cottage”, Town End, Grasmere. Shortly 
afterwards, in December 1799, he and Dorothy moved in and settled there. 
Some of Wordsworth’s finest poetry would be written whilst he resided in 
the cottage (until 1808); and it was here that Dorothy wrote her sensitive 
“Grasmere Journals”. If the literary partnership with Coleridge was to 
continue, it would only do so in the North. Wordsworth had finally bid his 
30 DW CL 1, 105.
31 To Southey, 30 September 1799, CL 1, 534. Coleridge also reported that this 
diagnosis was probably inaccurate.
32 To Southey, 25 September 1799, CL 1, 530.
33 Ibid at 533.
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farewell to the West Country. 
Coleridge now planned to move with his family to live in the Lake 
District in order to be close to the Wordsworths. Mrs Coleridge was, at first, 
reluctant to relocate so far from the support of her family and friends, most 
notably their stalwart neighbour, Thomas Poole, whose practical assistance 
had been of real value, especially whilst Coleridge had been abroad.34 
She must also have been cautious about going so far to reside near to the 
Wordsworths whom she now regarded with some hostility. The decision 
to move away must have been another gritty and aggravating difference 
between the couple.
Special Parliamentary Correspondent and 
Commentator 
After this first visit to the Lakes, Coleridge committed himself to earning 
money as a political leader-writer, special parliamentary correspondent35 
and critic for The Morning Post – a paper generally unsympathetic to 
ministerial policies. In his parliamentary role, he seems to have been given 
the freedom to report upon that which intrigued him as significant and 
newsworthy. But this was only a part of his duties. In a five month period, 
between December 1799 and April 1800, he penned some forty leading 
articles, verses and other miscellaneous materials at a time when one of 
the major national policy dilemmas was whether to continue the hostilities 
against France.36
Overtures inviting negotiation had been received from the French: 
but the British government summarily rejected this initiative. Ministers 
were then compelled to give a public explanation of their reasons for 
continuing the struggle. In a series of incisive articles, Coleridge mounted 
a persuasive case that the Government’s arguments were flawed.37 The 
French Government, acting under the new constitution may have been 
a “Usurpation”, “Despotism” and “Tyranny”,38 but it was no longer a 
34 See e.g., Sara to George Coleridge, 10 September 1800, quoted in Lefebure 
(1986), 127.
35 See D. Erdman cited in Hesell. Coleridge, who is thought to have been given a 
greater freedom than others by his editor, was arguably more faithful to the original 
than some of his rivals who focused on more “newsworthy” material, selected ac-
cording to idiosyncratic political prejudices.
36 Lefebure (1977), 305.
37 EOT, 1, 64, 69, 73, 2-4 January 1800.
38 Ibid., 4 January 1800, 73.
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threat to neighbouring States. The “French principles” of liberty, equality, 
and democracy had lost their allure in an England that had witnessed 
the regicide, blood-letting and tyranny in France. In short, France could 
not now de-stabilise the British legal, political and constitutional order. 
Powerful, reasoned and effective journalism of this kind must have added 
to the widespread clamour to hold the British government to account for its 
rejection of the French overtures – all the more so as Coleridge portrayed 
these two French approaches as patient, dignified and respectful in the face 
of British ministerial obstinacy and reproach.39 
The widespread dismay aroused by the uncompromising rejections 
eventually forced Pitt to come to Parliament to offer an account of ministerial 
policy. He had to face Charles Fox who now returned to the Commons 
after having withdrawn from it in 1797 in protest at the war policies of 
the Government. Coleridge’s treatment of this great set-piece confrontation 
is pre-eminent amongst his parliamentary reporting.40 Material that other 
newspaper reporters (and editors) chose to excise concerned the second 
part of Pitt’s speech in which he considered the implications of the new 
French constitution as well as Bonaparte’s character. However, Coleridge 
prioritised this material as an important political statement rather than 
Pitt’s reprise of the (well-known) origins of the war. Coleridge had clearly 
determined that appropriate British policy could only be established at 
a critical juncture in its history if France, its values, institutions and its 
leadership were properly understood. Later, when in public office in Malta, 
this acuity would be of value in his evaluation of the French intentions 
in the Mediterranean – a talent that no doubt contributed to the Civil 
Commissioner’s desire to keep Coleridge in Valletta after he stood down as 
Acting Public Secretary. 
Coleridge’s understanding of constitutional doctrine is also revealed in 
a number of political leaders, on the proposed new French Constitution, 
published in The Morning Post.41 Coleridge subjected the new Constitution 
to a sustained attack in which one of his most damaging broadsides was 
intended to reveal that the proposed settlement failed to respect the doctrine 
of the separation of powers.42 Coleridge also condemned it’s over-elaborate 
39 E.g. ibid, 8 January 1800, 84.
40 This eventually took place on 3 February 1800.
41 This was the Constitution establishing the Consulate which placed military 
and political power in the hands of Napoleon Bonaparte. It was formally adopted 
on 24 December 1799. His articles appeared on 7, 26, 27 and 31 December, 1799: 
EOT, 1, 31-57.
42 This doctrine is particularly associated with the French writer Montesquieu 
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design. It was, he argued, “complex almost to entanglement” in its system 
of checks and balances.43 Despite this, the Constitution singularly failed 
to provide appropriate curbs upon the powers of the new Chief Consul, 
Napoleon Bonaparte.44 He was particularly concerned that France had 
created an oligarchy that would survive only with the use of military force 
– and that military was placed exclusively in the hands of the Chief Consul. 
In summary, Coleridge concluded that the reform was a failure that would 
not last ten years.45 
When the British, somewhat conveniently from their point of view, 
exercised autocratic powers under the Maltese Constitution, which lacked 
similar curbs upon governmental and authoritarian power, Coleridge 
expressed no criticism, and indeed, devoted much of The Friend (as we 
shall see below) to eulogising the way in which the Civil Commissioner 
exercised power. This contrast is illuminating.
In this journalism, Coleridge also disclosed how far he had shifted from 
his earlier radicalism. Although it was a remark made in the context of 
French politics, he revealingly disclosed his view that Jacobinism was a 
“raving madness”.46 
From his pen, there also emerged both a treatment of Bonaparte47 and a 
highly critical profile of Pitt.48 In the case of the former, he acknowledged 
the dictatorial powers that Bonaparte exercised: but he portrayed his 
conduct, in seeking to end the war, as sincere and dignified, in contrast 
to that of British ministry whose public behaviour was “stupid”. Whereas 
Bonaparte and the French ministry behaved with scrupulous respect and 
restraint, the British response to their invitation to negotiate was carping 
and recriminatory. 49 
whose work L’esprit des lois, 1748, asserted that the three functions of govern-
ment (legislative, executive and judicial) should be performed by separate bodies. 
Misgovernment, or tyranny, would result if any two of those functions were per-
formed by one body. Ironically Montesquieu, who was an admiring visitor to Brit-
ain, wrongly concluded that the British constitution exemplified these enlightened 
principles. Amongst its many controversial arrangements, the legislature in Britain 
is dominated by the Executive. As we shall see, under the Maltese constitution un-
der which Coleridge worked whilst in office all legislative, executive and ultimate 
judicial authority was vested in the British civil commissioner.
43 EOT, 1, 46-7, 26 December 1799.
44 Ibid at 47.
45 EOT, 1, 49, 26 December 1799. 
46 EOT, 1, 282, 3 December 1801.
47 EOT, 1, 211-14: 11, 13 and 15 March 1800.
48 19th March 1800, ibid. 219.
49 See e.g., EOT, 1, 211, 13 March 1800. Note, however, that once war with France 
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In the profile of Pitt, he castigated the Prime Minister as “a being 
who had had no feelings connected with man or nature, no spontaneous 
impulses, no unbiased and desultory studies, no genuine science, nothing 
that constitutes individuality in intellect…” Pitt was portrayed as lacking 
a coherent response to the relationship with France, when the realpolitik of 
1800 was very different from that at the outset of war in 1793. In effect, Pitt 
personified the illiberal and repressive policies, in stamping out mature 
political debate in England, which had also attracted Coleridge’s fire.50 
This opinion-forming and influential journalism was professional 
experience that he would be able to put to valuable effect on Malta when 
writing the Bandi and Avvisi (Proclamations and Public Notices). As we 
shall see, it was in the political use of government information that, from 
the British point of view, Coleridge was arguably most successful in public 
office. Also valuable in his later office was his recognition of the central 
relevance and importance of constitutional principles. This would also be 
put to the test on Malta – although, arguably, with less success. 
Lirycal Ballads, 1800
As stated, in July 1800 Coleridge moved his family to Greta Hall, Keswick. 
Greta Hall house stood then, as now, upon a low hill by the River Greta. 
When the Coleridges resided there, it commanded excellent views of 
Derwentwater, Bassenthwaite, Borrowdale, the Coledale Fells and Skiddaw. 
Coleridge was much enthused by this landscape. The cloudscapes, storms 
and moonlight on the lakes, richly inspired his writing, especially in the 
private Notebooks. Proximity to his fellow poet was also, Coleridge argued, 
a “priceless Value”.51 
The first edition of the Lyrical Ballads had been a success and now a 
second edition was projected. In this venture, however, Coleridge may 
have been over-willing to accommodate Wordsworth. Gradually, the latter 
began to assert himself as the dominant party in their literary relationship, 
and this contributed to Coleridge’s subsequent loss of confidence in his 
had resumed, Coleridge offered his support for possible British military action even 
if this included the annexation of territory belonging to a foreign power: see below. 
Note also Coleridge’s essay on International Law in The Friend which argues for the 
legitimacy of an assertive foreign policy which might include the anticipatory use 
of force – The Friend, I, 298 et seq. It’s also of interest that Coleridge had enlisted in, 
and briefly served with the dragoons in 1794.
50 See also ‘Fire, Famine and Slaughter’, The Morning Post, 8 January 1798.
51 To T. Poole, 21 March 1800, CL 1, 582.
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imagination. His loss of self-esteem as an artist is a significant feature of the 
traumatic years that lay ahead. 
First Wordsworth proposed, and Coleridge agreed, that the second 
edition of the Lyrical Ballads should be published under Wordsworth’s 
name only. Despite this, Coleridge retained his commitment to the project 
and struggled to move forward with the second part of his important poem, 
Christabel, that was planned for inclusion in the second volume of the new 
edition. 
On 29 August 1800 Coleridge walked across the mountains, including 
traversing Helvellyn in moonlight, carrying a draft of Part II of Christabel 
to show Wordsworth. However, despite the “increasing pleasure” that 
the Wordsworths derived from the poem, by 6 October 1800 it had been 
decided that Christabel would be excluded from the Lyrical Ballads. This 
was ostensibly on the grounds that it was not consistent with the literary 
aims of the project. But that was not all. Coleridge’s major work, the Ancient 
Mariner, had attracted most of the criticism levelled at the first edition of the 
poems. Wordsworth decided to publish an apology for the inclusion of the 
poem in the second edition.52 It is possible that Coleridge may neither have 
seen nor approved of this prior to its publication.53 In it Wordsworth wrote: 
“The Poem of my Friend has indeed great defects…”,54 and he publicly 
acknowledged the criticism that the poem had attracted. Nonetheless he 
had, he stated, decided to publish it because its merits “gave to the poem 
a value which is not often possessed by better Poems”. (Emphasis added).
Early in October 1800, Humphrey Davey received a letter from Coleridge. 
This broached the subject of the second edition and appeared to show that 
Coleridge had accepted Wordsworth’s actions with equanimity.55 But this 
may merely have been Coleridge’s public mask. In fact, the rejection of 
two of his major works by a poet whose achievement he considered not 
to have been surpassed since Milton profoundly undermined Coleridge’s 
confidence and self-esteem.56 Coleridge subsequently wrote to Thelwall: 
“As to Poetry, I have altogether abandoned it, being convinced that I never 
had the essential poetic Genius”.57 A letter to Francis Wrangham also 
52 Lyrical Ballads, vol 1, unnumbered page after the text, quoted in Livingstone 
Lowes, 475. 
53 Lefebure (1977), 325-6.
54 Quoted in Lefebure (1977), 326.
55 To Davey, 9 October 1800, CL 1, 631. Coleridge thought that Christabel would 
subsequently be published with Wordworth’s The Pedlar.
56 To Thomas Poole, 21 March 1800, CL 1, 582.
57 To Thelwall, 17 December 1800, CL 1, 656.
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revealed what are likely to have been his true feelings: “As to our literary 
occupations, they are still more distant than our residences – He is a great, 
true poet – I am only a kind of Metaphysician”.58 
When, in 1818, Coleridge revisited this subject, he referred to the 
Wordsworths’ “cold praise and effective discouragement of every attempt 
of mine to roll onward in a distinct current of my own”. He continued, 
“[They] admitted that the Ancient Mariner [and] the Christabel…were not 
without merit, but they were abundantly anxious to acquit their judgements 
of any blindness to the very numerous defects”.59 Coleridge paid a high 
price for the Wordsworths’ ruthless intellectual integrity. Their damaging 
attitude can also be seen as influential in Coleridge’s eventual decision to 
spend an extended period away from their collaborations and friendship.
Addiction
During the stormy winter of 1800-1801 Coleridge’s health deteriorated. 
Fever and rheumatic symptoms predominated. He was confined to bed 
for long periods and resorted to opiates, which was the primary remedy 
within the limited pharmacopoeia of the period. Coleridge had previously 
resorted to it as laudanum which was easily procured as a palliative. He 
appears to have used opium throughout the previous decade.60 This 
undermines his subsequent argument that he became “seduced” into 
addiction. He claimed that he had read, in borrowed medical journals, of a 
case similar to his own that was successfully treated by these means. This 
possibility has been contested.61 However, it seems beyond doubt that, by 
1801, Coleridge was addicted. 
Medical science did not, at this time, appreciate the nature of addiction. 
Neither Coleridge nor those of his friends who took it upon themselves 
to warn him about excessive opium consumption, realised that he could 
not withdraw from the drug merely by determined abstention. Withdrawal 
symptoms would occur each time he attempted it. Over the next three 
years, Coleridge came to realise that he was hopelessly, irredeemably, 
hooked on opium. But this understanding would only be reached after long 
struggles with the drug. Each failed attempt to give it up was succeeded by 
the unremitting cycle of an unpleasant withdrawal symptoms, followed 
58 To Revd. Francis Wrangham, 19 December 1800, CL 1, 658.
59 MS New York Public Library, quoted in Griggs, CL 1, 631. 
60 Lefebure (1977), 338.
61 ibid., 333 et seq.
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by renewed dosing. Then he had to steel himself for yet another attempt 
at renunciation. Somehow he had to break the cycle of withdrawal and 
renewed consumption. 
Morning Post 
An early strategy was to remove himself from both his wife and the rigours 
of a Lake District winter. In the autumn of 1801, he returned to London 
to resume journalism for The Morning Post. Hard work, discipline and a 
drier climate would, he believed, serve him well. Nonetheless, his hopes of 
renouncing opium were dashed by severe withdrawal symptoms, which 
he confidently brushed aside as food poisoning.62 
Even so, he was effective and industrious. He provided a sustained 
critique of the new Ministry and, in particular, Addington, the recently 
appointed Prime Minister.63 He was acutely aware that in time of war 
or other emergency, the power of the Executive increases leading to the 
introduction of laws that are inimical to civil liberties and the rule of 
law – a problem he would encounter in Malta, where his support for the 
Civil Commissioner would be contentious and morally complex. Most 
controversial in Britain at this time were questions surrounding the moral 
and constitutional legitimacy of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Acts. 
The writ of Habeas Corpus is one of the principal bulwarks of civil liberty. 
It is a writ issued by a court requiring the state to justify in law the arrest or 
detention of a subject. If the court is satisfied that the detention is unlawful, 
it will order the prisoner’s release. Habeas Corpus thus prevents arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment without trial. In the words of Erskine May, “It 
brings to light the cause of every imprisonment, approves its lawfulness, or 
liberates the prisoner”.64 In other words, it underpins the right, conferred by 
Magna Carta in 1215, that an individual should be free from imprisonment 
until properly convicted. It further provides the foundation of the right to 
a fair trial and judgement by peers. 
Legislation “suspending” the writ was first introduced in 1794 and this 
was renewed annually until the legislation expired in 1802. The Suspension 
Acts had serious consequences for civil liberties. For example, one individual 
62 To Thomas Poole, 19 February 1802, CL 1, 787.
63 March 1801. Pitt had resigned over the question of Catholic Emancipation, but 
would subsequently return to Prime Ministerial Office in 1804.
64 Vol. III, Chapter XI, 10-24.
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was held for six years without trial and others for three years. 65
The influence of demagogues, during the Revolution in France, 
encouraged the British government to fear the small but articulate minority 
of individuals who sought constitutional reform in England.66 Imprisonment, 
upon mere suspicion of guilt, became possible and, after suspension of the 
writ, there would be no means of testing the credibility of any evidence 
underlying a detention order. Detainees would not, necessarily, know who 
had accused them, nor upon what evidence they had been detained. They 
had no right to demand a trial. This is why Coleridge’s political lectures 
risked him being seized and imprisoned during the anti-democratic 
hysteria of 1795.
Political discourse advocating social and constitutional reform was, in 
the government’s view, high treason. The harsh treatment of a number of its 
prominent political opponents revealed the lengths to which it was prepared 
to go to suppress free discussion of democratic reform. Nonetheless, the 
prosecutions failed as the juries had found the state’s evidence of a public 
emergency to be inadequate.
Shortly after taking office, in March 1801, Addington had released 
political prisoners, but, to Coleridge’s chagrin, soon effected a volte face 
by re-suspending Habeas Corpus. Addington’s defence of this apparent 
inconsistency relied upon undisclosed “evidence” that had been presented 
to “Committees of Secrecy” in both Houses of Parliament, which 
(according to Coleridge) Addington accepted uncritically. Notoriously, 
these Committees, which comprised Government loyalists, excluded even 
senior members of the Opposition. Coleridge’s central thrust attacked 
Addington’s moral weakness in this affair. 67 Practices such as these forced 
him to conclude that, Addington was “beneath mediocrity”.68 
Thus, the Acts of Suspension were renewed until the end of 1801. But this 
65 Erskine May, 16. The Government deployed the familiar assertion that officials 
accused of having acted unlawfully could not defend themselves without disclos-
ing secret information or the sources of intelligence. 
66 There were, however, advocates of reform in the House of Commons, most 
notably Francis Burdett, who held the rotten borough of Boroughbridge after 1797. 
He was elected the Member for Middlesex in 1802.
67 EOT, 1, 282-4, 3 December 1801.
68 EOT, 1, 308. Within a week of coming to power, Addington’s administration 
opened negotiations with France to end the war. Its eagerness to end hostilities per-
suaded it to it agree to evacuate Malta on unfavourable terms. Had this occurred, 
the outcome could easily have been highly damaging to British interests. In the end, 
Malta was neither evacuated by British forces nor returned to its pre-British govern-
ment. The war resumed in May 1803 with Malta as the casus bellum. 
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was not all because Addington’s Ministry also secured the passage through 
Parliament of the Act of Indemnity 1801. This was a measure intended to 
protect, from liability, any official who had authorised detention since the 
passing of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act 1794. The former measure 
put beyond doubt that there could be no accountability to the law for the 
arbitrary detentions. 
The passage of the Indemnity Bill 1801 was a matter of heated political 
debate, and drew fierce criticism from Coleridge’s pen. He used it to develop 
a conception of the Constitution that essentially rejected positivist theories 
of legitimacy. For Coleridge, a law could not be legitimate merely because 
Parliament had been persuaded to enact it and place it on the Statute Book; 
indeed, enacted law could actually be “unconstitutional” – an idea that was 
inimical to a system that lacked a written constitution. Coleridge’s argument 
was, however, consistent with Natural Law theorists according to whom 
man-made norms are only valid if they conform to a morally and legally 
superior law. The latter system is not, however, enshrined in the English 
legal system. According to constitutional orthodoxy in Britain, Parliament 
is a legislature having unlimited law-making powers, so anything that is 
enacted becomes “law” and thus legitimate. Validity does not depend upon 
conformity to some higher moral order, which is the basis of legal authority.
Undeterred by this, Coleridge repeatedly argued that the British 
Constitution is founded upon certain fundamental moral principles, 
including principles designed to protect the individual from the unlawful 
predations of Government.69 Laws that undermined those entrenched moral 
principles could, properly, be condemned as violating the Constitution. 
This was particularly so in the case of both the Suspension and Indemnity 
Acts. The latter, for example, would deny victims of arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment (i.e. the victims of the Suspension Acts) a remedy in damages 
in the courts. Coleridge’s use of language in describing the consequences of 
this reveal his idea of a hierarchy of laws within the constitutional system. 
He stated that the Indemnity Act was a “barrier between the individual 
and the law” (and thus not law itself).70 This discloses his idea the “law” is 
something permanent and inviolable that lies beyond even the powers of 
(an inferior) Parliament to amend.
His further concern about these controversial measures also revealed 
69 EOT, 1, 272, 27 November 1801; ibid., 282, 3 December 1801; ibid 287, 11 De-
cember 1801.
70 EOT, 1, 284, 3 December 1801.
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an emerging constitutional conservatism.71 The danger in violating 
fundamental political freedoms, he argued, was that it established a 
precedent that would make it easier for future governments to pursue 
similar repression. When this future conduct established its own precedent, 
the repressive measures could harden into accepted constitutional 
practices, destroying, by degrees, the fundamental principles of the British 
Constitution.72
He was acutely aware that repressive measures such as the Suspension 
and Indemnity Acts each violated the principle of the rule of law, which 
was one of the bulwark principles of the British Constitution. In summary, 
he warned that these measures were a fundamental erosion of the nation’s 
constitutional morality, weakening the very foundations of a stable society.73 
His principled approach invoking natural law, as opposed to positivist 
legal theory, once more revealed his ability to locate contemporary political 
controversy within the framework of fundamental constitutional doctrine. 
However, in 1802, Coleridge’s political journalism had not yet been 
enriched by that significant engagement with practical politicians that 
would occur in Malta. He had not yet experienced at first hand the need for 
prudent rather than principled governmental decision-making. Whether the 
public good could be mediated only through principled action would force 
Coleridge to consider a doctrine that made it permissible for government 
to override principles of the constitutional, legal or political order to 
achieve general welfare. In his official capacity, Coleridge would have to 
confront the need to manipulate Maltese public opinion to gain consent 
to legislation that overwhelmingly served Imperial interests. He could not 
avoid the problem that the legitimacy of British rule was questionable in 
the absence of a congruence between governmental policies and Maltese 
sympathies. In drafting such measures, promulgating them above his 
signature, and in offering a highly partial and incomplete public account of 
their purposes, Coleridge was complicit, and his actions sparked questions 
of legitimacy that he could not avoid.74 But that was in the future. He had 
yet to experience the moral dilemmas of power.75 
71 Although, it can be argued that Coleridge had to invoke natural law theory to 
defend what saw as the “true” Constitution, this theory was actually foreign to it. 
Thus, Coleridge’s “conservatism” is of a particular kind which emphasises morality 
– as an inherent and unchanging guiding value-over historical and legal precedent.
72 EOT, 1, 281, 3 December 1801; ibid., 295, 11 December 1801.
73 See EOT, 1, 295, 11 December 1801.
74 To Daniel Stuart, 22 August 1806, CL 2, 1178.
75 In The Friend he also described how Ball’s naval vessels, prompted by the threat 
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Notwithstanding this, Coleridge’s second period on The Morning Post 
must be regarded as unenhanced by his later experiences of governmental 
power in action; his high reputation as a political commentator and 
journalist was now assured. 
“Asra”
Coleridge’s relationship with his wife, which had been under strain since 
their Stowey days, was now becoming increasingly traumatic. Withdrawal 
from an uncongenial marriage would also have attracted him to overseas 
travel. He complained to Tom Wedgewood of Sara’s “ill tempered 
Speeches…my friends received with freezing looks, the least opposition or 
contradiction occasioning screams of passion”.76 
Coleridge’s deepening fascination for Sarah Hutchinson (Asra), which 
was not concealed from Sara Coleridge, broke open another fissure in their 
marital relationship. Sara demanded loyalty; Coleridge refused to renounce 
what he endeavoured to pass off as simply a virtuous friendship. Sara, (his 
wife) he argued, was the cause of his unhappiness. Friends whom he kept 
abreast of his domestic troubles advocated separation, and it is possible 
that the advice was first offered at about this time.77 
By the summer of 1802, Coleridge reluctantly summoned the courage 
to broach the subject to his wife. Her reaction appears to have been an 
incandescent blend of anger, alarm and betrayal. Coleridge, who later wrote 
of this episode to Tom Wedgewood,78 recoiled with “stomach spasms” and 
may have had some kind of seizure, which shocked and frightened his wife. 
They then resolved to talk about their difficulties and agreed to attempt 
reconciliation.79 Coleridge’s efforts to restore his marriage conspicuously 
fell short of renouncing Asra whom he continued to visit. 
Wordsworth had, by the spring of 1802 embarked upon one of his 
greatest creative periods. In contrast, Coleridge who had written little, felt 
a deepening sense of failure. In late March, the Wordsworths came to stay 
of mutinous revolt amongst the allied army, threatened force against Sicilian mer-
chants who refused to relinquish grain that was needed do badly on Malta. Ball 
was eulogised for not using his legal authority to punish the starving mutineers as 
much as for breaching established legal order in his adopted means of securing the 
grain from a friendly power: The Friend, I, 558-60. See also Chapter 5.9: Passports. 
76 To Thomas Wedgewood, 20 October 1802, CL 2, 876.
77 To George Coleridge, 2 April 1806 [1807], CL 3, 7.
78 To Thomas Wedgewood, 20 October 1802, CL 2, 875.
79 To Robert Southey, 29 July 1802, CL 2, 830-3.
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at Greta Hall. Wordsworth brought with him examples of his recent work 
including part of the Intimations of Immortality. On the evening of 4 April 
1802, Coleridge retreated to his study and began to pen the first version 
of the “Dejection” Ode. This was first composed as the highly confessional 
“Letter to Asra”. Its autobiographical themes are the unattainable Asra and 
the failure of his marriage. 
In the summer of 1802, the Wordsworths took advantage of the temporary 
peace established after the Treaty of Amiens which we shall consider later 
(see Appendix 2). They travelled to France to meet Annette Vallon, who had 
born William a child, Caroline, almost ten years earlier. The purpose of the 
visit was to prepare for William’s impending marriage to Mary Hutchinson 
and, doubtless, to make other arrangements for Caroline. 
During their absence the Coleridges’ marriage unexpectedly thrived: 
“Love and Concord” were rediscovered at Greta Hall. 80 Moreover, Coleridge 
enjoyed himself in other ways, not least by making the first recorded ascent 
of Scafell. 
Further Struggles with Addiction 
The return of the Lakeland autumn, in 1802, heralded the onset of the wild 
weather which Coleridge blamed for his poor health and increased opium 
consumption. He now planned to escape abroad with Tom Wedgewood. 
In the event, they ventured no further than South Wales and the West 
Country. Even so, it meant leaving Sara who was now heavily pregnant 
– a decision that must have put their marriage under further strain. His 
visit to Asra, en route, aggravated her further. An important exchange of 
letters between husband and wife ensued. Although Sara’s letters have not 
survived, those sent to her by Coleridge reveal a mixture of assertiveness, 
contrition and apology. Their future depended, he proclaimed, on “your 
(Sara’s) loving those whom I love” (i.e. Asra).81 This condition clearly 
verged on a repudiation of their marriage, but Coleridge’s tone was in 
other respects more accommodating. He repeated his commitment to 
the marriage, and told her that it was difficult to be apart from her.82 He 
even apologised for his own faults, not least his quick-tempered outbursts 
against her.83 Eventually, Sara seems to have been willing to pursue renewed 
80 Ibid at 832.
81 To Mrs Coleridge, 13 December 1802, CL 2, 894.
82 To Mrs Coleridge, 4 December 1802, CL 2, 889.
83 To Mrs Coleridge, 5 January 1803, CL 2, 908.
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reconciliation. Coleridge persuaded Wedgewood to travel to the Lakes so 
that Coleridge could rejoin his wife at the birth of their child. Needless 
to add, he was too late; Coleridge learned at Grasmere of the birth of his 
daughter (also called Sara).
Unable to travel abroad, Coleridge’s health declined once more when 
he fell ill with rheumatic fever. This probably resulted in an increased 
consumption of opium. Fearful nightmares, which awakened him 
screaming at night were but one of the unpleasant symptoms of addiction. 
It was at this period that Coleridge at last may have begun to admit to 
himself that he had hitherto misunderstood cause and effect. Many of his 
ailments, for which he took opium, were in fact caused by it. His private 
Notebooks eventually revealed this.84 However, at this period, he stoically 
insisted, to those who had begun to suspect the true nature of his problem, 
that nothing he consumed was habit forming.85 Nevertheless, he made a 
will and took out a life assurance policy to provide his wife with £1000 in 
the event of his death. 
There were renewed plans to go abroad. He planned either to take up 
an invitation to stay in Malta, with a John Stoddart, a school friend from 
his Christ’s Hospital days,86 or to visit Madeira.87 Stoddart, a prominent 
journalist and literary critic, who had just been appointed Kings and 
Admiralty Advocate in Malta, visited Coleridge in October 180388 and may 
have then issued an invitation to stay with him. Stoddart was eventually to 
become a Chief Justice of Malta. 
The Walking Tour of 1803
Meanwhile, Coleridge and the Wordsworths had decided to set off for 
a tour of Scotland. If this was an attempt to rekindle their exciting and 
halcyon days of Stowey/Alfoxden it was a dismal failure. Coleridge 
84 CN 2, 2990.
85 To Robert Southey, 16 April 1804, CL 2, 1129.
86 Stoddart was a literary critic who reviewed Scott’s work in the Edinburgh Re-
view, No. II, January 1803, “Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border”. Earlier he had pub-
lished Remarks on the Local Scenery and Manners in Scotland during the years 1799 and 
1800 (1801). He was political editor for the London Times from 1812-1816. He was 
eventually to serve as Chief Justice of the Vice-Admiralty court, Malta from 1826. 
His sister married William Hazlitt.
87 To Sir George and Lady Beaumont, 12 August 1803, CL 2, 965.
88 Coleridge wrote that John Stoddart had visited him on “Monday past”, that is, 
Monday, 27 October, 1800: CL 1, 643. Coleridge and Stoddart had travelled together 
to Keswick on 23 October 1800: Purton, V., 49.
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seemed, to Wordsworth, to be in bad spirits. For his part, Coleridge 
resented Dorothy’s fondness for reciting William’s verses aloud. The group 
of friends eventually separated. Coleridge left the Wordsworths at Loch 
Lomond and marched alone across the Highlands with a renewed sense of 
purpose and vigour. This was not the end of their friendship, but it signals 
a rupture whose origins lie, perhaps, in the second edition of the Lyrical 
Ballads and, in particular, the suppression of Christabel and the apology for 
Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner. Coleridge saw little of them after his return to 
Greta Hall.89
Once free to pursue his own goals, Coleridge sought physical renewal 
in almost obsessive exercise. He appears to have believed that he might 
achieve a cure by driving the illness to the extremities of his body. In 
pursuit of this desperate and hopeless strategy, he covered 263 miles in 
8 days on foot – as he proudly told his friends once back at Greta Hall.90 
However, his addiction simply refused to yield. Letters that resound 
with his physical prowess on the Scottish tour also reveal acute nocturnal 
struggles. Coleridge wrote to Thomas Wedgewood the “Night is my Hell, 
Sleep my tormenting Angel”.91 “Night-screams”, he reported, “have almost 
made me a nuisance in my own House”.92 He nevertheless vowed to take 
up armed resistance if the apparently imminent French invasion took place. 
If the country were in danger he would fight the enemy.93 This assertion of 
loyalty and patriotism is interesting because it reveals his willingness to 
use armed force to defend a country whose social, economic and political 
system he had earlier identified as oppressive. It is an early expression 
of his jingoism, which allows us to contextualise understanding of his 
complex responses to the behaviour of the British administration on Malta. 
Preparing to Sail
At this time, his brother in law, Southey, had been bereaved by the loss 
of his only daughter. He came with his wife, Edith, and her sister Mary94 
to stay with the Coleridges at Greta Hall. Their visit eventually became 
permanent. Coleridge, whose health continued to be in a “distressful state” 
89 To Thomas Poole, CL 2, 1012, 14 October 1803.
90 To Sir George and Lady Beaumont, 22 September 1803, CL 2, 993; also to George 
Coleridge, 2 October 1803 CL 2, 1005, and to T. Poole, 3 October 1803, CL 2, 1009. 
91 To Tom Wedgewood, 16 September 1803, CL 2, 991.
92 To Thomas Poole, 3 October 1803, CL 2, 1010.
93 To Sir George Beaumont, 17 October 1803, CL 2, 1017.
94 I.e. Sara Coleridge’s sisters.
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throughout the autumn, could now travel abroad knowing that Sara and 
the children would be cared for by close family. He determined to leave the 
Lake District hoping that he could recover his health in a warmer climate.95 
He claimed that his departure was “a choice of Evils”: to remain in England 
was to court death; the fulfilment of his desire for transcendence in the 
warm South was his final hope.96 
Madeira or Malta?97 Each seemed likely possibilities, although he 
seemed to favour the former.98 Coleridge would only make up his mind, to 
accept Stoddart’s invitation to travel to Malta, on 31 January 1804.99 Even 
then he had no plan to spend much time there since he regarded Malta as 
merely a staging post for Sicily, to which he was attracted by the possibility 
of an ascent of Etna.100 
As the day of his departure drew near his letters acquired a valedictory 
tone. His health and morale had deteriorated once more: and he recognised 
that his resting place was likely to be some corner of a foreign field:101 “..if 
I return, we shall be Friends: if I die, as I believe I shall, you will remember 
me”.102 “Death…”, he wrote to Sir George Beaumont, “will only be a Voyage 
– a Voyage not from but to our native Country”.103
“Bear up and sail large”104
Coleridge arrived in Portsmouth on the morning of the 28 March 1804, 
ready to board his ship, the fast 130-ton merchant brig, Speedwell. The ship’s 
voyage from London had been delayed by adverse winds and it had not 
95 To Matthew Coates, 5 December 1803, CL 2, 1021; also to Robert Southey, 13 
January 1804, CL 2, 1029.
96 To John Rickman, 13 March 1804, CL 2, 1089.
97 To John Thelwall, 26 November, 1803, CL 2, 1019. By January Catania was add-
ed to the list of potential destinations: to Sir George Beaumont, 30 January 1804, CL 
2, 1049. 
98 To Richard Sharp, 15 January 1804, CL 2, 1035. 
99 To George Bellas Greenough, 31 January 1804, CL 2, 1050, but his procrastina-
tion was not fully conquered by his apparent resolve: see To the Wordsworths, 16 
February 1804, CL 2, 1065.
100 He seems to have made two ascents of the volcano: to Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 12 
December 1804, CL 2, 1157.
101 To J. G. Rideout, 23 March 1804, CL 2, 1098; see also to John Rickman, 26 
March 1804, CL 2, 1098.
102 To William Sotheby, 27 March 1804, CL 2, 1106.; see also to Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 
1 April 1804, CL 2, 1115.
103 CL 2, 1123.
104 CN 2, 2016, 6 April 1804. 
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yet arrived.105 It was only on 9 April, after yet more contrary winds, that 
Speedwell weighed anchor and set sail in a convoy, which was to be escorted 
as far as Gibraltar by the Leviathan.106 Coleridge carried with him letters of 
introduction to Major-General Villettes, the commander of the British army 
on Malta, and Sir Alexander Ball, the Civil Commissioner.107 
The novelty of the journey, the talk of sailors, the idiosyncrasies of his 
fellow travellers, the routines of the convoy and the sight of ships in convoy 
under sail intrigued Coleridge. Seated upon the duck coop with the ducks 
quacking at his feet, and using the rudder case as a desk, Coleridge noted 
all that he saw and learned. He listened to the sounds of the ship, noting 
the “creaking of (the) Main top irons, & squeak of the rudder rope”;108 he 
learned that in certain winds the ship would travel faster with less sail;109 he 
recorded the latitude of the ship and regularly noted its speed; he looked 
forward to his first glimpse of Cape Ortegal.110 
Portugal sighted, he flung on his greatcoat and hurried shoeless on 
to the deck to observe it and the fishing boats laying off each side of the 
ship.111 He marvelled at the apparently magical progress of the Leviathan 
in contrast to the laboured rolling of his own vessel. This powerful ship-
of-the-line was, he wrote, “upright, motionless, as a church with its Steeple 
– as tho’ it moved by its own will, as tho’ its speed were spiritual-the being 
and essence without the body of motion”.112 
But the excitement was not to last. For the greater part of the journey 
between Gibraltar and Malta, as the weather deteriorated, he became 
seriously unwell. Lying in his bunk he returned to opium as the ship was 
alternately storm-blasted or becalmed. In adverse weather, the ship drifted 
backwards; when becalmed there hung the danger of attack from pirate 
105 The passage, which Coleridge arranged on 12 March 1804, was, he judged, 
expensive. It cost 35 guineas, with Coleridge having to purchase his mattress, three 
sheets, two blankets a pillow and pillow case as well as his own wine and spirits 
to the cost of a further £7 or £8; but Captain Findlay, the Commander of the ship, 
furnished everything else required for the journey.
106 She was a 74 gun ship of the line that was to become the third ship after Victo-
ry to pass through the enemy line at the Battle of Trafalgar. On the Gibraltar-Valletta 
leg of the journey the convoy was escorted by the Frigate Maidstone which was also 
shortly to see action against French ships off Hyères near Toulon, where the French 
fleet was blockaded by Nelson.
107 To William Sotheby, 13 March 1804, CL 2, 1086. 
108 CN 2, 1996.
109 CN 2, 2003.
110 CN 2, 2002.
111 CN 2, 2014.
112 To Robert Southey, 16 April 1804, CL 2, 1127.
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vessels using oar rather than sail.113 These could dart into the convoy when 
even the most heavily armed escort ship would be powerless to help them. 
He drifted into opium saturated reveries unable to return to the deck. 
At last, his body fell victim to the effects of opium; his bowels would not 
function. Tormented by self-disgust and guilt he suffered until finally the 
Captain of the Speedwell called upon the services of a surgeon. The remedy 
was humiliating and painful. 
Malta 
When Speedwell reached Malta, on 18 May 1804, Coleridge fled the ship. 
Leaving his baggage aboard, he went ashore and went directly to Stoddart’s 
house in Valletta, the Casa di San Poix, (a former auberge of the Knights of St 
John) where he was warmly received and given rooms. (fig. 1) Two days later 
he called upon Major-General William Villettes114 and Sir Alexander Ball, 
the Civil Commissioner, who was universally, albeit unofficially, known as 
113 To Mrs Coleridge, 5 June 1804, CL 2, 1136.
114 Major-General Villettes had been appointed commander in chief of the British 
troops in Malta in 1801.
1. A view of Valletta from South Street with the Marsamxett or Quarantine 
Harbour on the left
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the “Governor” of the Island.115 Coleridge recorded of the meeting with Ball 
that it was unlikely to lead to his appointment to a colonial post.116 This was 
a disappointment since Coleridge had thought it possible some small post 
might be offered by which he could defray the expenses of the voyage.117 
Fortunately for Coleridge, this unaccommodating first meeting was not to 
remain Ball’s final position. The following day, Ball invited Coleridge to 
the country palace at San Antonio (now St Anton, fig. 2).118 Riding back to 
Valletta, Ball posed the question whether fortune favours fools. Coleridge’s 
115 The Crown may have withheld the title of “Governor” as the status of Malta 
was unresolved, although an alternative possibility is ventured in Chapter 4. Nor-
mally, the use of the title might signal internationally that Britain would be un-
willing to give up sovereignty over the island and Britain was reluctant to give 
offence, especially to Russia. Coleridge was later to point to other, more conspirato-
rial reasons touching upon inter-service rivalry between the army (Major-General 
Villettes) and the navy (the Civil Commissioner). Villettes was not subordinate to 
Ball in matters outside the civil administration. See The Friend, I, 544 n. and later 
Table Talk, I, 475, April 1834. The first Governor, properly so called, was appointed 
in 1813 at a time when British sovereignty would not be disputed.
116 CN 2, 2101.
117 To William Sotheby, 13 March 1804, CL 2, 1086.
118 The Palace lies about one hundred metres from the Valletta to Rabat road.
2. San Antonio Palace, now the official residence of the President of Malta, at St 
Anton, Attard. During the Maltese uprising 1799-1800 Captain Ball used it as his 
residence. He returned when he became Civil Commissioner in 1802. Coleridge 
spent much of his time  there.
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articulate response, on the subject of chance and superstition, clearly 
impressed Ball and a friendship was firmly established.119 Coleridge was to 
write that this was “one of the most delightful mornings I ever passed”.120 
Sir Alexander Ball 
As early as 1804, but most notably after Ball’s death in 1809, Coleridge 
presented Ball as “the abstract Idea of a wise & good Governor”.121 In a 
Notebook written whilst he was acting Public Secretary on Malta, he 
recorded that Ball was “a great man”,122 and he subsequently eulogised Ball, 
in The Friend, as “[a] truly great man, (the best and greatest public character 
that I had ever the opportunity of making myself acquainted with)”.123 Ball’s 
prudence, he wrote, resembled wisdom; “his Intellect (was) “so clear and 
comprehensive”.124 This unity of wisdom and prudence allowed Coleridge 
to present Ball as the essence of morally-legitimate political authority. In 
the Civil Commissioner, Coleridge thus considered that wisdom governed 
the inherent fallibility of acting prudentially. This idea was developed and 
emerged as a major theme of The Friend in 1809-1810. 
Coleridge’s accounts have left us with important evidence as to how 
government in Malta operated. The qualities of the Civil Commissioner to 
which Coleridge drew the most attention were his willingness to consult 
and his open mindedness, evidenced by his readiness to seek the opinion 
even of those who might have very different opinions from his own.125 Had 
Ball pursued his naval career, Coleridge considered that he would, like 
Nelson, have had a “band of brothers”, a team of fellow officers, whose 
opinions he could trust and upon whose initiative he could rely. Coleridge 
arrived at this conclusion because, it seems, that was Ball’s modus operandi 
in conducting the civil government of the Island. 
Importantly, Coleridge also described Ball as a good listener who 
would make time to invite all opinion, even from those whose judgement 
would, it seems, not carry much weight. Coleridge made it clear that Ball 
was “zealous in collecting the opinions of the well-informed”; although, 
once he had consulted he would be careful to make up his own mind and 
119 The Friend, II, 250-3 (1809).
120 The Friend, I, 533.
121 To William Sotheby, 5 July 1804, CL 2, 1141. 
122 CN 2, 2438.
123 The Friend, I, 169.
124 CN 2, 2438. Coleridge privately referred to Ball as Sophosophron: CN 2, 2439. 
125 The Friend, I, 552.
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not slavishly follow what he might perceive to be the wishes of authority. 
Coleridge also described Ball’s passion for fully reasoned, reflective 
decision-making. The impression that Coleridge was careful to leave is 
of an independent, evidence-led decision-maker concerned to gather 
all relevant information and opinion before reaching a decision.126 And, 
Coleridge carefully emphasised that Ball was guided by principles of 
morality and justice. As Kooy describes, this is an idealised expression of 
“pure politics”. It is Coleridge’s deployment of conscience as the necessary 
means of subjecting politics to Reason.127
Coleridge provided direct evidence that he was amongst those whose 
formal, written opinion Ball invited. He also celebrated Ball’s openness by 
revealing to us the latter’s pleasure in finding that Coleridge had identified 
a wider range of argument than Ball had at first appreciated. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that their relationship was 
always harmonious. As a surviving un-dated note from Ball to Coleridge128 
reveals, the two men seem to have held implacably opposed views upon 
certain political subjects, although the nature of these is not disclosed. Even 
so, the disagreement was such that Ball would not again raise the subject 
with Coleridge. Moreover, Ball was prepared to reprimand Coleridge 
quite severely for critical views that the latter had indiscreetly expressed. 
This may suggest that Coleridge had difficulty in accepting the strictures 
of collective cabinet responsibility, although this is but one possibility. 
Coleridge’s irritated claim, in letters home, that Ball frustrated his attempts 
to return, also suggests that the two men were not always in harmony.129 
Whilst on Malta, Coleridge became troubled by the political morality 
of those in power, which can only be a judgement upon Ball’s conduct 
in office. Whilst still on the Island he had confided to Stuart: “But the 
Promises of men in office are what everyone knows them to be…”.130 This 
was a reference to Ball apparently breaking a promise that he had made 
to Coleridge himself, specifically that Coleridge should receive the whole 
salary of the combined offices of Treasurer and Public Secretary (although 
he did not act as Treasurer). He lamented the “heart-depraving Habits & 
Temptations of men in power, as Governors….is to make instruments of their 
126 The Friend, I, 552-4.
127 Kooy (1999), 102-8.
128 The Wordsworth Trust, Grasmere, manuscript WLMS A/ Ball, Alexander, 
Sir/4 Ball to Coleridge.
129 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170.
130 To Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1166. He added that, in other ways, Ball 
treated him kindly.
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fellow creatures-& the moment they find a man of Honor & Talents, instead 
of loving and esteeming him, they wish to use him”.131 More damning still 
was his conclusion that the public office entailed “intrigue”.132 He even 
confided to Stuart that he now knew “by heart the awkward & wicked 
machinery, by which all our affairs abroad are carried on”.133 The truth is 
that Coleridge’s eulogy of Ball, in The Friend, almost certainly conceals from 
the public the limitations of the man and his government. 
Other, perhaps more objective, evidence of Ball’s competence as an 
administrator reveals that Ball’s second period of office had only qualified 
success, especially during the difficult years of 1805-1806. As we shall see, 
in Chapter 2, the policies pursued by the administration were structurally 
flawed and the administration was, in some respects, ineffective. An over-
arching complaint would be that the oversight of the complex system 
of government was completely inadequate. For example, amongst the 
proliferating problems, it seems that the system of financial control was 
particularly weak, resulting in a waste of British taxpayers’ money.134 
Other Members of the Civil Establishment
Apart from the Civil Commissioner, the dramatis personae of the British 
Civil Establishment, in Malta in 1804, included the Public Secretary and 
Treasurer, Alexander Macaulay, (at Ball’s suggestion the offices had been 
combined in 1803). Although Coleridge regarded Macaulay as intelligent, 
honest and amiable135 he was, at about eighty years of age, perhaps no 
longer effective in his role. Ball reported to Lord Windham that, even 
by 1802, it was a Mr Eton who was taking “the most active part in the 
administration of the civil Government”.136 Eton, who had left the Island 
sometime in September 1802 (but who retained his appointment), was to 
cause much trouble for Ball, both locally and in London.
Prior to Coleridge’s appointment, Edmond Chapman, the Under-
131 CN 2, 2271, Friday, 23 November 1804. The Royal Commissioners, who report-
ed in 1812, also found that the Civil Commissioners had legally “despotic” powers: 
see, British National Archive, Kew, CO 158/19 (hereafter referred to as Kew). This is 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
132 To Daniel Stuart, 22 August 1806, CL 2, 1178.
133 To Daniel Stuart, ibid.
134 Kew, CO 158/19. 
135 CN 2, 2430.
136 Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/19.
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Secretary,137 and Giuseppe Nicolo Zammit, the “Maltese Secretary”, 
probably bore the brunt of the Public Secretary’s work. The archives 
reveal that whilst some of the written instructions to the departments of 
government were still being issued under Macaulay’s signature, most were 
issued under Zammit’s.138 The frailty of the Public Secretary can clearly be 
seen in his markedly deteriorating handwriting during the latter part of 
1804. At this period Ball was arranging for Macaulay’s permanent successor 
to be appointed
The British staff also included the Reverend Francis Laing (who, at this 
time, acted as the private secretary to Ball139) and Edmond Chapman, the 
Under-Secretary. 
Ball had to confront significant staffing shortages when Coleridge 
reached Malta. Chapman was absent from the Island pursuing an 
important official mission to the Black Sea region to secure corn supplies.140 
Laing, who also acted as tutor to Ball’s only child, Keith, was going on 
leave to Scotland with the boy and one Anthony Sucheareau was intended 
as a temporary replacement for him.141 Given the staffing problems, Ball 
made Coleridge the offer of Chapman’s post as Under-Secretary during the 
137 Edmond Chapman did not remain long as an active Public Secretary follow-
ing his return from the Black Sea in September 1805. Ball informed Windham, the 
Secretary of State that Chapman had been given six months’ leave on the grounds 
of ill health and that Laing had been appointed as acting Public Secretary: Ball to 
Windham, Kew, 4 June 1806, CO, 158/12/17. The illness might possibly have been a 
diplomatic convenience since the corn mission, for which Chapman had been partly 
responsible, had recently failed. Ball may have wished to be rid of him: see further 
Chapter 2.
138 National Archive of Malta, Rabat, Malta LIBR A22 PS01/1. Hereafter referred 
to as NAM.
139 Laing, who had been appointed as Acting Public Secretary during Chapman’s 
medical leave eventually took over the latter’s post. Laing was Public Secretary 
from 1807-1813 whereupon the office became that of the Chief Secretary. He held 
this post until 1814. 
140 See Kew, CO 158/10. As we shall see, the Island was unable to produce suf-
ficient foodstuffs for its own needs. By a peace treaty between France and Naples 
of 1801, the weak Neapolitan king had been forced to impose an embargo on corn 
supplies to Malta, thus cutting off food supplies from the customary source. Find-
ing an alternative source, safe from French control, resulted in the corn mission to 
the Black Sea area. Coleridge was subsequently nominated for one of these mis-
sions (see below). Chapman’s expedition was only partly successful: see further 
Chapter 2. 
141 It was planned that, en route to Glasgow, they would stay with Mrs Coleridge 
and Southey at Greta Hall. Laing had been below Southey at Balliol College, Oxford 
University: To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 5 July 1804, CL 2, 1142.
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latter’s absence.142 After an assurance that the work would be “nominal” 
Coleridge accepted because the salary would defray the expenses of his 
planned journey to Sicily. Coleridge’s contribution must have been most 
welcome, if not absolutely necessary. Coleridge thus began his official tasks 
as Under-Secretary to Ball.
Under-Secretary
In 1804 Ball was seeking to persuade British policymakers not only of 
the case for the permanent retention of Malta but also, more generally, to 
influence British political and military strategy in the Mediterranean. He 
decided to use Coleridge’s talent and experience, as a political leader-writer, 
to help him with these tasks and to make the case that the Island should be 
permanently occupied by the British. 
Coleridge was soon drafting a series of substantial memoranda on such 
issues as “future British policy and war aims’ and “the intentions of the 
French”.143 Foreign policy in relation to Egypt, Sicily, and the North African 
coastal states were all subjects of papers from his pen.144 In them, Coleridge 
was willing to advocate the aggressive assertion of the British national 
interest even if this meant annexing sovereign territory, as he argued in 
the case of Egypt. These papers were passed either directly to Granville 
Penn, an official in the office of the Secretary of State for War in London, 
or to Nelson who was then commanding the British Mediterranean fleet 
blockading the French at Toulon. In order to inform and influence opinion 
at home, Coleridge discreetly “leaked” material advocating the importance 
of Malta to Daniel Stuart of the Courier, directing him to use the material, 
but to avoid quoting him.145
142 With the salary of the Under-Secretary during Chapman’s absence. To Wil-
liam Sotheby, 5 July 1804, CL 2, 1142, In this letter Coleridge mistakenly refers to 
himself as Ball’s private secretary.
143 Note CN 2, 2143. It was important inter alia to deny French trading opportuni-
ties in the Levant.
144 A Political Sketch on the Views of the French in the Mediterranean, originally draft-
ed by the Civil Commissioner but edited and polished by Coleridge; Insults and 
Abuses which Great Britain Received from the Government of Algiers During the Period 
of 18 Years from 1785-1803; a further paper on the retention of Malta by the British; 
also Observations on Egypt and a paper on Sicily in November 1804: see The Friend, I, 
168-78; 382-4;. See further letter To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1164; also 
the Coleridge Collection at the Victoria University library, Toronto. This material 
reveals the extent to which Coleridge was committed to Imperial expansion.
145 To Daniel Stuart, 6 July 1804, CL 2, 1146.
34 Coleridge’s Laws
Coleridge, notoriously, became as willing as Ball to advocate selfish 
British national interests, even if this meant abandoning principles (such as 
public international law). This was so, for example, in Coleridge’s advocacy 
of the annexation of Egypt, simply to frustrate French ambitions – an 
aggressive policy that would appear to make Britain imperially ambitious 
and little better than France had been in its annexation of sovereign 
territories.146 
Such was the contribution Coleridge was making that Ball’s confidence 
in him grew and by early July he was given “cool & commanding Rooms”147 
in the Governor’s Palace. (figs. 3 and 4). His success at this work, and his 
new regime – which included swimming before sunrise – dramatically 
lifted his spirits and improved his health. 
In late November, Ball informed the Earl of Camden that Coleridge was 
to be sent, with Captain Leake, on the signally important mission to the 
Black Sea to purchase corn.148 The success of this mission was critical to 
the maintenance of the Island’s population who, as we shall see in Chapter 
2, were highly dependent upon imported grain. According to Ball’s plan, 
should Captain Leake be called away from the region, Coleridge would 
have been empowered to act as his substitute. In that event, he would 
have had sole responsibility for the success of this strategic mission, the 
funds for which amounted to £98,680.149 Coleridge now seemed to be on 
the verge of building a career in the colonial service. Privately, however, he 
was reluctant to go. As matters turned out, he was not actually called upon 
to do so.
Coleridge, the Most Illustrious Lord, The Public 
Secretary 
“..Like a mouse in a Cathedral on a Fair or Market Day”.150
On 18 January 1805 Alexander Macaulay died in his sleep. Ball, thereupon, 
146 See Observations on Egypt and Kooy (1999).
147 To William Sotheby, 5 July 1804, CL 2, 1140.
148 Ball to Camden, 26 November 1804, Kew, CO 158/9/52.
149 Ibid. And see Ball to Cooke, 1 February 1806, Kew, CO 158/11/9 in which a fi-
nancial statement concerning the corn mission was enclosed. Ball was later rebuked 
for appointing Leake without the prior consent of the Secretary of State: Camden to 
Ball, 12 February 1805, Kew, CO 159/3/153. 
150 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170 (Figs. 3 and 4).
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4. The Governor’s [Civil Commissioner’s] Palace with the Treasury Building in 
the background (now the Casino Maltese). Coleridge moved from the Civil 
Commissioner’s Palace in Valletta to the Treasury in late 1804.
3.  The interior of the President’s Palace, Valletta. It would not have been less 
opulent when Coleridge resided there.
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appointed Coleridge as acting Public Secretary.151 Coleridge declined to 
serve as Treasurer and, eventually, drew only half the salary. Even so, the 
decision to assume, even temporarily, the Public Secretary’s responsibilities 
was one that Coleridge later regretted.152
As Coleridge’s Notebooks make clear, his appointment as the effective 
head of the civil service was “pro tempore of Mr Chapman’s Absence”153 
and that Chapman would have the permanent appointment upon his return 
from the Black Sea region. The previous British government had earlier 
approved Chapman’s appointment, so there was no question of Coleridge 
taking over permanently.154 Moreover, Ball expected Chapman’s return 
“almost daily” from Smyrna, so Coleridge’s new position was expected to 
be particularly short-lived. The day following Macaulay’s death Coleridge 
confirmed to the Wordsworths that he was still planning to leave the Island 
no later than at the end of March 1805.155 
The Public Secretary played a key role in the administration. As we shall 
see in Chapters 2 and 3, the British plan for the government of Malta was 
that legislative, executive and judicial power would be placed in the hands 
of the Civil Commissioner. That ultimate authority was co-ordinated and 
managed through the office of the Public Secretary, who served as head 
of the executive. The office-holder represented the authority of the Civil 
Commissioner in the day to day administration of the islands. As such, he 
was centrally important in the government of Malta and was placed second 
in civil dignity to the “Governor”. 
The scope of the role was, legally, undefined when Coleridge held office, 
but its usual demands placed Coleridge in charge of a number of civil 
servants.156 It gave him a place in Ball’s cabinet, as well as in the Segnatura or 
151 He declined the Treasurership, which meant that he received only half the sal-
ary otherwise due to the combined offices (i.e. £500). The roles had been combined 
since 1802: see Hobart to Ball, Kew, CO 159/3/108. It is likely that the role of Treas-
urer was not performed until Chapman’s return to the Island in September 1805.
152 To Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1167. 
153 CN 2, 2408 see also 2430; also to Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1163; 
and to Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, CL 2, 1165.
154 Ball to Camden, 30 January 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/1. Ball informed his supe-
rior of the death of Mr Macaulay and l continued, “I expect Mr Chapman daily from 
Constantinople, whom I shall put into the office of Public Secretary and Treasurer 
in conformity to the Orders sent me by the Earl of Buckinghamshire”. These had 
been dated 9 January 1804. His lordship replied to Ball confirming the appointment 
of Mr Chapman on 24 March 1805: Kew, CO 158/10/26. See also CN 2, 2430.
155 To the Wordsworths, 19 January 1805, CL 2, 1160; to Robert Southey, 2 Febru-
ary 1805, CL 2, 1163.
156 By 1814 there were twenty-one staff in the Public Secretary’s office. There 
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Council. The office-holder would normally have been required to oversee157 
about a dozen government departments, administer oaths and affidavits 
and arbitrate disputes between merchants – a constant task that Coleridge 
dreaded above all.158 He had also to issue passports,159 attend the Court 
of Vice-Admiralty,160 and draft the Bandi and Avvisi.161 Records of these 
had to be maintained locally, and, in some instances, copies had to be sent 
to England. The Public Secretary also held a magisterial appointment.162 
There is also evidence that Ball felt unable to take on the audit function and, 
thus, relied heavily upon the Public Secretary to perform it.163 
The departments whose work Coleridge had to oversee164 included the 
Public Treasury, the Lazaretto and Quarantine department; the Custom 
House; the harbour;165 the Grand Almoner’s Office for the Maintenance of 
the Poor; the Government Printing Office; the Tribunals; Two hospitals;166 
the Foundling and Invalids Hospital; and the Post Office. 
Additionally, there was the Università, the function of which had become 
central to Ball’s policies for the Island. This important issue is more fully 
would not have been significantly fewer in Coleridge’s time: Kew, CO 158/25/233.
157 CN 2, 2552.
158 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1170. 
159 Passports other than those to serving military officers were to be issued under 
the authority of the Civil Commissioner and be signed by the “Secretary of Govern-
ment”: Kew, CO 158/1/209.
160 Coleridge, who may have been required to attend the Court regularly, provid-
ed advocacy in a wig and gown: see to Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1163.
161 See below Chapter 4 and Sultana, 270-1.
162 Sultana, 149-50.
163 Ball to Edward Cooke 30 November 1807 Kew, CO 158/13/463.
164 Ball to Cooke 30 November 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/463at 465: “The superin-
tendence, indeed, of the public departments more immediately devolves on the 
joint office of Public Secretary and Treasurer; but the various duties attached to 
that situation must necessarily prevent the investigation of accounts which requires 
exclusive and undivided attention”. A list of the public departments was enclosed 
and can be found at Kew, CO 158/13/469. See also Ball to Shee, 12 May 1807, Kew, 
CO 158/13/ 315.
165 He received Harbour Reports: see e.g., CN 2, 2446 and CN 2, 2583; also the Av-
viso of 9 March 1805 concerning the shallow water in the Grand Harbour.
166 Ball had reported that the hospitals, one for men and another for women, 
were a principal expense of government. There had been spending abuses therein 
and he thought that it was possible to reduce the cost of maintaining them by about 
half: Ball to Dundas, 26 December 1800, Kew, CO 158/1/12-25. Cameron was di-
rected to investigate, reform and to impose strict controls: see his Instructions of 14 
May 1801. By 1805 one of the hospitals had been taken over for military purposes, 
although Coleridge retained a responsibility to conduct inspections: see CN 2, 2420 
and Sultana, 277. 
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considered in Chapter 2 together with an account of the other departments 
of state. 
A significant burden upon Coleridge’s time, and a duty Coleridge found 
particularly disagreeable, was the arbitration and the settlement of disputes 
involving British merchants.167 These disputes, ostensibly, fell within the 
jurisdiction of the Maltese Court, the Consolato del Mare. In his instructions, 
Charles Cameron (the first British Civil Commissioner, 1801-1802) had 
been ordered to abolish it, but it continued to function through Coleridge’s 
period in office. However, the proceedings in this court were lengthy 
and complicated and the court did not win the confidence of the British 
mercantile class who, much to the chagrin of Maltese lawyers, (and the 
Public Secretary) preferred arbitration to expensive litigation.168 Coleridge 
described himself (with reference to the requirement that he provide 
advocacy in the Court of Vice-Admiralty) as a “jack-of-all-trades”.169 
Soon after his appointment Coleridge reported that he was employed 
from 8am until 5pm on official business. This included writing “public 
letters and memorials’,170 – i.e. the laws and public notices with which we are 
presently concerned. He described this as a most anxious duty. He was also 
engaged, from time to time, in writing despatches.171 It seems that this work 
would not normally have fallen to his Office but, according to Coleridge, 
his talents were such that this work was assigned to him.172 Burdened as he 
was by persistent ill-health, by drug addiction, by poor morale, and the 
eclectic cacophony of his diverse governmental responsibilities it would be 
a tour de force if Coleridge entirely succeeded as a draftsman of Maltese law. 
By Easter, Coleridge was complaining that he had “for months 
past …incessantly employed in official tasks, subscribing, examining, 
administering oaths, auditing, etc”.173 For the first time he found that he 
had no time to write to his friends and family in England.174 He complained 
167 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169 & 1170; CN 2, 2451 (Notes), 15 
February 1805 and see also Sultana, 347.
168 The Royal Commission of 1812 was to recommend its abolition: Kew, CO 
158/19.
169 To Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1164.
170 He usually referred to the Bandi and Avvisi as public memorials: see Sultana, 
271. His role in their production is discussed in Chapter 4.
171 See e.g., Ball to Camden, 4 August 1804, Kew, CO 158/9/42.
172 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1160; to Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, 
CL 2, 1165.
173 CN 2, 2552. 
174 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1160; to Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, 
CL 2, 1165.
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that the work left him so tired, and his spirits so “exhausted” that he was 
almost unable to undress himself at night.175 He regarded his official duties 
not only as excessive, but also stressful.176 The role may simply have been 
too multi-faceted, requiring a range of skills that any office-holder, no 
matter how talented, would find difficult to discharge. 
Coleridge’s decision to decline the office of Treasurer was perhaps 
a judicious one. As we shall see in Chapter 2, the policy of introducing 
inexperienced Maltese into the civil service had disastrous consequences 
for accounting, auditing and record-keeping and there were insuperable 
problems with the national finances. At the same time, Ball’s Administration 
was embarking upon a disastrous financial speculation in the purchase of 
corn resulting in significant losses affecting the public finances
There was, eventually, to be some recognition that the spread of 
responsibility was too great. Ball was later to seek permission from London 
to appoint an auditor or comptroller-general to take over some of the 
responsibilities of the Public Secretary, since even that part of the role 
demanded “exclusive and individual attention”.177 This was something of 
a volte face on his part, for it was Ball who had initiated the overloading of 
the Public Secretary/Treasurer by securing the agreement of his superiors, 
in 1803, that one office-holder perform the combined roles.178 This 
blunder, which suggests the limited nature of Ball’s understanding, may 
have contributed to some of the serious structural failings of the British 
Administration. In an official acknowledgement that the workload of the 
combined Offices was too onerous, the roles were split in 1811.
Zammit and Coleridge’s role
There is strong evidence that Coleridge did not perform some of the key 
duties associated with the office of Public Secretary. There was, in effect, 
a gulf between what might be described as the informal, customary job 
description – the responsibilities and duties placed upon the office-holder 
– and those that Coleridge actually performed. However much Coleridge 
complained of overwork, it is likely that he did less than might otherwise 
have been expected. Leaving aside concerns about his health, and the effect 
175 To Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1166.
176 Ibid.
177 Ball to Cooke, 30 November 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/465, and also Ball to Shee, 
12 May 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/463; also ibid 315-6.
178 Sullivan to Ball, 31 December 1803, NAM Libr 531 18.
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that might have had on his effectiveness, he was not fully proficient in 
Italian, and not at all familiar with the unique system of administration 
on Malta. It is, therefore, unsurprising that others assisted him. We know 
that Coleridge worked closely with Zammit, the Maltese Secretary, a 
fellow member of the Segnatura and chief legal adviser to the government. 
Surviving records reveal that, after Macaulay’s death, Zammit’s role was 
enhanced. Despite his age, Zammit retained considerable energy: not only 
did he discharge a considerable workload, but he managed to do so until 
standing down on 15 June 1814. 
Records reveal that there were at least two areas of responsibility in 
which Coleridge was not engaged. The first concerns the Università, the 
supervision of which, as we have described, normally fell to the Public 
Secretary. Before Coleridge took office the greater number of letters 
from the Jurats (directors of the Università) were addressed to Macaulay, 
although some were addressed to Zammit or even to Ball himself.179 But 
after Macaulay’s death, when Coleridge took over, letters from the Jurats 
were never addressed to him. Instead the Jurats communicated either with 
Ball or Zammit. Once Coleridge quit Malta, and Chapman took office, the 
Jurats communicated with him as well as to Zammit.180 This raises the 
question about the extent to which the acting Public Secretary was fulfilling 
his responsibility of supervising the Università.
But this is not all, because a further important function of the Public 
Secretary’s office was the issuing of formal written instructions (‘ordini’) to 
the departments of government and other officials such as, for example, the 
Luogotenente or civil magistrates of the villages (casals).181 A similar pattern 
to that observed in the case of the Università emerges here. In 1804, whilst 
most ordini were issued in Zammit’s name, others were issued by Macaulay, 
as Public Secretary. After Macaulay’s death, no instructions are recorded as 
having been issued by Coleridge. Much of the work was undertaken by 
179 See National Library of Malta, Valletta, Malta, Univ 42 (hereafter referred to 
as NAM). Letters from the Jurats to Macaulay in 1804 are dated 27 June, 10 July, 4 
September and 26 October. 
180 E.g., NLM Univ 425, 16 May 1806.
181 The functions of the Luogotenenti were defined in a Bando of 14th December 
1801: NAM LIBR/MS 430 Bandi 1805 AL 1814. This was to keep the peace, safe-
guard of weights and measures in their districts as well as general responsibilities 
to look after the welfare of the local population, including particular responsibili-
ties in relation to the poor and also to represent in their community the authority of 
the Civil Commissioner: see Galea (1949). Coleridge visited Giuseppe Abdillo, the 
Luogotenente of Casal Safi and his family on 27 March 1805. Coleridge considered 
him a “good” official: CN, 2 2506. 
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Zammit, although Ball issued all instructions to the Treasury.182 Chapman, 
upon assuming office, after Coleridge’s departure, issued his first instruction 
on 4 October 1805 and continued to do so regularly thereafter. Thus, a gap 
emerges. In cases where it might have been expected that Coleridge would 
have issued instructions, none are recorded under his signature. He seems 
to have been entirely inactive in this respect.
Despite this evidence, Coleridge was stretched by the volume of 
the work. Even in the early days of his tenure of office his desk already 
laboured under a “cumulus” of hospital and harbour reports – an irritation 
that he seems to have resolved by using them to light his candle, an act of 
destruction only committed with a “trembling” conscience.183 References 
to the workload, and its effect upon him, occur more frequently from April 
1805. He reported that official work had kept him “incessantly employed”,184 
working “from morn to night”.185 There was undoubted stress, which left 
him unable to sleep. In late April he recorded: “So hard have I worked 
lately, & to so little effect in consequence of my Health, so many calls and 
claims – & such agitation and anxiety in consequence that this morning 
(awaking) very early – a little after 2 – mistaking the light of the Lamp…
for the Dawn, my Heart sunk within me”.186 The nightmares and nocturnal 
screaming had not left him.187 References to deteriorating health, in April 
1805, become apparent in his letters home.188 When the letters and papers 
he had sent home (documents that he had entrusted to the Captain in his 
capacity as Public Secretary) were thrown overboard from the Arrow when 
she was attacked by French frigates (figs. 5 and 6) he felt exasperated at 
182 An illustrative list of these receiving formal written instructions in 1805 and 
their source appears in NAM LIBR A22 PS01/2. These would include the Universita 
della Valletta, 52 (Ball); Concessione del Ballo di Marmuscetto (Zammit), 52; Presi-
dente della Gran Corte della Valletta 53 (Ball); Presidente della Gran Corte della 
Valletta 57 (Zammit); Amministratori de Bene Publiche 59 (Zammit); Giurati della 
Valletta, 60 (Zammit); Commissari di Sanità, 61 (Zammit); Intendente di Polizia, 
67(Zammit); Circolare alli Luogotenenti di Campagna, 90 (Zammit); Presidenti 
degli Ospedali, 91 (Zammit); Tesoreria del Goveno (Ball); Luogotenente di casal 
Attard, 97 (Zammit) and Casal Zebbug, 102 (Zammit); Capitan di Verga, 108 (Zam-
mit); Giurati della Valletta, 108 (Ball); Luogotenente in Birchircarà, 111 (Zammit). 
183 CN 2, 2446.
184 CN 2, 2552.
185 CN 2, 2557.
186 CN 2, 2560.
187 CN 2, 2468.
188 E.g. to Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1166 ; to the Wordsworths of the same 
date, CL 2, 1168; to Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169.
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what he described as “an evil destiny”.189
The work Coleridge encountered was onerous. This is so not only in its 
volume but also in its significance, for Coleridge found himself at the heart 
of government with responsibilities for its successful administration as 
well as financial rectitude. As we shall see, some of the public action he was 
required either to take or, at least, to support was of questionable morality. 
Such conduct does not cohere well either with the idea of the rule of law or 
the separation of powers. But it does fit with expectations of the role. When 
the Revd Francis Laing subsequently took over the role, an independent 
observer noted that the role of Public Secretary “certainly requires the 
189 To Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, CL 2, 1165. In the same letter Coleridge de-
scribed how, prior to the Arrow incident, a further, large, set of papers had been 
burnt. He had entrusted them to a Major Adye who had died of plague in Gibraltar. 
It was standard practice to burn the effects of the deceased for fear of contagion.
5. Aquatint bearing the inscription: “To the R.t Hon.ble. Lord Viscount Nelson, 
K.B. Duke of Bronte &c. &c. &c., This Print of the commencement of the gallant 
defence, made by His Majesty’s Sloop Arrow of 23 Guns & 132 Men,  Richard 
Budd Vincent Esq.r Commander; and His Maj: Bomb Vessel Acheron of 8 
Guns and & 57 Men, Arthur Farquhar Esq.r Com.r against the French Frigate, 
L’Hortense and L’Incorruptible of 44 Guns & 550 Men each, including troops 
of the Line, which took place on the Morning of the 4.th of Feb.y 1805, off Cape 
Palos; for the preservation of a Valuable Convoy Is (by Permission most humbly 
Dedicated by his most obliged humble Servant, George Andrews. [&] To the R.t 
Hon.ble. Lord Viscount Nelson, K.B. Duke of Bronte &c. &c. &c.,” Painted by F. 
Sartorius. Engraved by J. Jeakes. Published Oct. 21. 1805, by G. Andrews, No. 7, 
Charing Cross
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exercise of talents not very compatible with the clerical character”.190 This 
speaks volumes about the hard-edged nature of Coleridge’s new role, 
which was entirely subservient to the overriding British strategic goals. 
The somewhat tainting experience of raw political action prompted 
Coleridge towards an intellectual response that strove to subject practical 
politics to Reason and principle. This struggle began within days of his 
appointment as Acting Public Secretary. He posed a question for himself in 
his private Notebooks: “Wherein is Prudence distinguishable from Goodness 
(or Virtue) – and how are they both nevertheless one and indivisible”.191 The 
Friend is a sustained engagement with this project. Indeed, it concludes, 
“Nothing is to be deemed rightful in civil society, or to be tolerated as 
such, but what is capable of being demonstrated out of the laws of pure 
Reason”.192 
His experience of public office, and reflections upon it, eventually led 
him to reject a utilitarian conception of political morality. Governmental 
action should not merely be concerned with the consequences of a political 
decision but the impulses that directed and motivated it. A concern with 
actions and consequences should not make government indifferent to 
190 A. William, Court to Bunbury, 10 November 1812, Kew, CO 158/18.
191 CN 2, 2412, 23 January 1805.
192 The Friend, I, 167.
6. Coloured aquatint of the sinking of His Majesty’s Sloop Arrow.  Painted by F. 
Sartorius. Engraved by J. Jeakes. Published Oct. 21. 1805, by G. Andrews, No. 7, 
Charing Cross 
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considerations of morality. Coleridge concluded that these “inward” 
motives contributed the essence of morality to the outward expression of 
public policy.193 This meant that governmental action, that might appear 
to be justified after a purely empirical analysis, might nevertheless fall 
short of the appropriate standard for public action. He later offered, as an 
example, the terms under which the British concluded the Treaty of Amiens 
in 1802. Whilst the Treaty ended hostilities with France, Malta had been 
forced by the British to accept the return of the despotic Order of St John 
which would fall under French influence and expose the Maltese (who had 
rebelled against their former French occupiers) to the risk of reprisals.194 
We can surmise that it was his disappointment with the ethical standards 
of colonial administration that led him, upon his return to England, to 
express such powerful condemnations of the “wickedness” of colonial 
government.195
Our names, and but our names can meet196
He gradually sank into renewed opium consumption that confined him 
to his room for substantial periods. He thought that he appeared efficient 
in his public role. Ruminating in his Notebooks over Christmas 1804 he 
concluded that, in Malta, he was seen as a “quiet well meaning man, rather 
dull indeed”.197 At weekends he seems to have withdrawn to his books and 
opium. Notebook entries, sometimes barely coherent, were scribbled in the 
small hours of the night. Unable to free himself from his addiction, his 
thoughts rambled from homesickness198 to suicide.199 Privately, especially 
when Chapman did not appear as expected, Coleridge was struggling 
with despair.200 He began to wonder whether he would survive to see his 
family and friends.201 He was glad when one convoy was delayed – it might 
mean that he could return in it, for he could not endure the possibility it 
193 The Friend, I, 314. It is revealing that in his Notebook Coleridge had interested 
himself in the relationship between positive law and “the dictates of right reason= 
inter Jus et aequitatem”. CNB 2413 21.578.
194 Coleridge regarded the Treaty as disregarding British national honour: The 
Friend, I, 571. See Appendix 2.
195 To Daniel Stuart, 22 August 1806, CL 2, 1177.
196 From An Exile thought to have been composed by Coleridge whilst on Malta.
197 CN 2, 2372.
198 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169.
199 CN 2, 2510; CN 2, 2527; CN 2, 2557.
200 CN 2, 2486, Sunday, 17 March 1805.
201 CN 2, 2560.
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should depart without him. But he was also at a loss to know where to 
go.202 He had clearly decided not to return to Greta Hall, and had resolved 
to separate from his wife.203 
His early enchantment with Malta left him. He grumbled about the 
incessant noise of life in Valletta.204 The Easter festivities, which involved 
the firing of guns and letting off of fireworks – behaviour that remains to 
this day a feature of the many Catholic festivals of the Island – seemed 
particularly irksome.205 Even the “torture” of reveillée and the parade 
drums of the English garrison eventually grated upon him.206 He bewailed 
the other denizens of street life: the courtship of Maltese cats, the pigs 
(which yelled rather than grunted) and “revival and playfulness” after 
sunset of the noisy packs of dogs, and, worse still, their night-long combat 
with the pigs.207 He lamented the street cries, and the priests; even the 
Maltese advocates were a noisy and an abrasive profession.208 
The intense summer heat caused prickly heat on his body, although 
without unpleasant sensations.209 Performing his many tasks in the extreme 
heat must have been debilitating. He awaited Chapman’s return with 
almost desperate, homesick, eagerness.210 He wrote to his wife, in August, 
that he could leave once he had completed “six public letters and examined 
into the Law forms of the Island’ – a commitment that would not burden 
him for more than a week.211 It is not at all clear what work Coleridge meant 
by the ”Law forms of the Island”. Following this letter, only one further 
proclamation (Bando) was issued under his signature; and there are no 
further surviving Public Notices (Avvisi). 
His health was not as robust as he would have wished. For this he blamed 
the lack of exercise caused by his duties. His departure still depended, 
202 CN 2, 2536.
203 CN 2, 2536. But letters to her were reassuring. For example on 21 August 1805 
he wrote to his wife: “My dear Sara! May God bless you be assured, (sic) I shall 
never, never cease to do every thing that can make you happy”. CL 2, 1172.
204 CN 2, 2614.
205 CN 2, 2547.
206 CN 2, 2614.
207 CN 2, 2635; CN 2, 2641.
208 CN 2, 2614. 
209 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170.
210 Notwithstanding his claim that he missed his friends and family in England 
he extended his travels in Italy thereby delaying his return to England until August 
1806. He separated from his wife following his eventual return to the Lake District, 
Holmes (1998), 77-80.
211 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170.
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however, upon Chapman’s much delayed return to Malta; and, when this 
eventually occurred, on 6 September 1805, the Notebook exudes relief. An 
Avviso, signed by Ball, was issued on 21 September 1805 announcing that 
Chapman had been appointed to the office of Public Secretary. Coleridge 
recorded, in his Notebook, that he quit Malta on Monday, 23 September, 
1805.212 He was never to return.
An Assessment
Although questions can be posed about Coleridge’s effectiveness in office 
(see Chapter 6), it seems that he continued to enjoy the Civil Commissioner’s 
trust and confidence. Coleridge even claimed, in August 1805, that Ball 
had “contrived” to keep him on the Island and prevent his return.213 Some 
corroborating evidence for this assertion survives. On 18 September 1805, 
Ball wrote to Granville Penn, assuring him that Coleridge had fulfilled 
the duties of Public Secretary to Ball’s “satisfaction”.214 Significantly, Ball 
proposed that Coleridge should be offered William Eton’s post at a salary 
of three hundred pounds a year.215 Because the Superintendency of the 
Lazaretto and Quarantine Department would not over-extend him, Ball felt 
that Coleridge could continue to assist Ball’s Government. He particularly 
wanted to exploit Coleridge’s experience as a political journalist in so far as 
Coleridge should work with Barzoni, the editor of the Malta Gazette, to make 
that newspaper an effective propaganda tool for advocating British policy. 
However, the letter makes clear that wider, perhaps ad hoc, responsibilities 
were also envisaged. Ball’s emphasis that Coleridge’s appointment would 
serve an important public interest itself suggests an intention to keep 
Coleridge on the pay roll at the heart of Government.216
Whilst Ball was genuinely keen to retain Coleridge’s services, we must 
also acknowledge the possibility of some mixed motives. Ball had powerful 
reasons for wishing to be rid of Eton. The appointment of Coleridge in his 
place would achieve this. Eton was a conspiratorial political opponent who 
212 Coleridge, mistakenly, dated the Monday as 21 September 1805: CN 2, 2673.
213 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170.
214 A draft letter in which Ball recommended Coleridge’s “talents and good moral 
character” to his brother also survives: Wordsworth Trust, Grasmere, manuscript 
WLMS A/ Ball, Alexander, Sir/2.
215 If this proposal had been accepted, Ball would also have rid himself of a bitter 
political enemy.
216 Wordsworth Trust, Grasmere, manuscript WLMS A/ Ball, Alexander, Sir/2.
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would agitate for many years to alter British policy and undermine Ball’s 
authority.217 This dangerous political enemy was eventually discredited 
and dismissed from office. Regrettably, from Ball’s perspective, this only 
occurred after Ball’s premature death in 1809. 
Nothing came of Ball’s proposal to retain Coleridge. After spending 
the winter of 1805-1806 in Italy, Coleridge eventually returned to England 
in August 1806. His opium addiction was unresolved, and his health and 
morale actually seemed to have deteriorated during his absence. When the 
moment had come to sail he described himself as exhausted. The prospect 
of his homecoming offered little joy.218 
Dorothy Wordsworth was deeply moved at their reunion when he 
eventually returned to the North: “..never, never did I feel such a shock as 
at first sight of him”.219 She was convinced that he was ailing: “..but that 
he is ill I am well assured; and must sink if he does not grow more happy. 
His fatness has quite changed him-it is more like the flesh of a person in a 
dropsy than one in health; his eyes are lost in it”.220 
She offered a vivid description of a man in decline: “He is utterly 
changed; and yet sometimes, when he was animated in conversation 
concerning things removed from him, I saw something of his former self. 
But never when we were alone with him. He then scarcely ever spoke of 
anything that concerned him, or us, or our common friends nearly, except 
we forced him to it; and immediately he changed the conversation to Malta, 
Sir Alexander Ball, the corruption of government, anything but what we 
were yearning after”. Dorothy portrayed a man who was distant and 
abstracted, ill and unhappy.221 Such comments invite the conclusion that 
he might have failed in his primary goal in travelling to the Mediterranean, 
and sunk further into addiction and illness, without worthwhile gain. 
Coleridge refuted this assessment; and powerful advocates would 
support him. Shaffer, for example, has demonstrated how Coleridge’s 
217 See further Chapter 2. His book Materials for an Authentic History of Malta 
which was made ready for printing in 1805 but not published until 1807 was highly 
critical of the administration on Malta. 
218 Suicidal thoughts were expressed in verse: see, for example, his fragmentary 
“Come, come thou bleak December wind” composed at Leghorn on 7 June 1806.
219 Dorothy Wordsworth to Catherine Clarkson, 6 November 1806, De Selincourt, 
277; See also Gittings, and Manton, 157.
220 Ibid.
221 Coleridge found it impossible to return to live permanently with his wife, but 
his children remained a joy: see e.g., the lines written to Hartley at about the time 
of his return from Malta: “Could you stand upon Skiddaw, you would not from its 
whole ridge/ See a man who so loves you as your fond S. T. Coleridge”.
48 Coleridge’s Laws
period in the Mediterranean contributed to his understandings and ideas 
on art, art criticism and philosophy.222 And Kooy has shown how, when 
Coleridge was forced to confront the grim, pragmatic compromises of 
practical politics, it forced him to renew his endeavours in political theory 
to advance the case for a “purer” politics founded in reason and principle.223 
This engagement first emerged in The Friend. When Coleridge offered 
an account of Malta he was unequivocal: his administrative experience, 
in particular his close association with Sir Alexander Ball, had been an 
instructive and valuable experience. He had seen how government worked, 
had experienced at first hand the vigorous pursuit of national self-interest; 
he had witnessed the careful and, arguably misleading, manoeuvrings of a 
Civil Commissioner determined to retain Malta; he had even lent his pen 
to these projects. He had exercised governmental power in his own right, 
drafting Proclamations and Public Notices, for the good government of 
Malta, that could entail the severest punishment of those who committed 
ostensibly trivial crimes.224 He had even indulged in manipulative 
“spin”, having been prepared to exploit the well-known Maltese dislike 
of foreigners in order to secure public support for otherwise unpopular 
taxation.225 He could, in future, write with the authoritative knowledge, of 
how politics worked, that his earlier works necessarily lacked.
‘Let Eagles Bid the Tortoise Sunward Soar’226
Sadly for Coleridge, the hoped-for cure for his addiction had been chimeric. 
The decade after his return was plagued by separation from his wife and 
children, fitful literary achievement, unsuccessful quackery and opium 
collapses. Only when he went to live with Dr Gillman in Highgate, in 1816, 
did he receive appropriate and (by the standards of the time) successful 
treatment. His condition stabilised and, whilst remaining a controversial 
222 Shaffer (1989).
223 Kooy (1999).
224 E.g., the punishment of mandatory exile was extended to those who let lodg-
ings to unregistered foreigners. A landlord who was deceived-for example, by the 
production of false papers- had no defence. He may also have approved of the deci-
sion to exile a boy of 12 years of age for spreading malicious rumours: see Chapter 
5: Public Order and Crime.
225 See Bando 8 March 1805, NAM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f.2. The 
official line inferring that foreigners were somehow less deserving than the Maltese 
might have had unfortunate consequences given the uprising against the local Jew-
ish community a few weeks later.
226 CN 2, 2932 (October-November 1806).
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figure, he largely re-established his position in the pantheon of the English 
Romantic movement. It is a testament to the skill with which Gillman 
treated him that a long-term heart condition rather than the toxic effects 
of opium caused his premature death at Highgate on 25 July 1834. He was 
just sixty-one years of age.
 2. Coleridge’s Malta
Introduction 
When Coleridge assumed the role of Public Secretary he was, as we have 
seen, acting as head of the Executive. He exercised a role that required 
him to implement the policies of the Civil Commissioner, Sir Alexander 
Ball, who had the ultimate administrative, legislative and judicial authority. 
Coleridge was required to understand the nature and function of the 
Maltese institutions, the legal system, and to assimilate the detail of the 
political, economic, social and legal policies that Ball was either required 
or authorised to implement by the British Secretary of State. As we shall 
describe, the British decided to continue and to exploit the constitutional 
arrangements of the former ruler – the Order of St John of Jerusalem. A 
consequence of this policy was that British provincial administrators, such 
as Coleridge, were required to administer a territory within a legal and 
political framework very different from their own.1 Chapter 3 provides 
an evaluation of the system, chosen by the British for Malta, based upon 
indirect rule, together with the Civil Commissioner’s constitutional powers, 
his accountability to the law, and the nature of the constitutional relationship 
between the Maltese administration and the Metropolitan territory. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the wider Maltese context. In 
the first section, we shall survey the Maltese social, political and economic 
background together with the British strategy for the government of the 
islands before turning, in the second section, to a brief evaluation of the 
important Maltese institutions, including the legal system. In the final 
section, we will address the public reputation and standing of Ball’s 
administration in order to explain why Coleridge’s laws represented a 
crucially important political engagement with the Maltese people that 
transcended mere law making. It will be also be helpful to note the political 
1 For a general introduction to the geopolitical context see M. Rapport,  Nine-
teenth-Century Europe, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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and military events surrounding the British conquest and its aftermath, not 
least because these events provided some of the early causes of friction 
between the British and the Maltese, and thus contributed to the problems 
that Coleridge inherited in public office. 
2.1.  Maltese Social Political and 
Economic Context
Preliminary Remarks: The Maltese Islands
The Maltese archipelago comprising Malta, Gozo and Comino, lies at the 
crossroads of the Mediterranean, between the Islamic states of North Africa 
and Europe. The territory of the islands is small, extending little beyond 
one hundred and twenty square miles. At the time of Coleridge’s stay on 
the Island, the Maltese population numbered about 100,000. 2 
Since 1530, Malta had been in the possession of the Knights Hospitaller 
of the Order of St John of Jerusalem who had acted as a regional military 
power. The resistance of the knights to the westward expansion of the 
Turkish empire culminated in the “Great Siege” of 1565. The Order, under 
the leadership of the Grandmaster la Valette, successfully resisted this 
epic Turkish assault mounted by some thirty thousand Ottoman troops. 
The attempted invasion eventually suffered defeat at the hands of a mere 
six thousand defenders and some six hundred knights. The halt of the 
Ottoman expansion in the western Mediterranean emphasised the strategic 
value and defensive strength of Malta, which was further improved by the 
subsequent construction of the city of Valletta with its massive fortifications. 
Valletta’s two vast, natural harbours, Marsamxett Harbour and Great 
Harbour, were formidable natural assets. From these, the Order’s navy 
formally engaged the Turkish fleet, as well as the shipping of the Barbary 
States.3 The harbours gave Malta its strategic importance for the British 
2 The Friend, I, 577. The population increased rapidly during the period of pros-
perity, 1805-1812 to reach about 120,000 by the latter date. This population growth 
caused the many frictional and macro-economic effects outlined by the Royal Com-
mission in 1812: Kew, CO 158/19.
3 The “Barbary States” referred to the territory between seaports of Tangiers and 
Tripoli. Britain and other nations trading in the Mediterranean, including France, 
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after it was won from the French in 1800. 
Valletta (often called “La Valette” by the British) became, and remains 
today, the capital city. The city was purpose-built as a walled fortress that 
held a strong defensive position on a peninsula between Marsamxett 
Harbour and Great Harbour. The foundation stone was laid in 1566, a 
year after the withdrawal of the Turkish invaders. Its design included 
many fine churches, a baroque cathedral and palaces as well as gardens 
for recreational use. These gardens were turned over to military use by the 
British after 1800.
Valletta’s suburb, Floriana, lay outside the city walls; the neighbouring 
“three cities” of Senglea, Vittoriosa and Cospicua4 lay on the far (eastern) 
side of Grand Harbour away from Valletta. Collectively, Valletta and the 
three cities were administered as “the magistracy of the four cities”. 
The more heavily populated region of Malta comprised the eastern 
portion of the Island including the capital, Valletta, and the other cities. 
In the countryside, there were twenty-one “casals” or villages5 each of 
which was administered by a Luogotenente or civil magistrate. To the 
north and west lay a more sparsely inhabited area which, nonetheless, 
included some dozen smaller “casals”.6 The reason for the concentration 
of population originated in the fear of raids by Barbary corsairs, which 
had once made those residing in the “uninhabited” region vulnerable to 
capture as slaves. Historically, this area had been under-developed, but by 
Coleridge’s time, the threat to increased settlement had been removed: the 
British had maritime supremacy and they had concluded a Treaty with the 
Dey of Algiers,7 guaranteeing the security of Maltese inhabitants from the 
predations of his corsairs. Since its climate and soil were indistinguishable 
paid the Dey of Algiers a tribute of money and other goods in order to ensure the 
safe passage of their vessels. The corsairs of the Dey raided the ships of other na-
tions, including those of the recently independent United States. This resulted in 
the Tripolitan War, 1801-1805, although this conflict did not finally resolve the prob-
lem of piracy and tribute.
4 These cities were renamed after the siege. Bormla became Cospicua; Birgu was 
re-named Vittoriosa; and L’Isla became Senglea. The cities are still occasionally re-
ferred to by their former names. The “Cottonera” is a reference to the Cottonera 
defensive lines – landward fortifications enclosing the three cities. These were con-
structed under the auspices of the Grandmaster Nicolas Cottonera in the 1670’s.
5 Ball to Dundas, 26 December 1800, Kew, CO 158/1/12-25. The memorandum is 
unsigned but has been attributed to Ball: see Royal Instructions from Hobart to 
Cameron, Hardman 350 et. seq.
6 Ibid.
7 Treaty of 19 March 1801: see Hardman 349-50. 
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from the more cultivated parts of the Island, this area represented a 
realisable opportunity for both habitation and agricultural development. 
Coleridge recorded that the gradual enclosure of the uncultivated part of 
the Island was under way by the time of his arrival.8 
The British Conquest and its Aftermath – The British 
Soldier and “Unhealthy” Posts9 
The French had conquered Malta in 1798 whilst its forces, led by Napoleon, 
were en route to the planned campaign in Egypt. After a popular Maltese 
uprising, aided by the armed forces of Britain and other nations, the 
occupying French garrison in Valletta was forced, in September 1800, to 
capitulate. The successful military strategy had been characterised by a 
two-year siege of Valletta and a blockade of the islands by the Royal Navy. 
By the time that Valletta fell, the French garrison had been reduced to 
starvation, and little remained on the Island to feed the population. 
Moreover, the events surrounding the British conquest and its aftermath 
are also important because they contributed to the declining confidence in 
Ball’s administration. Amongst the early causes of friction was the, highly 
8 The Friend, I, 570.
9 Ball to Dundas, (undated 1801), Kew, CO 158/1, 3.
7. The Porte des Bombes, a gateway into Floriana and thus into Valletta from the 
countryside of Malta. Lith. By C. de Brocktorff [1838].
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controversial, negotiation of the French surrender.10 The British had agreed 
the capitulation with the French commanders without consulting the 
Maltese, who felt slighted because, in their view, the British merely aided 
the Maltese military struggle with troops whose bravery and commitment 
was open to question, even by their own commanders.11 This resentment, 
compounded by unsatisfactory terms, exacerbated social and economic 
problems for Ball’s second administration (1802-1809). But that was not all. 
The absence of any public acknowledgement that the Maltese had, in law, 
become British subjects, after 1800, helped to create a divided society in 
which the British were seen as a dominant and foreign ruling class. The 
Maltese had purported to place themselves under British rule in 1802, but 
the apparent unwillingness of the British to accept their request, and make 
an unambiguous declaration that Malta formed a part of the British Empire, 
sent a signal that the fulfilment of their wishes was not Britain’s dominant 
pre-occupation. 
After the capture of Valletta, prize money had been promised to the 
Maltese who had taken part in the conflict; but the British, in an unwise 
volte face, angered and frustrated the Maltese who soon felt aggrieved and 
betrayed. Further Maltese dismay was caused by the Treaty of Amiens, 
under which Britain showed itself willing to sacrifice Maltese interests by 
restoring the islands to the unpopular and despotic Order of St John.12 The 
refusal to respect Maltese wishes also undermined trust and confidence in 
the British administration. 
The Siege and Depression 1800-1805: “The Plaintive 
Tones of Mendicancy’13
The lengthy blockade and siege of Valletta had profound consequences for 
both the economy and the administration of the Island. Battle and other 
damage associated with both neglect and military operations was extensive. 
Un-repaired highways, smashed buildings and other damaged parts of the 
infrastructure were problems that the new British administration, after 1800, 
had to address. Valletta, wrote Ball, was as if storm-swept: many houses had 
been damaged  or destroyed; the shops had been plundered and emptied 
10 Bonnici. The controversy is also discussed by Staines (2008).
11 ‘Humble Representation of the Deputies of Malta and Gozo’ in October 1801, 
English translation, with annotated alterations: Kew, CO158/2; see also Hardman, 
410-15 and See Ball to Sir Henry Dundas, (undated,1801), Kew, CO 158/1, 3.
12 Cameron to Hobart, 13 November 1801, Kew, CO 158/2/16.
13 The Friend, I, 567.
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of stock, and the inhabitants “reduced to misery”;14 indeed, they were close 
to starvation. Coleridge described how the economic depression was so 
severe that large numbers of the poor could only survive by begging on 
the streets. Many would congregate along a thoroughfare in Valletta called 
the “Nix Mangiare Stairs”, named after the cry of the supplicants who had 
nothing to eat.15 The French had looted the assets of the islands, including 
the Università and the Monte di Pietà (below) leaving the Island short of 
capital for reconstruction. Raising additional revenue by levying further 
taxation posed Constitutional problems that Coleridge was required to 
address. 
Naturally, during the blockade, international trade had ceased altogether. 
The collapse of the cotton trade, in which many of the Maltese were, in 
some way, connected, further reduced the Island’s revenue and contributed 
to the economic problems faced by the British. 
The maritime fleet had also been destroyed after the besieged French 
had broken up Maltese vessels, in the harbours, for firewood. This crippled 
the merchant capacity of the Island and impeded efforts to re-establish 
international commerce.16 
But the loss of those vessels also created a more pressing problem. The 
lack of grain in Valletta, at the time of the surrender, compelled Ball to 
rely upon foreign-owned vessels to import supplies. As we shall see, he, 
controversially, granted passports to the foreign owners on the grounds 
that these vessels would be crewed by Maltese. This caused continuing 
embarrassment for the British. In 1805 Coleridge would be required to issue 
a public notice to prevent further abuses.17 He grasped the opportunity to 
exculpate Ball (who had breached international law and brought Britain to 
the brink of war with the Dey of Algiers) by explaining that a public good 
can and ought to be furnished even if the government was compelled to act 
outside of a normative framework.
The Order of St John of Jerusalem: “Beings of a 
Different Race”18
The policy of the British ministers, and, therefore, of the administration 
14 Ball to Cooke, 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/187-8.
15 The Friend, I, 567.
16 Ball to Cooke, 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/187.
17 See Chapter 5.9: Passports.
18 The Friend, I, 536.
56 Coleridge’s Laws
on Malta, was to continue, so far as possible, the legal, constitutional and 
political structures of the ancien regime of the Knights of the Order of St 
John, as it had applied in 1798. The Knights and their paternalistic system 
of government are, therefore, of central importance to any account of Malta 
and, indeed, of Coleridge’s role on the Island. What follows here are some 
brief introductory remarks about the Order and its policies. 
Prior to their withdrawal from Malta following the French invasion, 
the Order had been drawn from aristocratic European families and 
comprised a lay and an ecclesiastical elite. The most important feature of 
their administration was that all legislative, executive and administrative 
authority was vested in the Grandmaster under an autocratic system. The 
Order refused to share power with the Maltese, which meant that there 
was no popular assembly with legislative powers. The Maltese were a 
subjugated people.
As part of their founding charitable and military mission, the Order 
had pursued the expensive welfare and health care policies that Britain 
eventually agreed to continue. These policies may have had unintended 
consequences because the Maltese were inclined to look to government to 
provide benefits for them. This culture of reliance was later to influence 
British policy and create significant burdens for the Administration.19 
The regime of the Order of St John fell into a rapid decline during and, 
in particular, at the close of, the eighteenth century. Coleridge clearly held 
them in contempt.20 According to him, the Knights had been “useless idlers” 
who were “generally illiterate”. Coleridge explained that, as a celibate order, 
they had laid aside any pretence of adhering to their vows of chastity by 
openly preying upon the Maltese population to acquire mistresses; often, it 
seems, this was achieved by forceful seduction.21 Each family amongst the 
more affluent classes of the Maltese had one of the Knights as a patron to 
whom a daughter or sister was, as Coleridge put it, “sacrificed”.22 With not 
19 As we shall see in Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime, there were frictions 
between the entrepreneurially effective Jewish community and the inhabitants.
20 The Friend, I, 536. 
21 Hardman describes how the husbands of attractive women might find them-
selves banished; similarly fathers of daughters who caught the eye of the Knights. 
Their predations seem to have fallen in particular upon urban families; and in Val-
letta there may not have been a single family unaffected by it. See Hardman, Chap-
ter 1.
22 The Friend, I, 536; and Table Talk, I, 475, 16 April 1834. The latter records that, in 
Coleridge’s opinion, moral corruption was not confined to the Knights of the Order 
at the time of the capitulation in 1800. Ball’s task in addressing it was a considerable 
one.
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inconsiderable irony, given the British strategy for government, Coleridge 
further added that, as “aliens”, they regarded themselves as a privileged 
social and governing class, who absolutely refused to share power with 
the Maltese. He regarded their government as a contagion, “a perpetual 
influenza” – an indictment that invites the conclusion that their rule was 
almost without worthwhile achievement.23
Coleridge seems to have given the Order little credit for the creation 
of charitable institutions and the welfare policies of the government that 
clearly benefited the disadvantaged members of the Maltese population. 
The provision of abundant and affordable food, as well as health care 
and welfare payments for the destitute, were achievements that deserved 
recognition. He also omitted to mention publicly the significant architectural, 
artistic and cultural achievements (not the least of which is the magnificent 
Cathedral of St John in Valletta) which he recorded in his contemporary 
Notebooks.24 It seems that the passage of time had hardened his views.
From the British point of view, continuing the Constitution of the Order 
created unforeseen problems that exposed the difficult tensions between 
modernity and tradition. The consequence of the Order’s unpopularity 
23 The Friend, I, 536 et seq.
24 “Of the Maltese/ my first impression, their ingratitude to the Order to whom 
they owe everything, those splendid Towers of Balsan”: CN 2. 2567.
 8.  St John’s Cathedral, Valletta. Lithograph by C. de Brocktorff [1838] 
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with the Maltese seems particularly to have been overlooked. When, in 
1802, the British proposed to restore the Order as governors of the Island, 
there was popular outrage that the despotic rulers could return.25 What 
the British did not appreciate was that by continuing the constitutional 
system created by the Order (with the Civil Commissioner exercising the 
powers of the former Grandmaster) they had perpetuated a system which 
was not universally popular. Thus, the key strategic goal of stability – and 
the “attachment” of the Maltese inhabitants to British rule – was threatened 
by the British decision to adopt a constitutional and political system that 
placed it at risk.
2.2.  The Maltese Economy 
Finances
The financial state of the Island was to became a pressing and intractable 
concern for the British administrators. The central tenet of British policy 
was to continue the institutions and policies of the Order, but acquiring the 
revenue to sustain this policy became problematic. 
During the time of the Order, the islands’ revenue had been derived 
from various sources, including excise duties, the profits the Order derived 
from commissioning privateers as well as rents from property on Malta 
owned by the Order. More important than any of these, were the revenues 
arising from each individual Knight’s European estates. However, this 
revenue was reduced by three quarters26 after the French confiscated the 
assets of the Order in France in 1792.27 From the point of view of both the 
inhabitants and the Order the confiscation had been calamitous because 
the government’s finances were plunged into a grave and irredeemable 
deficit.28 
25 Cameron to Hobart, Kew, CO 158/1/335, 23 October 1801.
26 See Hardman, 548. The immediate loss of revenue as a result of the actions of 
the French Republic was about £50,000 per annum. In 1788 the Island’s revenue was 
£136,417, but by 1798 this was reported to have declined to a mere £34,663 14s 2d. 
See also Ball to Dundas, 26 December 1800, above n. 5.
27 It has been estimated that the Knights spent circa £180,000 p.a. in Malta from 
their overseas revenues: see Bartolo. 
28 In 1796, this was £34, 249.
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During the final days of the Order, local discontent at the failure of its 
welfare policies threatened political instability. The Order became desperate 
to secure the fragile foundation of its government by negotiating to place 
itself under the protection of Russia. The French, who disapproved of this 
development, had responded by mounting an invasion in 1798. 
When Britain took over, and prepared a report upon the financial state 
of the Island, these structural economic weaknesses were entirely omitted 
from it. Captain Ball, (later, Sir Alexander Ball), represented to London, 
in December 1800,29 that the expenses of government would be minimal. 
This puzzling misrepresentation was to have very serious consequences 
for him when he returned to office, in 1802-1809, because the Secretary of 
State in London ordered him, in effect, to deliver the welfare policies and a 
balanced budget. These were incommensurate policy goals.
Food and “the Casualties of Ordinary Commerce’30
One of the Island’s major strategic problems was its inability to produce 
sufficient food to nourish the population. Even in the most productive years, 
there was barely sufficient grain to meet one third of local needs. Often it 
was less.31 The Island was, thus, dependent upon imported food supplies, 
notably grain, which were traditionally imported from Sicily. Because this 
food source became unavailable after 1801, a primary task of the early 
British administration, as we shall see, was to secure alternative supplies. 
The system for acquiring and subsidising basic foodstuffs is considered 
below, suffice it to note that Coleridge became acting Public Secretary 
after the death of Macaulay because the latter’s appointed successor, Mr 
Chapman, was absent from Malta purchasing corn in the Black Sea region.
Agriculture32
The landscape of Malta was well-described by Coleridge himself: “... it is a 
barren Rock ... the Sky, the Sea, the Bays, the Buildings are all beautiful but 
29 Ball to Dundas, above n. 5.
30 The Friend, I, 570.
31 Ball’s Memorandum to Dundas, 26 December 1800, above n. 5, recorded that 
corn production was only sufficient for three months’ supply in any one year. Col-
eridge was aware of this: The Friend, I, 577. The annual consumption was about 
50,000 quarters: Ball to Cooke 3rd February 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/ 19.
32 For a general account of agricultural practices in the late eighteenth century 
immediately prior to the British conquest see, Debono (1988).
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no Rivers, no brooks, no Hedges, no green fields, almost no Trees & the few 
that are unlovely”.33
Similar comments had been made by Ball who had reported, in 1801, 
that Malta was “a naked rock, where the hand of Industry has not covered 
it with soil”.34 The majority of the Maltese population pursued subsistence 
agriculture on thin, barely adequate loam. Much of the cultivated part of 
the Island had been divided into small fields, which Coleridge noted were 
little larger than English cottage gardens, enclosed with robust stone walls 
and arranged in terraces.35 Many of these can still be seen. 
The 1812 Royal Commission recorded how the Maltese had created the 
soil upon which their livelihoods depended, by importing it, in some cases 
from Sicily. Their historical struggle to wring crops from this otherwise 
barren and largely unproductive Island was recognised by the Royal 
Commissioners who thought little more could be done to make the soil 
more productive.36 
Agricultural practices were highly conservative: the Maltese preferred to 
adhere to the customary practices of their ancestors, rather than experiment 
with new farming methods. This suggests that, in their role as newcomers, 
the British had not persuaded the Maltese that they had any superior skill 
or knowledge to impart. Even the potato, which the British had introduced 
to the Island,37 had not been widely cultivated by the time Coleridge held 
office. 
Ball had firm views upon agricultural improvements, including the 
creation of “gardens” in each of the casals. The establishment of gardens 
for the Luogotenente (village magistrates) was another flagship policy 
designed both to promote horticulture, to diversify the economy and to 
supplement the food supply.38 It was Ball’s brainchild and he committed 
significant sums of public money to their construction. Not the least reason 
why much would have been expected of this project was its cost. Moreover, 
it also served a need, given the precarious state of the food supply. After 
33 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1171.
34 Ball to Dundas, 26 December 1800, above n. 5.
35 The Friend, I, 561. See also CN 2, 2508.
36 This was another implied criticism of Ball’s failed attempt to construct the “gar-
dens” in the casals.
37 By the time of Ball’s Memorandum of 26 December 1800, above n. 5, the potato 
was already under cultivation. His confident expectation that this “will prove of 
great advantage to the inhabitants” had not been realised by 1812: see Report of the 
Royal Commission, Kew, CO 158/19.
38 Hardman, 346-7.
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1800 the Island was facing increased immigration, reduced emigration and, 
thus, increased demand for food. 
The benefits of the horticultural project were, however, negligible;39 
indeed, it is surprising that Ball appears to have pressed on with the 
policy notwithstanding the uncomfortable dissonance between its cost 
and its benefit. The initiative resulted in little more than a waste of public 
funds.40 It is just one of many instances where, having introduced a project 
or initiated a reform, he lost interest in monitoring its implementation. 
This general characteristic of his government led to many problems in 
the administration including the squandering of resources – a particular 
problem in the Università and the hospitals, despite Ball’s reform of the 
latter (1804).
The absence of shade and running water meant that soldiers who 
deserted from the army in the summer of 1805 must have been recaptured 
unless they had assistance. As we shall see, this is contrary to the narrative 
that Coleridge constructed in several instruments, and this is a further 
testimony to his manipulative use of government information.
Economic Policies: Employment, and Public Works
 “...the multitude and low wages of the laborers in Malta”41
To address the hardships of the economic slump, which lasted until 1805, 
the British organised public works projects, some of which were intended 
not only to generate employment opportunities but also to create long 
term infrastructure or other benefits for the Maltese people. Some convicts 
and prisoners of war were also employed upon public works.42 Thus, 
large numbers of unemployed Maltese were heavily dependent upon 
government-funded employment schemes until the economy of the Island 
began to improve as a result of increased maritime trade. An unwillingness 
to share in the merging prosperity may have been a contributory factor in 
the racial tensions of 1805 that we describe below.43 
Examples of the public projects undertaken included a botanical garden, 
39 Kew, CO 158/19.
40 Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, CO 158/19.
41 The Friend, I, 570.
42 See Bando, 29 January 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356; 
also 22 March 1805 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
43 Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime, and note Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, 
Kew, CO 158/10/123-45 at 134.
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which was intended to be self-financing. It would also allow local people 
to enjoy the shaded walks that had been lost when other open areas of 
Valletta were given over to military use.44 Another project for recreational, 
or perhaps health, purposes was the construction of bathing facilities.45 Ball 
also ordered the construction of a fish market;46 and he repaired the wharf 
– the Pietà.47 Workhouses were also built, operated and regulated by the 
State, to provide employment.48
Effort was also invested in the re-construction and repair of roads.49 
Work of this kind was still continuing when Coleridge was in office. His 
important Bando of 29 January 180550 revealed that the government wished 
to reduce further wear upon the roads by regulating types of wheels. But 
this was not all because, in Coleridge’s Bando of 8 March 1805, Ball re-
imposed certain excise duties to raise further funds in order to finance the 
construction of new public buildings.
 Ball also devoted his attention to the maritime economy. A fishery was 
created off the southern coast of Sicily, not only to increase wealth but also 
to make fishing serve as a training ground for another generation of Maltese 
seafarers. These benefited from boats supplied by the administration.51 This 
subsidy was, of course, necessary given the destruction by the French of 
the Maltese vessels during the siege and the very limited capital available 
on the Island after the surrender.52
Cotton53 
Growing grain instead of cotton “would leave half of the inhabitants 
without employment”.54
44 Ball reported in 1804 that the garden was finished: Ball to Penn, 4 July 1804, 
Kew, CO 158/9/23.
45 Cost £250: Ball to Penn, ibid.
46 Cost £200: ibid.
47 Cost £7,000: ibid.
48 See e.g. Macaulay to Ball, 10 September 1804, Kew, CO 158/9/51-2.
49 See Memorandum of 26 December 1800, above n. 5, and CO 158/13/123.
50 NLM/LIBR /MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356.
51 Pirotta, 49; see also Ball to Penn, 4 July 1804, Kew, CO 158/9/13 to whom Ball 
reported that the fishery was still in the process of being established.
52 Ball to Cooke, 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/187-8.
53 See generally Vella; Debono (1988), 1, 27-50, and the Report of the Chamber of 
Commerce on the Economic Condition of the Island 1776: NLM, Lib. 1020, item 20, 
no folio reference. The text of this document (in Italian) is incorporated in Debono 
(1988).
54 The Friend, I, 577.
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The major addition to subsistence farming was the extensive cotton 
industry, which served to clothe the inhabitants. According to Coleridge’s 
observations, Maltese cotton was “naturally of a deep buff, or dusky orange 
color (sic)” capable of producing the most hard-wearing cloth.55 Cotton had 
also provided a lucrative source of foreign revenue during the ancien regime 
and foreign cotton imports were, generally, prohibited in order to protect 
domestic producers.56 The export of raw cotton was also forbidden in order 
to ensure the employment of (mainly) women in spinning,57 thus, cotton 
had to be spun on the Island before export. 
In 1776 the Grandmaster de Rohan had revived the Chamber of 
Commerce (previously abolished in 1741) as a recognition of the vital 
importance of this trade and the need to promote it. His initiative had two 
primary goals: firstly, he wished to ensure that both farmer and spinner 
obtained the best possible prices for the commodity; secondly, he sought 
to increase capacity by increasing the number of persons engaged in the 
production and manufacture of cotton. 
The revived Chamber pursued the expansion of the export markets 
with some success. Cotton exports increased from an average of 500 quintali 
per month in 1776 to 800 quintali per month in 1798. Whereas, exports had 
once been destined for Lisbon, the principal market eventually shifted to 
Spain because the British had encouraged the Portuguese to import cotton 
from the West Indies. Thus, in the years after 1743, Maltese vessels traded 
primarily with Barcelona, although a subsidiary market, accessed via 
Marseille, existed in northern Italy and South-East France. Maltese exports 
had, of course, been interrupted during the blockade between 1798 and 
1800, and the Spanish market was lost once hostilities with Spain broke out 
in 1804. 
The impact of the loss of the export trade after 1804 proved to be a 
grave economic crisis because the cotton trade, had in one way or another, 
benefited most of the workers on the Island. Coleridge suggested that 
about half of the inhabitants were, in one way or another, employed in 
55 Ibid.
56 At different times, various Proclamations were enacted forbidding the impor-
tation of foreign cotton: see, e.g., the Bando of 7 May 1757: NLM, Libr. 429, Bandi 
1756-1765, 7. Some importation seems to have been permitted under Proclamations 
of 1796 and 1797: see Debono above n. 53. 
57 Coleridge recorded with approval that Maltese women were normally not re-
quired to do hard work out of doors. “...[T]hey were almost exclusively employed 
in spinning and management of the House”. CN 2, 2650.
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this industry.58 Debono, who described the state of the industry, in the 
eighteenth century, observed:
Capitalists, small savers who could dispose of a few scudi59 for lending, 
merchants who bought and sold the seed and the cotton yarn, middlemen 
who helped to bring farmer and merchants together, spinners who spun 
their cottons at home, sea captains who owned ships and transported the 
product overseas, all had a share in the thriving cotton industry.60
Ball had reported, in December 1800, that exports of spun cotton thread 
had produced half a million pounds sterling per annum.61 Cotton seed was 
also used as cattle fodder, but, as Coleridge observed, this foodstuff altered 
the quality of the meat.62
Government employment schemes to alleviate poverty had also thrived 
upon the back of the cotton trade. For example, under the ancien regime, the 
invalids’ hostels had been constructed, in Floriana, in which the poor of 
both sexes could be employed as cotton spinners. In Coleridge’s time, the 
chief centre of production was at Città Vecchia, the operation of which had a 
charitable, as well as a commercial, purpose, since it provided employment 
for “several hundred indigent females” as well as others.63 
By 1805 the Maltese had begun to weave the cotton into cloth. The 
wartime conditions meant that they were forced to rely, only, upon sales 
of their products to occupying troops and others within their home 
market.64 Some were tempted to breach regulations governing quality and 
this attracted the intervention of the British authorities. In March 1805 
Coleridge was compelled to issue an Avviso, or Public Notice, reminding 
the population that it was forbidden to make cotton which was not spun 
either with seeds or with wool.65
58 The Friend, I, 577.
59 The denominations of Maltese currency were “scudi, “tari” and “grains”. 
Twenty grains made one tari; twelve tari one scudo. The exchange rate in late 1800 
was ten scudi to one pound: Ball to Dundas, 26 December 1800, above n. 5.
60 Debono (1988), 27, 32.
61 Ball to Dundas, above n. 5.
62 Above, n. 58.
63 Blaquière, 275-7.
64 By 1807 the number of looms present on the Island increased from 1945 to 2986: 
Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/51. 
65 Avviso of 22 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 5, dis-
cussed below.
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2.3.  British Model of Government on 
Malta: the “Continuation” Strategy66
Stability not Reform
When the British military first intervened in the struggle of the Maltese to 
liberate themselves from the French, they did not do so with any desire to 
acquire the Island for themselves; they respected the sovereignty of the King 
of the Two Sicilies. The principal British objective was to oust the French 
army from an island where its forces could threaten British interests in 
Egypt and the Levant. At that time, neither British commanders nor policy-
makers fully understood the military importance of the Island, Nelson 
having expressed the opinion that it was of less value than Minorca.67
Following the surrender of the French garrison, Ball unwaveringly 
advocated the case for the permanent retention of Malta. He had set out, as 
early as December 1800, to convince the Secretary of State in London of the 
military value of the Island, its harbours and impregnable fortifications. A 
central thrust of his argument was that the Island enjoyed a strategic value 
superior to that of Minorca.68 Nevertheless, in 1804-1805, Malta’s status 
within the British Empire had not been fully resolved. 
During the blockade, Ball learnt that the resentment and dissatisfaction 
of the Maltese, with the Order of St John, had been exacerbated when 
the Order was no longer sufficiently resourced to continue its expensive 
welfare policies.69 Even before the French invasion, the Maltese had begun 
to conspire against the Order because it could not provide for them.
Ball understood that, from a Maltese perspective, the legitimacy of 
British rule would depend, in part, upon a congruence between its values 
and those of the wider community. The French had prompted a disastrous 
social legitimation crisis by plundering the churches and taxing the 
population. Ball had to achieve legitimacy by convincing the Maltese of a 
harmony between their interests and those of the British. He understood 
the need to avoid policies likely to provoke public animosity. 
66 See Pirotta, 45-6.
67 See Randon, 354. 
68 Ball to Dundas, above n. 5.
69 There had been little assimilation of the knights as rulers into Maltese society. 
As a celibate order, assimilation by marriage was obviously precluded. The Order 
refused to share power with the Maltese and was thus perceived as despotic, arro-
gant and elitist. In this sense Malta was a divided society: see Hardman; also Pirotta.
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His preferred strategy, designed to win popularity with the inhabitants, 
was to continue operation of all the institutions of the government of the 
Order of St John. He believed that it was necessary to give the Maltese 
a material benefit from continued British possession of the Island, which 
meant not only re-establishing the legal and political order of the ancien 
regime but also pursuing the policy of benign paternalism that characterised 
its administration. It was a policy of reassurance and stability. 
He proposed, to his political superiors in London, that the constitutional, 
political, legal and administrative order of the ancien regime should be 
continued.70 In particular, the policies and institutions of the Order should 
be sustained with only minor changes. The rationale of this policy was to 
preserve the structure of Maltese political and economic life to avoid the 
Maltese being required to make a sudden adjustment to an unfamiliar legal, 
political, administrative or social structure. It was also consonant with the 
view that the Island’s ultimate future would only be resolved once the war 
had ended. Ministers would, naturally, wish to avoid fundamental change 
within the institutions of government in case British possession proved to 
be one enjoyed merely for the duration of hostilities. 
Ball’s plan was also consistent with the general principles of the British 
constitution as well as the lessons the British had learned from the somewhat 
difficult experiences in other colonies during the latter part of the eighteenth 
century.71 It appeared to be a coherent, rational and constitutionally-
appropriate policy that was consonant with both domestic and international 
law. In embracing the constitutional and administrative architecture of the 
Order, the British would, apparently, be sending a reassuring public signal 
about the synonymity of Maltese and British values and, thereby, making a 
powerful claim for the legitimacy of British rule. However, the policy, whilst 
capable of pacifying anxieties that might have arisen when the alien British 
first assumed government, nonetheless also created a potential problem 
of ossification. To what extent could the Administration initiate reforms 
that would improve the lives of the inhabitants? What scope was there 
for a reforming mission, for “modernity”, in this territory? And how far 
should a modernising project extend? “Continuity” thus posed important 
questions about the meaning of justice within a colonial context. This was 
to pose significant problems for Coleridge when in office.
70 Ball wrote: “It has consistently been my uniform system to abstain from every 
kind of change except in case of absolute necessity”. Ball to Windham, 28 February 
1807, Kew, CO 158/13/45.
71 See Chapter 3.
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Nevertheless, British ministers in Whitehall ratified the continuity model 
and established it as the guiding principle of government after 1801.72
Accordingly, the first proclamation of a British Civil Commissioner 
(Cameron) of 15 July 180173 informed the Maltese of the guiding principles 
of British rule. This Declaration, which has been described as “the Magna 
Carta” of the Maltese people,74 undertook that the British would respect the 
“dearest rights” of the Maltese. These rights were enumerated in an order 
which was, perhaps, not coincidental: their churches, holy religion, persons, 
and property.75 
When Ball was sent back to the Island, his Instructions included a 
further and significant obligation. This explicitly required him to ensure 
the “attachment” of the Maltese to the British so as to avoid Malta falling 
under the influence of a rival foreign power once the Order of St John was 
restored to the Island.76 British government of the Island had to be popular. 
The restoration of the Order did not, of course, take place.
Problems with the Continuity Strategy
The principal difficulty was that the British were assuming substantial 
financial and political burdens. Expectations amongst the Maltese were 
72 As the Instructions of 14 May 1801 make clear: Kew, CO 158/1/ff 53 et seq; 
Hardman 350, 355. They are a vindication of Ball’s position. However, the political 
support for this plan rested somewhat shakily on the information that Ball sup-
plied to London. Continuity was also a requirement of the Law of Nations, see de 
Vattel, 389, section 201 – relating to the conqueror of a hostile sovereign. Where, as 
in Malta, the population was not hostile, the sovereign had a duty to maintain the 
existing laws-for how long is not made clear. 
73 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 204. Cameron seems to have played 
a minor role in the affairs of government, preferring instead to leave many of his 
responsibilities to a William Eton in whose abilities he had complete confidence. 
William Eton (later knighted) was a private citizen with, it seems, considerable 
experience of effecting quarantine regulations. The British government appointed 
him Superintendent of the Lazaretto and Quarantine Department in 1801. Cameron 
seems to have left many of his responsibilities to William Eton in whose abilities he 
had complete confidence. Eton seems to have been the de facto civil commissioner. 
Eton may have expected to have succeeded Cameron (see e.g., Ball to Windham, 28 
February 1807, Kew CO 158/13/20) and disappointment may explain why he be-
came such an implacable opponent of Cameron’s successor, Sir Alexander Ball. As 
we shall see, Eton stimulated dissent and agitated for Ball’s downfall.
74 Galea.
75 Hardman, 342. There is further discussion of the status of these Instructions in 
Chapter 3.
76 Downing St to Ball, 9 June 1802, Kew, FO 49/3/51.
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raised,77 which it would be dangerous to frustrate. Pressing questions were 
posed concerning how the policies were to be funded, given the loss of 
much of the Island’s revenue after 1792. This, eventually, forced Ball to raise 
funds by way of taxation – a risky strategy given the promises to uphold a 
Maltese system in which regular taxation was unknown. 78
A further political risk lay within the structure of government. The 
absence of a popular representative assembly under the Order of St John 
meant that the burden of securing the compliance of the Maltese inhabitants 
rested entirely upon the administration. In continuing this system, the 
British had assumed an exclusive responsibility to deliver. There would 
be no possibility that the Civil Commissioner might escape blame for any 
failure of policy by using an inept local assembly as a convenient scapegoat. 
But this was not all because the continuity strategy also rested upon 
an assumption that the autocratic constitution, embracing the despotic 
powers of the Grandmaster (which the Civil Commissioner would assume 
and exercise), was politically acceptable to the Maltese population. This 
was not necessarily the case. Particularly irksome was the refusal of their 
governors (whether British or the Knights) to share power. There is little 
evidence that the British properly understood this problem and assessed 
its risks. The way in which Ball exercised these extensive governmental 
powers exacerbated tensions with the Maltese inhabitants and created 
grave political problems which, during his time in office, fell to Coleridge 
to address.
In a Memorandum of December 1800, in which Ball proposed continuity, 
he had also raised political expectations in London. These did not always 
cohere well with the need to maintain popularity with the Maltese. On the 
one hand, Ball had led the Secretary of State to believe that the islands 
would not be a continuing drain upon the British Treasury. On the other, 
the Maltese had been encouraged to believe that the expensive welfare 
policies would be maintained. This latter commitment meant that some 
unpalatable measures would have to be imposed to raise revenue to meet 
the expense of civil government. How this was done without alienating 
Maltese public opinion was deeply problematic. Coleridge, as acting Public 
77 There were a number of formal, public declarations to the Maltese intended 
to reassure them. For example a Proclamation issued by Pigot on 19 February 1801 
which included the following: “...every possible means shall be used to make you 
contented and happy”. He referred to the restoration of peace and liberty following 
the armed resistance of the Maltese people and their allies before adding, “It shall 
be my constant care to ensure the continuance of this well-being”. Hardman, 341-42.
78 See Chapter 5.3: Taxation.
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Secretary, would be confronted with dilemmas of this kind when drafting 
of several of his Bandi and Avvisi.79 Moreover, this first-hand experience 
might well have prompted his deep disillusionment with what he soon 
condemned as “corrupt” government.80
Although it had superficial merit, the continuation policy was fractured 
by structural weaknesses both in its conception and in its implementation. 
Some of these difficulties derived from the rather elusive and problematic 
state of the Island’s finances; others from the tensions surrounding the 
priority to be accorded to British interests in a relationship that the British 
wished to present as benign and protective towards Maltese interests. But, 
at an operational level, there were problems. For example financial and 
administrative accountability seems to have been weak. Proper scrutiny was 
part of the expected role of the Public Secretary, yet the evidence suggests 
that Coleridge may have only partly fulfilled this expectation.81 This not 
only reveals something of Coleridge’s success as an administrator, but it 
also exposes an important lacuna lying within the heart of government in 
1805. 
2.4.  Maltese Institutions
After the capitulation of the French garrison, Ball began to re-instate the 
political and legal institutions that existed under the Order, and it is to 
these that we must now turn. 
The Law and the Maltese Courts
The Maltese constitution did not embody any conception of the 
independence of the judiciary,82 the separation of powers, nor of the rule 
of law.83 All legislative, executive and even ultimate judicial authority was, 
79 E.g. the Bando of 8 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2 
(above) and see generally the introduction to the Bandi and Avvisi in Chapter 4.
80 To Catherine Clarkson, 6 November 1806, DW Letters 1806-1811, letter 277.
81 Hough and Davis (2007).
82 The Act of Settlement 1700 guaranteed judicial independence in Britain in so 
far as judicial salaries were thereafter protected by law. For the modern statutory 
guarantee against ministerial interference in the judicial process in the United King-
dom, see the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s.3.
83 In contrast, the requirement that Executive action had to conform to the stric-
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constitutionally, concentrated in the hands of the Grandmaster. But it is a 
mistake to ignore the extent to which there was a fully functioning legal 
system enforcing the ordinary civil and criminal law. The fact that there 
was no effective public law able to restrain the exercise of executive power 
did not mean that reasonable protection for private rights did not exist.
The Code de Rohan
The basic law, restored by the British, was the Code of Rohan.84 The 
administration of law, and the status of the Code, as well as its application 
was to prove highly controversial because, as we shall see, the Civil 
Commissioner, in suppressing public disorder, chose to impose criminal 
punishments beyond the maximum permitted by the Code – actions that 
Coleridge supported. 
The Code was effected in 1784 by Grandmaster Emmanuel de Rohan-
Polduc (1725-1797), in office 1775-1797. Matters not covered by the Code, 
or where the law was unclear, were resolved, in normal civilian fashion, 
by reference to Roman law and the collected opinions of authoritative 
jurists, predominantly from Italy.85 The Code was supplemented by the 
issue of Proclamations – the Bandi – a power also enjoyed by the Civil 
Commissioners under British rule in which, of course, Coleridge was 
closely involved.86 
The Code de Rohan continued much that was in an earlier codification, 
the Code de Vilhenha,87 subject to some important differences. William 
Eton, the Superintendant of Quarantine, who was one of Ball’s English 
critics, thought that continuing the Code de Rohan rather than returning 
to the original Code de Vilhenha involved a political choice, made by Ball, 
designed to strengthen the grip of the British Civil Commissioner over 
the affairs of Malta. The earlier Code, he claimed, gave fuller recognition 
to the privileges of the Maltese people privileges which were limited or 
subordinated in the Code de Rohan.88 Nationalists, such as Mitrovich, are 
tures of the positive law had been laid down in England in Entick v Carrington 
(1765), 19, Howell’s State Trials, 1029.
84 Del Diritto Municipale di Malta Nuova Compilazione con diverse altre costituzioni, 
Malta, Stamperia di Palazzo, 1784.
85 Code de Rohan; see also Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, CO 158/19/17 and 30.
86 Eton, 134.
87 Grandmaster 1722-1736.
88 Eton, 144.
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said to have “detested” the Code on these grounds.89 This view, however, 
needs to be understood, first, in terms of Eton’s general support for 
traditional nationalism as expressed, in particular, through the argument 
for a restoration of the Consiglio Popolare, and, secondly, in the context of his 
general thesis that the laws of Malta were perfectly adequate and that the 
Island’s problems stemmed from the fact that the laws were not properly 
enforced by an autocratic Civil Commissioner.90 
The Code and its contents were described by Eton (writing between 
1802 and 1807):
The Code is divided into eight books, containing 434 pages of small folio-
large and open print. The greater part of the matter regards the military and 
naval regulations of the Order-and bulls of the pope-and many other things, 
which have no relation to the present state of the island.91
It had significant provisions regarding judicial offices (Book 1) and 
criminal procedure, including torture, and sentences (Book 2); Book 5 
defined a range of crimes and their punishments including those relating to 
public order. As we shall see, the public order provisions of the Code were, 
from Ball’s standpoint, inadequate. When the anti-Semitic disturbances 
arose, in 1805, Coleridge issued Avvisi (Public Notices) which extended the 
criminal law. As indicated, when convictions were obtained, Ball dictated 
the sentences which were not always those prescribed under the Code.
Through British eyes, in 1812, the laws were, with the exception of 
commercial law, “well founded on just and equitable principles”.92 The Code, 
subject to some additions and amendments to suit local conditions, was 
based upon Roman law and, thus, located the Maltese legal system within 
a legal tradition common to much of continental Europe. The decisions of 
foreign courts and tribunals which applied Roman law were accepted as 
precedents, as were the opinions of eminent jurists on occasions when the 
Code needed interpretation.
89 Frendo, 66; cf. Mizzi, 32. The Code “In fact, it took into consideration local cus-
toms and traditions and included improvements made in Italy and Franc in legal 
enactments and procedures”.
90 This general view was broadly endorsed by the Royal Commission of 1812.
91 Eton, 153.
92 Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, 9. Commercial law, administered by 
the Commercial Court (the Consolato del Mare) and based on traditional civilian 
principles, needed, according to the Civil Commissioners, root and branch reform 
if it was to meet the needs of Malta as a hub of imperial trade. 
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The Maltese Judges
The judicial system on Malta was characterised by a lack of security of tenure 
of the judges and, hence, their lack of independence from the executive. The 
judges were appointed by the executive (the Civil Commissioner) who also 
had the power to dismiss them at his pleasure; that is to say, without reason 
and irrespective of their own behaviour or performance in the role. It must 
have been an anxiety for members of the judiciary, who might have been 
tempted to act independently, that judges held only annual appointments 
and were, thus, subject to annual scrutiny.93 
In practice, judges seem to have been removed only infrequently. More 
usually, they were transferred to other courts.94 In a despatch to Hobart, Ball 
justified this interference as an “ancient usage” and, thus, in line with the 
principle of continuity. An additional comment suggests that Ball realised 
the practice needed justification and that this lay in its political utility:
This [usage] I have thought it necessary to conform to, since it operates as 
an incitement to the faithful discharge of their duty, and at the same time 
affords the Government a powerful check over a body of men who have the 
greatest influence in the Island.95
The Civil Commissioner was not required to give reasons for any 
decision relating to the power of appointment or removal, nor was he 
formally accountable for its exercise. There was not even the appearance of 
judicial independence and judges wishing to stay in office, therefore, had a 
powerful incentive not to offend the executive by their decisions. 
The Courts
The law was administered through a court system that was, largely, effective 
though subject, as we shall see, to some severe criticisms. Grandmaster 
Rohan, as well as re-codifying the law, had also restructured the courts. 
Ball, in his first administration, reversed some of those changes. He was 
responding to the concerns, in the Royal Instructions,96 about the effects 
93 Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, 20.
94 Ibid.
95 Ball to Hobart, 15 November 1803, Kew, CO 158/7/437, 440.
96 Hardman, 350-7. The Royal Instructions identified the basic principles (such 
as the continuation strategy discussed above) and some particular policies (such as 
the possible reforms of the courts mentioned here) which the British administration 
was to promote. They are discussed further in Chapter 3. 
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upon the administration of justice of the fact that the judges were paid out 
of court fees. This matter is discussed below. In particular, Ball reduced the 
number of judges. The resulting changes created the court structure that 
existed in Coleridge’s time.97 Ball’s reforms were part of a broader strategy 
to reinvigorate Maltese institutions after the French departure98 and seemed 
to have been successful. However, as the Royal Commission noted, from a 
British perspective, serious problems remained, which are outlined below.
The court structure during Coleridge’s time can be discerned from 
various sources.99 The High Court of Valletta was composed of a President 
or Castellano (a knight), a criminal judge, two civil judges, a procurator fiscal 
and deputy fiscal; advocate fiscal, a pro-advocate for the poor; a protector 
of prisoners (a knight), two notaries, actuaries and writers, and captains or 
officers of police, with their assistants.100 
Criminal cases
Criminal cases101 were to play a significant part in Coleridge’s workload. He 
used Avvisi to notify the inhabitants of politically significant or noteworthy 
convictions, not least for its deterrent effect. The trials were usually held in 
the Grand Criminal Court (Sale Criminali della Gran Court della Valletta102), a 
part of the High Court. As well as a President, whose role was formal, there 
was a specialist criminal judge.103 The jurisdiction of the court included 
all criminal cases which were based upon the Code de Rohan. The Code 
differentiated the criminal law into “public” crimes (which included not 
only crimes against the state, such as treason, but also murder and other 
offences that disturbed the public peace) and “private” crimes. Private 
crimes may border closely with what, in the common law system, are torts. 
The former were proceeded against by the authorities upon their own 
motion, the latter only upon the complaint of the victim.104 Robberies, of 
which there were a rising number at this period, and which were part of 
a wider crime wave that was politically damaging to Ball, were pursued 
by the fiscal upon receipt of a complaint from the victim. Procedure was 
97 Eton, 131; Laferla, 53.
98 Pirotta, 53.
99 Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, above n.37.
100 Eton, 131-2. 
101 See further, Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, 15-20.
102 Laferla, 54, fn 1.
103 Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37.
104 Book 2 Chapter 1 #19 of Eton’s translation, in Eton, 153 passim.
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summary; no jury105 and the judge decided issues of fact and law. Minor 
cases involved an oral hearing, but more serious cases seem to have been 
decided mainly upon the basis of written submissions. Evidence gathering 
was a judicial process with witnesses being examined by the judge with the 
fiscal, scribes and others present to assist.106 Though the court process was 
non-adversarial, the law asserted the need to “confront” the witness, to 
cross-examine and to test the evidence.107 Surviving testimony, in relation 
to the public disorder of May 1805, gives some insight into the nature of the 
process, and this is considered further below.108
From a British perspective, the most controversial provision was 
the legal requirement of detaining the accused in prison if an initial 
investigation confirmed a “well grounded suspicion of guilt”.109 Those 
suspects (described as “criminals” in the law) could, it seems, stay in prison 
awaiting the pleasure of the judge and other court officials. There appears 
not to have been an independent judicial remedy to order release, though 
release could have been obtained at the discretion of the Civil Commissioner 
by way of a petition to the Segnatura.110 
The Code referred, in general terms, to protecting the rights of the 
defence though, from a British perspective, the absence of a right to silence, 
and, thereby, a full presumption of innocence, was troubling.111 Torture 
was still occasionally used notwithstanding that the Code suggested 
its abolition in time to come. An accused person who had confessed to 
treason could be tortured in order to obtain the names of accomplices.112 
105 The lack of a criminal jury was a matter of concern to the 1812 Commission, 
who viewed fairness through British common law eyes. However, they did not rec-
ommend its introduction because, at that time, it was likely to be unpopular. The 
first juries were found in the new Court of Piracy (1815) but it was not until 1829 
that a more extensive scheme was introduced, see Cremona (1964). Similarly, Major 
General Pigot, as part of his objection to allowing British soldiers to be tried by 
Maltese courts, cited the lack of the jury system: Pigot to Cameron, Kew, 16 August 
1801, CO 158/2/81, the matter is discussed below.
106 This procedure was laid down in the Code de Rohan, Book 2, Chapter 3, #11 
of Eton’s translation; in Eton, 141.
107 “The criminal cannot require a note of the names and Christian names of the 
witnesses; but after the examination, in every case, the criminal and witnesses are 
to be confronted”. Code de Rohan, Chapter 11, ibid. 
108 See Chapters 5.4: Public Order and Crime, and Chapter 6. 
109 Book 2, Chapter 1 #19 of Eton’s translation, in Eton.
110 See further below****.
111 Silence in the face of serious offences would result in convictions and a threat 
of an equivalent punishment for the less serious offences, ibid #33 and # 34.
112 The Code had significant provisions dealing with the methods of torture and 
the rights of the accused, ibid #27.The main method suggested is “the corda” by 
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However, one of the grievances raised by the Maltese against Ball was the 
use of torture in other cases.113 Formally, the maximum punishment that 
the Grand Criminal Court could impose was life on the Galleys, but this 
punishment was entirely obsolete by 1805.114 
There was a range of other punishments including banishment, fines 
and the requirement to undertake public works. Capital punishment 
was allowed, in the Code, for murder.115 Capital cases could be heard 
by the Grand Criminal Court but only the Supreme Court of Appeal 
could pronounce sentence. In the British view, expressed in the Royal 
Commission, some penalties were over-severe. The death sentence was 
rarely pronounced and, in the Commission’s view (speaking, of course, 
from a United Kingdom which used the death penalty extensively in ways 
that still awaited Parliamentary reform), punishments were, sometimes, 
out of proportion to the seriousness of the offence.116
Appeal was to the Supreme Tribunal of Appeal (Supremo Tribunale di 
Appello). 117 There were three judges, after Ball’s reorganisation. One of these 
was also one of the two judges in the civil court. This tribunal acted upon 
its own procedure and at its own time. The appeal judges needed to be 
different from the judge at first instance. There was a right of further appeal, 
within the Tribunal, to two new judges nominated by the Executive.118 Two 
confirmations of the initial sentence (i.e. three pronouncements of guilt or 
innocence) were generally considered final and binding with no further 
appeal. 
Civil Cases119
Apart from prize cases in the Court of Vice-Admiralty, civil suits did not 
which the suspect is suspended by ropes and then dropped. Eton alleged that a 
market inspector, Sateriano, had been tortured by being imprisoned with live rats 
and thereby forced to confess. His conviction resulted in banishment to Tripoli: 
Eton to Windham, 11 October 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/ no folio reference.
113 Ibid. and Memorial and Petition of the Maltese [unsigned and undated], Kew, 
CO158/10/151.
114 According to the Commission the maximum sentence was, by 1812, no more 
than 10 years in the galleys. The Code clearly allows for a life sentence in the gal-
leys such as for abusing and injuring parents or “senior relatives”, Code de Rohan, 
unpublished translation by Dr Lydia Davis (Code de Rohan), Book 5, Chapter 3, #4.
115 Code de Rohan, Book 5, Chapter 4, #1.
116 Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, 79.
117 Code de Rohan, Book 5, Chapter 4, #1.
118 Royal Commission of 1812 above n. 37, 19.
119 See Royal Commission of 1812, ibid., 29-34.
76 Coleridge’s Laws
feature in Coleridge’s duties and so the Maltese system is noted here only 
briefly. 
Civil cases were heard in the Grand Civil Court (Tribunale Civile della 
Gran Corte della Valletta). The jurisdiction of the Court extended to all civil 
matters except those pertaining to state property (heard by the Court of 
Administration and Public Property) and commercial cases (heard by the 
Commercial Court, the Consolato del Mare). There was also a small claims, 
summary, process for sums under fifty scudi.120 There were two judges 
nominated to the Tribunale Civile. Cases were heard, at first instance, by one 
judge sitting alone; the other judge sat in the appeal court, the Supreme 
Tribunal of Appeal. As with the criminal court, the civil procedure was, 
predominantly, based upon the papers, although the judge could examine 
the parties after a statement of facts and issues had been agreed. Appeal was 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal (Supremo Tribunale di Appello) (Supreme 
Tribunal). Characteristically of civilian systems, this was a process of 
confirmation, necessary to give the first instance decision its authority, rather 
than an “appeal” based upon specific grounds. The initial confirmation, in 
the Supreme Tribunal, was by one of the three appeal judges nominated to 
the Supreme Tribunal. Further confirmation or appeal, within the Supreme 
Tribunal, was to different Supreme Tribunal judges including the judge 
who sat in the Grand Civil Court but who had not heard the case. Three 
confirming judgements were normally considered final. If the judgement 
was not confirmed (i.e. the judges were divided) there was the opportunity 
for a fourth or even a fifth hearing before a Supreme Tribunal judge and 
also two other judges nominated by the government.121 There was no 
formal provision for further appeal after the fifth hearing.
There were also civil and criminal courts in Città Vecchia and Gozo 
with ultimate appeals to the Gran Corte in Valletta. Fortunata Tagliana, for 
example, about whose case Coleridge issued an important Avviso, was 
tried and convicted in the criminal court, the Corte Capitanale, of Città 
Vecchia.122 
Disputes involving state property were heard by the Court of 
Administration and Public Property (which, by 1812, was conducting 
little business). The Commercial Court dealt with matters of trade and 
commerce, such as disputes over commercial contracts, bankruptcy, bills of 
exchange and insurance. It was the court that was likely to involve British 
120 Royal Commission of 1812, ibid., 34.
121 Royal Commission of 1812, ibid., 32.
122 This case is discussed below in Chapter 5.
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inhabitants and it came in for considerable scrutiny and criticism (for being 
slow and over formal) by the 1812 Royal Commission which suggested 
major reforms.
Two other courts, neither of which was directly part of the Maltese legal 
system, should be noted in the context of Coleridge as a public servant 
in Malta. Courts of Vice-Admiralty were established under the Royal 
Prerogative throughout the British Empire, including in Malta early in 
British rule. Their jurisdiction was the settlement of maritime disputes 
between seamen and merchants which related to events on the high seas. 
Coleridge’s duties included advocacy in this court dressed in wig and 
gown.123 The experience may not have been a pleasant one, for he privately 
lamented that the Court was a forum for the “world’s squabbles”.124 
There were also three ecclesiastical courts in Valletta, Città Vecchia and 
Gozo. Their jurisdiction was over ecclesiastical matters but upon issues 
which also affected public order (such as immorality or blasphemy) their 
jurisdiction, sometimes, traded close to the state courts. Appeal from these 
religious courts was to the Metropolitan Court in Palermo or the Holy 
See. The 1812 Royal Commission suggested no change to their position. 
It was, however, concerned with the abuse of sanctuary, an issue that 
clearly existed in Coleridge’s time. Sanctuary interfered with the authority 
of the criminal courts and gave rise to a potential for conflicts between 
the Holy See (to whom a person removed from sanctuary could appeal) 
and the state. It was, clearly, a complicated matter and raised issues upon 
which petitions to the Civil Commissioner could be grounded. One such 
involved an alleged murderer (Grazio Fenech) who had sought sanctuary 
after escaping from custody but who had then been returned to prison at 
the request of the court. He was willing to trade his (disputed) right to 
sanctuary for exile, which the Civil Commissioner could order. The right 
to sanctuary depended upon issues such as the seriousness of the offence 
and the nature of the defendant (in another case sanctuary was refused, 
by the bishop, to deserters).125 The particular concern of the 1812 Royal 
Commission was that “foreigners” (including British soldiers) were subject 
to attack by Maltese who then sought sanctuary. The British had little 
sympathy with immunity sought by perpetrators through sanctuary and 
the Royal Commission recommended careful steps, through consultation 
123 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, 
CL
 2, 1164.
124 CN 2, 2379.
125 Advice to Ball from the Corte Capitanale, 22 May 1805: NAM 92/04 1805 box 
04. 
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with Rome, to bring the practice to an end.126 
Failings of the Courts
The 1812 Royal Commission identified a number of serious failings of 
the Maltese courts and legal system which would have been prevalent in 
1805 and are, to some extent, confirmed in a few of the Avvisi.127 The most 
important flowed from the low wages paid to judges and their consequent 
reliance upon court fees and a proportion of criminal fines for their 
personal remuneration.128 This may have caused corruption;129 it certainly 
compromised the range of case management decisions, that judges needed 
to take, over issues such as the length of pre-trial detention, the timing 
of trials, of sentencing and confirmation hearings. Judges would tend to 
concentrate upon the higher fee cases (e.g. high value property cases), a 
consequence of which could be that criminal defendants might have stayed 
in pre-trial detention for much longer than they otherwise would130 and 
poor litigants might have suffered longer delays. Some civil cases were 
heard in a judge’s home creating at least the suspicion of corruption and 
private arrangements rather than the open administration of the law.131 
Delay in both civil and criminal justice became a major problem and a 
characteristic of the Maltese system. 
It was not unusual, in a colonial context, for local judges to rely upon fees 
and for corruption and unfairness to be alleged.132 Similarly, concerns about 
the administration of justice on Malta were not confined to the Maltese 
courts and the Maltese judiciary. In particular, allegations of corruption 
and other difficulties flowing from a fee-based remuneration system were 
also made, including in the House of Commons, in respect of the British 
Court of Vice-Admiralty in Malta.133 
126 Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, 28.
127 Royal Commission, ibid.; see also an incident attempted bribery in Avviso of 
14 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 11.
128 Broadly speaking, the court fees amounted to about 90% of the salary of one 
of the judges in the High Court in Valletta who earned (in 1812) £20 p.a. salary and 
shared court fees to increase their incomes by about £300 p.a.: Royal Commission 
of 1812, above n. 37, 21.
129 Hinted at by the Royal Commission of 1812, ibid., 20 and 53.
130 Royal Commission of 1812, above, n. 37, 17.
131 Royal Commission of 1812, ibid., 31.
132 Manning, 115-19; also 153-4. Generally, the issue was exacerbated if the judges 
were not judicially trained; this was not a problem in Malta.
133 Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates Vol. 20, 1811, 464-70.
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The problems with the Maltese judicial system, identified from the 
British perspective, were recognised early. The Royal Instructions of 1801 
instructed Cameron (the first Civil Commissioner) to continue with the 
system of payment of fees but to regularise their application by producing 
and publishing a table of those fees. Furthermore, the Civil Commissioner 
was required to examine whether the system undermined the “pure and 
impartial administration of justice” and, if it did so, to take appropriate, 
regulatory, steps to remedy the problem and report these to London. Ball’s 
reforms in 1803 (mentioned above) involved a reduction in the number 
of judges in order to reduce the burden of fees. This seems not to have 
been successful. Problems emanating from low judicial salaries were 
a major concern of the 1812 Royal Commission one of whose principal 
recommendations was for major increases aimed at a salaried remuneration 
equal to what was obtained under the fees approach.134 None of these issues, 
however, seemed to trouble the Maltese during Coleridge’s time in office. 
Their major grievance was the manner in which Ball used his constitutional 
powers to interfere in the judicial process in order to impose harsher 
sentences than the law otherwise allowed.135 This highlighted problems 
with the scope of the powers vested in the Civil Commissioner 
Interventions in the Judicial Process
After Coleridge left office, the role of the Civil Commissioner in the legal 
and judicial process was recognised as problematic. After all, it had been 
one of the central reasons why the Nationalist’s complained that the Civil 
Commissioner held despotic powers.136 These damaging complaints 
contributed, along with other causes of friction, to troubling public 
dissatisfaction with Ball, in 1805, and sparked the “propaganda offensive” 
in which Coleridge became engaged in the Bandi and Avvisi. The substance 
of the Nationalists’ complaints about the role of the Civil Commissioner 
was, eventually, accepted by the 1812 Royal Commission, although without 
explicit criticism of the late Sir Alexander Ball. This marked a closing of 
ranks to maintain British prestige.
134 Large pay rises were put into effect by Maitland after he came to office as Gov-
ernor: Maitland to Bathurst, 24 October 1814, Kew, CO 158/25/215; see enclosure 13, 
Kew, CO 158/25/284-5 for a table of wage increases.
135 See below and Chapter 5. 
136 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated), Kew, CO 
158/10/151. Considered below, and especially in Chapter 5.
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The problem was that the Grandmaster (and hence the British Civil 
Commissioner) could intervene directly in a criminal trial after the judicial 
process of confirmation or appeal had been completed.137 He could confirm, 
revise or annul the sentence of  the court. The sentence could be varied 
even if there had been two confirmations of the original sentence.138 The 
Civil Commissioner could also increase the sentence, or require the judge 
to refer up his proposed sentence for confirmation. Ball’s exercise of these 
powers aroused strong dissent during Coleridge’s period in office.139 The 
Grandmaster (and Civil Commissioner) had, in effect, a dispensing power 
rather like, in English eyes, the power pretended by the Crown over 
domestic affairs. These had been made unlawful, domestically, by the Bill 
of Rights 1688 and it was this power that Lord Mansfield may have had 
in mind when he sought to limit the legislative power of the Crown in 
conquered and ceded colonies by reference to “fundamental principles”.140 
For critics, such as Eton, this dispensing power was an important part of the 
argument that the country was ruled tyrannically. The formal complaints 
by the Maltese themselves were embarrassing and damaging for Ball and 
his senior advisers (including Coleridge). 
According to the 1812 Royal Commission, the content of the laws was 
unobjectionable, but the power to dispense with them was obnoxious.141 
In fact, the dispensing power was not necessarily objectionable in practice 
in Malta since, as mentioned above, there were significant reasons to 
doubt the fairness of some of the judicial processes. They recommended 
the removal of the most important legislative and judicial powers.142 But, 
during Coleridge’s time, Sir Alexander Ball could and did, act in conformity 
with the Maltese constitution and the continuity principle, by exercising 
137 For further discussion of the powers of the Grandmaster, see Chapter 3.
138 Eton, 132: “this Grandmaster [Pinto] ordered by his sign-manual, which con-
stitutes a law, certain thieves to be hanged, who had been by three concurring sen-
tences condemned to be banished to Sicily, and they were executed”. 
139 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated) Kew, CO158/10/151; 
see also Chapter 5: Public Order and Crime.
140 See the discussion of Mostyn v Fabrigas (1774), 1 Cowp. 160, below.
141 Eton, 143.
142 Although the prerogative of mercy would be retained as a prerogative of the 
executive authority, as it is under the English constitution. The power to prevent 
cases coming to court was also to be preserved but only in so far as it related to dis-
putes over state property. The Royal Commission was concerned that there would 
otherwise be a flood of possible claims against the administration on this ground. 
Under the Royal Commission’s proposal, the Civil Commissioner would have a 
duty to report any exercise of this power to Whitehall.
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the arbitrary or, at least, despotic powers of the Grandmaster. Similarly, 
with respect to civil cases, after the (potentially extensive) process of 
confirmation and appeal had been completed, petitions were often made 
to the Civil Commissioner who could revise the order given or cause a re-
hearing. 
The ultimate decisions of this Supreme Court ought to be final, but there 
are frequent instances upon record of case sent back and revised, and some 
even of a total and summary reversal of its decrees by the sole authority of 
the Grandmaster.143
Segnatura (Council of the Civil Commissioner)
The Civil Commissioner exercised significant powers through the 
Segnatura.144 In his Public Notice of 1 March 1805, Coleridge reminded the 
population that they were at liberty to petition the Civil Commissioner 
with their grievances. Any person, whose interests were adversely affected 
by an administrative decision, had a further avenue of redress.
At the weekly meetings, the caseload was huge. On 17 May 1805, for 
example,145 the Segnatura had to process seventy-five petitions.146 Eton 
thought there was “scarcely” a limit upon the kinds of request that 
could come before this Council, and the surviving records substantiate 
this.147 Coleridge, observing Ball’s operation of the system, noted, rather 
unflatteringly, that the Maltese inhabitants consulted Ball’s opinion with 
almost “child-like helplessness”148 even upon matters that were, essentially, 
private matters. Claims concerning administrative decisions, injustice, 
delays, a pardon or a reduction in a fine or term of imprisonment, the 
rescission of banishment, or requests for political preferment or even 
charity are examples.149 
143 Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, 47.
144 See e.g. Harding, 66-7.
145 A date selected at random: NAM LIBR 43/12 vol N- 10 May-11 September 
1805.
146 Ibid.
147 Eton, 143; see also Registro dei Memoriale e Decreti da Sua Excellenza il sig Cava-
lier Alessandro Ball Regio Commissionario Civile di Sua Maesta’ Britannica, NAM LIBR 
43/11.
148 The Friend, I, 561. 
149 The petitions for 1805 can be examined in NAM 92/04 1805. These petitions 
have been handwritten and various relevant parts have been underlined for empha-
sis (presumably by the responsible auditor). They relate to a wide variety of admin-
istrative and judicial matters. For example, some deal with “clemenza” of sentence; 
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The possibility of petitioning the Civil Commissioner meant that there was 
always the opportunity to persuade him to change or modify the outcomes 
of judicial or administrative processes. This had two consequences. First, 
it signified that the Civil Commissioner was the highest court of appeal. 
Secondly, it meant that legal and administrative problems needed not to be 
resolved according to published, impersonal legal norms but by the ethical 
responses, the political necessities, the self-interest or other expressions 
of the will of the Civil Commissioner. This resulted in uncertainty, if not 
in arbitrary rule. In summary, the Segnatura was the embodiment of the 
despotic power of the state because it combined executive, judicial and 
legislative functions in the unaccountable, unchallengeable and subjective 
discretions of the Civil Commissioner/Grandmaster. It embodied, in 
English eyes, a system without constitutional and legal guarantees of 
liberty and property.150 
No reasons were given for the Segnatura’s decision,151 and neither, of 
course, was the Civil Commissioner accountable to the courts for those 
decisions. The Civil Commissioner was assisted by four Uditori who 
were salaried lawyers or ecclesiastics152 serving as advisors.153 They had 
an important role in receiving the petitions and subjecting them to an 
initial evaluation, highlighting the essence of each and summarising it for 
Ball’s benefit. His Public Secretary and Treasurer was also present, thus 
Coleridge must have participated in the Segnatura.154 The Uditori held office 
at the appointment and during the pleasure of the Civil Commissioner 
and, it seems, were often replaced.155 There was no legal or constitutional 
principle that they should be broadly representative of society. In practice, 
they were thought to be the Civil Commissioner’s creatures.156 
others licence applications; others are appeals relating to the award of prize money. 
They are addressed “Eccelenza”.
150 Eton, 136.
151 Above n. 144.
152 At the time of Ball’s second administration, (1803-1809) there would appear to
have been at least one lawyer present. He had reported to Dundas, 26 December 
1800, above n. 5 (also Hardman 344-6), that only some of the appointees had to be 
legally qualified.
153 See Ball to Dundas, ibid.
154 Ball had combined the offices: see Sullivan to Ball 31 December 1803- Libr 
531, 18.
155 Eton described the Uditori in Eton, 145 et seq. 
156 The Grandmaster could consult with them, but under the normal procedure 
(certainly that followed in Ball’s time) they would not venture an opinion on a mat-
ter unless asked to do so.
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Ball’s conduct in the Segnatura seemed to embody the despotism of the 
Grandmaster. According to Eton, petitioners who used “least freedom in 
remonstrating” were liable to punishment. Ball, it seems, continued this 
policy as a discouragement to critics of government policy.157 There is 
evidence that in 1805 a petition had been made to the Segnatura for the “re-
establishment” of the Consiglio Popolare (the allegedly traditional legislative 
assembly that the Maltese critics of British rule wanted restored). Ball 
punished the petitioner by summary banishment, a severe punishment 
pour encourager les autres who, by seeking an assembly, were challenging the 
Civil Commissioner’s autocratic powers. This harsh response confirmed 
Ball’s “despotic” reputation amongst the Maltese. His willingness to 
punish severely those who advocated reform also featured as one of the 
most serious complaints against his government made in the Petition to the 
Crown of 1805. 158 
The Segnatura could be used to moderate criminal sentences where 
the political context and British interests allowed for it. As we shall see, 
some of those convicted and exiled for anti-Semitic conduct, in May 
1805, successfully petitioned for their sentences to be commuted. Some of 
them were restored to their families on Malta soon after the disturbances 
subsided. From the British point of view, this possibility was advantageous. 
The harsh crackdown had signalled that anti-Semitic conduct would not 
be permitted, but when that message had been conveyed and stability had 
returned, the unpopularity of the sentences was quietly addressed and 
moderated.
In the view of the Royal Commission, the right of petition to the Segnatura 
and its exercise in practice was wrong in principle, as setting the Executive 
above the law, which they saw as a dangerous doctrine amounting to a 
“despotism” with the “potential to cause injustice”.159 They also concluded 
that  suspending the power to reverse or modify judicial decisions would 
be “very objectionable”160 and  repugnant to British ideas of the rule of law 
and constitutional government. Despite this, it concluded that the system 
was generally acceptable to the Maltese people.161 
It is particularly revealing that the Royal Commission also concluded 
that, notwithstanding the unlimited scope of their powers, the Civil 
157 Eton, 146.
158 See the undated Memorial and Petition of the Maltese, Kew, CO 158/10/151 (1805).
159 Ibid.
160 Royal Commission of 1812, above, n. 37.
161 Royal Commission of 1812, ibid., 82-3. 
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Commissioners’ (including Ball’s) behaviour was “exemplary”.162 
Their, somewhat surprising, position was that Civil Commissioners 
were uncertain of their powers and, therefore, tended to exercise their 
considerable discretion with caution. Ball’s arbitrary use of his powers 
to suppress possible political dissent and to deter threats to public order, 
suggest that this part of the Royal Commission’s judgment was either not 
fully informed or perhaps reflects a desire to bolster British authority rather 
than uncover the truth about the exercise of governmental power during 
Coleridge’s Malta period. 
The Catholic Church and the “Catholic Superstition’163
From the very commencement of their administration the British were at 
pains to emphasise that they would respect the liberties of the Maltese in 
their religious beliefs.164 The Maltese were devout Catholics, and many 
remain so to this day; their church plays an important part in their daily 
lives. Village society in Coleridge’s time focused around the family, home 
and church.
British religious toleration was, of course, designedly central to the 
“attachment” of the Maltese to British rule. The new administration was 
fully aware that the casus belli of the insurrection against the French had 
been its treatment of the Catholic Church, especially its plundering of 
church property. The outbreak seems to have begun in Rabat where officials, 
responsible to the French, had been sent to seize property of the Church of 
Our Lady of Mount Carmel. Ball was determined that the British would do 
nothing to arouse similar hostility.
An overt demonstration of Ball’s toleration policy was the recognition of 
the traditional religious festivities. He gave these his full support, subject 
only to regulations to preserve good order. Coleridge noted, during his 
period of office, how noisy public celebrations were.165 Fireworks were 
tolerated and children seemed to let them off “every three yards”.166 
Coleridge subsequently suggested that, in contrast to Sicilian festivals, the 
Maltese ones were subdued.167 Even so, he had little time for the Catholic 
162 Ibid.
163 CN 2, 2420, 28 January 1805.
164 Proclamation of 15 July 1801, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 204.
165 See e.g. the Easter celebrations 1805, CN 2, 2547.
166 CN 2, 2547. He noted the noise accompanied most forms of catholic ritual 
practised on the Island: CN 2, 2561.
167 The Friend, I, 566.
 Coleridge’s Malta 85
religion. After an early official visit, to the Maltese hospital, he also lamented 
the presence of religious iconography and complained of the “indefatigable 
ubiquitarian intrusia of the Catholic superstition”.168
Ball may have tolerated religious expression but he drew the line at 
compensating the religious institutions for property looted during the 
French occupation. Private individuals fared better, as was made clear 
in one of Coleridge’s most important Bandi dated 8 March 1805.169 The 
religious institutions never succeeded in recovering their stolen property 
or its equivalent monetary value. This was a lingering controversy, which 
we will discuss below.170
Whilst Ball appreciated the valuable role the church played, he also 
recognised its potential threat. In 1800 he had thought it desirable “to keep 
a watchful eye” on the priests who had a substantial influence over the 
population.171 There was always the possibility that disaffected priests 
could provide leadership and organise popular dissent, as some had done 
during the insurrection against the French. This implies that Ball’s refusal 
to underwrite the Church’s investments must have carried certain political 
risks. As we shall see, however, by 1805 any policy that aggravated the 
Island’s financial deficit was even less appetising than the risk of political 
agitation from its priests. 
The Maltese Administrative System 
A complex administration had been developed under the Order, which had 
often been pre-occupied with funding the defence of the Island. Despite 
this priority, the Order had maintained a system of courts for the redress 
of disputes. It had minted coinage, enforced laws, run hospitals, and 
established and maintained an effective water supply.172 It also operated the 
bulk purchase and supply of grain and other foodstuffs via the Università.173 
We shall now consider some of its principal institutions.
168 CN 2, 2420, 28 January 1805.
169 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
170 See Chapter 5: taxation theme.
171 He had reported that it was necessary to treat the religious “prejudices” of the 
Maltese with “great indulgence”: Ball to Dundas, above n. 5.
172 Water was scarce; drought often threatened: Pirotta, 21.
173 Ibid., 10.
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Hospitals 
In [the Maltese] Hospital among the Venereal Convalescents I saw (in the 
same bed) a child of 12 years old, and an old man at least 70!174
The care of the sick had been one of the main charitable objects for which 
the Order of St John was originally founded, and it had continued this limb 
of its mission on Malta. The British policy, inaugurated by Sir Alexander 
Ball, was to continue the health provision of the Order. At around £10,000 
per annum175 the required expenditure was a significant part of the Island’s 
budget. 
Ball fought for and won back, from the military authorities, the use of 
the civil hospital (which Coleridge called the Maltese Hospital176) which, 
during the French administration, had been appropriated for military use. 
This was a key policy, for it was tangible evidence of the administration’s 
desire to win the favour of the local inhabitants by giving them the 
assurances of funded public health provision. 
Ball undertook a major re-organisation of the hospitals, in 1804, which, 
notwithstanding the financial pressures upon his administration, included 
salary incentives for senior management.177 His aim was to ensure the 
efficient and effective running of the hospitals and it augured well that he 
was able to report that the costs of health provision declined sharply in 
1805 as the reforms took hold. Thereafter, the hospitals apparently ceased 
to claim much of Ball’s attention. This was another example of the failure to 
supervise and monitor the implementation of his important policies. 
Such scrutiny as there was must have been ineffective. Large numbers 
of the destitute were unnecessarily sheltered within the hospitals even 
though they had no need of medical care.178 This was another major cost 
to government that was allowed to go unchecked. But that was not all. 
Suspiciously, there were unexplained rises in costs, which drew the criticism 
174 CN 2, 2420.
175 Pirotta, 31.
176 CN 2, 2420, 28 January 1805.
177 See e.g. Macaulay to Ball, 10 September 1804, Kew CO 158/9/51-2. Ball admit-
ted that the salary of the President had been increased, to ensure his leadership in 
providing good management. He drew attention to “considerable reforms” includ-
ing the merger of the Invalids and Foundlings Hospital. Costs were predicted to fall 
in 1805: Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/147-9.
178 Maitland to Permanent Committee of Management of the Charitable Institu-
tions, 14 January 1816, Kew, CO 158/27/ no folio reference, where he referred to a 
“mass” of individuals in the hospitals who were not entitled to be there. He wrote 
that he had discovered “a place of resort for the idle”. 
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of the 1812 Royal Commission. Governor Maitland, who discovered that 
the hospitals were still overstaffed and inefficient, reformed the system in 
1816.179
Coleridge’s official responsibilities embraced the inspection and 
supervision of the civilian hospitals. His Notebooks record that, when he 
visited them, he discovered care arrangements that provoked his severe 
criticism.180 Despite this, he seems to have been unable to effect appropriate 
changes, for the problems remained in Maitland’s time.181 This is intriguing 
because Coleridge, when later travelling in Italy, professed a greater interest 
in the Pisan hospitals than he did in the leaning Tower, which he viewed 
in moonlight. The two Pisan hospitals, he discovered, were notable for the 
size of the rooms, the light and their “perfect cleanliness & good order”.182 
If this inspired him to reflect upon what might have been achieved in Malta, 
it came too late.
Alms
The monthly distribution of alms also provided welfare support to those 
in need.183 It was a function performed by the office of the Grand Almoner 
– an office that also came under the scrutiny of the Public Secretary. During 
the administration of the first British Civil Commissioner, we know that 
alms derived from the profits of the sale of wheat.184 And the substance of 
this policy continued under Sir Alexander Ball. One of Coleridge’s Public 
Notices, for example, reveals that judicially confiscated property could be 
sold and the proceeds distributed amongst the poor.185 Coleridge lost no 
opportunity to emphasise this in order to enhance Ball’s intended image as 
a kindly protector of the vulnerable.
Monte di Pietà e Redenzione 
The Order had also created a pawn brokerage, known as the Monte di Pietà 
179 Maitland to Permanent Committee, etc, ibid. 
180 CN 2, 2420. 
181 Maitland later found that the standard of care was characterised by a “filth 
and misery” which was “degrading to the government” and “disgraceful” to the 
inhabitants: Maitland above n. 178.
182 CN 2, 2856.
183 See, for example, the Bando of 8 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 
1805 AL 1814 2.
184 Cameron to Hobart, 24 February 1802, Kew, CO 158/3/16.
185 Avviso of 14 June 1805: NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 11.
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e Redenzione. This institution was to enable those who needed short-term 
finance to obtain it without having to sell their possessions to raise funds. It 
charged an interest rate of 6% per annum, which was below that demanded 
by private sector lenders. 
The Monte di Pietà was a semi-autonomous facility which, it seems, 
was used by all classes of the population. According to Ball, three hundred 
pounds a year accrued to the revenues of the Island as a result of its lending 
activities during the time of the Order.186
Unfortunately, it had also fallen victim to French rapacity when all 
pledged assets were plundered. Ball considered that it required a capital 
investment of five thousand pounds to re-establish it.187 In his Instructions 
to Cameron, Lord Hobart allowed the Civil Commissioner to determine 
who should manage it, but he explicitly required that the management be 
supervised so as to avoid fraud or abuse. 188 
Administrators of Public Property
The British Imperial government learned from Ball’s Report, of December 
1800, that various classes of property had formerly been vested in either 
the Order or the Grandmaster. After the French surrender, these properties 
became vested in the Crown. They included gardens, houses, warehouses; 
and Hobart ordered the Board of Administrators of Public Property, which 
fell under the scrutiny of the Public Secretary, should continue to manage 
them. Ball was, later, to use his power to appoint its members in order 
to promote broader political purposes. For example, the Marchese di 
Testaferrata was “demoted” from the office of a “Jurat” of the Università to 
the Board of Public Property once his nationalist sympathies had become 
known. He is likely to have been one of the anonymous authors of the 1805 
Petition to the Crown, which made a series of damaging allegations against 
Ball’s administration. We will consider this in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The Università
“..a strange, yet valid, anomaly in the operations of political economy”.189
The Università of Valletta190 was a centrally important Maltese institution, 
186 Ibid.
187 Ball to Dundas, above n. 5.
188 Instructions of 14 May 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/ff 53 et seq; Hardman, 350.
189 The Friend, I, 570.
190 More formally, of Valletta, Cospicua and Vittoriosa.
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which handled far greater sums of money than even the Island’s Treasury. 
It was to become a main bulwark in Ball’s policy of continuity. As we shall 
see, Ball’s policy in relation to the Università, leading to the distribution of 
bad bread, dealt a major blow to public confidence in his administration. 
Much of the resentment and ridicule was eventually targeted at Ball himself, 
which was a major crisis in confidence that Coleridge had to address. 
Ball required the Università to succeed in two ways each of which was 
central to his continuation strategy. Firstly, he expected it to generate a 
financial surplus upon its activities. This was needed to replace the lost 
revenue of the Order. Without that revenue, Ball could not afford the welfare 
policies and subsidised food necessary to “attach” the Maltese to British 
rule. Secondly, the Università was pivotal in ensuring a regular and, above 
all, affordable food supply to an island that was largely dependent upon 
imported foodstuffs. Without cheap bread the poor would be especially 
vulnerable to starvation, especially in the years 1800-1806 when there as 
an international grain shortage. The success of the Università system was a 
sine qua non of the success of his administration.191 Ball’s difficulties in both 
acquiring cheap grain and balancing the budget were the central anxieties 
of the Administration whilst Coleridge held office. It is, thus, important to 
examine the Università in some detail.
The Role of the Università 
The Università of Valletta was a municipal corporation, with local 
government functions, that formerly operated under the control of the 
Grandmasters who received monthly accounts of its transactions.192 One of 
its primary functions, and the one with which we are presently concerned, 
was to control a monopoly upon the purchase and supply of grain, as well 
as other staple food items, including meat,193 and oils. Traditionally, after 
the annual harvest, the Università would despatch buyers to neighbouring 
countries, principally Sicily, to purchase grain, which was placed in public 
granaries and sold at a fixed price. The grain was retailed to the Maltese 
population via designated shopkeepers. This system had come into existence 
191 Funds derived from the importation and selling grain, whether as surplus on 
sales or on taxes derived on grain imports, provided a major source of government 
revenue until 1939: See Bartolo.
192 Bartolo, ibid, citing Muscat, 98. See also Thornton (1836). 
193 After 1800, the Università began to trade in cattle to meet the demand from the 
increasing numbers of British military and other personnel on the Island: Thornton, 
ibid., 39-41. 
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because it was recognised that international mercantile trade would ensure 
that the grain needed to feed the Maltese would be sold in countries where 
better returns could be obtained. This would leave the Maltese population 
vulnerable to famine, unless they were able to pay the higher prices. As 
Ball reported, in 1800, this was a particular risk to the “labouring poor”;194 
and in the words of the 1812 Royal Commission a “permanent abundance” 
of grain was absolutely necessary.195 The government-controlled monopoly 
enabled the State to buy the required quantity, on the international market, 
and then control the retail price to ensure that the abundant supply of grain 
was marketed at an affordable price, in the domestic market.196 
The Order had once been able to achieve a long-term balanced budget 
by retailing the grain at a higher price than the purchase price when this 
could be afforded. In other words, the cost of subsidy in some years was 
off-set by the surpluses in other years. However, there was a structural 
flaw in the way the system was organised. The Jurats fixed the prices at 
which grain could be bought whilst the government fixed the sale price.197 
This system meant that the government could not require a surplus to be 
achieved unless it gave clear directions as to the maximum purchase price 
to be paid. This division of responsibility was a fundamental weakness in 
the management of the Università.The Università had also operated as a 
public bank, receiving deposits in return for which it paid interest of three 
per cent per annum from the surpluses it made upon the grain monopoly. 
The deposits were used as capital with which to acquire the grain. But the 
private capital of the Island had other uses, too. For example, it was used 
by the Order for public works and defence. The problem for the British, 
after 1800, was that these deposits, belonging to perhaps one thousand 
depositors, had been plundered by the French during the occupation. The 
victims included many private individuals whose livelihoods depended 
upon the interest payments and whose impoverished circumstances was 
causing political embarrassment. Convents and other religious bodies 
194 Ball’s to Dundas, above, n. 5.
195 In 1822, British policy makers in the Colonial Office were finally persuaded 
by local commercial interests to abolish the monopoly. This was surprising if only 
because the Università had, by this time, become profitable and provided revenue 
to support the welfare schemes which the government that were implemented 
through the charitable institutions. Notwithstanding the consequences of the loss 
of revenue, the monopoly was dissolved, whereupon the supply of grain fell into 
the hands of a private cartel, which was highly damaging to the public interest. 
Eventually the monopoly had to be restored: see Pirotta, Chapter 5.
196 Thornton (1816).
197 Ibid.
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also gained the majority of their revenue from accrued interest, and 
they, too, were now in difficulty.198 Confidence in the Bank had collapsed 
and so British funds had to be used to underwrite the Bank as well as to 
fund the purchase of grain. As we shall discover, the confiscation and its 
consequences were to create significant problems for British administrators, 
including Coleridge.199
The difficulty facing the British administration (of which it does not 
appears to have been fully aware) was that, in the eighteenth century, the 
Università system had sunk into perpetual decline, incapable of achieving a 
long-term balanced budget. The Grandmasters of the Order had subsidised 
grain so heavily, since about 1740, that the Università was insolvent even 
before the French invasion.200 In some years, the sale price of the grain had 
been only one quarter of the cost price.201 The Order had also raided the 
capital deposited by the inhabitants rather than draw upon the Maltese 
Treasury, and this accelerated the Università’s decline. For example, the 
Knights relied upon the deposits to shore up the funding of other institutions, 
and the welfare system.202 Notwithstanding these fatal, structural problems, 
the Università system continued until the French invasion.
Thornton, the careful and authoritative official who became Auditor-
General in Malta charged with the arrear-audit of every Maltese public 
institution, reported, in 1816, that the deficit was in excess of one million 
scudi (£100,000) by the time of the French invasion.203 It is difficult to believe 
that Ball was not aware of these critical difficulties when he decided to 
revive the Università in 1800. But if he was, indeed, aware of the problems, 
his insistence, in despatches, that the Università had delivered an annual 
surplus, even in the later years of the Order, seems inexplicable.204 It placed 
198 Eton to Sullivan, 29 July 1801, Kew, CO 158/2/308.
199 See especially, the taxation theme in Chapter 5.
200 See generally the account of the Royal Commission of 1812, above n. 37, and 
Thornton (1816, 1836).
201 Grain was bought for 60 scudi and sold for 15 scudi: Royal Commission, 
above n. 37, or 16 scudi, per Thornton (1816). These losses, according to the Com-
mission, went on increasing. 
202 The value of loans made by the Università to the Exchequer exceeded £65,000: 
Bonnici, 128.
203 Thornton (1816), and further Bartolo, who comments on the reliability of 
Thornton’s data. The assessment of the Royal Commissioners was that the deficit 
was about a million and a half scudi or about £150,000. Thornton thought that the 
deficit was about one million scudi by the date of the French invasion (June 1798). 
By September 1800, the Bank had debts “upwards of three and a half million scudi” 
(£350,000): Thornton, (1816), 5-7.
204 By 1801 Hobart had somehow come to believe that the Università “produces 
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his financial strategy for the Island upon the most precarious of footings 
because he committed himself to spending on popular projects without 
having the resources to fund them. This placed his administration in a 
straitjacket which he hoped to escape by speculation on the grain market. 
The project involved using British Treasury funds to purchase a year’s 
worth of cheap grain from Russia and then selling it at a profit within 
Malta and elsewhere. The surplus would, he hoped, substantially remove 
the Island’s deficit. 
In the end, Ball miscalculated; the mission inflicted severe damage 
upon the Island’s finances, and he fell back upon unpopular taxation and 
economies – the latter of which seem to have been only intermittently 
pursued. In this respect the guiding policies that his administration 
followed seem to have been ill-considered or, at least, poorly implemented. 
The grain mission of 1804-5
 “up the Black Sea to the mouth of the Dnieper”205
Ball’s predictions, of a financial surplus to be realised from grain speculation, 
had hardened into a firm political expectation for which, as the Secretary of 
State made clear, Ball would be accountable. No further funds to support 
the Università would be forthcoming from the British Treasury. Politically, 
the venture was required to succeed in the manner that Ball had, unwisely, 
predicted that it would.206 He now had to remove the Island’s deficit and 
deliver upon the Report he had made to Dundas in 1800. 
As it turned out, the grain mission was poorly executed, and the débacle 
was one for which the Jurats were made scapegoats and dismissed.207 The 
wheat purchased by Chapman had been of a “soft” or “tender” variety that 
considerable revenue”. Hardman, 354. The erroneous impression that the Order 
had made a surplus on the grain monopoly still influenced the actions of the Secre-
tary of State in 1805: see Cooke to Ball, 27 March 1805, Kew, CO 159/3/162.
205 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 12 December 1804, 
CL
 2,1158.
206 Camden to Ball, 24 February 1804, Kew, CO 159/3/121-2.
207 According to Borg, the dismissals took place on 23 July 1806: Borg to Eton 
23 July 1806, CO 158/12 (no folio reference). This is corroborated by NAM LIBR 
PS02/02, 138-9, 23 July 1806. On that date, Charles Livingstone was also appointed 
as a replacement Jurat. Ball regarded Borg as a “subversive” not least because Borg 
had openly advocated the establishment of “a congress to make laws for the Is-
land”. He had been deprived of his public office (as a Luogotenente) in 1804. Ball to 
Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/25; also Ball to Penn, July 1804, Kew, 
CO 158/9/7.
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was liable to decompose when shipped and which, in any event, could not 
be stored longer than five or six months.208 It was quite unsuitable given 
that the wheat was to safeguard the Island’s needs for one year.209 Ball 
ignored the Jurats’ advice, that the newly arrived grain was only fit for 
animal fodder. They were ordered to release the wheat into the market.210 
The oversupply of decomposing grain meant that the market prices that 
it fetched were much lower than anticipated. The poor quality of bread, 
made from the bad wheat, caused political disquiet.211 Most importantly, 
the evident failure of the mission damaged the administration’s reputation 
and added to the financial problems of the Università and, thus, of the 
Island.212
Moreover, it is possible that Coleridge might have been partly  responsible 
for what happened, since the Public Secretary’s role included giving 
directions to the Jurats. Although Coleridge seems to have left the Island 
208 See Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/78, also Livingstone 
to Ball, 25 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/203.
209 Ball had impressed upon Camden that this was the amount required, and the 
Secretary of State signalled his acquiescence: See E. Cooke to Ball 27 March 1805, 
Kew, CO 159/3/162. 
210 See Eton to Windham 11 October 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/ (no folio reference).
211 E.g. Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12 no folio reference. Borg lists 
a number of causes of popular displeasure with Ball, including “the bad quality of 
the bread”. In his response to the Secretary of State, Ball flatly denied that there was 
dissatisfaction. He stated that the inhabitants were “extremely well satisfied” to 
purchase a staple food at low prices: Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 
158/13/58-9.
212 Ball seems to have tried to cover up the disaster. At first, he reported to Lon-
don that Chapman’s consignment had generated a “saving to government” of 
£21,957: Ball to Cooke, 1 February 1806, Kew, CO 158/11/9. By 1807, Ball’s language 
had subtly altered. He then reported that the profit stated to have been made by 
the Università in 1805-1806 was £12,033: Ball to Shee, 12 May 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/ 
315. The true picture was very different. Thornton described it as a costly failure 
being “by far the greatest loss that [the Università] had then, or since, sustained”. 
Thornton (1816). His investigation revealed a loss in excess of 805,000 scudi (about 
£80, 500) for the financial year 1805-1806. Thus, almost all of the British taxpayer’s 
capital investment in the scheme was wasted. Ball’s obfuscations may have suc-
ceeded and delayed the moment when Ministers became convinced of the truth. 
This is so because Chapman (conveniently sent home on sick leave in June 1806) 
was rewarded by the Secretary of State with a £1000 payment for his services. Had 
his negligence been understood such a generous reward would have been unlikely: 
Castlereagh to Ball, 8 May 1807, Kew, CO 159/3/227. Within Malta, the Jurats were 
publicly made scapegoats and Ball dismissed them en bloc: see Borg to Eton 23 July 
1806, Kew, CO 158/12 (no folio reference): and further, n. 207 above. Coleridge’s role 
in the affair remains somewhat unclear. 
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by the time the grain arrived,213 he might have been expected to have begun 
planning for its arrival during 1805. This is so because, as early as February 
1805, both he and Ball expected Chapman’s imminent return.214 Since the 
storage capacity of the Island could not be increased without significant 
advanced planning (especially given the occupation of the granaries by the 
troops destined for the planned expeditionary operation under Lieutenant-
General Sir James Craig) it, perhaps, says something of Coleridge’s period 
in office that nothing appears to have been done either by him or the pro-
Seggretario, Giuseppe Zammit, to ensure that the imminently expected 
grain could be properly stored when it reached Valletta. 
The Civil Service: Ball’s Staffing Policies 
The “wide-branching tree of patronage”.215
Ball’s staffing strategy altered, in a number of ways, the established 
principles of the Order. Appointments to government offices under the 
ancien regime had been a reward to the Knights for military valour but, 
as operations against the Turks declined, the system under the Order 
degenerated into one based upon intrigue and patronage.216 Notoriously, 
their administration had excluded the Maltese from power. 
Ball continued the principles of patronage, but, in contrast to the Order, 
he favoured appointing Maltese to public office. In particular, he wanted to 
use his patronage to reward loyalists217 and to demonstrate to any influential 
213 Allegations about the quality of bread and the diminution in the weight of a 
loaf referred to the entire period Coleridge held office: Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, 
Kew, CO 158/12.
214 Ball to Camden, Kew, CO 158/10/1, 30 January 1805, in which Ball informed 
Camden of Mr Macaulay’s death. He continued, “I expect Mr Chapman daily from 
Constantinople, whom I shall put into the office of Public Secretary and Treasurer 
in conformity to the Orders sent me by the Earl of Buckinghamshire”. Coleridge 
wrote in similar terms to Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, 
CL
 2, 1163.
215 The Friend, I, 568.
216 Hardman, Chapter 1.
217 The system of reward extended to any public office in Ball’s grant. For example, 
upon its revival in October 1800, he appointed one of the leading insurrectionists, 
Canon Saverio Caruana, as Rector of the University. The dominant motive in this 
appointment seems to have been to reward a loyal individual rather than a desire to 
promote education. This is so because the University could not thrive without a sys-
tem of popular education to underpin it and from which it could derive its students. 
Instead, private education was available for the few who could afford it. Ball took 
no steps to introduce a public system. See for Coleridge’s views on the importance 
of mass education: The Friend, I, 540; also Debono (1996), 47-74. Caruana’s appoint-
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citizens, tempted to agitate against British rule, that loyalty carried notable 
benefits. Coleridge gave his support to this policy.218
Ball’s insistence upon his right to make appointments produced 
tension with Whitehall, because British officials did not wish to relinquish 
their own powers of patronage.219 Nevertheless, Ball pressed on; in fact, 
there is evidence that he must have moved quite rapidly to achieve his 
goals: Coleridge recorded, with approval, that by 1804-1805 each civil 
appointment, apart from  the Public Secretary and the Civil Commissioner 
(both appointed by ministers in Whitehall), was held by a Maltese.220 
Subject to the exceptions mentioned, he inferred that both senior and junior 
posts had native Maltese office-holders by that date. However, he appears 
to have overlooked the fact that that there were a number of Englishmen 
who staffed Ball’s private office.
Amongst a number of consequences, the already large Civil Service now 
grew further as Ball increased the staffing compliment by the appointment 
of local Maltese. This further increased the costs of government and with it 
the need to generate more revenue.
The new appointments also posed a number of questions about 
competence and effectiveness. One such question related to the depth of 
technical expertise and administrative experience in the new administration. 
The Heads of Department under the ancien regime had, largely, been 
recruited from the Knights. Most of these experienced administrators had 
left the Island in 1798, and those that remained were no longer in post. 
Ball’s policy, in effect, replaced these experienced experts using  criteria 
other than their lack of fitness for office. It was a policy that would reap 
sour rewards because, given new office-holders’ lack of professionalism, 
the need for effective systems of scrutiny and systematic financial reporting 
was all the greater. The weakness in such systems was a cardinal failure 
of Ball’s administration generally, and it was a problem which Coleridge 
seemed unable to resolve.
Ball’s willingness to delegate important matters to the Maltese officials 
was not unqualified. One example of this emerges in Coleridge’s important 
ment is a revealing one that speaks volumes of Ball’s real concerns. As we shall see, 
his policy implanted deep structural flaws into the Maltese administration.
218 The Friend, I, 569; see also Table Talk I, 475, 16 April 1834.
219 See Coleridge’s discussion in The Friend, I, 568-9. Hobart to Ball, 2 December 
1803, Kew, CO 158/7/443-7 reveals that Ball was ordered to find a suitable post for 
one M. Viale.
220 The Friend, I, 568.
96 Coleridge’s Laws
Proclamation of 22 March 1805221 which, as we shall see, was concerned with 
the regulation of spirits. It was, no doubt, intended to prevent disorder and 
drunkenness amongst the large number of British troops who had arrived 
on the Island in readiness for an impending attack upon Sicily. Whilst 
certain wholesalers were licensed by the President of the Grand Court of 
Valletta, the shopkeepers, pub owners and manufacturers all fell under the 
direct control of the Civil Commissioner. Clearly, trust in Maltese officials 
only went so far. Ball was under pressure from the military and needed to 
maintain a close supervision of the premises where soldiers could consume 
alcohol. He was right to be concerned because, as we shall see, alcohol-
related violence between soldiers and civilians was to lead to at least one 
fatal stabbing in 1805. 
A further problem was cultural. Coleridge informs us that the Maltese 
appointees of high social standing, most of whom seem to have been 
rewarded for loyalty, accepted public office as “honourable distinctions”.222 
Certainly. the early British administrations brought into the civil service 
a number of individuals who were, subsequently, judged to be “too old, 
infirm or from other causes incompetent in their duties”.223 One Maltese 
complained that “(p)laces are given not to the honest or meritorious but 
through favour to the worst people”.224 Record-keeping and correspondence 
was neglected as letters not requiring an immediate response were thrown 
on the floor.225 These criticisms suggest that some, perhaps many, of the 
appointees were either not interested in becoming active professional 
administrators or were ineffective for other reasons. Their lax approach to 
government business may furnish some explanation for both the lamentable 
state of the accounts,226 and the poor record of financial accountability 
uncovered by the 1812 Royal Commission. 
221 See the consumer protection theme in Chapter 5.
222 The Friend, I, 569.
223 Maitland to Bathurst, 24 October 1814, Kew, CO 158/ 25/210.
224 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12 no folio reference. 
225 Mark, At Sea with Nelson, 125 quoted in Laferla, vol I, 48 and Pirotta, 65.
226 See Thornton (1816) at 9 who discovered that the only accounting record of 
the Jurats were the ledgers “supported by a journal and other auxiliary books”. The 
ledger operated a double entry system, but when the book failed to balance the ac-
countant failed to close the account or, alternatively, made fictitious entries to make 
the books appear to balance.
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English Officials
The establishment, in 1803, of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, staffed by English 
lawyers, added to the small number of British office-holders who provided 
close assistance to Ball.227 This group established a small, but influential, 
society of English expatriates which did not, it seems, mix socially with 
the Maltese. Curiously, there is some evidence that Ball may actually have 
been unenthusiastic about English officials forging social relationships 
with the inhabitants.228 Borg reported to Eton that Ball “laboured to prevent 
friendships and acquaintance between Maltese and English”. Certainly, 
Sultana has noted that Coleridge did not appear to have made a single 
friend amongst the Maltese during his year and a half stay on the Island. 
If Borg’s somewhat surprising assertion is correct, the explanation may be 
that fraternisation was officially discouraged. 
It would be surprising if Coleridge agreed with any such policy. He 
had noted, and strongly disapproved of, the habits of the English to reach 
hasty, irrational, judgements about the local population. He condemned 
the tendency to overlook the virtues in vices, and to show intolerance for 
different customs and lifestyle.229 However, he lamented. in The Friend 
that, in general, the British behaved with hauteur showing insolence to 
and contempt for the local population – views that he also expressed in 
conversation with John Coleridge.230 Blaquière also noted a “marked 
and mutual coldness” between natives and the British.231 Mistrust of the 
British on the part of the Maltese may, of course, have had its origins in 
the Treaty of Amiens in which, according to Maltese opinion, Britain had 
revealed its willingness to sacrifice its wartime ally in order to further its 
own selfish interests. The marked coldness is also consistent with the rising 
unpopularity of the Administration in 1805. It is to that issue that we now 
return.
227 The key figures have been noted in Chapter 1.
228 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 58/12/ no folio reference.
229 The Friend, I, 555-7. Whether Coleridge acted on this can be questioned, espe-
cially in his vitriolic reaction to the Catholic Church and its rituals. 
230 Talker, 158-60, quoted in Holmes (1998), 247.
231 Blaquière.
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2.5.  The Public Reputation of the British 
Administration 1802-1806
“... the very clamors of the market-place were hushed at [Ball’s] entrance”.232
As we shall discover, Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi served a number of 
political purposes which went far beyond law-making or drawing the 
attention of the public to some particular issue of public importance. 
Coleridge used these instruments as propaganda tools that were intended 
both to influence Maltese opinion and to change behaviour and attitudes. 
These instruments reveal a systematic political agenda to enhance the 
public reputation of the Civil Commissioner and to persuade the Maltese 
to accept otherwise unpalatable measures. How Coleridge achieved this is 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, but for present purposes it is important to 
outline why Ball’s administration in 1805 was losing public confidence. 
The orthodox account of this period in Maltese history is dominated 
by a narrative strongly influenced by the British establishment.233 
According to this account, complaints about Ball’s government in 1805 
were orchestrated by known agitators, organised and assisted by William 
Eton, the Superintendant of Quarantine.234 Many of these individuals had 
grievances against Ball. 
Although, at first, the complaints were taken seriously and investigated, 
(inflicting temporary damage to Ball’s reputation) Ball’s superiors in London 
eventually exonerated the Civil Commissioner. They satisfied themselves 
that Ball had presided over an effective and popular government. The 
substance of the complaints was thus dismissed as scurrilous and seditious. 
First, it will be argued that this account is not supported by the wider 
historical record and secondly that, in any event, the conclusions reached, 
in 1808, contained a non-sequitur. It is true that many of the complaints 
were, as the British concluded, maliciously motivated, but it did not follow 
that they were, ipso facto, false. A more thorough investigation would have 
revealed that many of them could have been independently corroborated. 
Thus, it will be suggested that the William Eton’s235 known personal agenda, 
232 The Friend, I, 566.
233 See Hardman and most recently Staines.
234 See n. 73 above. 
235 Eton was eventually dismissed from his office as Superintendant of the Quar-
antine in Malta: Liverpool to Oakes, 18 September 1811, Hardman, 503. His alle-
gations against the Ball’s administration were then seen as “calumnies”: Oakes to 
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in discrediting Ball, allowed Ball’s superiors to marginalise the damaging 
allegations in order to re-establish the reputation of its government in 
Malta. In that way damage to Britain’s standing as a colonial power 
was conveniently avoided. Thus, it was Eton, now regarded as “a most 
dangerous man”,236 who was eventually dismissed from public office, and 
not Ball.237
Coleridge’s period in office took place during Ball’s second 
administration. As a Royal Navy Captain, Ball, acting in the name of the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, had administered the islands during the siege 
and blockade between 1799 and 1800. There is little doubt that in doing so, 
Ball won public support.238 After having shared the privations of the long 
siege of Valletta the inhabitants had composed the Maltese national song 
in his honour.239 In The Friend Coleridge went to some lengths to recount 
how fond a regard the Maltese had for “father Ball”. In the poorest houses, 
he recorded that two pictures were inevitably found: the Virgin and Child 
together with a portrait of Ball.240 According to Coleridge, the market place 
in Valletta fell into a reverential hush at Ball’s passing. 241
And the affection was not merely a personal admiration of one 
administrator. When Ball was replaced by Cameron in 1801 we learn that 
the latter was greeted by the inhabitants as a “Messiah”. The British were 
at first warmly received as liberators from the tyranny of the Order of St 
John and the French. 
Coleridge was convinced that during his second administration, 
following his recall to the islands in 1802, Ball had public confidence. He 
recorded that Ball had unlocked the fetters of political oppression which, 
of course, implied that the inhabitants, under Ball’s regime, enjoyed a new 
political freedom.242 As we shall discover, it is doubtful whether the Maltese 
shared this assessment.
A more convincing account is that, after the Treaty of Amiens, 1802, 
(which even Coleridge regarded as a “betrayal” of the Maltese243) the 
Liverpool, 1 August 1811, Kew CO 158/17. See generally, Staines, Essay 06.
236 Oakes to Bunbury, 30 July 1811, Kew, CO 158/17.
237 Liverpool to Oakes, 18 September 1811, Hardman, 503.
238 Maltese officials sent numerous expressions of gratitude to Ball on his quitting 
office: see Hardman, 343-4.
239 The Friend, I, 566.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid., 571.
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political context became more challenging and called for a broader range 
of political skills than those previously required. Friction between the 
inhabitants and the Administration had increased. 
The effect of the Treaty of Amiens upon the relationship between the 
governors and the governed cannot be over-stated. From the British point 
of view, the French offer to discontinue hostilities if Malta was returned 
to the Order of St John under the protection of Russia seemed attractive. 
However, this settlement was acutely unpopular in Malta. Cameron, the first 
British Civil Commissioner, reported to Lord Hobart that a mere rumour 
of the agreement “has occasioned most violent fermentation” locally.244 The 
Maltese remonstrated that, as France had confiscated the French property 
of the Knights in 1792, in effect, France would have an indirect control of 
Malta.245 They were also concerned about possible reprisals against their 
people. 
These objections were swept aside because the benefit to Britain was 
thought to outweigh the concerns of the Maltese. In an attempt to force the 
British into a volte face the Maltese, on 15 June  1802, issued a Declaration of 
Rights246 declaring that the “King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland is our Sovereign Lord, and his lawful successors shall, in all 
times to come, be acknowledged as our lawful sovereign”. The purpose of 
this was to try to prevent Britain renouncing possession of the islands. 
As matters turned out, the Treaty was never implemented; Britain 
retained possession and, in response to the British refusal to evacuate, 
France resumed hostilities in May 1803. But the damage to Maltese public 
opinion had been done. The inhabitants had seen that Britain was capable 
of “sacrificing” Malta when its own interests demanded it.247 To make 
matters worse, the British were dragging their heels over prize money 
that had been promised to the Maltese following the capture of Valletta, 
and were thought to have breached faith with the inhabitants who had 
served in the Maltese military. This was, eventually, to provide another 
administrative burden for Coleridge.248 Complaints about the terms of the 
French surrender, under which it was alleged that Britain had not taken up 
an offer by the French commander to compensate those whose property 
244 Cameron to Hobart, 23 October 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/335.
245 Hardman, 410-15.
246 Widely reproduced; see, for example, Cm 9657 Appendix F; Frendo.
247 Lord Hobart replied to the Maltese Deputies to London in a letter dated 20 
April 1802 that the abandonment of Malta was “an indispensable sacrifice”: Hard-
man, 412.
248 See Chapter 5.2: Distributions of the Prize. 
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had been looted, also formed a part of the context at this period.249 A 
mutually cynical relationship seems to have evolved in which the Maltese 
took what they could from Britain until their conquerors should once again 
abandon them. 250
The immediate consequence of the Treaty of Amiens was to stimulate 
an invigorated Nationalist campaign for political pluralism to gain some 
measure of self-determination. After 1802 the calls for the “restoration” by 
the British of the Consiglio Popolare – a popular council which the Maltese 
alleged had deliberative and legislative powers – became more evident. 
This campaign also included an assertion that the British had reneged upon 
their promise to restore the traditional constitution (which included, they 
argued, the Consiglio). The British emphatically rejected both arguments 
and steadfastly refused to share power with the Maltese.251 These and other 
frustrations were undoubtedly coming to a head in the spring of 1805. 
Crime remained high, most notably highway robbery and burglary in 
the countryside. The murder rate was also a concern, combined with low 
levels of detection and prosecution.252 Moreover, the British had reversed 
a centuries old policy of prohibiting Jews from settling on Malta. Jewish 
immigrants had begun to arrive in late 1804 and, by 1805, many had 
set up in business as rivals to the Maltese. This was causing resentment 
amongst the small traders of Valletta who were afraid that competition 
might return them to poverty just as the economy lifted from depression. 
Underlying trade anxieties boiled over into violent public disorder in May 
1805. As we shall discover, suspected Jews were stoned, and two thousand 
demonstrators poured down the main street in Valletta. The demonstration 
was, of course, heading to the seat of government, which signalled that the 
Maltese held the British responsible. The situation was, as Coleridge later 
admitted, a “difficult emergency”.253 We shall return to this in relation to 
public order and crime. 
To restore order Ball directed the judiciary to impose more severe 
sentences than the Code de Rohan permitted – a controversial political 
intervention in the judicial process that caused consternation amongst the 
Islanders. The sentence of life-long exile that was imposed upon a twelve 
249 See Appendix 2.
250 Corrupt practices were later identified: Maitland to Bathurst, 24 October 1814, 
CO 158/25/209, et seq. 
251 Hardman, 498-9.
252 Borg to Eton, Kew, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/ no folio reference.
253 The Friend, I, 544.
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year old boy, who had been implicated in the disturbances, must have 
added to the accusations (albeit accusations from well-known political 
opponents) that Ball’s government exercised “thundering vengeance” and 
despotic powers. 
Moreover, serious problems in feeding the population were also 
emerging. As we have seen, Ball had staked much of the financial strategy 
upon the success of the grain mission. Following the decay of the imported 
wheat, the Maltese now grumbled about unfit bread.
There had also been a breach of faith when the British re-imposed 
the excise duty on wine and to initiate a further duty on liquor in March 
1805. The potentially inflammatory volte face emanated directly from 
Ball’s failure to grasp the financial condition of the islands in 1800. The 
repercussions were damaging. At about this time (March 1805) it appears 
that one of the Nationalists decided to petition the Civil Commissioner. 
Most likely, this sought political reform – a power-sharing between British 
and Maltese by means of a representative assembly – the Consiglio Popolare. 
Notwithstanding that the Maltese constitution allowed individual citizens 
to petition on any subject, a report reached London that Ball had summarily 
exiled the petitioner.254 This uncompromising denial of structured political 
pluralism meant that the Maltese had no lawful avenue to pursue their 
political grievances; indeed, it was this ruthless crushing of political 
expression taken with the politically-motivated interventions in criminal 
trials held after the anti-Semitic uprising that eventually featured strongly 
in the flurry of complaints to the Secretary of State in London. Frustrated 
and angry Nationalists petitioned Lord Windham arguing that they should 
be able to by-pass Ball and send their grievances directly to the King.255 
Revealingly, the petition stated that, if this direct channel were permitted, 
those who sought to re-establish the Consiglio Popolare could make their 
254 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated): Kew, CO 
158/10/151 et seq. No record of it appears in the Memoriali e Decreti of the Segnatura. 
So the petition must have been made directly to the Civil Commissioner.
255 Ibid. The petition sought “some channel thro’ which the Maltese might state 
(either in a body or individually) grievances without the risk of being banished to 
the Coast of Barbary, or otherwise punished if their petitions are intercepted”. Oth-
er grievances included: (i) failure to establish the Consiglio Popolare; (ii) freedom 
from torture; (iii) that no-one should be punished without trial; (iv) the trial judge 
should be under no control other than the law-i.e. not subject to the direction of the 
Civil Commissioner; (v) that sentences should be mitigated, but not augmented by 
the Commissioner (pronounced in open court) and not first submitted to the Civil 
Commissioner.
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argument for it without the risk of banishment to the coast of Barbary.256 
Moreover, the complainants argued for laws to be reformed so that no 
person could be punished without trial and that sentences should only be 
pronounced by the judge in open court, without the prior approval of the 
Civil Commissioner. 
These and others complaints were legitimate grievances and not 
the fanciful inventions of disappointed individuals. Ball did interfere 
in the sentences of the criminal courts;257 the corn mission had failed 
and, (according to the Jurats), the bread was bad;258 crime rates were high 
and detection rates low (because of reluctant witnesses and community 
solidarity); the government was nervous about friction and resentments 
arising from the new tax burden. Moreover, disgruntled citizens flooded 
the Segnatura with a significant number of petitions complaining that they 
had been unjustly denied their share of the promised prize money. This 
volume of litigation disclosed grave policy misjudgements in encouraging 
and then frustrating Maltese expectations. Dissatisfaction also simmered 
over the collapse of the cotton markets; there were tensions over military 
enlistments, the hunting down of deserters from the Royal Regiment of 
Malta, the wasted expenditure, Ball’s civil service staffing policy, and the 
diminution in the weight of bread.259 
To make matters worse, Eton had (with some justification) written in the 
strongest possible terms to Windham (the Secretary of State) condemning 
Ball’s “shameful speculation” on the grain market and, in effect, accusing him 
of abusing the unfettered powers of his Office. He called for Ball’s immediate 
recall on grounds of incompetence and financial mismanagement.260 By 
mid 1806 graffiti lampooning Ball and his administration appeared all over 
Valletta and one complainant, albeit a member of Eton’s cabal, wrote:
 “Country people have no faith in Ball. His bad conduct has produced this 
effect. No one shews (sic) him any respect in the streets, neither in town nor 
256 Petition of the Maltese, ibid. 
257 See Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime. The recommendation of the Royal 
Commission of 1812 that the Civil Commissioner should lose the power to interfere 
in the judicial process vindicates the complaints made in this respect: Kew, CO 
158/19.
258 Ball denied the quality of the bread was poor, but the denial is unconvincing 
given that the wheat had deteriorated: Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, 
CO 158/13.
259 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12. It is interesting to note the com-
plaint that the Maltese had suffered bad bread for the previous thirty months.
260 Eton to Windham, 13 March 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/245.
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country…[t]hey tremble at his despotic scourge”.261 
If this allegation is true then it is unsurprising, given the inevitable 
frictional effects of the policy failings described above. The suggestion that 
Ball’s administration was competent and effective in the years 1805-1806 
lacks credibility.
 Thus, notwithstanding the eulogistic narrative of Ball’s administration 
that Coleridge promoted in The Friend, the wider historical record bears 
witness to the mounting problems of unpopularity that Ball and Coleridge 
faced. Confidence in the British administration at this time was in a rapid 
and steep decline. 
In fact, evidence of a damaging loss of public confidence in the 
administration is corroborated in Coleridge’s official work. The emerging 
popular resentment and unpopularity of the Civil Commissioner explains 
why Coleridge, in the Bandi and Avvisi, undertook, as we shall see, an 
effective and systematic public relations offensive to boost Ball’s image 
and to restore Ball’s reputation and public standing. This is explored in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
Coleridge’s later accounts suggest that this project continued after he 
left Malta. It seems that he still experienced a loyalty both to the Maltese 
colonial project and to his late colleague, the Civil Commissioner. 
There is little doubt that Ball had once enjoyed, as Coleridge claimed, 
an excess of gratitude from the Maltese,262 but this was likely to have been 
a legacy of days when he administered the Island during the struggle 
against the French (1799-1800). The British betrayal of Malta, in the Treaty 
of Amiens, had marked a change and the popular mood gradually became 
one of disillusionment and disappointment. Coleridge’s period of office 
occurred at a time of crisis. As Public Secretary, it fell to him to frame the 
government’s political message and to win back popular support whilst 
loyally implementing measures (such as re-imposed taxation) that were 
widely disliked. If Malta were to be retained as a British possession, the 
consent of the Maltese had to be maintained, so Coleridge’s role was of 
strategic significance. Hitherto, this onerous burden of responsibility has 
not been fully understood. Nevertheless, it goes some way to explaining 
Coleridge’s exhaustion whilst in office. Much was expected of him and he 
had to deliver.
During his time as Public Secretary Coleridge struggled to work within, 
261 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/ no folio reference.
262 The Friend, I, 566.
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and make popular, ill-judged, counter-productive and contradictory 
politics: to maintain the welfare system, whilst avoiding taxation; to 
“attach” the Maltese to British rule whilst crushing political expression; to 
continue the Constitution whilst, in fact, breaching it; to pursue popularity 
whilst punishing opposition, even amongst children; and, in the face of 
these actions, to surround Ball with a propaganda myth of wise, benign 
and prelatic authority. 
At this time the intractable conflict between liberty and empire that 
had been exposed in the American Revolution was far from resolved. The 
experience of the early British administrations on the Island revealed that the 
“continuity” model of government, both in conception and implementation, 
posed significant challenges to the provincial administration.
Coleridge’s talent, as we shall see, was not in the skilful drafting of legal 
norms, but in sensitive, but crucial, political engagement with the Maltese 
people. In the Bandi and Avvisi the Administration spoke directly to them, 
and in this work Coleridge (from the British point of view) stood out as 
particularly talented. 
Eventually, the damaging complaints,263 from Eton and his fellow 
agitators forced Windham to demand Ball’s formal response to the “serious 
charges” they alleged.264 After Ball had, in 1807, provided his answer to 
the allegations,265 the Secretary of State delayed forming an early opinion 
about the standard of public administration; Ball had to be content with 
a holding reply.266 It seems that, in official eyes, Ball had been tarnished 
and his superiors were uncertain how to respond. However, no thorough 
investigation was stimulated by these complaints until after Ball’s death. 
However, once it emerged that Eton was a vindictive troublemaker, his and 
the other complaints lost credibility. This presented a useful exit strategy 
for Ball’s superiors. In 1808, almost a year after the holding reply, Ball was 
formally exonerated.267 The Establishment had finally decided to close 
ranks.Ball’s reputation in Malta was also to recover. Improved economic 
prosperity, political stability and improving government finances were, 
263 Even Ball thought that he would be removed from office: Ball to Graham, 14 
September 1806, NLM 441. 
264 Windham to Ball, 6 January 1807, Kew, CO 159/3/220 at 223. For Ball’s sus-
tained rebuttal to the allegations made against him see Ball to Windham, 28 Febru-
ary 1807, CO 158/13/9 et seq. Investigations continued and Windham delayed offer-
ing a formal response: see Cooke to Ball, 4 May 1807, Kew, CO 159/3/226. 
265 Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/9 et seq.
266 Cooke to Ball, 4 May 1807, above n. 264.
267 Cooke to Ball, 5 April 1808, Kew, CO 159/3.
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perhaps, Ball’s legacy after his early demise in October 1809.268 Even 
concerns over Ball’s intervention in the criminal process eventually faded, 
for the Maltese Deputies summarised Ball’s achievement in government as 
“substituting a just and paternal Government in the place of a revolutionary 
regency (i.e. France)”.269 (Emphasis added). But this cannot disguise how 
difficult the years 1805-1806 had been; and this period coincided, very 
closely, with Coleridge’s term of office, which meant that the burden of 
dealing with it fell upon his shoulders as well as upon Ball’s. If this period 
of difficulty eventually proved to be a temporary crisis, it was, nonetheless, 
a grave one. There’s no doubt that Coleridge is due some credit for the 
administration’s success in the field of government communication, which 
must not only have played some part in re-building popular trust in the 
Civil Commissioner, but also in achieving stable government in Malta.
268 See comments of the Royal Commissioners of 1812, Kew, above n. 37.
269 Letter of the so called “Deputies of the Nation” to the acting Public Secretary, 
Chapman, 22 December 1809, Hardman, 508.
3. The Constitutional Position 
of the Civil Commissioner
Introduction 
Coleridge occupied the office of Public Secretary, “Segretario Publico 
dell’Isole di Malta, Gozo e delle loro dipendenze’. This office was the 
channel through which all the civil administration of the islands and all 
the policies of the British Civil Commissioners were put into effect.1 His 
legal authority to act in that office came from the authority of the Civil 
Commissioner, Sir Alexander Ball. Ball was a British official exercising, 
indirectly, upon authority from London, powers recognised under English 
law as flowing from the Royal Prerogative. Ball’s authority also came 
from the considerable prerogatives of the Grandmaster whose powers the 
British officials took over after the British occupation began in 18002. In 
these capacities it was Ball who exercised the legislative, law making power 
(formally and actually) in Malta. Coleridge advised, drafted and signed the 
instruments (the Bandi and Avvisi) but political and legal responsibility 
for these, and for actions taken under them, lay with Ball. In this chapter 
we will explore issues relating to the constitutional and legal position of 
Ball in his capacity as a British official albeit one exercising the powers of 
a Grandmaster. Those powers were, potentially, despotic and the general 
theme of this chapter is the nature and degree of the limits and controls 
imposed, not only politically, but also, and in particular, by the rule of law, 
on the exercise of these powers by a British official. There are actions by 
Ball in which Coleridge, if only by being Public Secretary, is implicated and 
which were politically, but also legally, problematic. Political accountability 
for such actions, under the new approach to colonial government that the 
1 Caruana.
2 The role of the Grandmasters in areas such as welfare policies and the law is 
discussed in Chapter 2.
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British had adopted, was not, it seems, very effective. Legal accountability, 
on the other hand, was, at least in principle, more rigorous. There could have 
been challenges to Ball’s actions, not in the Maltese courts but in the courts 
in London, applying English law to the position of a Civil Commissioner. 
On a number of points, such as the way he sometimes intervened in the 
judicial process, Ball could have been vulnerable to such action. In fact, 
though, no such cases were brought.
3.1.  Colonial Policy and the Civil 
Commissioner
Introduction
A Civil Commissioner was appointed in Malta in order to meet Maltese 
concerns about being subjected to military rule and, thereby, to try to 
confirm Maltese allegiance to the British Crown. Following the capitulation 
of the French garrison, in September 1800,3 the British government 
considered the possession of Malta in predominantly military terms, as 
a base for the defence of British military and commercial interests in the 
Levant and, in particular, for blocking any renewed threat to Egypt. The 
military government, that had been established under Major-General 
Pigot, was, for a time, considered sufficient to meet these British aims 
and to provide a stable and effective government for the Maltese. For 
many Maltese, however, a military government was unsatisfactory. It 
might threaten those liberties that they had enjoyed in practice under the 
Grandmaster and, also, those that might be anticipated under British rule. 
From aboard his ship, Ball wrote to Dundas, in March 1801, that “(t)he 
inhabitants conceive their liberty insecure until the military and civil power 
be divided”. 4 He added that the burden of a civil and military government 
would be excessive for one office-holder, and insisted that the Maltese were 
anxious lest their concerns were neglected. Ball’s representations were 
clearly persuasive. The Secretary of State appointed Charles Cameron the 
3 See Chapter 2 and Appendix 2.
4 Ball to Dundas, 26 December 1800, Kew, CO 158/1/1. Eton (a British political 
opponent of Ball’s, see below) thought that any delay in establishing a civil govern-
ment could lead to insurrection (Eton to Sullivan, 5 July 1801, Hardman, 496).
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first Civil Commissioner, in May 1801.5 Though, according to William Eton, 
the new Civil Commissioner was “received as a Messiah” by the people,6 
the Civil Commissioner’s authority was to operate in parallel with the 
military and the issue of military and civil relations was left unresolved 
for a number of years.7 In 1803 Cameron left Malta to become governor of 
the Bahamas and Sir Alexander Ball was appointed as Civil Commissioner. 
The Absence of Legislative Assemblies
As with Cameron, Ball had to work within the context of British colonial 
policy and ambitions. The occupation, by the British, of Malta, in 1800, took 
place at a time of a gradual, and not completely conscious, shift in policy 
towards colonial government8. The former model of colonial government 
was decentralised and had at its centre a more or less complex relationship 
between a local legislative assembly and a Governor whose consent was 
required to enact legislation. The ideology of this “First” Empire had been 
one of assimilation. It had not been an empire of conquest but an “outpost 
of British norms’, founded predominantly upon oceanic commerce and 
Protestantism and inhabited by metropolitan migrants.9 
However, the British became increasingly disenchanted with having 
to govern through a legislative assembly. This disenchantment stemmed 
from areas of conflict (such as slavery) between London and different 
colonies and also difficulties, illustrated by the American experience, of 
subduing any spirit of independence amongst the colonial population. 
Difficulties meant that imperial policy had to be pursued by encouraging 
governors to use diplomatic and exhortatory means in order to avoid 
an assembly garnering popular support and becoming the focus for 
impasse or even revolt.10 Even where an Assembly assumed powers at 
variance with a governor’s Instructions, Secretaries of State might advise 
the governor to act with caution and discretion;11 and a minister, in order 
to avoid direct confrontation, might provide the governor with some 
5 Randon, 347-74.
6 Eton to Sullivan, 5 July 1801, Hardman, 496.
7 The issue is discussed in more detail below.
8 See generally, Manning, Part One.
9 Armitage, “The Ideological Origins of the British Empire’, 3.
10 E.g. Manning, 140-2.
11 Hobart to Seaforth, 20 August 1801, Kew CO 29/29/1, where the Secretary of 
State reminded the governor of the importance of “Prudence and Discretion” in 
dealing with the Executive government of Barbados.
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negotiating leeway by speaking to influential members to discover how 
far, in fact, the practices of the Assembly would be in conflict with “true 
Constitutional principle”. Above all was the need to avoid an open breach, 
“open contest…. cannot be too cautiously avoided”.12 Thus, ministers were 
forced to adopt diplomatic means to secure imperial goals and to remind 
assemblies of the constitutional constraints that bound them.13 There was 
the possibility of dissolving a recalcitrant legislative assembly. But, though 
governors might expect support from London14, this was a course of action 
that raised delicate political questions and considerable risks. Following 
Campbell v Hall,15 indeed, a dissolution in most cases would require an Act 
of Parliament, which could be difficult to achieve.16 
The advent of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, changed the 
purposes underlying the acquisition of colonies and reinforced a tendency 
towards more centralised colonial governance that had its origins in the 
loss of the American colonies. Malta, in particular, was a colony acquired 
for an immediate military purpose and advantage in the context of war and 
it then achieved strategic importance. Issues of settlement for British people, 
which had been central in the “first” empire, were not a consideration. 
Changes in the purpose and nature of the British perspective on colonies 
and the pursuit of the national interest overseas led, often though not 
always, to a change in the general principles of colonial governance one of 
whose central features was a determination to govern independently of a 
local legislative assembly.17 
12 Hobart to Seaforth, 6 January 1803, Kew, CO 29/29/25-6, quoted in Manning, 
141.
13 Castlereagh seemed to prefer prorogation followed by a public relations cam-
paign by the governor to win public support against the assembly was an alterna-
tive: Manning, 142. After 1815 ministers were more prepared to support governors 
anxious to adopt a firmer stance with assemblies: the governor was praised for 
dissolving the Bahamian assembly in 1817 after it ordered the imprisonment of the 
Attorney-General: Kew, CO 24/17 Bathhurst to Cameron, 30 April 1817, quoted in 
Manning, 147.
14 See Bathurst to Cameron, 31 April (sic), 1817, Kew, CO 24/17/64.
15 (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 ER 1045.
16 In outline, Campbell v Hall held that once the Imperial government had al-
lowed a legislative assembly to be set up it could not be dissolved other than by an 
Act of Parliament unless the Crown, when establishing the assembly, had reserved 
a power of dissolution.
17 See generally, Manning. The Quebec Act 1774 embodied the new approach that 
was based on the acceptance of the existing laws and institutions of the subject ter-
ritory but the refusal to allow local legislatures with significant power to develop: 
Manning, 294-6. A contrary example is Britain’s brief occupation of Sicily, 1806-1815: 
see Gregory. 
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For Malta, therefore, it was not surprising that the British consistently 
rejected the claim, by elements of the Maltese opposition, including 
William Eton,18 to allow or restore a legislative assembly in Malta (the 
Consiglio Popolare) that, it was claimed, was customary in Malta but had 
been allowed to fall into disuse by the Knights. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the British ruled by the principle of continuity with the constitution, laws 
and institutions of Malta as they were prior to the French invasion. It was 
important, from the British point of view, to demonstrate that, even if there 
had been a customary assembly in Malta, it had not enjoyed legislative 
powers.19 
The Authority of the Civil Commissioner
The system that was imposed, in the early years of British rule, was, 
therefore, autocratic. The autocracy was based not simply upon the revised 
approach to colonial governance which the British had adopted. It also 
gained legitimacy from the continuity principle which mandated the 
British, through the Civil Commissioner, to take over the Maltese system, a 
system ultimately rooted in the autocracy of the Grandmasters. As shown 
in Chapter 2, the new system was established under the Proclamations of 
19 February20 and 15 July 180121 and the Royal Instructions of 14 May 1801.22 
Indirect Rule under the Royal Prerogative
Cameron’s and Ball’s authority to govern, from the British perspective, was 
based upon the Royal Prerogative. Blackstone, writing of the eighteenth-
century constitution, defined the Royal Prerogative as “that special pre-
eminence which the King hath, over and above all other persons, and out 
of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his regal dignity”.23
18 Cameron was compelled to warn Eton not to encourage the Maltese to expect 
“restoration” of a Consiglio Popolare: Cameron to Eton, 22 May 1802, Kew, CO 
158/4/43.
19 This was eventually established to British satisfaction by the Royal Commis-
sion of 1812: Kew, CO 158/19, although rejection of the Maltese claim was consist-
ently done through Ball’s period.
20 Hardman, 341-2; NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 185.
21 Hardman, 358-359; NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 204.
22 Hardman, 350-7. The Royal Instructions provided a policy framework for Com-
missioners to work within. The Royal Instructions for Malta are discussed below.
23 Blackstone, Book 1, Chapter 7, 232. No attempt is made here to discuss modern 
day issues about the scope of the Prerogative.
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In effect, it meant that ministers, formally advising the Crown, could act 
and legislate for Malta independently of any need for authorisation by an 
Act of Parliament. The Royal Prerogative was used in London to create and 
authorise a local official (the Civil Commissioner) who would exercise the 
Crown’s legislative and executive powers in the colony. 
From London’s point of view there were obvious practical advantages 
which this system had over any attempt at more direct rule. In particular, 
the presence of a locally-based official meant that necessary legislation 
could be identified and the resulting laws would be appropriate to local 
conditions. At the same time, the Imperial interest would not be threatened 
(as it might be by a local legislative assembly) because local legislation 
would be in the hands of a British official. Political direction and control 
could be retained in London. The Civil Commissioners would not be 
exercising some uncontrolled vice-regal authority but be subject to political 
limits upon their powers. The authority of the Commissioners derived 
from their Commission and from Royal Instructions which governed their 
appointment. Civil Commissioners, such as Ball, were subject to Royal 
Instructions, from the Secretary of State, which set out, albeit in general 
terms, the policy goals, and the powers delegated to them in order to achieve 
those goals.24 These Instructions, along with the practical supervision of the 
Secretary of State and  formal review by the Privy Council and its Committee 
for Trade, established a supervisory context within which Commissioners 
operated. The Instructions (14 May 1801) to the first Civil Commissioner 
for Malta, Charles Cameron, were explicitly stated to be “guidance”, but 
they had the constitutional force of a Royal command. 
Once the initial Instructions had been issued, ministers could and 
did provide further advice to the Civil Commissioners. Despatches 
supplemented, refined or even countermanded the initial instructions.25 
The traffic was clearly not all one way. Malta’s Civil Commissioners were 
in regular communication with ministers, reporting upon the state of the 
Island’s finances, the system of financial controls, proposals for the food 
supply, and all other major questions of policy. Such reports, then, assisted 
the ministers in London to advise the Civil Commissioners on the direction 
and execution of future policy.
Under this indirect system, the Civil Commissioner had a great deal 
24 The Royal Instructions of 1801 for Malta are discussed below.
25 The despatches that followed Cameron’s Instructions, for example, clarified 
and amended them in relation to the demarcation of responsibility between the 
civil and military authorities.
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of local freedom. In particular, as in the case in Malta, he was not only the 
apparent but usually the real initiator of legislative proposals. Thus, in the 
case of “Coleridge’s laws”, all of the political initiatives, leading to their 
enactments, originated in Malta; subject to the exceptional case relating to 
passports.26 
Powers and Discretion
The Commissioner’s authority and powers derived from his Commission 
and the Instructions presupposed additional, general powers widely 
enjoyed by Governors and Commissioners27 in the colonial context. These 
were implied powers which were assumed in the Instructions and would 
apply unless explicitly overridden. 
Implied and ancillary powers were derived from interpretation of the 
Instructions and were those which were necessary or expedient in order 
to give effect to the Instructions. Such powers, in effect, would expand 
the scope of the express Instructions, but in a manner that was consistent 
with and supportive of them. However, their scope was unclear on issues 
such as whether and to what extent they could authorise coercive actions. 
In principle that was a matter of interpretation of the Instructions which, 
under a constitutional separation of powers, should have been done by the 
courts. In Malta, however, there was no effective procedure by which a 
judicial challenge to the exercise of his powers by the Commissioner could 
have been brought. This issue is discussed further, below. 
An example of ancillary powers can be offered from the Instructions 
received by Charles Cameron in May 1801. Malta could not feed herself. 
By 1801, the corn supplies from Sicily, a traditional source, had become 
uncertain when Sicilian ports were closed to British vessels. The Instructions 
required the Civil Commissioner, as one of the most “essential” of his 
duties “to make yourself thoroughly acquainted with every circumstance 
26 This was the Avviso of 25 June 1805 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2, Bandi 1805 AL 
1814, 15. A copy of this instrument was transmitted to London: Kew, 158/10/195; see 
Chapter 5.9: Passports.
27 Nothing of significance, in terms of authority, turns on which of these offices 
is used: Roberts-Wray, 306. The Maltese experience suggests that “Governor” ap-
plies when British sovereignty was certain. The first “Governor” was Sir Thomas 
Maitland appointed in 1813; formal cession occurred in the Treaty of Paris 1814. In 
Sammut v Strickland [1938] AC 678, British courts accepted Malta as a ceded colony 
“not later than 1813” and left its status between 1800 and 1813 uncertain. The issue 
is discussed by Davis and Hough (2007).
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relative to the purchase and sale of corn at Malta, of which you will transmit 
to me (the Secretary of State) a full detailed account”.28 Nothing was said 
about how this was to be done and Cameron could well have argued that, 
if necessary, coercive powers to seize and inspect relevant documents (e.g. 
from recalcitrant officials of the Università) were ancillary to this instruction. 
Furthermore, the Civil Commissioner had other powers which were 
inherent to his office. These were powers conferred by law as an incident 
of the office, rather than by express or presumed terms of the Instructions. 
Those powers were ill-defined and potentially controversial. The law 
recognised two grounds for such inherent powers: custom and necessity. A 
customary power was one usually exercised by the governor of the territory 
in question.29 Governors lacking express power to pass a particular law 
would sometimes fall back upon an alleged custom that permitted their 
action, but the custom relied upon could only be established in evidence 
by reference to practice within the territory in question.30 This would be 
extremely valuable for Cameron and Ball in Malta given the wide, if not 
unlimited, scope of customary authority of the Grandmasters.  A “necessary” 
power was one that the Governor or Commissioner required in order to be 
able to perform his functions. Governors often claimed as “necessary” a 
range of powers that the English courts refused to countenance. Suspending 
the law in order to deal with serious threats to public order is as example. 
Mostyn v Fabrigas31 indicates that it was for the judges, in England, to 
determine whether otherwise unlawful actions were justified on necessity 
grounds. Most notable amongst these was the power to amend the law. 
However, in Cameron v Kyte,32 the Privy Council held that the legislative 
power was not an inherent power of a governor. Although this case was 
decided after Coleridge’s departure from Malta, it is doubtful whether an 
English court would have decided the issue differently in 1805. In practice, 
this meant that if the instructions omitted to confer a law-making power 
– or only conferred a restricted power – the courts would not allow Civil 
Commissioners to by-pass these restrictions and act in any manner they 
thought necessary under the banner of an inherent or necessary power. 
The powers actually conferred upon the Civil Commissioners in Malta are 
28 Chapman’s absence from the Island on the Corn mission to the Black sea in 
1805 was the immediate reason why Coleridge became Acting Public Secretary.
29 Cameron v Kyte (1835), 3 Knapp 332, 345-6.
30 Ibid.
31 (1774), 1 Cowp 161, 98 ER 1021.
32 Ibid.
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considered below.
Grandmaster
From the position of the Maltese, it must be remembered, the British Civil 
Commissioner continued to exercise the authority of the Grandmaster. This 
followed from the principle of continuity upon which British government, 
in the early years, was based. 
Once the Order of St John had assumed power in Malta the Grandmaster 
governed as an absolute ruler.33 This absolutism explained the judgement 
of the 1812 Royal Commission that the Maltese Constitution placed the 
Civil Commissioner above the law.34 
Legislative authority was vested exclusively in this office:35 the 
Grandmasters could make new laws and repeal existing ones on any subject 
matter. No court or other person or body could question the validity of 
the laws so passed. The Bandi and the Avvisi under Coleridge’s signature 
were, thus, immune from legal or constitutional review in the courts of 
Malta. Grandmasters and their British successors continued to deny, as 
discussed above, any nationalist claim to the traditional existence of a 
competing or complementary legislative assembly. As has been discussed, 
in Chapter 2, Grandmasters had important judicial powers and these Sir 
Alexander Ball was happy to continue with. He appointed and dismissed 
the judges and exercised a constitutionally unlimited power to punish, 
including banishment. His quasi-judicial role of hearing petitions through 
the Segnatura has also been considered in Chapter 2. A further significant 
power enjoyed by the Grandmasters was the power of patronage: they 
nominated persons to every public office. Ball regarded this as a key tool to 
reward loyalists and to cement the acceptance of British rule. The disastrous 
consequences of this policy – for which Coleridge expressed support in The 
Friend – have been considered in Chapter 2. 
Whilst his legal or constitutional position was unlimited, the 
Grandmaster’s authority was, nevertheless, constrained by circumstances, 
and by his own conception of customs and morality. In particular, he took 
33 See Hardman, 6.
34 Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, CO 158/19. 
35 Note, however, that legislative powers were, at different times, delegated. In 
some instances, this may have been necessary since the Order was itself not permit-
ted to engage in commerce. For example, the first Chamber of Commerce, during its 
brief existence in the eighteenth century, was authorised to make laws for the better 
regulation of commerce: see, generally, Debono (1988).
116 Coleridge’s Laws
an oath of office which included a promise not to raise general, permanent, 
taxes.36 Because the Grandmaster had absolute power, this oath, if breached, 
would not be enforceable in the courts. One of the most controversial 
legislative acts of the Coleridge period was the introduction, by a Bando, 
of an excise duty on spirits. The legality of this is discussed in Chapter 5. 
He would not act entirely by himself but would take advice. Ball, for 
instance, was usually advised by others, including Coleridge, though 
consultation was not, in any sense, a legal requirement. Ball was 
(appropriately) advised by Maltese law officers such as Dr Guiseppe 
Zammit, but not English law officers. He was also able, informally, to call 
upon the English legal expertise of the staff of the Court of Vice-Admiralty, 
after its establishment in 1803. 37
As regards his public actions, the Grandmaster, like any sovereign, 
would be expected to act within the law but subject to two important 
qualifications. First, he had to follow the law as a matter of grace and 
not obligation. As indicated, his actions could not be directly tested in 
the Maltese courts. Secondly, the law itself granted wide discretionary 
powers to the Grandmaster, in particular he seems to have enjoyed an 
unchallengeable power to suspend laws. We shall see later in the chapter 
that for the Civil Commissioner, exercising these powers in his capacity as 
a British official, the situation was, at least in principle, different. In that 
capacity he was responsible under English law for the exercise of powers 
derived from the Royal Prerogative and the question of whether his actions, 
as actions of the Civil Commissioner, could be challenged in the English 
courts is discussed further below.
Contexts, Limits and Constraints
Coleridge’s authority to draft and sign the Bandi and Avvisi derived from 
that of Sir Alexander Ball, the Civil Commissioner, and he, Ball, exercised 
the constitutionally-despotic powers of the Grandmaster but did so as the 
British official responsible to ministers in London whose own authority was 
that of the Crown exercising its Prerogatives. As such he was also subject to 
36 I.e. taxes which were general and permanent rather than focused specifically 
on particular projects.
37 This included its judge, Dr Sewell, and senior advocates such as Dr Moncrieff 
and Dr Stoddart. The independence of such advice is challengeable because all four 
(and Coleridge) enjoyed a close social relationship. He did this in relation to crimi-
nal cases see Chapter 2 for a discussion of his powers, where the outcomes were 
conformed in all but one case: Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13.
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a range of constitutional, military, legal and political constraints upon the 
effective exercise of his powers. 
The Royal Instructions in Malta, 1801-180538
The Royal Instructions, given to Cameron in May 1801, adopted by Ball 
and, as mentioned above, subject to further instructions, advice and other 
pressures from London, created the general policy context within which 
the Civil Commissioner exercised his powers. 
The Instructions, firstly, embodied the primary strategic policy: the 
continuation of the legal, constitutional and administrative order of the 
Knights, as it obtained in 179839. They required the Civil Commissioner to 
acquaint himself with the laws, customs and privileges of Malta, under the 
Knights, as well as the financial state of the islands.40 
…in substance at least, and so far as circumstances will admit in for also, no 
alteration should be made in the modes, laws and regulations according to 
which the civil affairs and the Revenue of the Island have been heretofore 
managed unless the same shall appear to the officer commanding HM forces 
to be required for the safety and defence of the Island, or to be evidently 
beneficial and desirable, as to leave no doubt of its expediency or of it 
being generally acceptable to the wishes, feelings and even prejudices of 
the inhabitants. You will therefore understand that the administration of 
justice and police is, as nearly as circumstances will permit, to continue 
to be exercised in conformity to the Laws, and Institutions of the antient 
(sic) Government of the Order of St John of Jerusalem, subject only to such 
directions as you may from time to time receive from this country, and to 
such deviations, in consequence of sudden and unforeseen emergencies, 
as may in the judgment of the Commander-in-Chief, render departure 
therefrom necessary and unavoidable, the occasion whereof, however, you 
will by the first opportunity report to me. 
The important point to note is that any changes to the laws of Malta, 
such as those made under Coleridge’s hand in 1805, had to fall within the 
exceptional categories outlined by the Secretary of State, Lord Hobart, in 
these Instructions. 
The Instructions suggest a presumption in favour of continuity, both in 
“substance” and also in “form”. Nevertheless, the status quo was subject to 
38 Hardman, 350-7.
39 See Chapter 2.
40 On this he could rely on Ball’s Memorandum of 26 December 1800, Ball to Dun-
das, Kew, CO 158/1/1.
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any necessary changes caused by the new circumstances. There was a wide 
power to make general laws of any kind affecting “civil affairs and the 
Revenue” which were undoubtedly beneficial (in the Civil Commissioner’s 
view) or generally acceptable to the inhabitants. There is no indication 
how either of these tests were to be established. No court was ever asked 
to rule upon the legitimacy of laws and policies pursued by the Civil 
Commissioners, including Ball, although the advice of Maltese jurists was 
certainly sought in 1895, over the validity of Coleridge’s Bando imposing 
excise duties.41 Nothing in the Instructions implied that the test for obvious 
expediency could, for a court, be based upon anything other than the Civil 
Commissioner’s subjective judgement, at least in the absence of strong 
evidence pointing to corruption or bad faith. Similarly, the Instructions say 
nothing about how the wishes, feelings or prejudices of the Maltese were 
to be ascertained. Again, it is likely that any court would have felt bound 
to uphold the Civil Commissioner’s judgement upon Maltese opinion. In 
particular, it must be remembered that there was a clear British intention 
not to allow a legislative assembly to develop. Thus, the Instructions gave 
the Civil Commissioners a wide discretion over changes to the law; and it 
is clear that their political judgement upon what was expedient or desirable 
for the local population could (and would) involve an overall political 
assessment in which the British imperial interest, partly reflecting policy 
instructions from London, was a major factor.
Nevertheless, the Instructions did not envisage an unlimited legislative 
power for the Civil Commissioner. There was only a limited power to alter 
the laws controlling the “administration of justice and the police” unless 
on the basis of directions from London or in the context of emergencies, as 
recognised by the military authorities. But this was more honoured in the 
reach than in its observance. As we shall discover, some of Coleridge’s laws 
were passed without reference to the military authorities; although they 
would, nonetheless, have to be justified under the expediency clause.
The purport of the Royal Instructions was communicated to the Maltese 
in Cameron’s Proclamation of 15 July 180142 which included the undertaking 
to respect the “dearest rights” of the Maltese: their churches, holy religion, 
persons and property.43 The Proclamation promised that the laws would be 
upheld but there was no explicit promise not to alter Maltese law. A Public 
Notice (Avviso) of 23 July 1801, signed by Pigot and Cameron, indicated 
41 See Chapter 5.3: Taxation. Coleridge’s Bando was accepted as binding in law. 
42 See Chapter 2.
43 Hardman, 342.
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that it was His Majesty’s intention to continue in force the existing laws and 
administration of justice until such time as His Majesty (emphasis added) 
should command. The Proclamation is interesting because it gave greater 
emphasis to the power and willingness of the British Crown to alter the law 
than was found in the Instructions. Moreover, it implied that alterations to 
the law would be  initiated by the Crown, in London. What was not made 
explicit was the fact that local legislative and administrative authority, in 
reality, resided in the person and judgements of the Civil Commissioners, 
local British officials, rather than the benign paternalism of the British 
monarch.
The Instructions continued by requiring the public revenues to be 
maintained and administered, as under the Knights, subject to changes 
“obviously requisite” following the change to British rule. In particular, 
the various categories of the property of the Order, as identified by Sir 
Alexander Ball, were to be taken over by the Crown. Customs and Excise 
was to continue, subject to likely, future, reform; the system, directed by 
the Unversità, for feeding the population was to continue; the fees and 
expenses of government were to be identified and reformed if necessary; 
trade was to develop by making Valletta a free port with particular attention 
to maintaining effective quarantine through the lazaretto (with the advice 
and superintendence of William Eton).
Civil and Military Power
Underlying the Royal Instructions was one of the great constitutional 
tensions of the early British period – the relations between civil and 
military powers. Although much of the initial tension had evaporated by 
Coleridge’s time, it remained an important part of the context, and basic 
assumptions, behind the exercise of the civil power in 1805. It indicates 
the kinds of issues that, though they have a military aspect to them, were 
within the jurisdiction of the Civil Commissioner (and so could be the 
subject of legal change); it also helps to explain why Coleridge’s signature 
was required upon the Bandi and Avvisi.
The Instructions began with the doctrine that “direction and 
superintendence of the civil affairs and of the revenue of Malta should be 
separated from the duties of the commander of the forces in that Island…”. 
Nevertheless, the Instructions did not give the Civil Commissioner any 
authority over military affairs but insisted that the control of the civil and 
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revenue affairs should be “in concert” with the officer commanding British 
forces. Military matters were those concerned with the “safety and defence” 
of Malta but other than that, no attempt was made to differentiate between 
the civil and the military.44 Furthermore, at the beginning, the commanding 
officer’s “concurrence and approbation” and signature45 were necessary 
for all legislative measures, whether civil or military, and the Commander 
claimed the right to propose legislation for safety and defence with no 
equivalent power of veto vested in the Civil Commissioner.46 London swiftly 
realised that the suborning of the civil to the military power, even if real, 
should not be apparent to the population. A despatch of 21 May 1801 made 
it clear that, in the event of disagreement with the military commander, 
the Civil Commissioner was, nevertheless, to sign the instrument and 
communicate his reasons for dissent only to the commanding officer and 
the Secretary of State.47 Pigot, the military commander, claimed a wide 
jurisdiction.48 Disputes between Pigot and Cameron occurred over issues 
such as the admission of foreigners to the islands, the allocation of passports, 
the policing of the fortified towns and, in particular, the intractable issue of 
the jurisdiction of Maltese law and process over British soldiers accused of 
crimes against Maltese citizens.49 
Cameron sought clarification on the issue from London. Lord Hobart’s 
response of 2 September 1801 was of great significance.50 The British 
Government remained unwilling to demarcate, precisely, the discrete civil 
and military jurisdictions. Rather, the need for co-operation, compromise 
and the maintenance of harmonious relations with the military was 
emphasised; though the Civil Commissioner’s right to refer concerns to 
London was re-stated. 
Nevertheless, Hobart’s despatch clarified and expanded the civil 
jurisdiction at the expense of the military. Some of Pigot’s specific claims 
were rejected. Immigration control, specifically the granting of passports 
44 Hobart to Cameron, 2 September 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/207 suggests that this 
was unlikely to have been an oversight. The British Government’s policy was evi-
dently not to define the scope of these two jurisdictions.
45 Royal Instructions, Hobart to Cameron, 14 May 1801, Hardman, 357; Kew, CO 
158/1/88.
46 Ibid.
47 Hobart to Cameron, 21 May 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/107. 
48 Pigot to Cameron, 2 July 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/119. 
49 Ibid., 114; also, Pigot to Cameron, Kew, 16 August 1801, CO 158/2/81.
50 Hobart to Cameron, 2 September 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/207 et seq. A copy of this 
despatch was sent with a copy to Pigot for the avoidance of future misunderstand-
ings between them: see Kew, CO 159/3/40.
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and admitting foreigners, was characterised as a civil matter within the 
Civil Commissioner’s jurisdiction, and it was an issue in which Coleridge 
would become closely involved.51 What is more, the reply stated that the 
Civil Commissioner would, henceforth, have an exclusive authority over 
civil matters. 
In all public acts relative to the civil administration the name of HM Civil 
Commissioner should alone appear and all such acts should be signed by 
you or by the Secretary of Government under your Authority.52 (Emphasis 
added). 
Thus, Coleridge’s name eventually appeared at the foot of the Bandi and 
Avvisi issued by Ball’s administration whilst Coleridge held office as public 
secretary. 
Whilst Hobart’s reply of 2 September 1801 was aimed at restricting 
military jurisdiction, it did not attempt to remove military authority over 
security matters. There was still scope for civil and military tensions over, 
for example, the extent to which military competence embraced not only 
the defence of the Island from external attack but also internal security. The 
precise distinction between civil and military jurisdictions was not resolved 
(as if it ever could be) and the practical business of government would 
depend upon achieving pragmatic co-operation between the military and 
civil authorities. Much would, therefore, depend upon the individual 
personalities and the relationship between the Civil Commissioner and 
the commanding officer. By 1805 military and civil relations seemed to 
have improved. Pigot had left the Island and had been replaced by Major-
General Villettes, with whom Sir Alexander Ball seems to have had an 
effective working relationship.53 Several of the instruments promulgated 
by Coleridge seem to have been influenced by representations from or co-
operation with the military authorities.54 Thus, the Proclamation (Bando) 
on spirits55 partly emerged from discussions with the army chief physician 
51 See Chapter 5. 9: Passports. 
52 CO 158/1/207;  A copy of this despatch was sent with a copy to Pigot for the 
avoidance of future misunderstandings between them: see CO 159/3/40.
53 Although there was at least one allegation that there was friction between Ball 
and Villettes: see statement by Borg, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12 (no folio ref-
erence). There may also have been some friction between Ball and Pigot, which 
may explain why Ball was not chosen as the first Civil Commissioner in May 1801 
despite his popularity with the Maltese: see the address to Ball dated 11 February 
1801, Hardman, 343.
54 See, generally, Chapter 5.
55 Bando of 22 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
122 Coleridge’s Laws
and had the support of senior commanders; similarly, the Avviso and the 
Bando concerning the recapture of deserters and the Avviso relating to the 
dishonest taking of enlistment money, also suggest some high-level co-
operation between the military and civil jurisdictions.56 
Power to Change the Law in Malta 
It is clear, therefore, that the Royal Instructions, whilst establishing the 
principle of continuity, nevertheless envisaged the British making changes 
to the laws of Malta from the beginning of the occupation. The limits of 
that legislative power, as written into the Instructions, were quite vague 
and uncertain and would be difficult to establish judicially. The question, 
therefore, is whether there were any other, overriding, constitutional and 
legal constraints upon the exercise of the legislative power which are 
properly thought of as implied or presumed limits to what could have been 
done by changing the law. Such limits would have applied to the Bandi 
and Avvisi promulgated by Ball and Coleridge and so, to the extent that 
they are recognised or ignored in the drafting, are part of the analysis and 
evaluation of those instruments. 
Legislation and the Grandmaster
As discussed above, the Grandmaster, whose authority in Malta the Civil 
Commissioners adopted, had a legally unconstrained power to change 
the laws of Malta. The forms of this power were used by Ball, through 
Coleridge, in the drafting and signing of the Bandi and Avvisi. Whilst the 
Grandmaster was not subject to legal constraints there were, as suggested 
above, customary restraints upon his power such as restricting the 
introduction of new forms of general taxation. The view of the 1812 Royal 
Commission was that the Grandmasters were “practically if not legally 
despotic”57, suggesting that any customary restraints were honoured in the 
56 Deserters: Avviso of 15 July 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814,17; 
Bando, 2 September 1805 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi AL 1814,21; enlistment mon-
ey: Avviso, 20 June 1805 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 12. These are 
discussed below, Chapter 5.
57 Kew, CO 158/19. During his administration, there were Maltese critics of Ball, 
such as Vincenzo Borg (the former leader of the Birkirkara battalion. Following his 
dismissal by Ball from the Board of Administrators of Public Property, and as part 
of a campaign to discredit, the Civil Commissioner, Borg described the Maltese as 
fearing Ball’s “great despotism”: Borg to Eton, 30th May 1806 Kew, CO 158/12/ no 
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breach. Indeed, critics of Ball, such as Eton, made the same point about 
his performance in the Grandmaster’s role – it was not the lack of formal 
constitutional restraint that was the issue but, rather, the despotic practice 
of his discretion by the Commissioner. 
Legislation under the Royal Prerogative
Other, more complicated, issues arose concerning the limits, if any, of a 
Civil Commissioner, as a British official, to change the law in a colony. There 
were two linked issues. First, the general power of the Crown to authorise 
and require changes to the law in a colony and, secondly, whether the 
Commissioner could exercise that Royal power himself, like a Viceroy, or 
whether his powers were always limited, in principle, even if the practical 
scope of the limits were hard to establish, by the specific grant of legislative 
authority from the Crown.
By the eighteenth century it was agreed, following the Case of 
Proclamations 1610,58 that the scope of the Royal Prerogative was a matter of 
law to be determined by the courts in England and that the Crown had lost 
the power of independent legislation at home in normal times. The eventual 
result of the Civil Wars made it clear that any independent right of the 
Crown to legislate, tax or take other coercive actions in times of emergency 
(and who defined the emergency) was also lost. Changing the law required 
an Act of Parliament. However, the Crown retained an independent power 
to legislate for colonies, such as Malta, which were either conquered by the 
Crown or ceded to it.59 This power could be exercised in one of two ways. 
The first way was by ministers themselves in the form of an Order in Council. 
Such Orders had the force of an Act of Parliament but, as Campbell v Hall 
(below) makes clear, could be overruled by a later Act of Parliament whose 
terms were clear and which applied to the colony in question (as discussed 
below, there were a few such Acts applying to Malta). The second way, 
used predominantly in Malta, was to use the Royal Prerogative to authorise 
an official with legislative powers. Since a delegate could not expand his 
own delegated powers, such authority would, at most, be restricted by any 
limits on the Crown’s powers.
Following Campbell v Hall60 a distinction was made between settled 
folio reference
58 12 Co. Rep 74, 77 ER 1352
59 Campbell v Hall (1774), 1 Cowp. 204, 98 ER 1045, below.
60 (1774), 1 Cowp. 204; 98 ER 1045.
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colonies and those which were conquered or ceded. Settled colonies were 
uninhabited or places where, from a European perspective, there were no 
established, working institutions of law and government. In such places, 
the English colonists brought with them, as it were, the domestic law of 
England. 
Malta clearly did not come into the category of a settled colony; it was 
either “conquered” or “ceded”. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had not 
formally ceded sovereignty following the French invasion and occupation. 
The British, at least at the beginning of the occupation, offered reassurances 
to Ferdinand’s court despite the fact that the French surrender was accepted 
by Major-General Pigot exclusively under the British flag to the deliberate 
exclusion of Maltese, Sicilian and Russian representatives.61 In respect of 
the view that Neapolitan sovereignty was not restored by the removal 
of the French but reverted to the Maltese people, it has been powerfully 
argued that Malta was informally ceded to Britain by the Maltese through 
the will of the people and, in particular, the Declaration of Rights of the 
Inhabitants of the Islands of Malta and Gozo.62 In regards to  this theory, the 
British would have been bound by the terms of the Declaration and this 
might have been seen as restricting the development of British interests. 
The British government’s had a preference for conquest as the justifying 
theory for British rule in the early years63. In any event,  conquered or ceded 
colonies have the same status in English law.64 
Conquered or ceded colonies were Crown dominions. The local 
population became fully equal subjects of the Crown. The existing laws 
(e.g. the Code de Rohan in Malta) continued to apply,65 but the Crown had, 
under English law, the legal authority to alter this law without needing 
61 Laferla, XI. Napoleon had ceded sovereignty over Malta to the Czar shortly 
before the French were expelled; the Czar became Grandmaster.
62 15 June 1802. Widely reproduced, e.g., Cm 9657 Appendix F, Frendo; see Rob-
erts-Wray, 685 (who accepts formal accession as an alternative).
63 The Foltina (1814), 1 Dods 450 suggests that military conquest itself transfers 
sovereignty. See also Penn, for a contemporaneous view. Deliberating retrospec-
tively, in 1836, Lord Glenelg, the Secretary of State, endorsed the conquest thesis for 
the early period through his criticisms of the voluntary cession in the reports on the 
legal system by the Chief Justice, Stoddart: Kew, CO 158/91. Stoddart’s Reports are 
bound as appendices.
64 For a discussion of the issues, which sides with the conquest theory, see Davis 
and Hough (2007).
65 This, by the end of the eighteenth century was also a principle of international 
law (Vattal, 389, section 201), at least where the quarrel is with the sovereign power 
rather than the peoples.
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the consent of the United Kingdom Parliament. However, this power to 
legislate, with the authority of the Royal Prerogative alone, was subject to 
at least three caveats. 
First, whilst it was within the scope of the Royal Prerogative to establish 
a colonial legislative assembly, once this occurred, it was the assembly and 
not the Crown, exercising its Royal Prerogatives, which could legislate. 
What was even more serious from a British ministerial point of view was 
that an assembly’s power to legislate could only be revoked by an Act of 
Parliament. This was one reason why the British were unwilling to create 
an assembly, with legislative powers, on Malta. In a conquered or ceded 
colony, of course, such a move would, in any case, have been inconsistent 
with the principle of continuity. 
Secondly, the Crown’s power to legislate alone for a conquered or ceded 
colony was subject to the overriding authority of an Act of Parliament (one 
which extended to the colony or which limited the overseas exercise of the 
Royal Prerogative). In other words, Parliament could always pass laws 
applicable in Malta.
Thirdly, the extent of the content of the Crown’s legislative power 
(outside Parliament) was unclear. Campbell v Hall66 suggested that the 
Crown’s legislative powers may have been restricted but just what those 
restrictions were appeared then, as now, elusive. Lord Mansfield, in words 
that have become notorious, said 
this legislation [the Crown’s legislative power outside Parliament] being 
subordinate, that is subordinate to his own authority in Parliament, he 
cannot make any change contrary to fundamental principles: he cannot 
exempt an inhabitant from that particular dominion; as, for instance, from 
the laws of trade, or from the power of Parliament, or give him privileges 
exclusive of his other subjects; and so in many other instances that might be 
put.67
At least three possible meanings arise from these words. The first 
possibility was that Royal Prerogative legislation (including laws 
purportedly authorised by Ball and signed by Coleridge) must not be 
“repugnant” to (inconsistent with) an Act of Parliament extending to the 
colony. This would seem to be uncontroversial, since Parliament and not 
the Crown is the supreme law-making body. Secondly, Lord Mansfield may 
have meant that there were “fundamental principles” or an irreducible 
minimum of basic liberties, such as freedom from slavery, which could, 
66 (1774), 1 Cowp. 204; 98 ER 1045.
67 (1774) 1 Cowp. 204, 209; 98 ER 1045, 1048.
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as lex non scripta, restrain the Crown or the Civil Commissioner. Finally, 
the possibility that, as the context and examples suggest, the “pretended 
power” of the Crown to suspend the laws was not be used by the Crown 
in its overseas possessions.68 If this had been correct, the King’s legislative 
power did not extend, for example, to legal discrimination against members 
of the local population (such as punishing a person more severely than 
the law allowed) or giving particular legal privileges or exemptions.69 If 
so, Ball may have contravened this in relation to the banishment of certain 
offenders convicted of rumour-mongering.70
Lord Mansfield’s statement became notorious in the mid nineteenth 
century and led to legislative change. Under the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865, the restraint upon the Crown’s power to legislate for a colony 
was limited to matters repugnant to an Act of Parliament extending to the 
colony. In later years they were subject to little argument.71 In the early 
British period in Malta, the statement stood in all its ambiguity. 
The question about the limits to the Civil Commissioner’s legislative 
powers will be returned to later in this chapter when the issue of civil and 
criminal liability is discussed. 
Lord Mansfield also said, regarding conquered colonies, that the 
“articles of capitulation upon which the country is surrendered and the 
articles of peace by which it is ceded, are sacred and inviolable according to 
their true intent and meaning”. It is unclear whether “sacred and inviolable” 
restrains the Crown exercising its Royal Prerogatives voluntarily or as a 
matter of law;72 it is possible that it could restrict Parliament in regard to the 
way general words in an Act are interpreted but it is doubtful whether it 
could restrict the deliberate and expressed intention of an Act of the Crown 
in Parliament. 
The Malta Articles of Capitulation73 gave rise to few clear rights or 
duties with respect to the parties. They were mainly concerned with the 
disposition of French troops and the military take-over. Provisions reaching 
civilians included collaboration – the matter of whether a person could be 
punished for things said or done during the occupation (article 8) and the 
matter of freedom of movement and property. British acceptance of Article 
68 The power ended, at least for domestic UK purposes, by the Bill of Rights 1688.
69 See the discussion in 2008 by Lord Hoffman in R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61, [90].
70 See Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime.
71 Lyanage v R [1967] 1 AC 259, 285.
72 Chitty is clear that this is a legal restraint on the King (Chitty, 29).
73 Hardman, 319-22.
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8, dealing with collaboration, merely assured the population that that 
they would be treated with “justice and humanity, and shall enjoy the full 
protection of the laws”. Article 9 proposed the right of French civilians to 
return to France with all their property, this was accepted by the British but, 
as with Article 8, with the weakening caveat that it was not an appropriate 
provision for military capitulation. Article 12 was the most controversial 
because it proposed a general right to the benefit of all property transactions 
undertaken by the French government and civilians. This seemed to ratify 
the French despoilment of the Island. The legal obligation upon the British 
was qualified since Article 12 was only accepted so far as the transactions 
were “just and lawful”.
3.2.  Legal Restraints on Power
Introduction
We have seen that Coleridge’s authority was a reflection of that of the Civil 
Commissioner. The latter had, in effect, the powers of the Grandmaster. 
These were wide and despotic. Despotic, formally, because of the absence of 
a separation of powers and properly independent judiciary, and despotic in 
practice depending upon the personality of the incumbent. There were few 
legal constraints, powers were discretionary and limited by the personal 
conscience of the incumbent. But the Civil Commissioner was also a British 
official who was exercising authority stemming from the Royal Prerogative. 
This gave him wide executive and legislative powers including the right 
to change the law in Malta (a ceded or conquered colony). The scope of 
this right, as a power under the Royal Prerogative, was certainly wide but 
not, perhaps, thought to be unlimited in the early nineteenth century. The 
problem, in what follows, is to identify and discuss any general, legal or 
constitutionally-based constraints upon the exercise of these legislative 
and executive powers. The underlying issue is the lawfulness of particular 
actions and how these might have been challenged in the courts and the 
focus is upon the grounds a court might have had for holding an action, 
legislative or executive, to have been unlawful. 
There were three general grounds upon which a Governor or 
Commissioner could have been brought before the courts. First, there was 
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civil liability where the Commissioner or Governor could have been sued by 
a victim of his actions, secondly there was criminal liability where he could 
have been  prosecuted by the Crown for criminal offences and, finally, the 
possibility that actions that were neither tortious (invoking civil liability) 
nor criminal could, nevertheless, have been unlawful because they were 
ultra vires being beyond the Commissioner’s powers. The first two, civil 
and criminal liability, raised two important issues which will be discussed 
below: the issue of jurisdiction and the issue of justification.
By the early nineteenth century, English law was beginning to develop a 
somewhat ill-defined conception of accountable, constitutional government. 
Civil Commissioners operated within the normative framework of their 
office as it was being structured not just by ministers and Parliament but also 
by the courts reflecting English constitutional practice and conceptions of 
the rule of law. The nature and scope of this framework, the understanding 
of the constitutional and legal position of British administrators exercising 
official power overseas, was complex and developing as the scope and 
purposes of British rule changed. 
Jurisdiction
Could Governors and Commissioners have been brought before the 
courts at all or were they, as Royal representatives, outside the jurisdiction 
of the courts altogether? English courts decided in Mostyn v Fabrigas74 
that Governors and, therefore, Civil Commissioners could be liable for 
exercising their powers in an unlawful way by committing crimes or civil 
wrongs in their official capacity. Briefly, the governor of Minorca had 
assaulted, imprisoned and then exiled to a foreign country, a political 
opponent whom he alleged was fermenting riot and disorder. The alleged 
actions had taken place on a part of the Island where the writ of the local 
courts did not run and the governor’s powers where absolute or at least not 
justiciable in the Minorcan courts. The English courts accepted jurisdiction 
(by using a legal fiction that the assault had also taken place in London) and 
held that the governor was liable in tort.75 
Mostyn is the authority for the view that the governor was like a Viceroy 
and so immune from civil or criminal action in the local courts (in relation, 
it seems, to alleged violation of either local or English law). In question, 
74 (1774), 1 Cowp 161, 98 ER 1021.
75 He recovered £3,000 damages with £90 costs.
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on one hand, was the scope and substance of Royal power and this was 
not within the competence of local courts to determine: “for no question 
concerning the seignory, can be tried within the seignory itself”. On the 
other hand, it could not be lawful to abuse the Crown’s commission without 
remedy. It was a “monstrous proposition” to claim that “…a governor 
acting by virtue of letters patent under the Great Seal, is accountable only 
to God, and his own conscience; that he is absolutely despotic, and can 
spoil, plunder, and affect His Majesty’s subjects, both in their liberty and 
property, with impunity,…”76 The matter, therefore, could be tried before 
the English courts. 
In subsequent cases, the view that the legality of a Commissioner’s 
actions could not be challenged in the local courts was said to be a mere obiter 
dictum and eventually set aside77. The point being that in Minorca the actions 
were, geographically, outside the jurisdiction of the local courts. In Malta, 
of course, there was, similarly, no procedure for bringing the Grandmaster 
before the Maltese courts and, under the principle of continuity, the Civil 
Commissioner enjoyed the same immunity. Thus, Mostyn does not address 
the situation where the local law does have procedures for questioning the 
actions of the Commissioner. In Sir Alexander Ball’s time, the issue was 
uncertain but it can be speculated that it would not have been possible to 
act against him in the Maltese courts but the English courts would have had 
jurisdiction to hear complaints that he had acted in a criminal or tortious 
fashion. The cases of Borg, Hasciach and Bonello would have raised 
interesting possibilities here.78
Mostyn v Fabrigas illustrates the fact that a Civil Commissioner had 
personal civil liability, enforceable in English courts, at the suit of a person 
harmed by an unlawful, tortious act which was, nevertheless, done in the 
course of the Civil Commissioner’s conception of his duty, in good faith and 
for the public interest.79 As Mostyn illustrates, these tortious actions could 
include assault and battery, false imprisonment and torture. These were 
also criminal offences that might be prosecuted by the Crown. Criminal 
responsibility, of Governors and Civil Commissioners, was established 
under a series of statutes. Governors who oppressed their subjects, or who 
violated the laws of England or the laws of their colonies, were also liable 
76 (1774), 1 Cowp 160, 175.
77 See Hill v Bigge (1841), 3 Moore PC 465, 481-2; 13 ER 189. 
78 See Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime.
79 See also, for example, Dutton v Howell [1693] Shower PC 24; Comyn v Sabine 
(1738), cited in 1 Cowp, 169. 
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to be tried in England under a statute of 170080 and this was extended, by 
the Criminal Jurisdiction Act 1802, to the effect that all persons who, in 
the course of their responsibilities, whether civil or military, committed a 
misdemeanour or offence whilst in the public service abroad, could be tried 
in England.81
Justification
Any Commissioner or Governor brought before the English courts 
would be entitled to defend an otherwise criminal or tortious action upon 
the grounds of lawful justification, that the actions were within the scope 
of his lawful powers. Thus, as mentioned above, English law recognised 
implied powers to take necessary actions to maintain order and security. 
Though justification would need to be determined by the English courts, 
they would allow defences derived from the local law upon which 
evidence could be taken. However, there could be a problem, not clearly 
resolved in the early nineteenth century, if the actions in issue, though 
lawful under the local law, were unlawful under English law. Mostyn v 
Fabrigas suggests that a Commissioner would not, necessarily, have a legal 
justification for actions that, if done in England, would have been unlawful 
just because the actions (taken bona fide and in the public interest) were 
lawful under local law. In the case, Governor Mostyn had been advised that 
a Governor’s powers, under Minorcan law at the time of British occupation, 
allowed arrest, detention and exile. Lord de Grey, at first instance, took 
the view that, even under the policy of continuity, local laws which were 
offensive to fundamental principles recognised in English law, such as the 
illegality of torture, ceased having legal validity once English authority 
was established.82
But the issue was not decided at that time and had become increasingly 
controversial by the mid nineteenth century. The question of the definition 
and specification of what counted as a “fundamental principle” was too 
80 11 William III c.12.
81 Unlike the Act of 1700 the 1802 Act did not extend to felonies.
82 “I suppose the old Minorquins thought fit to advise him [Governor Mostyn] 
to this measure. But the governor knew that he could no more imprison him for a 
twelvemonth, than he could inflict the torture; yet the torture, as well as the ban-
ishment, was the old law of Minorca, which fell of course when it came into our 
possession”, Fabrigas v Mostyn [1773] 2 Wm Bl 929; (1773), 20 St Tr 82, 181 De Grey 
LCJ; quoted by Lord Rodger in R (Bancoult) Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 .
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complex and discretionary to answer with adequate certainty. So, under 
the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, the limiting principle was redefined 
as inconsistency with a United Kingdom statute applying to the colony.83
In the early nineteenth century, however, the issue was clearly live as 
is indicated by the famous case of R v Picton.84 The defendant, who had 
been governor of Trinidad, was accused of having personally authorised 
torture, as a technique of questioning, in a criminal investigation.85 Under 
the procedures of the day he was convicted, then the conviction was set 
aside and a re-trial followed. The re-trial was suspended in 1812 but, it 
seems, Picton was never fully exonerated. 86
Picton’s defence was that torture, in order to question a defendant, was 
allowed for by the normal procedures of traditional Spanish law which 
applied in Trinidad at the time of British occupation. Much of the case 
involved an exploration of whether Spanish law did authorise torture and 
this was a question that an English jury, on the basis of expert evidence 
and judicial direction,  had to decide. In the first trial the jury found that 
torture was not part of the law status quo, ante the British occupation, and 
so there was a conviction. The hearing to set that conviction aside, and 
the second trial, involved a challenge to that finding – the defence argued 
that torture was part of the applicable Spanish law and so (given that there 
was no evidence of bad faith or malice and that Picton had done nothing 
more than follow normal procedures) Picton should be acquitted. But the 
prosecution’s point was that, even if it was allowed under Spanish law, 
and given the principle of continuity, torture was both illegal under the 
83 Though the issue was to some extent revived in R (Bancoult) Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 where a majority of the 
House of Lords accepted that, at least after the enactment of the Colonial Laws Va-
lidity Act 1865, the Crown had the power to legislate to exile the local population of 
a colony. On this view even a local law upholding torture could not be set aside if it 
was not repugnant to a UK statute extending to the colony (per Lord Rodger, para 
98) though in practice its enactment would not have been permitted. 
84 (1812), 30 St Tr 225.
85 By “picketing” or using a wooden spike to pierce the foot under the weight of 
the victim’s body which was suspended onto the spike from a pulley. The practice 
was used in the British army. In Picton the prosecution sought to distinguish this 
army practice from torture (“piqueting” from Pictoning) because the soldiers could, 
temporally, pull themselves off the spike.
86 The case report ends to the effect that it was thought by the Bar at the time that 
Picton would have been convicted but only lightly punished. It is noted that he 
fought with distinction in the Peninsular War and died an heroic death at Waterloo 
in 1815, leading a bayonet charge.
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positive law of England87 and was also contrary to fundamental principles 
which were the bases of and presumed by that positive law. Authorities 
cited included Blackstone, the leading authority on the eighteenth-century 
English Constitution, who considered that local laws contrary to the laws 
of God would not be continued88, and his opinion reflects the Master of 
the Roll’s memorandum, of 1722, that “until the conqueror gives them [the 
inhabitants of a conquered country] new laws, they are to be governed by 
their own laws, unless their laws are contrary to the laws of God or totally 
silent”.89 Similarly, the view of Lord de Grey, in Mostyn, was urged upon 
the court. In the end, the issue was never decided though it is clear, from 
the report, that the presiding judge, Lord Ellenborough, was sympathetic 
to the defence case. This might, contrary to the view of the Bar at the time, 
have led to him ordering an acquittal on the sufficient grounds that torture 
was lawful under the local law (if that was the finding). If so, he would 
have rejected the view that oppressive and unconscionable laws became 
unlawful with the arrival of the British flag. 
The issue is important because the law, the Code de Rohan, permitted 
torture where the victim had been convicted of treason and the aim 
of torture was to identify accomplices. There were allegations that the 
authorities may have used it in at least one case.90 
Ball may have violated Lord Mansfield’s principles in other ways. As 
we shall see, in Chapter 5 (the public order and crime theme), Ball seems 
to have been prepared to go beyond his legal powers in order to exile 
individuals responsible for anti-Semitic violence.91 In so far as this involved 
suspending the laws (the Grandmaster’s powers in the criminal part of the 
Code de Rohan) he was, clearly, vulnerable to legal action based both on 
the grounds that executive suspension of the laws violated fundamental 
principles as did the power of exile itself. If the imposition of the exile, which 
Coleridge publicised in Public Notices, was, thus, contrary to “fundamental 
87 Torture was, apparently, always illegal under common law; the Crown lost the 
Prerogative right to torture in 1640.
88 Blackstone, Introduction, section 4, 105. Blackstone cites Calvin’s Case and so is 
vulnerable to Lord Mansfield’s view in Campbell v Hall that the doctrine in anach-
ronistic. 
89 See Peere Williams’s Reports Vol 2, case 15, 74, 1826, London: Butterworth.
90 Eton alleged that a market inspector, Sateriano, had been tortured by being 
imprisoned with live rats and thereby forced to confess. His conviction resulted in 
banishment to Tripoli: Eton to Windham, 11 October 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/ no folio 
reference. The facts have been disputed: see Staines, 226.
91 See the cases of Hasciach, Borg and Bonello discussed in Chapter 5.4: Public 
Order and Crime.
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principles” in Lord Mansfield’s sense, it raises the intriguing argument that 
some of the sentences of exile (which Coleridge publicised and appeared to 
approve) may have been unlawful and challengeable, at least in an English 
court. How sympathetic to Ball an English court would have been if Borg, 
Hasciach or Bonello (the subjects of Coleridge’s Notice) had challenged their 
punishment is now a matter of speculation. However, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that the English judges in the early nineteenth century would 
have accepted that Ball’s actions were lawful, merely because he acted in 
good faith, without malice, and on the grounds of security and public order.
Ultra Vires Actions
Mostyn v Fabrigas and R v Picton deal with a gubernatorial action which 
was unlawful in the sense that, had the actions been committed in England, 
they would, subject to any lawful justifications, have been crimes or torts. 
Governors and Commissioners were required to exercise their powers 
using lawful means. A different question relates to whether Governors 
or Commissioners were lawfully limited in the scope of the powers they 
had. In particular, whether there might be legal consequences if a governor 
or civil commissioner exceeded his powers, as expressed in the Royal 
Instructions, even though the actions taken where not otherwise unlawful 
– were neither criminal nor tortious? An example would be where an 
unauthorised tax was imposed. Could the courts restrain such acts? There 
were two general views. On one view, Commissioners or Governors were 
like Viceroys. In other words, they were, themselves, exercising the Royal 
Prerogative directly, in the eyes of the law. Whatever the Crown could do 
in its colonies so, too, could a Viceroy. No doubt, the Crown should use 
lawful means (though the Crown’s judgement of what would be justified 
in the public interest would be hard to challenge) but a court could not, as a 
matter of law, limit the purposes and policies being pursued. According to 
the the other view, Commissioners or Governors were like Royal delegates 
governing on the basis of their Instructions. This interpretation would 
mean that actions taken outside those Instructions would lack legal validity. 
At the time when Ball was Civil Commissioner, and Coleridge his Public 
Secretary, the position was unclear. In Mostyn v Fabrigas, Lord Mansfield 
had appeared to suggest that an otherwise lawful ultra vires act could 
be invalidated by a court (though, of course, only in England) but his 
formulation of the principle was decidedly ambiguous:
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So that emphatically the governor must be tried in England, to see whether 
he has exercised the authority delegated to him by the letters patent legally 
and properly; or whether he has abused it in violation of the laws of England 
and the trust so reposed in him.92
This suggests both an ultra vires argument (in the first clause) but, in 
the second clause, an implication that an illegal and improper exercise 
of authority is confined to criminal or tortious actions. Furthermore, in 
Mostyn, Lord Mansfield had asserted that “it is truly said that the Governor 
is in the nature of a viceroy”93 (and, therefore, is not subject to criminal 
or civil liability in local courts). This also implies that the Viceroy (having 
all the powers of the sovereign in the territory) could, in law, pursue 
otherwise-lawful administrative actions even if they went beyond the 
authority in the Instructions. In the absence of a crime or a tort, he could 
not be challenged in the courts either locally or in England. This meant that, 
at the time Coleridge was in office, it was probably, though not certainly, 
the case that actions not authorised by Royal Instructions would be valid 
and binding upon the local courts. In other words, the Instructions directed 
the Civil Commissioner but did not create mandatory, legally-enforceable, 
obligations. Only the Secretary of State, in London, would have the 
authority to require the recission of an unauthorised measure and the 
measure would be valid until rescission had taken place. 94 
The English courts only resolved the matter decades after Coleridge had 
resigned his office and left Malta. In Cameron v Kyte,95 the Governor had 
issued an “instruction” purporting to reduce the commission of the local 
Vendue Master.96 The power to make such a reduction could not be found 
in the Governor’s Instructions and, though it was not directly a tort or a 
crime, the English court (upholding the local courts) allowed the Vendue 
Master’s claim. The Governor’s purported act was invalid and incapable of 
having legal effect, it was outside his Commission and Instructions. The 
idea that the Governor was like a Viceroy, with the “whole Royal power” 
delegated to him, was explicitly rejected in the judgement.97 A further point 
about Cameron v Kyte is that, although final appeal was to the Privy Council 
92 Mostyn v Fabrigas (1774), 1 Cowp 161, 173, 98 ER 1028, Lord Mansfield.
93 Mostyn v Fabrigas (1774), 1 Cowp 161 172, Lord Mansfield. See also Roberts-
Wray, 147.
94 This represents academic opinion: see, generally, Swinfen.
95 (1835), 3 Knapp 332, 12 ER 678.
96 An official who sold, by public auction, property seized under the order of the 
court. 
97 (1835), 3 Knapp 322, 344, 12 ER 678, 683
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in London, the jurisdiction of the local courts (Supreme Court of Civil 
Justice in Demerara and Essequibo) to hear a dispute about the scope of a 
Governor’s powers was not challenged. 
International Law
Finally, it is worth observing that the law of nations was sufficiently 
developed to provide a normative framework within which policy, action 
affecting other states would have to be conducted and justified.98 This had 
possible implications in Malta in the early British period. For example, the 
decision to feed a Maltese population which was, in January 1800, on the 
brink of starvation, by seizing, at gunpoint, grain supplies loaded onto 
ships in Sicilian ports, was a prima facie unlawful action. It was crucial that 
the Sicilian Crown later ratified this use of force against ships in a friendly 
port.99 International law also influenced British ministers in repudiating 
Ball’s adventurous and controversial policy of granting British passports 
to Sicilian and Neapolitan vessels.100 As acting Public Secretary, Coleridge 
was required to re-structure the government’s passport policy to ensure 
consonance with both the principles of international law and the political 
direction of British ministers.101
3.3.  Political Constraints
Introduction
The legal analysis of the position of a Civil Commissioner, such as Sir 
Alexander Ball, suggests that there were, in legal principle, a number 
of areas within which he could be constrained by the courts. In practice, 
though, this was difficult to do (if only because of the need to bring an 
action in the courts in London) and, thus, it is true that Ball’s actions were 
never challenged. Of greater practical significance were the conditions and 
98 De Vattel’s The Law of Nations was considered to be an important source book 
for diplomats by the end of the eighteenth century. Hinsley, 200-1.
99 Kew, CO 158/13/262. 
100 Kew, CO 159/3/131.
101 See Avviso of 25 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 15; and 
further, Chapter 5.9: Passports. 
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constraints upon a Commissioner’s freedom of action based upon political 
procedures and power. 
Political Accountability to London 
Commissioners were subject to political supervision, guidance and 
instruction from London. This political control was exercised through letters 
and despatches between the Civil Commissioner and the Secretary of State. 
In these despatches, Civil Commissioners reported their decisions and 
actions to ministers and received further detailed instructions from them. 
A diligent Secretary of State could, thus, limit the Civil Commissioner’s 
freedom of action to policies and decisions established within a framework 
prescribed in London.102 
Civil Commissioners who took unauthorised action outside of their 
Instructions naturally courted political sanctions. Reprimand or removal 
from office could follow as a result of unauthorised conduct. These sanctions 
reflected political judgement rather than being the necessary consequence 
of legal wrongs and depended upon the judgement of the Secretary of 
State in London. Unlike a determination by a court, the political outcome 
was not governed by a legal normative framework. Indeed, an errant Civil 
Commissioner could escape all sanction because a minister could properly 
decide, upon political grounds, either to ratify the unauthorised conduct 
or, simply, to take no action. However, there were limits. Ratification could 
not make lawful an act which was unlawful in the sense of being a crime 
or a tort. In other cases, political considerations were usually overriding, 
and the preservation of the prestige and authority of British rule was an 
important consideration. 
In Malta, for example, politics played a critical role in how the Secretary 
of State responded to the serious, and not altogether unfounded, criticism 
of Ball’s administration in 1806. As we have seen in Chapter 2,103 Ball had 
been invited responded to “such serious Charges against your administration, 
as call for immediate Investigation”, but once he had done so, a formal decision 
102 The constitutional doctrine was that the Secretary of State acted under the 
authority of the King in Council. It is doubtful whether the Secretary of State read 
every despatch; much was delegated to one of the two Under-Secretaries. Sir Al-
exander Ball, for example, often addressed despatches to E. Cooke: see Ball to 
Cooke, 3 February 1805, Kew CO 158/10/ 19; Ball to Cooke , 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 
158/10/187-8; Ball to E. Cooke, 1 March 1806 Kew, CO 158/11 (no folio number); Ball 
to E. Cooke, 30 November 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/463. 
103 Chapter 2 Section 3.
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was delayed until 1808.104 When the decision came Ball was formally (if not 
altogether convincingly) “acquitted”, by his superiors, but the significant 
issue is that embarrassment had been avoided by a politically-convenient 
long delay. As we have argued in Chapter 2, the finding that the complaints 
were entirely baseless was not fully supported by the evidence and suggests 
a closing of ranks by the Establishment.
Accountability and Legislation
Under the old system of colonial governance, colonial legislation, emanating 
from provincial legislative assemblies, was submitted to the Secretary of 
State in London for review under the authority of the Privy Council (its 
Committee for Trade). Colonial statutes could be disallowed upon various 
grounds including interference with individual property and rights and 
general inexpediency. The Committee could act upon political advice from 
the Secretary of State and upon the advice of the Law Officers, who were 
alive to constitutional objections such as an improper encroachment upon 
the Royal Prerogative.105 
Malta, was an early example of the new model of colonial governance, 
which, therefore, lacked a legislative assembly. Accordingly, the process of 
legislative scrutiny did not apply. Ball’s/Coleridge’s legislative acts were 
legally effective without the Secretary of State’s prior approval. And they 
were not routinely ratified ex post facto. In other words, despite the continual 
stream of correspondence upon major policy issues, between London and 
Ball, there is no surviving evidence that texts of the Bandi and Avvisi were 
communicated to London either for approval or to keep the Secretary of 
State abreast of new developments in the legal system. 
There were, however, a number of particular issues upon which the 
Instructions required that information, and proposals for regulation, be 
transmitted to London for His Majesty’s approval. These included any 
“deviations”, deemed necessary and unavoidable from the existing Maltese 
laws and practices, relating to justice and police. There was also an express 
requirement that any regulations deemed necessary, to deal with possible 
abuses in the courts and the judicial system (a particular concern in 1801 
and discussed in Chapter 2), should be communicated to London prior to 
104 See Windham to Ball, 6 January 1807, Kew, CO 159/3/220 at 223; Windham 
to Ball, 19 December 1806, Kew, CO 159/3/218 at 219. A formal resolution was not 
despatched. Ball to Windham, Kew, 28 February 1807, CO 58/13/9.
105 Manning, 75-81.
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publication for approval. However, it should be noted that Ball chose to 
submit a copy of the Avviso of 25 June 1805 to the Secretary of State in order 
to demonstrate that he had fulfilled instructions in relation to passports.106 
This is, of course, a very different matter, from establishing a duty to submit 
each of the Bandi and Avvisi. 
This is not necessarily surprising since, under the principle of continuity, 
there was an assumption that little legal and regulatory change would be 
necessary. This was a major weakness in the system of ensuring that the 
British administration on Malta was accountable. As Chapters 5 and 6 make 
clear, a number of the Bandi and Avvisi issued under Coleridge’s signature 
contained provisions which were inconsistent with basic assumptions 
of the rule of law. They, sometimes, lacked comprehensibility, seemed to 
impose obligations upon the population of an uncertain nature or created 
criminal offences by notice rather than by proper legal procedure.107 The 
lack of any reporting requirement meant that such defects in legislation, 
obvious to legal scrutiny, could not be picked up and remedied by Law 
Officers in London. 
Other forms of direct political control from London were equally weak 
at this time.
Ministerial Responsibility to Parliament 
Although the modern convention of ministerial responsibility had yet to 
evolve, a Secretary of State might, nonetheless, be called upon to explain 
and justify, to Parliament, his colonial policies, including those relating to 
Malta. In the case of the Crown’s prerogative powers, however, ministerial 
accountability was more discretionary than for other national affairs.108
There were some Parliamentary debates relating to Malta in the period 
1800-1806. These related to the negotiations on the Treaty of Amiens and 
the resumption of the war with France in 1803 – Malta having been the 
casus belli.109 There were no debates dealing with the ordinary governance 
106 See Chapter 5.
107 See, for example, the Avviso of 22 May 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 
1805 AL 1814, 8 which appeared to create criminal offences in a public notice and 
described those offences in such a vague, un-followable, way.
108 E.g., the Lord Chancellor refused to report on treaty negotiations with Russia 
in 1805, which involved the exercise of the crown’s prerogative powers in relation 
to a foreign state, Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates Vol 5, 2-12.
109 See, famously, Lord Wyndham’s intervention on the negotiations for the de-
finitive treaty of peace, 1802 Cobbetts Parliamentary History, vol. 36, 565.
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of Malta in this period.110 This lack of Parliamentary concern and scrutiny 
can be contrasted with other areas of colonial activity in which Parliament 
did express a considerable and continuing interest, such as the affairs of 
India and the slave trade.111 
The quiescence of the Parliament meant that colonial policy was 
dominated by Whitehall without serious parliamentary scrutiny.112 A 
Minister could invite the Privy Council to enact an Order in Council – if he 
wished to pass a law that would be directly effective in a colonial territory. 
This was a comparatively rare occurrence. The system chosen for Malta 
emphasised bureaucratic rather than democratic controls over the Maltese. 
When Ball’s administration passed laws in Malta, they did so under the 
political and legal authority of instructions from ministers in Whitehall 
under which Ball enjoyed considerable freedom of action.
Legislation
As discussed in this chapter, the British system for governing Malta, in the 
early period, was based upon indirect rule using the Royal Prerogative. 
A possible alternative, rule on the basis of powers conferred by an Act of 
Parliament, was avoided. The political costs and insecurities of securing 
Parliamentary consent for the details of colonial policy were too great. 
Nevertheless, where an objective was sought that could not be done under 
the Royal Prerogative, an Act of Parliament was necessary, and there were 
occasions, in the early nineteenth century, when ministers obtained Acts of 
Parliament which related to Malta. The aim of creating a free port in Malta, 
immune from certain taxes, was such a purpose and was pursued through 
110 See Cobbett’s Parliamentary History (until 1802) and Cobbett’s Parliamentary 
Debates 1803, vols. 1-6. The first recorded debate specifically on Maltese affairs oc-
curred in 1811 and involved allegations of extortion (by extracting unlawfully high 
fees) by the Court of Vice Admiralty, Parliamentary Debates, XL, 1077-9.
111 Cobbett’s Parliamentary Debates vol. 2 has, for instance, debates on the India 
budget, Sierre Leone Company and compensation for the West Indies relating to 
proposals to abolish the slave trade; vol. 36 of Cobbett’s Parliamentary History in-
cludes a debate on Trinidad and the slave trade.
112 In 1819 Joseph Hume attacked ministers on the grounds that governors and 
the secretary of state were conducting government in the conquered colonies with-
out either being properly accountable. Criticism was particularly levelled at wheth-
er the Secretary of State, without reporting the matter to Parliament, should have 
control over significant expenditure in relation to the military establishments of the 
colonies. Worse still, Parliament had no knowledge of the revenue produced by the 
colonies. The absence of a colonial council meant that there were no checks on the 
governors. 
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the enactment of the Malta Act 1801.113 Legislation was also enacted to 
provide for the payment of salaries of the Vice-Admiralty judges in the 
newly created Court of Vice-Admiralty in Malta in 1803.114 
When problems arose about the mode of trial of a British soldier, Private 
John Allary, who was accused of murdering a Maltese civilian, the civil 
and military authorities disagreed as to the applicable law.115 When the 
unresolved dispute was placed before the Law Officers of the Crown, they 
favoured the arguments of the Civil Commissioner that the local civil 
jurisdiction should apply. As this outcome was unsatisfactory to the military, 
the matter had to be resolved by the passing of legislation in Westminster.116 
3.4.  Conclusion 
Sir Alexander Ball, under the continuity principle, exercised the wide and 
absolute powers of the Grandmaster, powers that were not effectively 
reviewable by the Maltese courts. They were autocratic powers in the 
sense that he controlled the legislative, executive and judicial functions. 
Nevertheless, Ball was also a British official operating the law of Malta. 
His authority derived from his Commission and Instructions, which were 
subject to little, if any, review by the courts. 
The Crown, under English law, had the power to change the law in 
a conquered or ceded colony and, in the case of Malta, this legislative 
power would be exercised by the Civil Commissioner (using the forms of 
Maltese law). At least, as a matter of politics, if not law, Ball had to ensure 
that changes to Maltese law would need to be for the express, implied 
or ancillary purposes found in the Instructions. As we have seen, these 
purposes were very wide. Ball would have little difficulty in establishing 
that the laws promulgated under Coleridge’s signature were (in the words 
of the Royal Instructions) “evidently beneficial and desirable, as to leave 
no doubt of [their] expediency”. The task of persuading the Maltese of this 
was, in some instances, significantly more challenging. As we shall see in 
113 41 Geo III c103, repealed by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1986 Ch 1 pt IX. 
114 43 Geo III c160. The salaries were to be paid under the same conditions as laid 
down in the Act 39 Geo III c110. 
115 Harding, 10 et seq; the issue is discussed above.
116 A clause was inserted into in the Articles of War, published annually under 
the authority of the Mutiny Act, exempting from civil jurisdiction members of the 
military accused of criminal offences in Malta.
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Chapters 5 and 6, it fell to Coleridge to make the political case for each of 
the instruments, within the text of the laws and public notices.
Persons detrimentally affected by allegedly unlawful actions of the Civil 
Commissioner could pursue whatever domestic remedies were available. 
In the case of Malta, it seems that the law and its practice provided little 
by way of remedies against the Civil Commissioner. It was clear, from 
earlier cases, that if the Civil Commissioner committed a tort or a crime 
under English law he could be tried in England and English courts would 
determine any defences of lawful justification (based upon the local law) 
that might be argued. Any locally-lawful justifications, like torture in the 
context of treason, might be rejected, if they were deemed to be unlawful 
under English law, upon the grounds that, being unconscionable and 
against fundamental principles, they had ceased to be lawful following 
the British occupation. However, in Coleridge’s time, such a view was only 
arguable, not settled. It might have been the case, as became settled later 
in the nineteenth century, that unlawful actions could be addressed in the 
local courts but, again, this was not clear at the time and, anyway, may have 
had little impact in Malta given the strength of the Civil Commissioner’s 
position. Similarly, it is unclear whether an otherwise lawful action, outside 
the express or implied powers in the Instructions, could be challenged in 
the courts, local or English. In particular, any such act could, retrospectively, 
be validated by the Secretary of State in London.
No suit, whether civil or criminal, was ever brought in England 
challenging any of Sir Alexander Ball’s actions as Civil Commissioner.117 
However, this is not to say that his decisions were always unambiguously 
within the law. The punishments that Coleridge notified to the Maltese 
public by an Avviso of 22 May 1805 are problematic.118 In these cases, Ball 
inflicted severe punishments that, apparently, exceeded the maximum 
penalty available in Maltese criminal law. The punishments were a prima 
facie tort, under English law, and the question for the English courts would 
have been whether Ball’s defence of justification would have succeeded. 
His actions were probably lawful under Maltese law (given the position of 
the Grandmaster) but this would not necessarily have satisfied the English 
117 At least not in his life time. In 1895 a claim to compensation from Britain for 
losses caused by the French between 1798 and 1800 was rebutted by the British 
authorities by reference to Coleridge’s Bando of 8 March 1805, LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f.2; the latter was treated as still valid law in 1895: see Chapter 
5.3: Taxation.
118 See Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime.
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court if they were outside the written law and also, perhaps, unconscionable. 
Ultimately, the despotic powers of the Civil Commissioner meant that 
the liberties of the subject depended upon the conscience of the Civil 
Commissioner. The 1812 Royal Commission concluded that this was 
unsustainable. It recommended that constitutional reform, necessary to 
impose “some restraint”, should be pursued. In this, some of the criticisms 
of the nationalists, particularly Eton, were implicitly accepted.119 The Royal 
Commission recommended the ending of the Commissioner’s suspending 
and dispensing powers, though it considered that the power of exile, by 
a simple warrant, should remain, albeit subject to greater checks than 
previously.120 However, those reforms lay in the future, many years after 
Coleridge left Malta. 
119 See Chapter 2.
120 Royal Commission of 1812, 236. At the same time, they steadfastly refused to 
recognise traditional existence of a legislative assembly or promote its establish-
ment.
4. Coleridge’s Proclamations 
and Public Notices
4.1.  Coleridge’s Role: the “Most 
Illustrious Lord, the Public Secretary” 1
Coleridge’s Authorship
Whilst he was Public Secretary, a number of instruments published in 
Italian, were promulgated under Coleridge’s name. In some, but not all, of 
these, Dr. Guiseppe N. Zammit’s name was also subscribed in his capacity 
as “Prosegretario” or Maltese Secretary. 
The exact nature of Coleridge’s responsibility for the instruments is not 
clear. There are numerous references, in his letters home, to his onerous 
responsibilities in writing official documents. Coleridge did not refer to 
the Bandi and Avvisi as such; nor did, he explicitly refer to the equivalent 
English terms, “Proclamations” and “Public Notices”. The allusions in 
his letters reveal, however, that he was, probably, obliged to write three 
different types of official document during his Malta period: dispatches, 
Bandi and Avvisi respectively. And, it should be noted that he consistently 
refers to having to “write” these, rather than to supervise others in their 
authorship. His descriptions of this, as an “anxious duty”,2 are almost 
always intended to convey the sense of a heavy and stressful workload. 
Coleridge’s nomenclature for the different classes of document he dealt 
with are, on the one hand, “public Letters” and Memorials”,3 and, on the 
1 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1172.
2 To Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, CL 2, 1165.
3 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1160; to Daniel Stuart, ibid; to Daniel 
Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1166; to Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169; to Mrs 
S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170 .
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other, “public Memorials”.4 The question is: what did he mean by these 
terms? Does his idiosyncratic use of these terms mean that we can attribute 
the authorship of the Proclamations and Public Notices to him?
Before we investigate this question, it is important to remember that 
Coleridge, as Public Secretary, was, constitutionally, required to sign the 
Bandi and Avvisi.5 We shall argue below that he also had a major role 
in drafting them, but even if he did not, he could not avoid the ultimate 
responsibility for ensuring their coherence and fairness.6 Thus, Coleridge 
had some responsibility for what emerged under his signature. It is the 
nature and extent of that responsibility with which we are now concerned.
He seems to have used to term “memorial” (sometimes capitalised) in 
its conventional sense to mean a report comprising a statement of facts, as 
well as argument and conclusions derived from those facts. For example, 
he wrote to Southey:
I could tell you how for the last nine months I have been working in 
memorials concerning Egypt Sicily and the Coast of Africa…7
These memorials were not identified as “public memorials” because, for 
obvious reasons, these were for government eyes only. 
Similarly, he later described as a “well-reasoned Memorial”8 an essay on 
Lampedusa written by a third party. This was not, it seems, to be published 
un-amended,9 so it is unsurprising that he does not describe it as a “public 
Memorial”. The latter term, (“public Memorial”), no doubt, had a different 
meaning. 
We cannot be certain, but if he meant official statements of fact placed 
before the public, it is possible to conclude that Coleridge had the Avvisi 
or Public Notices in mind when he used the term “public Memorial”. 
These Public Notices would fulfil an important public role because they 
invariably give the public factual information, such as, for example, the 
sentence imposed upon a named convicted criminal or the presence in 
Malta of counterfeit coinage. These and the other examples of his Avvisi are 
considered below. But did Coleridge also use the term “public Memorial” 
4 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169-70. 
5 See Chapter 2.
6 Unless the requirement for signature was treated as a “rubber-stamp” exercise, 
although this can hardly have been intended by British ministers when they im-
posed it.
7 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1164.
8 To Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, CL 2, 1165 at 1166.
9 Although he thought it might provide the foundation of a newspaper article, 
which is why it was sent to Daniel Stuart.
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to embrace documents other than just the Avvisi?
Sultana seems to think so. He does not suggest that the term “public 
memorial” was confined only to the Avvisi. His conclusion is that, in his 
private correspondence, Coleridge did not distinguish between Bandi and 
Avvisi, (i.e. the Proclamations and Public Notices respectively) treating 
each alike and calling them, indifferently, “public Memorials”.10 
Sultana’s point does not, necessarily, mean that Coleridge simply 
failed, in his nomenclature, to make significant distinctions. The ordinary 
meaning of the term “memorial” can include any communication 
containing significant information which the addressees are required to 
remember and act upon. If Coleridge used the term “public Memorial”, in 
this second sense, it could, as Sultana suggests, embrace all official public 
communications, which would include both the Bandi and the Avvisi – 
each of which was to be acted upon and the latter to be remembered and 
understood. “Public Letters”, could then be taken to be Coleridge’s terms 
for government correspondence – including the dispatches – an argument 
that is also supported by Sultana.11
This conclusion, which strongly points to Coleridge’s authorship of the 
Bandi and Avvisi , is corroborated by a complaint that Coleridge made in 
a letter to Daniel Stuart, written in April 1805. In referring to his workload, 
he complained:
.. having beside the most anxious duty of writing public Letters and 
Memorials which belongs to my talents rather than my pro-tempore Office…12 
(Emphasis added).
Assuming that “public” qualifies “Letters” and not “Memorials”, 
Coleridge was here disclaiming formal, ex officio, responsibility for having 
to write both the public Letters (dispatches) and Memorials. This does not 
challenge our conclusion concerning his responsibility for the Bandi and 
Avvisi because he refers to these, it will be recalled, as “public Memorials”. 
He could not have meant that the Bandi and Avvisi fell outside his role 
because the Secretary of State had ordered otherwise:13 but he was 
complaining about the additional burden of having to write dispatches and 
reports.
10 Sultana, 270-1. 
11 Sultana, 271.
12 To Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, CL 2, 1165.
13 By the Royal Instructions of 1801, and the dispatches succeeding them, the 
Public Secretary was required to sign all such measures: see Chapter 3. The case we 
are making here is that he also had a major role in drafting them.
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Given the heavy burden of the Public Secretary’s normal tasks, Coleridge 
was not acting unreasonably. It did not, usually, fall to the Public Secretary 
to write official reports, such as those Coleridge had once produced in his 
former role as Private Secretary to Ball (e.g., about Sicily and about Egypt). 
The Public Secretaries did not hold a “political” office, in the narrow 
sense of being officially involved in influencing the formation of British 
military and foreign policy. The Public Secretary’s concern was the efficient 
administration of Malta. Thus, Coleridge had good cause to grumble. 
There is also some internal evidence, in the Bandi and Avvisi, of his 
authorship. Coburn14 and Sultana15 have each detected features in the 
drafting of the Bando of 29 January 180516 that suggest Coleridge’s early 
and inexperienced work. The practice of including justificatory material 
in the Bandi, whether signed by Coleridge or other office-holders, was 
not unique. A preamble explaining the factual context to new laws or 
administrative practices, explaining why they were needed, was sometimes 
adopted in instruments published before Coleridge took office.17 Coleridge, 
subsequently, adopted this practice in Bandi, such as that of 8 March 
1805,18 (this concerned the politically sensitive excise duties), where the 
stated reasons for the legislation, included in the preamble, were detailed, 
extensive and served to make the political argument for their enactment. 
But Coleridge’s first Bando is quite distinct from this later approach. This 
is shown by the nature of the material included and its location within the 
text. 
Coleridge was anxious to demonstrate, scientifically, why enlightened 
self-interest favoured certain conduct that the government wished to 
promote. This reasoning, based upon scientific principles, was a last effort 
at persuasion. But its location within the structure of the Bando is also 
revealing. Rather than include it in the preamble, where the contextual 
and justificatory material was usually located, Coleridge inserted it into 
the final paragraph. Because, in later Bandi and Avvisi, Coleridge did not 
return to this structural technique, Coburn has, convincingly, argued that 
it is suggestive of the experimentation of the inexperienced draftsman.19 
Thus, the nature of the sustained argument that protruding nails act to 
14 Coburn, 2, Appendix B.
15 Sultana, 278.
16 NLM LIBR/MS, Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356.
17 See e.g., the Bando of 29 August 1801, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 
1805, 213.
18 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
19 Coburn, 2, Appendix B.
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impede forward motion of a cart is at least suggestive of Coleridge’s work 
in the Bando of 29 January 1805.
Some further internal evidence of Coleridge’s authorship may also be 
detected in measures that reveal an inexperience and lack of familiarity with 
Maltese conditions: the narrative in the Avviso announcing the conviction, 
for anti-Semitic violence, of Fortunata Tagliana, in which Coleridge 
underscored the evil nature of her conduct by drawing upon her motive.20 
This feature of the Avviso is particularly interesting because no evidence of 
motive emerged from any of the extensive witness testimony. The reference 
to it may well have been an invented device to heighten further moral 
outrage and isolate other potential racists. Coleridge’s superior skill in 
using information, to which Ball was to testify,21 also suggests his very close 
involvement with the texts. This is more fully explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
There is also evidence of Coleridge’s lack of familiarity with the Maltese 
social context, especially the attitudes of the less advantaged. As we shall see, 
there is persuasive evidence that the criminal justice system was weakened 
by a reluctance, on the part of the Maltese, to inform upon their neighbours. 
For example, the high crime rate but low conviction rate emerged as a 
complaint against the government in 1806;22 many offenders “melted away” 
into a supportive local community. In the early days of his office, Coleridge 
may not have fully understood the significance of this “community 
solidarity”. In an early Avviso, dated 22 March 1805,23 Coleridge announced 
new punishments for offenders one of which required that those convicted 
of growing cotton, illegally, should hand over a proportion of the crop to 
an informant. Given the reluctance to inform, the prospect of the informant, 
personally, having to confront the offender, to demand the share of the 
crop, would seem to have been impracticable and unlikely to succeed in 
its purpose of providing an incentive for neighbours to give information 
to the authorities. Someone more experienced in Maltese conditions might 
not have entertained such unrealistic expectations. 
There is a final, indirect, argument to suggest Coleridge’s responsibility 
for the drafting of the Bandi and Avvisi (albeit in English). It is simply 
that, apart from the Bandi and Avvisi, there are no other known official 
documents issued to the public that could answer the description that 
20 See Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime.
21 See Chapter 1, nn.
22 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12 (no folio reference).
23 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 5. LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 
1814, 5.
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Coleridge offered in his letters. The suggestion is, therefore, that Coleridge 
had a significant drafting responsibility, albeit that he most likely relied 
upon an official to translate his text into Italian. No doubt, he would also 
have sought advice from experienced civil servants, and, possibly, also 
from Ball himself, although no evidence has yet been found of this in the 
surviving archive.
There is no suggestion, however, that Coleridge had an exclusive 
responsibility for the final published text of these instruments.24 He, almost 
certainly, had professional assistance of some kind, not least because these 
instruments were published in Italian. Indeed, the Italian used in the Bandi 
and Avvisi is of a stylised form, suggesting that Coleridge, with his limited 
command of the language, could not have had sole responsibility for the 
Italian text.25 Sultana suggests that Coleridge may have drafted the Bandi in 
English, but gained the assistance of a translator, such as Millar, or, indeed, 
other assistants.26 An alternative possibility is, of course, that the translator 
was none other than Dr. Zammit himself since such work also fell within 
his responsibilities.27 His name was also subscribed upon some of the Bandi 
and Avvisi, which may also suggest his involvement in them.
As legal documents the issue arises of how effective they were, not 
only in achieving the substantive good, the general purpose they aimed 
at, but at embodying what might be called “rule of law” principles and 
general principles of good governance. We shall consider these questions 
in Chapters 5 and 6. 
“Segretario Publico dell’Isole di Malta, Gozo e delle 
Loro Dipendenze”28
The Bandi and Avvisi, are signed: “Samuel T. Coleridge, Public Secretary 
to the Royal Commissioner”.29 (Emphasis added). This is an inaccurate 
24 Nor, of course, for the substance of the laws enacted, since the law-making 
power was vested in Ball as Civil Commissioner, not Coleridge as acting Public 
Secretary. See further below, Chapter 3.
25 See Coburn, 2, Appendix A where she concludes that although Coleridge 
could converse in Italian by early 1805, his understanding was far from perfect. 
26 Sultana, 278.
27 Zammit was required to transcribe official documents into Italian: see Carua-
na.
28 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1163.
29 The alternative formula was, “S. T. Coleridge, Secretary to the Royal Com-
missioner”. Ball was formally entitled, “His Majesty’s Civil Commissioner for the 
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statement in so far as Sir Alexander Ball was the Civil Commissioner rather 
than the “Royal” Commissioner. Ball’s decision to use an alternative is 
revealing.30 
We know that Ball thought that his proper title was confusing to the 
Maltese. He also hinted, perhaps somewhat pompously, that he thought that 
it was not sufficiently commensurate with the dignity of his Office.31 The 
Bandi and Avvisi suggest that, for local purposes, Ball used an alternative 
and more regal title, substituting “Royal” for “Civil”. He presented 
a request to Lord Windham for permission to be called “Governor”. 
Ministers refused to accede to this request,32 although formally a decision 
in this matter was merely deferred.
Coleridge’s Responsibility for Policy 
In what follows, it is important to recall that, in accordance with the Maltese 
Constitution, and the Royal Instructions from the Secretary of State to the 
Civil Commissioner, the law-making power was, in a constitutional sense, 
vested in the Civil Commissioner, not in the Public Secretary. Coleridge, in 
describing governmental decision-making, recorded, in The Friend, that Ball 
was the de facto, as well as the de jure, decision maker.33 Coleridge, it might 
be stated, was merely “his master’s voice”, in so far as he had, loyally, to 
introduce such Proclamations and Public Notices as Ball ordered. In other 
words, he was not responsible for (i) the decision to pass a Proclamation 
or issue a Public Notice; (ii) its subject matter; (iii) the policy it sought to 
advance.
However, Coleridge’s primary intention, in describing in The Friend the 
Island of Malta and its Dependencies and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Order of 
St John”.
30 His adoption of this style appears elsewhere and seems to represent a general 
practice intended to association his office more closely with Royal dignity: see e.g., 
Registro di memoriali decretati da sua Excellenza il Sig. Cavalier Alessandro Ball, Regio 
Commissionario Civile di Sua Maestà Britannica Incominciato li 14.9.05 sino li 24.12.1805. 
NAM LIBR 43/13, volume “0”. 
31 Ball to Windham, 27 August 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/153, 157.
32 A possible reason for this rejection is that it coincided with rising ministerial 
concern about Ball’s administration. Windham was about to demand of Ball that 
he respond immediately to the serious allegations made against him by Eton and 
others: see Windham to Ball, 6 January 1807, Kew, CO 159/3/220, 223. Ball’s request 
for a change in his title was under consideration at the very time his reputation was 
impugned: see Windham to Ball, 19 December 1806, Kew, CO 169/3/ 218, 219.
33 The Friend, 1, 552-3.
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processes of government, was to impress upon us that, before deciding any 
question, Ball consulted widely and, most significantly, that he consulted 
Coleridge. Thus, the Civil Commissioner was presented as an administrator 
who, according to Coleridge, enjoyed fully-reasoned and evidence-led 
decision making. But, Coleridge also makes clear, that the final decision 
as to what government did was Ball’s. Thus, when we consider Coleridge’s 
responsibility for the outcomes – the Bandi and Avvisi that he issued – we 
must bear this important caveat in mind. 
This means that, where the substance of the law appears to the modern 
reader to be harsh or oppressive (as in the case of the banishment of 
minors for repeating false rumours), the responsibility for this action lies, 
predominantly, with Ball. We might hope and expect that in the extensive 
consultation that took place before such new measures were introduced 
Coleridge would have made arguments consistent with the ideas that had 
earlier been advocated, for example, in The Morning Post, which emphasised 
the need to observe the appropriate constitutional and moral standards.34 
But the contemporary documentary evidence, required to establish what 
advice Coleridge actually gave, has been lost. It is now only possible to 
conclude that, if Coleridge offered such advice (and Coleridge is clear 
that he was consulted) he did not always succeed in persuading the Civil 
Commissioner to adhere to these “constitutional” standards.35 
This is not to say that Coleridge can always be distanced from 
controversial decision-making. For example, in The Friend, Coleridge 
expressed support for a number of administrative and criminal justice 
policies that we regard as problematic. For example, he supported the 
appointment of (unqualified) Maltese to important government posts, 
which is likely to have been a major cause of administrative inefficiency and 
even corruption.36 Even more controversial is his ex post facto assessment 
that the measures taken to suppress the anti-Semitic disturbances were 
appropriate and even wise.37 In this conclusion he must have accepted, for 
example, that the public interest could, sometimes, only be safeguarded 
where the judiciary acted upon the instructions of the government, and 
that the need to protect the Jewish community overrode constitutional 
34 See Chapters 1 and 6.
35 Thus, Coleridge could only be held to account for the initiatives discussed 
below if it could be demonstrated that he had acted without instructions from Ball. 
Unsurprisingly, there is no surviving evidence that this ever happened. 
36 The Friend, I, 569.
37 Ibid., 544.
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orthodoxy. This expression of support does, of course, implicate him in the 
banishment of minors for rumour-mongering. It was a sentence dictated 
by the government; presumably Coleridge was consulted about it; and he 
expressed a general approval for the actions of government in relation to the 
disturbances in his later writing. This invites the conclusion that his earlier 
opinions on, for example, the emergency powers proposed by Addison’s 
government in 1802, that Rule of Law values should be maintained even in 
times of emergency (see Chapter 6), had undergone some revision whilst 
he held public office. 
Moreover, Coleridge was not merely a public functionary who lacked 
authority to exercise some independent professional judgement. Whilst 
the political, legal or administrative objectives of each instrument could be 
determined by Ball, Coleridge’s judgement affected how the Bandi and Avvisi 
were drafted and what “extraneous” material went into them.38 Coleridge, 
as we shall discover below39, experimented with various techniques, either 
to win public support for the laws or for the British administration more 
generally. These techniques included: the promotion of Ball as a wise 
governor; arguments that compliance with the new law was in the self-
interest of the inhabitants; or in other cases, somewhat controversial and 
even unpalatable experiments with propaganda. Sometimes, he even 
misled the population about why a particular measure had been adopted. 
Whether Coleridge discussed these techniques with other officials, or even 
with Ball himself (and if so, what advice he might have received) remains 
unclear. However, it must be assumed that Ball would have interested 
himself in the legislation that was critical to the success of his government. 
The Bando of 8 March 1805,40 concerning excise duties, is pre-eminently 
such a measure. It can be assumed that the two men would have discussed 
how to persuade the Maltese to accept the new tax.
4.2.  The Nature of Bandi and Avvisi
We are presently concerned with the Bandi and Avvisi, and we must now 
explain more fully what these instruments were.
38 By extraneous, it is meant material (often explanatory or justificatory) that was 
not strictly necessary to achieve the purposes of the measure.
39 See also Chapter 6.
40 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
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Definition of Bandi
A Bando, which was a form of regulation known since at least the middle 
ages, has been described by Leopardi as a Proclamation.41 Accordingly, we 
use the term “Band” and “Proclamation” inter-changeably.
A Bando had the force of law. If this had ever been in doubt, from the 
English perspective, the matter was settled in a dispute that, as it happened, 
concerned Coleridge’s Proclamation of 8 March 180542 – one of the most 
important instruments published under his name. The dispute concerned 
a claim for compensation made, in 1894-1895, by the Ecclesiastical 
Corporations on Malta. They argued that, in this Bando, the British had 
assumed a responsibility to compensate them for losses sustained after 
the French looted their capital, which had formerly been invested in the 
Bank of the Università. Their case was that a legally-enforceable promise 
had been made, which the British had reneged upon. The outcome turned 
upon whether the Bando of 8 March 1805 had the force of law and, if it had, 
whether an unambiguous undertaking to compensate them had been made 
within it. 
The Maltese and British governments, who consulted the opinion of 
jurists and judges, were advised that a Bando was a binding legal instrument, 
which remained in force until repealed. However, Coleridge’s text, when 
properly understood, had not created an unambiguous undertaking that 
the Ecclesiastical bodies would receive compensation. It merely stated: “As 
soon as he is able, His Excellency shall not neglect to give the necessary 
help to places of worship, and to religious foundations”.
The payment of compensation was thus an aspiration, not a promise. 
This meant that the claim by the Ecclesiastical bodies failed upon its merits.
In fact, there could be few doubts about the constitutional authority of 
the British authorities to pass laws in Malta after 1800, so it is not surprising 
that a Bando was found to be a legislative instrument; but for our purposes 
the case of the religious foundations serves to remove any serious question 
about the legal status of Proclamations issued by the Civil Commissioner 
in 1805.
Characteristics of a Maltese Bando
There is an interesting distinction between an English statute and a Maltese 
41 Leopardi, 186.
42 See Chapter 5: Taxation.
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Bando of this period. English statutes express the commands of the Crown 
in Parliament; and they are enforced by the coercive powers of the State. 
Most significantly, the obligations created and imposed by this legislation 
are regarded as outcomes of the political process. The reasons that 
persuaded Parliament to enact the law are not incorporated or expressed 
within the instrument itself. They were made known to the public by means 
of newspaper reports of parliamentary debates of the kind that Coleridge 
had himself undertaken prior to his period in Malta. The debates that these 
reports stimulated would be a part of a wider public-political engagement .
This means that the reasons for legislation will have been explored and 
tested in the political process leading to the enactment of the statute. Once 
the legislators had been persuaded that a legislative enactment was either 
desirable or necessary, and it was placed upon the statute book, individuals 
were expected to obey it.43 
Unlike English statutes, Maltese Bandi often commence with a recital 
or preamble as to why the introduction of the law was either necessary or 
desirable. This contextual material, appealing to the reason of the inhabitants, 
was no doubt intended to make the obligations imposed upon them more 
acceptable. Merely by having to justify its intervention in their lives, the 
state might be seen to respect the autonomy of individuals thereby affected. 
As his later accounts in The Friend revealed, Coleridge placed a significant 
emphasis upon the importance of fully-reasoned decision-making within 
Ball’s cabinet. He associated this with what Coleridge described as Ball’s 
love of justice which served to demonstrate the moral authority of the law.44 
Thus, for Coleridge, there would have been a close relationship between 
having sound reasons for introducing a Bando and communicating those 
reasons to the Maltese. As we have described, the Bando of 29 January 
180545, about the regulation of cart wheels, is a pre-eminent example of his 
attempt to incorporate and communicate the reasons why legislation was 
being introduced. Other examples are considered in Chapter 5. 
This is not to say that securing the consent of the inhabitants was legally 
or constitutionally necessary. The inhabitants lacked a legal veto over 
measures enacted by the Civil Commissioner. Ball was, in a constitutional 
sense, exclusively equipped to identify and implement policies beneficial 
to the wider community. There was not even the veneer of democratic 
legitimacy to measures introduced into law. Nevertheless, both the Civil 
43 This was, of course, before the introduction of universal suffrage.
44 The Friend, I, 169-70. 
45 See Chapter 5.1: Reconstruction.
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Commissioner and Coleridge would have been aware that securing popular 
consent to an enactment was, politically, fundamental to Ball’s continuation 
strategy; indeed the Instructions from the Secretary of State required him 
to ensure the continued support of the Maltese for British rule.46 At the very 
least, unpopular laws would fan agitation for a representative, legislative 
assembly, such as the Consiglio Popolare. Confronted with unpopular laws 
that went against the grain of Maltese preferences, their leaders would 
demand influence, or even control, over new legislation. As we saw, in 
Chapter 2, this reaction occurred in 1805 and became a serious political 
issue for Ball after the first petition to the Crown was made by nationalists 
who (by-passing Ball) pressed the Secretary of State for fundamental 
political reform.47
In The Friend, Coleridge revealed his opinion that an engagement with 
the reason of the Maltese had a moral as well as a practical value. “No body 
of men (sic) can for any length of time be safely treated otherwise than 
as rational beings”.48 He intuitively understood that argument had to be 
ventured to persuade the inhabitants of the merits of British rule – ”If there 
be any difference between a Government and a band of robbers, an act of 
consent must be supposed on the part of the people governed”.49 The Bandi 
and Avvisi reveal how Coleridge practised these political values.
Definition of Avvisi
Avvisi were also published, as official instruments, by the British 
administration. An Avviso has been described, by Paul Cassar and Albert 
Ganado,50 as an “advertisement”, although the nomenclature “Public 
Notice” would seem to be equally apposite. For present purposes the latter 
term, “Public Notice” is used interchangeably with “Avviso”. 
Ball ordered Coleridge to publish Avvisi to ensure public awareness of 
government action. The administration of the law provided one of their 
major subjects. For example, he used them to publicise the punishment 
meted out to offenders. Deterrence required the widest publicity, for which 
notification of the conviction and punishment would be a pre-requisite. 
46 Downing Street to Ball, 9 June 1802, Kew, FO 49/3/51.
47 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated), 1805, Kew, CO 
158/10/151.
48 The Friend, I, 540. 
49 Ibid., 175.
50 P. Cassar and A. Ganado, ‘Two more Documents of 1813 written on Wood dur-
ing the Plague of Malta’, Melita Historica (1979), VII/4: 356-62
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These Avvisi also ensured the denunciation of the convicted criminal in 
order to effect a public shaming. But this is not all because Coleridge’s 
Avvisi, in fact, served diverse bureaucratic purposes, such as, for example, 
announcing the revocation of passports51 or ensuring that the population 
was made aware that armed deserters were roaming the countryside.52
One question concerns why public information notices were used, to 
convey this government information, rather than newspapers. This is of 
particular interest because the only printing press on Malta was under 
government control. The Malta Gazette was the government’s propaganda 
organ which, by the time of Coleridge’s sojourn on Malta, was edited by 
Vittorio Barzoni under the title of Il Cartaginese. This was used as a tool 
to counteract the effects of French propaganda.53 Information about the 
sentences imposed upon miscreants might easily have been published in 
the Gazette rather than in a Public Notice.
The likely reason why Il Cartaginese was not used was that the poor literacy 
levels,54 as well as the expense, probably limited its circulation. Moreover, 
the Avvisi could be deployed as a means by which the administration 
“connected” – which could not occur so effectively if the Maltese thought 
they received information through the prism of the editorial function – even 
if the paper was controlled by government. Addressing the Maltese directly, 
in a governmental capacity, contributed to the sense that their government 
was speaking to them, notwithstanding that the instruments were in Italian 
– a language with which most Maltese were unfamiliar. A Public Notice, 
which would be read aloud to a fanfare of drums in the villages and towns 
would be more likely to be effective in disseminating the information to a 
wider audience, especially where some educated person, most likely the 
local priest, was on hand to translate the instruments for the assembled 
crowd. 
During the earliest days of their administration, the British had 
experimented by publishing new laws and public notices with a parallel 
English and Italian text. Presumably, the English text was of little interest 
to the Maltese since few spoke the language, and the practice was quickly 
abandoned. 
51 Avviso, 25 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 15.
52 Avviso, 15 July 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 17.
53 See Sultana, 13.
54 The widespread illiteracy amongst the Maltese prompted Coleridge to remark 
in his private Notebook that the time spent by the priests in religious observance 
might have been better spent in teaching the poor to read. His further despairing 
comment was that ignorance served the interests of the Church: CN 2, 2484.
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Coleridge knew how to give this information the heightened impact 
necessary in an effective public instrument of this kind. As we shall see, 
nowhere is this more clearly revealed than in some of the Avvisi relating 
to crime and punishment. Where widespread disorder occurred, Coleridge 
sought to maximise popular revulsion to reinforce the deterrent effect of 
the conviction. Instead of a dull record that a named individual had been 
convicted and sentenced for a serious offence, we sometimes discover a 
richly-informative narrative style to give an account of the horrifying 
events constituting the offences. It is in instruments such as these, rather 
than the legally rigorous Bandi, that Coleridge can be said to excel. 
Avvisi were, therefore, more than mere advertisements or notices; and 
they were more useful to government than a controlled press. An Avviso 
allowed the government to directly control the tone and content of the 
message – to exploit its propaganda value, and to choose what information 
to reveal to, and what to conceal from, public consumption. They allowed 
Coleridge and Ball to speak directly to the Maltese people, creating a 
stronger relationship than would have been possible if they had used 
the medium of the press. Thus the Avvisi were, clearly, valuable tools of 
communication, especially in Coleridge’s hands.
Avvisi as Legal Instruments
Some Avvisi also reveal a legal complexity that remains perplexing. There 
are two senses in which this was so: in the first, the Avviso indicated how 
existing legal power would be exercised in future; in the second the Avviso 
purported to change the law itself. In this second sense, their constitutional 
status was controversial. 
An example of an Avviso indicating how power would, in future, be 
exercised is that of 22 March 1805.55 It suggested that existing, but not 
specified, powers over health and consumer protection would be used to 
inspect wine shops and confiscate any wine of insufficient quality. It does 
not, however, state any legal authority for such a drastic sanction. The 
suggestion is that the Notice itself purported to create that authority. 
A similar example concerns the Avviso of 12 June 1805 which brought 
to the attention of the Maltese the circulation of false currency. The text 
included a duty upon those receiving the coins to deliver them to the 
55 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 6.
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authorities.56 It is unclear whether this merely expressed an existing 
obligation recognised by law or purported to impose a new one. If the latter, 
it would be constitutionally controversial whether a Notice could achieve 
this. It is to this issue in several of the Avvisi that we now turn.
Bando or Avviso: Choice of Instrument 
A rigid distinction between a Bando and an Avviso was not always 
practised, which meant that an Avviso could, sometimes, be used where the 
Administration sought to amend the law or the punishment available to the 
courts for particular offences and where a Bando was more constitutionally 
appropriate. In an interesting dispatch, Ball reported to Lord Castlereagh 
that he had complied with instructions by issuing a “Proclamation”. It is 
most revealing that he was actually referring to Coleridge’s Avviso (Public 
Notice) relating to passports, dated 23 June 1805.57 If Ball’s report was not 
a mere lapse, this language may suggest that officials sometimes regarded 
Bandi and Avvisi alike as “Proclamations”, each capable of altering Maltese 
law.
The problem, in Malta, was that executive and legislative power was 
fused in the office of the Civil Commissioner. Law reform depended, 
ultimately, upon Ball’s discretion because, under the Maltese Constitution, 
he exercised unlimited powers. The difference between a Bando and an 
Avviso might have seemed to some officials – perhaps even to Coleridge 
himself – to be a trifling, bureaucratic formality especially when there 
appears to have been no substantive differences concerning the process of 
their promulgation. 
However, the differences were fundamental and ought to have been 
recognised as such. The Maltese would have understood that a Bando 
altered the legal relationship between citizen and state. Thus, the adoption 
of an instrument officially entitled “Bando” communicated to the Maltese 
that their legal rights and entitlements were being altered. This was not 
obviously the case with an Avviso. Where the administration purported 
to reform the law by means of the latter, it risked confusing the Maltese 
and failed to meet the requirement, of the Rule of Law, that rules should 
be comprehensible. For example, the decision to criminalise those who 
56 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 10. These coins resembled silver 
coins having a face value of one scudo bearing the mark of Grandmaster De Rohan.
57 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 15; also Ball to Cooke, 21 July 1805, 
Kew, CO 158/10/187.
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repeated false rumours as well as those who were present when false 
rumours were spread, but who did nothing to “undeceive” other listeners, 
represented a clear extension of the Code de Rohan, which ought to 
have been achieved by a Bando rather than an Avviso.58 Similarly, with 
the “severe” punishments for assisting deserters that the Administration 
purported to impose by the Avviso dated 15 July 1805.59 And, in the Avviso 
of 22 March 1805,60 regulating the cotton trade, the Civil Commissioner 
“ordered” new (and presumably more severe) punishments to be imposed 
upon those who used illegal means to produce inferior cotton. 
The announcement of new punishments was also a breach of the 
principle of nulle poena sine lege, which requires that legitimate punishment 
can only be imposed in accordance with existing, publicly disclosed laws. A 
person should know, in advance, what is proscribed, and he or she should 
be able to alter their behaviour accordingly. Thus, the prior existence of 
a valid law that prescribes a penalty for the condemned behaviour is 
a requirement of the Rule of Law. This principle is, perhaps, the most 
important guarantee of civil liberty, for without it any conduct of which the 
administration disapproved could be subjected to punishment.
There is a suggestion that the authorities became aware of this problem 
(and thus understood that a Bando and not an Avviso ought to have been 
the legitimate means of altering Maltese law) because the “offences” that 
were supposed to have been created, by an Avviso of 15 July 1805,61 were 
placed into a Bando, dated 2 September 1805.62 This Bando would not have 
been required if the Notice of 15 July 180563 had been understood to be 
legally effective. 
Bandi, Avvisi and Coleridge’s Health: “Some 
Intrusions of Sickness’64
The Bandi and Avvisi were issued at irregular intervals. A flurry of activity, 
which might sometimes involve the issue of several instruments on a single 
day, could be followed by a significant lull. One interesting question is 
58 Avviso, 15th July 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 17.
59 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 17.
60 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 5.
61 See n. 58 above.
62 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 21.
63 Ibid. 17.
64 To Daniel Stuart, 30 April 1805, CL 2, 1165 .
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whether these irregular “pulses” of administrative and legislative action 
coincide with Coleridge’s bouts of ill-health and remission, or whether the 
explanation was merely bureaucratic convenience – a requirement to focus 
upon other tasks? A further question is whether Coleridge’s low morale, 
albeit originating in his addiction, also suffered because of the moral 
ambiguities of the work he was required to undertake. For example, did 
his relapses occur after the most controversial Bandi and Avvisi and were 
these collapses attributable to his responses to the work upon which he was 
engaged?
In the state of present knowledge, the task of establishing any detailed 
correlation between Coleridge’s reports of his health and the dates upon 
which the Bandi and Avvisi were promulgated is problematical. A further 
problem is that Coleridge did not, explicitly, express a connection between 
the Bandi and Avvisi and his emotional or physical state whilst in office. If 
he felt distaste for some of his more controversial work, it may only have 
formed a part of an intricate array of causes for his physical and psychiatric 
suffering. Coleridge seems to have been acutely aware of this: “…did I not 
groan at my unworthiness, & be miserable at my state of Health, its effects, 
and effect-trebling causes?”65 
If his own accounts of his condition are reliable, Coleridge suffered 
from the physical and psychiatric symptoms of his addiction throughout 
his period of office. Homesickness, the failure of communications with 
family and friends, and the unrelenting pressure of work associated with 
his public duties each affected him.66 Sir Alexander Ball’s insistence that he 
remain in post, against his will, was also likely to have been damaging to 
his morale and resilience.67 Moreover, Coleridge had assumed the role of 
acting Public Secretary on the understanding that it would not last for more 
than a few weeks. The disappointment that Mr Chapman (his permanent 
replacement) was inexplicably delayed must have been particularly 
wearying when Coleridge’s hopes of release were repeatedly frustrated.68 
It is known that Coleridge reported a decline in his health from 
mid February 1805, barely a month into his tenure. The demands upon 
Coleridge were considerable even though he did not act as Treasurer and 
65 CN, 2, 2453, 15-16 February 1805.
66 See e.g. To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169; also to Mrs S. T. Col-
eridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170.
67 “...my gloom has encreased (sic) at each disappointment”. To Mrs S. T. Col-
eridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169.
68 To Robert Southey, 2 February 1805, CL 2, 1163.
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some of the Public Secretary’s work (such as directing the departments 
of State) was, apparently, delegated to Giuseppe Zammit. Despite these 
limits upon his workload, Coleridge’s already-weakened health suffered 
an early deterioration. Almost as soon as the volume and complexity of 
his public role became apparent to him, he seemed to struggle, not least 
because of the volume and unfamiliarity of the work involved. In his 
correspondence to friends and family at this time, the onerous nature of his 
work and his sense of fatigue were described alongside various symptoms 
of ill-health. Privately, in his Notebooks, he added further information, most 
particularly his responses to his suffering and the depressing side-effects 
of his addiction.69 
However, there was no hint, in his correspondence, that the moral 
complexities of his work affected his mood. In a revealing letter to Daniel 
Stuart, after having complained of his excessive workload, Coleridge 
proceeded to describe a recent illness followed by an inexhaustive list of 
its perceived causes, none of which referred to the political manipulation 
of governmental information.70 However, his participation in what he later 
confessed was the “awkward & wicked machinery” of colonial government 
makes it difficult to dismiss the possibility that his experience of morally-
complex policy-making did not have some influence upon his depression 
whilst in office.71
The period between late February and early March was, unquestionably, 
a stressful time because he was required to produce a critically-important 
Bando (the excise duties upon wine and spirits) and three Avvisi. As we 
have seen, it would not be an exaggeration to claim that Ball’s financial and 
political strategy for the islands depended upon persuading the Maltese 
to accept the new duties notwithstanding a constitutional provision 
that precluded it. The political situation was all the more dangerous 
because the British had formally promised the Maltese to maintain the 
constitutional rights of the Maltese people. As we have seen, in Chapter 
2, the risks presented by breaching these undertakings, and frustrating the 
very expectations that the British had encouraged, should not be under-
estimated. The burden of deflecting Maltese hostility, and even winning 
Maltese support for the highly controversial measure – tasks that might 
have seemed all but impossible – fell upon an ailing Coleridge. 
69 CN 2, 2453, 15-16 February 1805; CN 2, 2457, 18 February 1805 discloses re-
morse and self-disgust, which implies a relapse. 
70 To Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1166.
71 To Daniel Stuart, 22 August 1806, CL 2, 1178.
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, these burdens took their toll upon him. His 
coping strategy meant that he resorted to opium. By 21 February 1805 
he was reflecting on possible ways of deterring his resort to the drug. He, 
stoically, considered writing and displaying warning memoranda wherever 
he might see them to stiffen his resolve to stay away from  narcotics. This 
idea was gloomily put aside because the notes displayed would only 
remind him of his frailties.72 He struggled on with symptoms that were 
already very familiar to him: bad bowels and nightmares.73
 As soon as the Bando and the three Avvisi had been issued, Coleridge 
seems to have fallen back into despair and a further period of ill-health. 
On 8 March 1805 – the very day the Bando about the excise duties had 
been issued – Coleridge recalled lines from his poem The Pains of Sleep 
and then concluded, “Help Lord! Or I perish”.74 In an entry a few hours 
later, he verged upon “utter Despair”.75 There is no doubt that this was an 
expression of his wretched realisation that, after almost a year in Malta, he 
had not succeeded in liberating himself from dependency upon opiates. 
The web of propaganda that he had just created might well have had a 
further depressing influence upon him. 
He was to issue three further instruments, on 22 March 1805, which 
meant that the immediately-preceding period must also have been busy. 
Sunday 17 March 1805 found him at a particularly low ebb. It was, he wrote, 
“A Day of Evil/wretch….O a groan deep and almost of moral despair!” His 
work at this time was suffering. The Bando about the regulation of spirits76 
lacked clarity in drafting. Even identifying which was the responsible 
licensing authority was far from clear. Moreover, there were indications 
of a lack of attention to detail. Similarly, Coleridge may have overlooked 
the fact that the Avviso governing wine inspections77 (also dated 22 March 
1805) should have been a Bando rather than an Avviso because it appears 
to have introduced a new penalty. These lapses suggest that his ability to 
comprehend and execute his complex new role may have been affected by 
his physical and mental condition. 
A letter written to Daniel Stuart, on 1 May 1805, recorded that, from 
mid April, he had been very ill, much worse, indeed, than at any other 
72 CN 2, 2489, 21  February 1805.
73 CN, 2, 2468, 5 March 1805. See also to T. Wedgewood, 16 September 1803, CL 2, 
991.
74 CN 2, 2482.
75 CN 2, 2483.
76 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
77 Ibid. 6.
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period during his time on Malta.78 After 22 March 1805, no further Bandi 
or Avvisi were promulgated for two months. Not until the emergency 
caused by the anti-Semitic uprising was Coleridge compelled to return 
to producing Avvisi. This substantial interval suggests either that there 
was no requirement to issue further instruments or that Coleridge was 
prevented from attending to that business. Although he seems to have been 
active in other ways during this interval, he could judge for himself that 
his effectiveness was in doubt. An undated Notebook entry of April 1805 
is revealing: “So hard have I worked lately, & to so little effect in consequence 
of my Health…”79 Despite his most industrious efforts, he seems to have 
understood that he was unproductive. This failure was, he claimed, causing 
him “agitation and anxiety”.80 Perhaps this is unsurprising when he was 
forced to confront his own decline, and most particularly, difficulties in 
work in which he should have excelled. Moreover, his description of an 
“anxiety” state is an under-statement. He had, very recently, contemplated 
suicide and feared that he would not survive to see his family.81 Even so, 
there were still occasional moments of joy. The emerging spring blossoms 
and flowers were a particular delight.82 
Six instruments were promulgated in the second half of June and a 
further (Avviso) on 15 July 1805. The effort this required also appears to 
have taken its toll upon him, for he reported in a letter to his wife, dated 
21 July 1805,83 that his health had recently been “very, very bad”. The final 
quartet of official instruments emerged in August and early September by 
which time he reported that he was too busy to exercise.84 He had once 
more sunk into a despondent frame of mind and seems to have found sleep 
difficult.85 At the same time, there are signs of an impaired ability to produce 
coherent and fully considered law reform. The bizarrely drafted Bando of 5 
August 1805, concerning unripened fruit, is an example of this.86 Even more 
significant was that, on the very same day, he issued an Avviso containing 
the erroneous statement that a Proclamation of 1801 had criminalised 
sales of goods to soldiers (rather than purchases from soldiers). Was this a 
78 To Daniel Stuart, 1 May 1805, CL 2, 1166.
79 CN 2, 2560.
80 Ibid.
81 CN 2, 2557, 21 April 1805 and CN 2, 2560.
82 E.g. CN 2, 2499, 2519, 2538 and 2565.
83 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 July 1805, CL 2, 1169.
84 To Mrs S. T. Coleridge, 21 August 1805, CL 2, 1170.
85 E.g. CN 2, 2638, 14 August 1805.
86 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 19.
 Coleridge’s Proclamations and Public Notices 163
careless error or a reckless intention to deceive – a decision, in other words, 
to gamble with the reputation of Ball’s administration? Taken together, 
these instruments might well mark a further stage in the progressive 
disintegration in his effectiveness in public office.
The summer heat caused a boil on his arm and he became ever more 
irascible at the intrusive sounds of dogs, pigs, parade drums and reveille.87 
To make matters worse, on 24 August 1805, he sustained an injury to his left 
eye, which troubled him for several days. This occurred just after he had 
issued a second Avviso concerning the distribution of prize money. The 
injury, as well as his general condition, may have delayed the production 
of his final measure – the Bando criminalising the provision of support for 
the deserters from the Royal Regiment of Malta. The civil administration 
was under pressure from the military to assist in the apprehension of these 
men. The previously-unsuccessful intervention had been issued, on 15 July 
1805. Given the urgent emphasis that the military authorities had placed 
upon locating and capturing these soldiers, it is, perhaps, surprising that 
the necessary Bando was delayed until 2 September 1805. The explanation 
for the likely postponement may lie in Coleridge’s reduced capacity for 
work during the latter part of August 1805.
87 CN 2, 2614.
5. Thematic Analysis of the 
Proclamations and Public 
Notices
The Themes
In this chapter each of the twenty-one Proclamations (Bandi) and Public 
Notices (Avvisi) under Coleridge’s signature will be contextualised and 
evaluated. For convenience, they are grouped into themes according to 
their ostensible subject matter, and these themes are set out in Table 1 
below. This classification is not definitive in so far as the stated purpose of 
the measure may sometimes be different from its true motivation. Equally, 
some measures have more than one purpose. An example is the Bando of 22 
March 1805,1 which might, fairly, be seen as a measure concerned with the 
prevention of crime, or military discipline rather than consumer protection, 
which is its stated purpose. Similarly, the Avviso of 20 June 1805,2 which 
is considered under the heading of “military discipline” might, fairly, be 
regarded as a measure to combat crime.
The themes are: (i) reconstruction; (ii) distribution of prize; (iii) taxation; 
(iv) public order and crime; (v) corruption; (vi) consumer protection; (vii) 
regulation of trade; (viii) the harbours; (ix) passports; (x) military discipline.
1 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4. 
2 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 12.
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Date Tyoe Subject Theme Reference
29 January 1805 Bando Roads Reconstruction
LIBR/MS 430 1/2 
Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 
356; 431 II/3, 50
1March 1805 Avviso Extortion Public Order and Crime
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 1
8 March 1805 Avviso Prize Money Distribution of Prize
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
3
8 March 1805 Bando Wine tax Taxation
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
2
9 March 1805 Avviso Safe navigation Harbours
LIBR/MS 431 2/3 
Bandi 1804-1808, 97
22 March, 1805 Bando Regulation of spirits
Consumer 
Protection
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
4
22 March 1805 Avviso Cotton Regulation of Trade
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
5
22 March 1805 Avviso Inspections of wine
Consumer 
Protection
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
6
22 May 1805 Avviso Notice of conviction
Public Order 
and Crime
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
8
25 May 1805 Avviso Notice of conviction
Public Order 
and Crime
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
9
12 June 1805 Avviso Counterfeit coinage
Consumer 
Protection
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
10
14 June 1805 Avviso Attempted bribery Corruption
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
11
20 June 1805 Avviso Enlistment Military Discipline
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
12
21 June 1805 Avviso Ferryboat licensing Harbours
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
13
21 June 1805 Bando Foreigners and Vehicles
Public Order 
and Crime
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
14
25 June 1805 Avviso Mediterranean Passports Passports
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
15
15 July 1805 Avviso Deserters Military Discipline
 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
17
5 August 1805 Avviso Deserters Military Discipline
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
18
5 August 1805 Bando Unripened fruit
Consumer 
Protection
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
19
19 August 1805 Avviso Prize money Distribution of Prize
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
20
2 September 1805 Bando Deserters Military Discipline
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
21
Table 1: 
Proclamations (Bandi) and Public Notices (Avvisi) under Coleridge’s signature
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5.1. Reconstruction
Introduction
As we have seen, in Chapter 2, the Maltese uprising against the French, 
in 1798, which had been followed by two years during which the French 
garrison had been besieged on land and sea, had severely disrupted 
the administration and the economy of the Island. At the date of the 
capitulation, the Island’s economy was in a state of collapse. The export 
of cotton to Spain, which generated about £500,000 per annum, had been 
impossible during the blockade.3 Much of the Island’s traditional revenue 
had been lost when, in 1792, the French confiscated the assets of the Order 
in France. There was little economic activity, because the shops in Valletta 
had been either destroyed or looted; the bank had been plundered; and the 
merchant and fishing fleets of Valletta smashed. The wherewithal to re-
build the infra structure depended, in part, upon the British taxpayer and, 
otherwise, upon the gradual recovery of the economy. A significant backlog 
of public works accrued before the problems could be fully resolved. Re-
construction work continued whilst Coleridge was on the Island. 
The question of road maintenance was one of the first problems that 
confronted Coleridge in his new public appointment, since he was only 
eleven days into his office when his first Bando, as Public Secretary, was 
issued. Its purpose was to minimise future damage to the highways arising 
from the use of certain types of wheels.
Roads
Some evidence of the significant investment made in the repair and 
maintenance of the highways, at this period, survives. In his annual financial 
report upon the affairs of the Island, for the year 1803-1804,4 Ball warned 
Camden that significant sums would have to be spent, not only in repairing 
the roads in the countryside but also upon the continuing street repairs in 
Valletta. As matters turned out, he was right to do so because the financial 
statement for the following year, 1804-1805, revealed that the Island’s 
continuing deficit was, in part, attributed to the cost of restoring the roads 
and other infrastructure; indeed, Ball considered the road reconstruction 
3 Hardman, 535.
4 Ball to Camden, 10 September 1804, Kew, CO 158/9/59. 
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programme to be one of the heaviest financial burdens of government.5 
A number of methods, apart from regulating the design of cart 
wheels, were employed to keep the road network in good condition. The 
administration used conscript labour, including French and Spanish 
prisoners of war, to work upon road maintenance.6 There is some, slight 
evidence, in his Notebook entry of 23 January 1805, that Coleridge might 
have visited them on or about this date.7 He was, later, to record that the 
POWs were “shamefully” treated on Malta.8 This adverse judgement could 
easily have been influenced by what he witnessed of the men labouring 
at such arduous work, although it must not be forgotten that one of the 
victims of the anti-Semitic violence, whom a crowd was invited to stone, 
was also a French prisoner.9
The use of these prisoners to reduce labour costs must have been 
attractive, given the limited resources otherwise available, to meet the 
significant arrears of work. Perhaps, for this reason, the POW labour 
force was about to be expanded by Maltese convicts. Ball and Coleridge 
were, in effect, about to experiment with a type of community service 
programme. The Bando of 22 March 180510 (regulation of spirits) was to 
stipulate that, although certain offences were punishable by fine, those 
who either could not or would not pay their fine could either be sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment or six months community service engaged upon 
public works. But the administration recognised that these methods, by 
themselves, would be insufficient. In effect, these were simply measures to 
treat the symptoms of abuse. More had to be done to reduce the expense, to 
government, arising from unnecessary damage to the surface of the roads.
Ball’s parallel strategy, which Coleridge’s first Bando of 29 January 
180511 implemented, was aimed at minimising the need for costly repairs. 
The Administration had identified the use of studded wheels as a major 
and avoidable cause of damage to the road surface. Unless Ball abolished 
their use, the only alternative would be to repair the damage they caused, 
5 Ball to E. Cook (Under-Secretary), 1 March 1806, Kew, CO 158/11 no folio ref-
erence – Revenue & Expenditure of Malta & Gozo, 25 July 1804-24 July 1805. Ball 
reported that very considerable sums had been expended on roads without specify-
ing the amounts spent.
6 Sultana, 274.
7 CN 2, 2412.
8 To Robert Southey, circa 24 December 1809, CL 3, 265.
9 See Public Order and Crime, below.
10 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
11 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 2.
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which would have meant raising additional revenue by taxes or duties. In 
a constitutional sense, this latter policy choice might have been possible. 
In the days of the Order of St John, wheels had, indeed, been taxed for the 
repair of streets and roads, and once the work had been completed the tax 
had was no longer levied. This precedent meant that ad hoc taxation for the 
maintenance of the highways was not a “new” tax, and so it fell within the 
terms of the Maltese constitution.12 
Political reasons probably explain Ball’s reluctance to levy hypothecated 
road taxes. A burdensome and, possibly, unpopular tax on wine was about 
to be promulgated, and Ball fully understood the risks to his policy of 
retaining Malta if his government lost favour with the inhabitants.13 As 
we shall see below, any increase in taxation would have to be carefully 
managed. Legislation exacting two new imposts, each imposed within a 
few weeks of the other would be courting trouble. If Ball appeared to resort, 
too readily, to tax-raising it might spark renewed calls from the Nationalists 
for a representative assembly such as the Consiglio Popolare14. Moreover, 
if the harmful wheels were prohibited instead, and the roads less easily 
damaged, he no doubt reasoned that an unpopular road tax would not be 
necessary.
However, if this was his assessment, it was unduly optimistic. The 
thorny question of how to fund the communications network was not fully 
resolved by either this or any other of the early British administrations. 
When the Royal Commission reported in 1812,15 it acknowledged that 
the repair of streets and roads continued to remain an item of heavy 
expenditure; but it shared Ball’s preference to address the matter by means 
other than taxation. The Commission’s recommendation was that prisoners, 
who might otherwise have been sentenced to servitude on the galleys, 
should instead be required to maintain the roads as a community service. 
This was so, in part, because the sentence of time in the galleys was an 
obvious anachronism, this form of punishment having fallen into disuse. 
This signalled an approval of the community service ideas employed by 
Ball in 1805. 
12 The question whether the constitution precluded new taxes was a particularly 
vexed one. It is considered in the theme concerning taxation at 5.3, below.
13 See generally Chapter 2 and the taxation theme at 5.3, below.
14 As the Royal Commission acknowledged in 1812: Kew, CO 158/19.
15 Ibid.
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Bando 29 January 180516 – Regulating Studded 
Wheels
Coleridge pursued three distinct strategies to limit the damage to the surface 
of the highways. These strategies are of interest because they suggest that 
there were significant political constraints upon the use of regulation and, 
in particular, constraints upon the employment of sanctions under the 
criminal law. They also reveal something of Coleridge’s inexperience as an 
administrator.
Firstly, the Bando required that wheels should be made to a pattern 
supplied by, or on behalf of, the government to the wheelwrights. 
Craftsman who made wheels to any alternative design would commit a 
criminal offence for which they would become liable to a fine of twenty 
oncie for each offence, upon conviction. 
Secondly, and as a separate offence, the Bando prohibited the construction 
(as opposed to the use) of wheels that had iron nails or studs protruding 
from the rims since these damaged the surface of the highways. Failure to 
comply with this regulation also constituted an offence punishable by a 
fine as above. 
The final strategy adopted was to exhort the majority of vehicle owners 
to fit and use the approved wheels even if their existing wheels had only 
recently been fitted. Intriguingly, the continued use of studded wheels by 
members of the public was not punishable. This decision is interesting 
because, if the major cause of damage to the highways was the use of 
studded wheels, we would expect any instrument deploying the criminal 
law to include penalties, such as a fine, to enforce the removal of studded 
wheels from use. That this was not done reveals a concession to practical 
politics that forced Coleridge into an alternative strategy. 
Rather than using criminal penalties against a potentially large number 
of Maltese, he instead resorted to a reasoned appeal to their self-interest. 
He argued that journeys in carts without studded wheels would be more 
comfortable; the carts and wheels would have a longer life since the jolts 
caused by the studs would, necessarily, cease; the goods carried would 
be less liable to damage; and the beasts drawing the carts would not tire 
so quickly. To drive home this final argument, he resorted to the laws of 
physics by asserting that the studs operate against the moving force and so 
a greater effort is required to draw carts fitted with studded wheels than 
16 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356; 431 II/3, 50.
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would be the case otherwise. 
Depending upon how successful this exhortation to the owners may 
have been – and much might have depended upon the cost and convenience 
of wheel replacement (as much as on the reasons Coleridge expressed) – 
the restriction of criminal sanctions to the manufacturing process suggests 
that the Bando was really aiming at a long-term strategy. It would take time 
before new vehicles were produced according to the new design. Short 
term gains in reducing the damage to the road surfaces depended upon 
early, but voluntary, compliance in having studded wheels upon existing 
vehicles replaced. 
The reluctance to enforce a prohibition upon the use of studded wheels 
was, probably, perceived to be necessary for pragmatic, political reasons. 
Mandatory wheel replacement would put a majority of the citizens to 
significant expense and risk unpopularity. It is unclear whether the craft 
capacity of the Island could achieve a rapid replacement of the old, harmful 
wheels; and the criminalisation of a potentially large number of people, 
including, perhaps, the less affluent who would be unable to afford to 
replace their wheels, would be unpopular. It would tend to frustrate the 
overriding British policy designed to secure the support of the Maltese for 
the British administration. There is evidence that Coleridge succeeded in 
limiting political damage because the restrictions on wheels did not feature 
in the litany of complaints, made in 1805, about Ball’s administration.17
However, Coleridge’s failure to impose a criminal offence for the 
continued use of the wheels is also interesting because it reveals something 
of his inexperience and lack of confidence as an administrator. It reveals 
his uncertainty as to whether his reasoned appeal, to the self-interest of the 
Maltese owners, would succeed in persuading them to alter their behaviour. 
Had most of them complied voluntarily the number of recalcitrant owners 
who retained the studded wheels would be quite small. This means that, 
if his reasoned appeal succeeded, the political objections to using the 
criminal law to punish those who did not make the change of wheel would 
have been less powerful because there would have been fewer offenders 
to bring to court and less resistance to the new policy. Coleridge, as an 
inexperienced public official, can be seen to experiment with persuasion, 
and he was, evidently, not confident that his explanation and appeal, no 
matter how objectively reasoned, would secure the goal he intended. 
17 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated): Kew, CO 158/10/151 
(1805).
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Certainty
Legislation normally informs a society, or a class of the population, of 
the conduct that is required of it or, alternatively, that certain conduct 
is prohibited. The behaviour that is either permitted or prohibited must 
be clearly established so that law-abiding individuals can go about their 
business without risking a penalty. This is not possible if the law is unclear.
The drafting of Coleridge’s first Bando suffers from certain 
interpretational problems. 
Firstly, it was enacted so that the craftsmen should only make wheels 
according to the pattern supplied to them. Presumably, although the Bando 
does not make this clear, no craftsman would have been liable for making 
wheels according to other designs until the pattern had been supplied to 
him. 
Secondly, it was enacted so that it would be an offence to depart from 
the pattern. A separate offence was the manufacture of a wheel with nails 
that protruded from the rim. 
It can be objected that the second offence was redundant since the 
obligation to construct wheels according to the government’s approved 
pattern would, obviously, mean that the wheels would not have protruding 
nails. This also reveals Coleridge’s inexperience as a legal draftsman.
The fine of twenty oncie was imposed on craftsman “for each offence”. 
It can be asked whether the construction of a wheel with protruding nails 
is one or two offences? Is it an offence contrary to the requirement to 
manufacture according to the pattern (offence 1) and a further and separate 
offence to have protruding nails (offence 2)? This is unclear and is further 
evidence of lay draftsmanship.
Enforcement
The experience of any legal system is that a law that is not enforced is 
almost worthless. However, legislators do not always address this question 
by providing an adequately-resourced enforcement mechanism that will 
prove effective in identifying and prosecuting offences. The effectiveness of 
public-enforcement bodies can be compromised if they suffer from under-
funding, a lack of zealous, efficient staff, poor management or a lack of 
political or public support. 
On Malta at this period, the absence of an organised police force limited 
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the scope for the detection of offences. Coleridge’s Bando sought to avoid 
this potential pitfall since the inhabitants were, in effect, recruited to 
perform the work of detection and evidence gathering. He achieved this 
by invoking the aid of self-interested informants who were to be rewarded 
with one half of the fine to which an offender would become liable upon 
conviction. Whilst minimising a public burden – that of detecting the 
offences – it nevertheless created a conflict of interest since the informant, 
who might easily be a witness, had a pecuniary interest in a conviction. As 
we discuss in Chapter 6, this is also a matter in which we find Coleridge 
having to set aside his own published opinions to pursue goals set for him.
As we shall see, there is evidence that the Maltese were reluctant to 
inform upon their fellow citizens. Co-operation with the authorities, in their 
law enforcement activities, seems to have been problematic. A financial 
inducement to inform and give evidence may have been the only possible 
means of encouraging individuals to inform against their neighbours, and, 
even then, the required flow of information was not guaranteed.18 But this 
was not all. Whilst the prosecutorial decision, in any given case, remained 
one for the public authorities, which would provide some control upon 
the activities of informants who were obviously malicious or vexatious, it 
18 As the two Public Notices and the Proclamation concerning desertions from 
the Royal Malta Regiment revealed: see the military discipline theme, below.
9. The presence of studded wheels on this Calesse suggests that Coleridge’s Bando 
had not fully succeeded by the late 1830’s. Lithograph by C. de Brocktorff 
[1838]
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would not necessarily prevent all cases of injustice that might arise from 
untrue or exaggerated witness statements.
Proclamation of 8 March 180519 – the Excise Duties on 
Liquor and Wine
Re-construction policies were also a feature of the later Bando of 8 March 
1805. This concerned the re-introduction of an excise duty on liquor and 
wine. In order to make the tax more acceptable to the Maltese, Coleridge 
identified some of the purposes for which the revenue was to be raised. 
These included the reconstruction of the economy and certain infra-
structure. Charitable institutions that were engaged in constructing 
buildings to be enjoyed by the public were identified as beneficiaries of 
public funding, no doubt because their work had popular support amongst 
the devout Maltese. This Proclamation is, however, more fully considered 
elsewhere.20 
5.2. Distribution of Prize
Introduction
In 1801, the British reversed their policy and decided not to award Maltese 
military personnel a share of the prize money arising from the capture of 
Valletta. This had, naturally, become a lingering cause of friction between 
the British and the Maltese. Following the intervention of the Secretary 
of State, there was a further volte face, but problems surrounding the 
authorised distribution remained unresolved by the time Coleridge held 
office. As we shall see, the payments occurred in two instalments, the first, 
in 1803, and the second, under Coleridge’s supervision, in 1805. From the 
Maltese point of view, even the revised terms of the 1805 distribution were 
disappointing because his Avviso still excluded many individuals from 
making a claim. Moreover, the British were later to overturn some claims 
that had been formally recognised as meritorious by Maltese officials. This 
added fuel to other grievances, such as the bad bread, trade competition, 
19 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
20 See the taxation theme, below. 
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and the complaints over civil and political rights. Thus, the issue of prize 
money, which was, no doubt, intended to earn political capital and reward 
loyalty, added to the difficult political context that Ball and Coleridge had 
to administer. 
Promises
A brief account of how the British and their allies acquired Malta by 
means of a naval blockade and the landward siege of Valletta has been 
offered in Chapter 2 and Appendix 2. After Valletta eventually fell to the 
allied armies, Maltese military personnel were led to believe that they would 
be given a share in the bounty to be distributed to the victorious armies. To 
implement this, Major-General Pigot ordered Captain Ball (as he then was) 
to prepare a list of the Maltese military, of all ranks, who could qualify for 
reward.21 However, when he saw the list, Pigot changed his mind, which 
meant that, in the aftermath of the French capitulation, no prize money was 
actually paid. Pigot’s argument was that it would be difficult to allocate 
shares according to rank because rank, in the Maltese forces, depended 
upon social status rather than the number of men commanded.22 However, 
the argument overlooked the political damage inflicted by a breach of 
promise.
Ball, who was fully aware of hostile local sentiment regarding this and 
other aspects of British conduct both during the campaign and, in particular, 
in relation to the terms of capitulation,23 regarded the breach of faith as 
politically disastrous. He knew that there was also anger that the British had 
excluded the Maltese from the negotiation of the capitulation – an unwise 
decision that they would later have good reason to regret; and Pigot’s 
inconsistency would only fuel disillusionment with British occupation 
thereby making the peaceful, stable and long-term government of Malta 
problematic. Ball wrote to Dundas, the Secretary of State for War and the 
21 NAM LIBR A22 PS09 Maltese Corps Serving at the Surrender of Malta on 4 
September 1800. The list names 2506 individual officers and men whom Captain 
Ball identified as potentially eligible to claim.
22 Captain Ball’s list, ibid., recorded, for example, that the colonel of Birchicarra 
(sic) battalion commanded 478 officers and men, whilst his counterpart in the Cren-
di Battalion commanded a mere 25 troops.
23 The Maltese were excluded by the British from the negotiations for capitula-
tion. As a result no provision was made in the Articles of Capitulation for repara-
tions to be paid to those Maltese citizens whose private property had been looted: 
see Appendix 2. 
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Colonies, warning of instability and urging that Pigot be overruled.24 
This letter is particularly interesting because it offers an unguarded 
insight into the conduct and bravery of the British army on Malta. Ball 
drew Dundas’ attention to the military achievements and hardiness of the 
Maltese soldiers. His powerful comparison between British conduct and 
that of the Maltese troops was intended to make the case that the Maltese 
were more deserving of reward than their British allies. Ball did not hesitate 
to point out that, when the British troops finally arrived to assist the Maltese 
insurgents, the British withdrew from the most dangerous positions and 
left them to be defended by the Maltese. The following statement, intended 
to emphasise the justice of the Maltese claim is revealing:
Another post was abandoned to the Maltese, because the British troops 
deserted from it to the enemy, and the Maltese, who were more to be trusted than 
our own troops, were the means of preventing our own troops from deserting, 
and actually arrested one of our own men close to the enemy’s works.25 
(Emphasis added).
Not only is this account a powerful and critical assessment of the 
contribution made by British land forces to the siege of Valletta, it also 
explains why the Maltese regarded themselves as having liberated 
themselves, with the British performing only an “auxiliary” role.26 Ball’s 
openness is also worthy of comment because, at this time, Ball continued 
to serve as a captain in the Royal Navy (and had, by then, returned to his 
ship). Coleridge’s subsequent, later references to inter-service rivalry may, 
however, provide an interesting perspective on this apparent frankness.27
As stated above, the British government in London eventually acceded 
to the representations made on behalf of the Maltese. An annotation made 
in 1803, to Captain Ball’s original list of beneficiaries, formally signalled that 
policy had changed and that Ball (who was by now Civil Commissioner) 
was to decide upon the entitlements of the individual officers and men. 
The Distribution of Prize in 1803-1804
The new policy was first implemented when the Public Secretary, Alexander 
Macaulay, announced that a sum of £13,916. 13s. 4d was to be distributed 
24 Ball to Dundas, 6 March 1801, Hardman, 344-5, Kew, CO 158/10/15.
25 Hardman, 345.
26 See, for example, the ‘Humble Representation of the Deputies of Malta 
and Gozo’ in October 1801, English translation, with annotated alterations, Kew, 
CO158/2/272 ; also Hardman, 410-15.
27 The Friend, 1, 544 n. and Table Talk, 1, 475, April 1834.
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amongst the Maltese who had served in the Maltese battalions. The criteria 
governing each claim were published in an official Notice (Avviso) dated 
3 December 1803.28 These criteria caused significant popular confusion 
– perhaps even consternation and dissent – because Maltese civilians (as 
opposed to enlisted troops), who wrongly assumed that they would qualify, 
fell outside the scheme. To avoid widespread disappointment Macaulay 
had been forced to clarify the entitlements in a further Notice dated 11 
December, 1803,29 but the damage had already been done. Expectations had 
been raised, and now the British were seen as having once more frustrated 
them. As we shall see, Coleridge broadly adopted the criteria of 11 December 
1803, but with important refinements in relation to enlisted men that were 
intended to address some of the perceived injustices. Civilian franc tireurs 
were still excluded.
Controversy 
The difficult problem the British encountered was to establish eligibility 
criteria that would win public confidence without appearing to undermine 
the rules of war. It will be recalled that there had been a popular 
uprising against the French, which had, from the Maltese point of view, 
been supported by the wider community, many of whom had suffered 
considerably. Not least amongst these had been the citizens of Valletta who 
had been subjected to the severe privations of the blockade, which caused 
a large number of casualties. Freedom fighters, some of whom had been 
captured and shot by the French, had also shown bravery. Some civilians 
had taken part in the resistance by fulfilling ad hoc roles, for example in 
providing food, shelter or medical aid for soldiers; others may, for a short 
time, had been in battle and risked their lives. Yet others, including some 
priests, had performed important political or administrative roles. Some 
local leaders had served on Ball’s Council. Guerrilla forces had also 
participated in the uprising. These were, according to Macaulay’s Avviso, 
to be satisfied with the honour of having served their country, and could 
not expect a financial reward. 
This blanket denial of entitlement to these individuals seems to have 
been a major cause of resentment. Even those who had, in the words of 
the Avviso, “answered the call of the bells” and who went immediately to 
28 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 321.
29 LIBR/MS 431 1/3 Bandi 1800 AL 1803, 333.
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provide assistance to the military were excluded from the bounty. From the 
British point of view, the distinction between civilians and enlisted troops 
was probably necessary to avoid the legal and political complexities that 
might have arisen if the British had been seen to promote irregular forces.30 
But, given the dangers they had encountered, in some cases shoulder to 
shoulder with the enlisted soldiers, the misunderstood decision to refuse 
them a share seemed to the Maltese to be arbitrary and harsh.
1803 Criteria
The 1803 rules essentially prescribed two categories of qualifying enlisted 
personnel eligible to present a claim for a share in the Prize. The first category 
comprised those who had been in “full military service” at the time of the 
surrender of the City.31 The Notice of 11 December 1803 stated that this group 
included all battalion commanders, their officers, soldiers, quartermasters, 
doctors and surgeons, second mates and military chaplains. The claim by 
soldiers who had served prior to the fall of Valletta but who had left service 
before 5 September 1800 fell under a second, discretionary, category of 
entitlements, whilst those who joined at a late stage of the campaign would 
not have been eligible.
This discretionary category allowed a claim by soldiers who, for 
legitimate reasons, had not been in service at the date of the surrender, 
provided that they fulfilled two conditions. The first, and potentially the 
most restrictive, was that each claimant (or their relatives in the case of the 
deceased) would have to demonstrate that the soldier in respect of whom 
the claim was made had “distinguished themselves by their bravery in 
some venture” and that they had either been killed or wounded in combat 
or had suffered some “involuntary accident” that had prevented their 
continued military service. In the case of the deceased, their families could 
present a claim. Those who left service “voluntarily” were excluded.
30 Private citizens could only take enemy vessels as lawful prize on the high seas 
under the authority of “letters of marque”, or the express prior authority of the 
Crown. In the absence of this authority the seizure was liable to be condemned as 
piracy. Although this legal doctrine could not directly influence the British decision 
regarding the Valletta prize money, it reveals that the policy of international law 
supported the use of irregular forces only under the authority of the Crown and 
subject to the limitations on such action, namely that the legality of the seizure 
should be tested in a Court of Vice-Admiralty, such as the one the British estab-
lished in Valletta in 1803. 
31 5 September 1800.
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The authorities, clearly, had a certain discretion as to what degree of 
distinction and valour was required. It is not entirely clear whether merely 
taking part in the military venture – for example taking part in a battle – 
was, by itself, enough, or whether the claimant had to demonstrate that 
they had distinguished themselves by exceptional valour. This meant 
that the various Luogotenente (civil magistrates) could each make their 
own judgements on the facts of each case with all the attendant risks of 
arbitrariness or unfairness. This was likely to have been one of the main 
causes of friction between the disappointed claimants and the authorities.
The second category was obviously intended to make clear that deserters 
were not to be rewarded. 
Role of Luogotenente
The 1803 scheme also made it clear that the Public Secretary was unwilling 
to interest himself in the minutiae of claims. Macaulay emphasised that 
the Luogotenente had been especially authorised to resolve the claims, and 
that the claimants were not to apply to the Secretariat. The problem was 
that the trust placed in the Luogotenente ipso facto removed control over the 
outcomes of claims from the senior officials of the British administration. 
This may have been something that the authorities later regretted because 
the decisions of the Luogotenente did not placate certain disgruntled 
Maltese.
Although the 1803 Avviso does not make it explicit, the amount actually 
received by any entitled person would have been determined by their rank 
in military service. This was another area of policy that Coleridge’s Notice 
re-considered. 
Coleridge’s “Prize” Avvisi of 8 March 180532 and 19 
August 180533
In 1805, by which time Coleridge had replaced Macaulay as Public Secretary, 
the bounty was £22,703.0s.6d.34 Coleridge issued a Public Notice dated 8 
March 1805 to explain how the claims would be managed. This depended 
upon the category of claimant.
32 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi1805 AL 1814, 3.
33 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi1805 AL 1814, 20.
34 Caruana, Introduction. 
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For those who had been successful under the 1803 scheme, the claims 
would be paid on the spot by the local Luogotenente on 10 March 1805. 
This was because the claims had, in effect, already been verified in 1803. 
For undisclosed reasons, the timescale was very short because Coleridge 
gave just two day’s notice to the claimants. Why this was done is unclear, 
although it suggests that the Administration wanted to act as quickly 
as possible. Perhaps the urgent action was intended to offset, as quickly 
as possible, the political fallout from the excise duties, which had been 
passed into law that same day (8 March 1805). If so, this is suggestive of 
the nervousness in the Administration at this critical juncture.35 Sultana 
suggests that the simultaneous promulgation of these two measures was 
hardly coincidental;36 and we can, reasonably, infer that the timing of the 
announcement of the distribution of Prize was also influenced by pressing 
public relations concerns.
For other claimants – those “unjustly excluded” in 1803 – there was to 
be a two stage process. The claimants – in effect appellants – were to have 
their claims re-considered and, if successful, certified by the Luogotenente 
within one month of 10 March (i.e. until 9 April 1805). After that date, no 
further avenue of redress was available.37 Once a claim had been certified, 
it would mean prima facie eligibility for payment. Coleridge issued a further 
notice, dated 19 August 1805, to inform the successful appellants, whose 
claims had now been authorised, how to receive payment. As the claimants 
were to discover, payment was not to be automatic; in other words, the 
officials of the Secretariat would not honour all certified claims. This would 
prove to be a further cause of grievances. 
Eligibility in 1805 
Coleridge re-shaped the eligibility criteria, for the 1805 award, by removing 
the requirement that the enlisted man must either have been in service 
at the date of the surrender or have been killed or wounded during a 
distinguished military service. In his distribution, no distinction was to 
be drawn between those who had served for a short period of time, but 
who had left their battalion prior to the surrender, and those who were 
35 See the discussion of the excise duties in Chapters 2 and 5, particularly, the 
taxation theme, in Chapter 5 below.
36 Sultana, 300.
37 Although, as mentioned below, the Maltese Constitution gave the Maltese a 
right to petition the Civil Commissioner sitting in Segnatura about any grievance. 
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still enlisted on 5 September 1800. This important revision enlarged the 
categories of enlisted man entitled to make a claim. It removed the injustice 
of excluding (i) those who had genuine reasons other than being wounded 
to leave military service before the campaign had concluded, and (ii) those 
who had suffered disabling wounds who had not shown particularly 
distinguished bravery during their service. Its real significance was, of 
course, that it removed much of the discretion from the Luogotenente. A 
soldier wounded in action would, ipso facto, have a good claim to the 1805 
instalment without the Luogotenente having to determine what constituted 
distinguished bravery. Moreover, the Luogotenente could consider claims 
by others who had neither been in service at the capitulation nor wounded 
“out”.38 
However, Coleridge also added, somewhat confusingly, that claims 
could only be paid to those who had been judged worthy of a payment in 
the 1803 award. This is confusing, since the rules had obviously changed. It 
is either an example of a lack of clarity in drafting or a deliberate attempt 
to mask a further embarrassing volte face in respect of the prize money 
undertaken in response to public pressure. The essential point, for those 
interested in Coleridge’s work, is that the drafting of the Avviso was not a 
model of clarity and reveals either a lack of skill or care. 
However, Coleridge’s intention was not to give the new rules 
retrospective effect. In other words, whilst every killed or wounded soldier 
not in service on 5 September 1800 (or those who left the campaign for 
other good reasons) could claim a share of the second instalment, only 
those with a distinguished service record could appeal successfully against 
the refusal to pay them in 1803. In practice, this meant that some wounded 
soldiers not in service at the capitulation might qualify for a share of the 
second instalment but not the first. From the Maltese point of view this 
must have seemed incoherent. Either their service merited a reward or it 
did not. An entitlement to one instalment but not another was, from their 
standpoint, simply bizarre.
From the British perspective, there were, probably, reasons to view the 
matter differently. Coleridge was, probably, unable to undo the damage 
of the 1803 rules by granting a share of the first instalment to those who 
had genuine reasons for leaving service before the fall of Valletta. First, the 
prize money available to meet the 1803 claims had been distributed and, as 
38 They had to establish that they had left due to some “involuntary accident”, 
which potentially included other reasons than disabling wounds. 
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we have seen, the finances of the Island in the spring of 1805 were too frail 
to draw upon money from general public funds. This was the reason for 
the wine duty enacted that very day. Moreover, there may also have been a 
reluctance, on Ball’s part, to admit that he and Macaulay had made an error 
of judgement; but this is merely speculation.
Maltese Officials
As in 1803, claimants and appellants alike were required to present 
themselves to their local Luogotenente with documentary evidence to 
support either their claims or appeals respectively. These arrangements 
are worthy of comment because they reveal that, like Ball, Coleridge was 
generally willing to trust Maltese public officials.39 They also align with 
comments Coleridge later ventured in The Friend.40 At this time (March 
1805) he clearly had faith that the Luogotenente would make an appropriate 
assessment of the appeals and would not indulge in arbitrariness or 
unfairness. This might have been unduly optimistic because, as we 
shall see, there is some suggestion that the Luogotenente did not assess 
the appellant’s service records as carefully as they should have done. 
Interestingly, this experience of their collusive or fraudulent conduct did 
not persuade Coleridge to qualify his remarks upon the wisdom of Ball’s 
policy of relying upon Maltese appointments, which he supported in order 
to extend British influence.
Amount of Bounty
The 1805 scheme made the further reform that there would only be two 
levels of award. The distinction between the higher and lower sums 
awarded was made according to the military rank of the recipient. The 
first category included officers and non-commissioned officers of the rank 
of sergeant or above, and, the second, soldiers below those ranks – that 
is corporals and enlisted soldiers. The Avviso does not disclose the actual 
39 Although there were exceptions. The Civil Commissioner retained the power 
to licence premises retailing spirits: see the Bando of 22 March 1805, NLM LIBR/
MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4, and the consumer protection theme, below. The 
explanation for this instance may be that Ball was under pressure from the military 
authorities to prevent ill-discipline amongst the British troops awaiting embarka-
tion.
40 The Friend, 2, 569.
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sums paid to each grade.
Reasons and Transparency
Coleridge’s Avviso of 8 March 1805 infers that the authorities were required 
to give reasons to disappointed claimants who asked for them. The evidence 
of this can be located in the final paragraph of the Avviso which states that 
after 9 April 1805 no request for any reason would be provided. 
This is interesting because it means that the Luogotenente were not 
only required to have relevant, lawful, reasons for reaching their decisions, 
but that these had to be communicated to a disappointed claimant who 
requested an explanation. This was most likely to arise in the case of the 
appellants because the Luogotenente had the power to grant or withhold 
the certificates according to the evidence of service records presented to 
them. 
By imposing this duty of transparency, Coleridge recognised a value in 
open government and administrative candour. Generally, administrators 
understand that if reasons are given it is more likely that these would not 
only have been properly thought out but that they would withstand public 
scrutiny. The Luogotenente would have to make sure that each case was 
properly assessed, and this would give assurance to the claimants that their 
claim had been properly considered and that the appropriate rules had 
been duly applied. This would help in avoiding any possible perception 
of unfairness or arbitrariness. In other words, Coleridge seems to have 
understood that the giving of reasons made decisions more acceptable by 
emphasising their rationality. He clearly hoped that a properly reasoned 
refusal would extinguish some of the anger that surrounded the 1803 
bounty. 
The resulting exposure of any faults in the decision-making process 
could also underpin a right of appeal, although in the case of the 1803 
appellants and the 1805 claimants this would be only to the Segnatura. 
Appeals and the Controversial Administration of 
Claims
As mentioned above, the second of Coleridge’s “prize” Avvisi, dated 19 
August 1805, invited the successful appellants (who were, by then, in 
possession of “certified” claims) to attend the Secretariat, between 22 and 
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29 August 1805, to collect their share of the 1803 distribution, after which 
no further claim would be met. The critical burden was that the claimants 
had to present their certificates when making a claim. This was an obvious 
safeguard, but the reliance upon the certificate, to identify the genuine 
claims, seems to have failed. 
This is so because certain appellants whose appeals had been upheld 
and certified by the Luogotenente, in March 1805, were later turned away 
by officials at the Public Secretary’s office, perhaps even by Coleridge 
himself (although Ball was blamed). Clearly, the British were not convinced 
that the certification process had worked as it should have done. The 
refusal of certified claims caused significant anger, and was used as further 
ammunition to undermine Ball. The refusals provoked a flurry of angry 
petitions that were heard by the Segnatgura on 29 August 1805. These were 
mostly claims brought by civilians who had taken part in the uprising in 
the Maltese countryside. All twenty-one petitions were rejected, although 
another petition that was heard a few days later was successful.41
The politically-sensitive allegations, that Ball (or Coleridge) was 
denying claims certified to be meritorious, emerged in an anonymous 
letter of complaint about Ball’s administration that was sent to Eton, Ball’s 
main political rival, who forwarded it to the Secretary of State in 1806. It 
contains a significant passage relating to the Prize distributions: “They (the 
Maltese) complain of his (i.e. Ball) having under false pretences taken from 
the meritorious certificates of their services during the siege”.42
The reference by the complainant to “false pretences” is particularly 
suggestive of a decision that resulted from an abuse of power. This was 
a damaging allegation. It was a matter that the Secretary of State took up 
with Ball who, eventually, denied that he had acted improperly; but there 
seems little doubt that some Maltese were frustrated, as the petitions to the 
Segnatura revealed.43 
The reasons why the Administration did not honour some of the 
certificates is unclear. One possibility is that either the Public Secretary or 
his staff suspected collusion between the Luogotenente and the claimant. 
If so, this does resonate with other administrative contexts (such as the 
military bounty) where some Maltese cynically attempted to make the most 
41 See NAM LIBR 43/11, Registro de memoriali decretati  da sua Excellenza il Sig. 
Cavalier Alessandro Ball Regio Commissionario Civile di Sua Maestà Britannica, vol. N.
42 Anonymous letter passed by Eton to Windham enclosed in a letter dated 11 
October 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/ no folio reference. 
43 Ball’s rebuttal survives: Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807 Kew, CO 158/13/64.
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of every opportunity to obtain money from the British. Similar suspicions 
later surrounded the Università. Whatever the reason, the adverse decisions 
in relation to the controversial certificates caused political damage. 
Appeals and the 1805 Instalment
Coleridge’s Notice did not allow for an appeal by any person who was 
unjustly refused their share of the second, 1805, bounty. Appellate rights 
were only given to those unjustly excluded from the 1803 award. The failure 
to provide a similar right in 1805 is puzzling. Coleridge must have been 
confident that the decisions of the Luogotenente could not be controversial; 
after all, they were, in most cases, simply paying money to individuals 
whose claims to the first instalment had been officially recognised in 1803 
and this recognition triggered the entitlement to the 1805 award. However, 
Coleridge clearly overlooked the possibility that problems might arise 
when the certificates were presented to the Secretariat for payment. He may, 
also, have overlooked the likelihood that the 1805 award would re-ignite 
resentment of those denied in 1803. These numerous individuals could be 
predicted to re-state their grievances; and this is what, indeed, occurred.
However, in Coleridge’s defence it can be argued that an explicit right 
of appeal was not strictly necessary. Coleridge knew very well that any 
aggrieved individual would petition the Civil Commissioner via the 
Segnatura and this was the avenue that the disgruntled Maltese vigorously 
pursued. 
Further Grievances
As matters turned out, a torrent of petitions from dissatisfied claimants went 
up to the Segnatura for further adjudication. Dozens of these cases fell to be 
decided after 22 March 1805; and some were still being presented as late 
as mid May 1805. Most were summarily rejected.44 The significant number 
of unsuccessful petitions signalled that, in a number of ways, Coleridge’s 
revised scheme had not succeeded. Very large numbers of Maltese remained 
dissatisfied; and his desire to get the matter resolved quickly (evident in the 
rule providing for only two days to present a claim) had also backfired. The 
44 Some were referred to other officials better placed to determine their merits: 
see e.g., Michele and Francesco Pivano’s cases which were referred to the Governor 
of Gozo on 22 March 1805, and Rosa Abela case, she was referred to her Luogote-
nente on 2 April 1805: see NAM LIBR 43/11 above n. 41.
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final cases were being adjudicated almost at the moment when the anti-
Semitic disturbances erupted, which suggests that the administration had 
not fully resolved the grievances of the disappointed claimants before the 
next problem followed upon its heels. 
But, even those cases were not the end of the matter because, as we have 
seen, further petitions were stimulated by the denial of certified claims in 
late August 1805, which meant that the grievances over the prize money 
simmered for almost six months from the date of Coleridge’s Avviso of 8 
March 1805. 
Conclusion
The question of rewarding the Maltese with a share of the bounty had been 
incompetently handled from the moment Pigot reneged on a promise to 
make a payment. Once that decision had been overruled, the 1803 scheme 
had failed to win the support of the Maltese. Coleridge, later, found himself 
charged with addressing problems that were not of his own making and, of 
course, turning the tide of hostile public opinion. 
Coleridge perhaps achieved as much as he could within the political 
constraints within which he found himself. His insistences that the decisions 
of the Luogotenente should be fully reasoned and that the reasons should 
be communicated to those who asked for them reveal Coleridge’s concern 
for transparency and open government. It introduced into practical politics 
some of the qualities of Ball’s administration, and, not least, the emphasis 
upon rational, evidence-led decision-making that Coleridge most 
admired.45
Coleridge’s reforms were not well drafted, because the criteria were not 
always as clearly expressed as he might have intended. Moreover, they 
were not sufficiently bold to cure the political damage. Perhaps Coleridge 
should not be blamed for this outcome because Ball, rather than Coleridge, 
would have been the final decision-maker, albeit that Coleridge would 
have been consulted. 
The very large numbers of disgruntled Maltese who took their cases to the 
Segnatura meant that the administration had not won the argument. Since 
almost all petitions were, unsurprisingly, rejected by Ball it is evident that 
a significant number of those who took part in the uprising resented their 
treatment. The rejection of claims, which they saw as justified, meant that a 
45 The Friend, 2, 552.
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large number of Maltese continued to feel anger against and betrayal by the 
British. In summary, the initiative, intended in part, to deflect criticism of 
the excise duties, was exploited by Maltese nationalists to inflame dissent 
and widen support for the broader agenda of having Ball removed from 
office. The episode was critical in undermining confidence in the British 
administration at a challenging time. The importance of this should not 
be overlooked because it is part of the difficult political environment that 
Coleridge had to address in his careful efforts to win back public support. 
5.3. Taxation46
Introduction
As we have described, the timing of the distribution of prize money was 
intended to deflect criticism from the Administration at a time when it 
had decided to increase taxation. There were many political and some 
legal reasons why the British administration, reluctantly, imposed excise 
duties when other preferences, such as cost-cutting, had been exhausted. 
The political reasons for Ball’s hesitation were rooted in internal dangers to 
Malta, as a new British possession, if the Government became unpopular; 
and legal objections arose because of the, perceived, constraints of the 
Maltese Constitution. These restraints – albeit weak ones – were buttressed 
by a significant, but ill-defined, formal promise that had been made to 
Maltese people in 1801 by the first British Civil Commissioner.47 Two of 
Coleridge’s Bandi are either concerned with or shaped by the politics of 
taxation. 
As we have earlier described, Coleridge’s first Bando of 29 January 
180548 was imposed to reduce the need for costly repairs to the highway. By 
preventing the damage caused by the studded wheels, and by requiring 
46 In what follows we are principally concerned with the imposition of excise du-
ties. In so far as a “tax” is imposed on a transaction, and a “duty” on goods, a “tax” 
can be distinguished from a “duty”. However, that distinction was not applicable 
in Malta under the Constitution in force in 1798 and therefore in what follows there 
is no legal significance between a tax and a duty and so the terms can be used inter-
changeably. 
47 See e.g. the Proclamation of 15 July 1801, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 
AL 1805, 204.
48 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805.
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new wheels to be made according to an approved pattern, less damage 
would be done and (at least in the long term) the expenditure on highways 
could be reduced. This Bando was, thus, concerned with reducing the 
demand for publicly-funded expenditure. The Bando of 8 March 180549 
was concerned with raising funds from direct taxation. 
Ball’s Political Agenda
By the spring of 1805 Ball had recognised that increased taxation was 
necessary if the Island’s financial deficit was to be eliminated. He had 
already, formally, assured ministers that achieving a balanced budget was 
possible; and his financial strategy gave him confidence that this would 
shortly be achieved.50 He had observed a significant improvement in 
economic conditions, evidenced by rising wages and increased private 
wealth, which meant that some increased taxation would not, unduly, 
suppress demand.51 
Ball’s despatches to London reveal that the proposed duties underpinned 
his ambition that the Island should be retained as a British possession. When 
added to the revenue that Ball expected to generate, by speculating upon 
grain, he forecast that the duties would remedy the Island’s financial deficit 
and, thus, make Malta a more attractive proposition to British ministers.52 
We have described elsewhere53 the economic strait–jacket into which 
Ball’s enthusiasm for Malta placed him. If British ministers were to be 
persuaded to retain it as a possession of the Crown, the Island could not be 
49 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
50 Ball’s Memorandum to Dundas of 26 December 1800, Kew, CO 158/1/12-25, 
assured ministers that Malta, if retained as British possession, would not be a bur-
den on the Imperial power. This hardened into a political expectation as Hobart’s 
Instructions to Cameron dated 14 May 1801 make clear: see Hardman, 350, 355: 
“Under the head of expenditure I have only to state His Majesty’s expectation that 
the revenue will be found fully adequate to defray all charges of the Civil Govern-
ment (as well as other listed expenses)”. In 1805 Ball continued to assure ministers 
that a balanced budget would be achieved: see e.g. Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, 
Kew, CO 158/10/125.
51 Ibid, 131: the “general distress” caused by the economic collapse of 1800 “has 
already ceased”. The rising demand for labour and an increase in wages, in his 
judgement, permitted an increase in taxation.
52 He estimated that the duty on wine and spirits would raise a surplus (after the 
sums for the relief of bank depositors and the increased salaries of public servants) 
of £6,000 per annum: Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, above n. 50.
53 See Chapter 2.
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a burden on the British taxpayer – as ministers repeatedly made clear.54 On 
the other hand, the British, in their continuation strategy, which necessarily 
meant generous public expenditure, had encouraged Maltese expectations 
of benign welfarism. These highly-expensive policies were problematic 
because the confiscation of the assets of the Order of St John, in 1792, and 
the resulting collapse of the Island’s revenues, meant that the Island’s public 
expenditure could not be sustained without additional sources of revenue. 
In addition, the damaged infrastructure, the enormous costs of repairs (for 
example to the roads and public buildings), the cost of unemployment and 
a collapsed economy, all placed burdens upon the State in the years after 
1800. 
Thus, in the Proclamation of 8 March 1805 Coleridge re-introduced 
an excise duty on the importation of wines and imposed a further new 
excise duty on spirits.55 When taken with the projected profits accruing 
to government from the grain monopoly, these duties were expected to 
generate sufficient funds to produce a balanced budget. 
The Political and Constitutional Problems of Taxation
Although wine dealers had been liable to pay excise duty on wine imports 
under the ancien regime,56 Ball was known to be extremely nervous about 
the imposition of new duties, (in this case on spirits) not least because 
their likely unpopularity would lead to a collapse in confidence in British 
rule. This political priority collided, however, with the British Imperial 
imperative that the Island should not impose continuing burdens upon the 
British taxpayer.
Regular taxation was almost unknown to the Maltese (who had been 
accustomed to ad hoc taxes designed to raise funds for particular, identified, 
purposes, including the repair of the road network).57 Every Grandmaster 
had taken office subject to an oath not to impose new taxes, which was 
perceived by the British civil government as having created a constitutional 
54 See Cameron’s Instructions of 14 May 1801, Hardman, 350, and, more generally, 
Chapter 2, above.
55 This was actually a re-introduction of the wine tax because the Jurats of the 
Università had failed to collect it from about 1802-1803 following some confusion 
about the status of Malta as free port. See Macaulay to Camden, 25 January 1804, 
Kew, CO 158/8/111.
56 See De Bono.
57 The tax would no longer be levied once its purpose had been achieved: see 
Report of Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, CO 158/19.
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right, in the Maltese, not to be regularly taxed.58 To their eventual 
consternation, the British had, unwittingly, reinforced this inconvenient 
constitutional entitlement by their own actions. This had occurred in 
the famous Proclamation of 15 July 1801,59 in which the new British civil 
administration had promised to respect the rights, property and freedom of 
the Maltese. When taken with the other aspects of the Maltese system, this 
was thought to require that the British uphold a constitutional restriction 
upon the powers of the government to impose new, permanent, taxes.60 
However, as we have described, it is unlikely that these constitutional 
restraints could have been judicially enforced,61 although this weakness 
seems not to have been discussed within the British administration.
As said, in so far as the Proclamation imposed a duty on imported 
wine, Coleridge and Ball could present an argument for the constitutional 
legitimacy of their action, because there had been a precedent for placing a 
duty on wine in the time of the Order of St John. Less certain, was the duty 
to be imposed on spirits. 
As his despatches to London reveal, Ball was aware of this problem 
and would, naturally, have been nervous about it.62 Despite this, he had 
no alternative to increasing taxation. Even if Chapman’s corn mission were 
fully successful, only two thirds of the income required would be raised.63 
Of course, the mission eventually failed, but, in March 1805, Ball was still 
able to assume that it would generate the projected surplus to supplement 
the general revenues of government. 
Early 1805 was, thus, a critical period in the life of Ball’s administration. 
Ball had to increase taxation, but he knew that the risks of appearing to 
renege on a promise to the Maltese would exacerbate a situation that was 
becoming inflammable.64 This explains why Coleridge was forced to make 
58 See Ball to Camden, above n. 50.
59 NLM LIBR/MS 430 ½.
60 See the Report of the Royal Commission, 1812, Kew, CO 158/19.
61 See Chapter 3.
62 See e.g. Ball to Cooke, 3 February 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/128.
63 As described in Chapter 2, Thornton reported that the mission resulted in the 
greatest loss that the Università had sustained. Thornton, Kew, CO 163/33. Ball’s 
forecast of an estimated profit of £20,000 on the 40,000 salms of wheat to be pur-
chased in the Black Sea area can be found in Ball to Cooke, 16 September 1804, Kew, 
CO 158/9.
64 It should not be forgotten that within a few weeks, significant numbers of Mal-
tese rose up against the Jews. Their wrath was also directed against the British and 
their immigration policies because the demonstration of two thousand angry Mal-
tese processed to the seat of government in Valletta.
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the political case for the need to raise revenue by enumerating various 
classes of deserving beneficiaries who would receive government aid by 
virtue of the new duties. Their needs were, thus, held up by the British to 
make the case for the new duties. But the British agenda was much wider 
than their needs, and if this were known, the Maltese were less likely to 
accept the new duty. 
Persuading the Maltese
It is important to emphasise just how important Coleridge’s propaganda 
was in persuading the Maltese to accept the excise duties. Coleridge drafted 
the Proclamation with considerable astuteness, clearly responsive to the 
sensitive context of the measure. He and Ball had, clearly, determined 
that the popularity of the identified beneficiaries, which Coleridge would 
emphasise, and the unpopularity of alternative policies, would, together, 
make a persuasive political case for the new tax. 
As in Coleridge’s first Bando, the unusual efforts undertaken to give 
reasons for the decision are interesting. In essence, Coleridge’s technique 
was to over-play one of Ball’s subordinate motives for introducing the 
duties, and, for political reasons, entirely suppress the dominant motive. 
He was to suggest to the Maltese that additional revenue was necessary 
to provide for certain identified deserving causes (and no others). In other 
words, he was suggesting that Ball sought to achieve increases in public 
spending. In contrast, the Civil Commissioner’s true priority was to impose 
the new taxes to help him meet existing expenditure.65 This was so because 
the duties were planned to raise about £10,000 per annum66 – more than 
would be required to fund the explicitly stated aims of assisting the poor 
families, raising public sector salaries and so on. The difference, between 
what was represented to the Maltese and what was intended by government, 
is significant; and the priority given to the latter partly explains why there 
were no binding commitments to fund the deserving causes. The claims of 
65 Albeit that he would also endeavour to make provision for the deserving caus-
es. Nevertheless, these represent almost a footnote in his strategy: Ball to Cooke, 
above n. 62. 
66 This sum can be deduced from Ball’s prediction that, when combined with the 
£20,000 from the corn speculation, the total revenue raised would be £30,000: see 
Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, Kew, above n. 50, 134. Ball failed to offer a firm com-
mitment to raise this sum (i.e. £10,000) from the new duties presumably because, as 
the Proclamation of 8 March 1805, conceded, he was unsure how great the resulting 
revenue would be.
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the British Treasury would come first.
This deliberate and careful obfuscation reveals something about 
Coleridge’s controversial approach to the business of practical politics. He 
can be seen to have collaborated with Ball in ensuring that public goods 
could be delivered outside of the constitutional framework. Even if the 
Maltese constitutional norms were judicially unenforceable vis a vis the 
Civil Commissioner, they nonetheless existed and they prescribed the 
constitutionally-permitted boundaries of governmental action. In other 
words, Coleridge seems to have been compelled by Ball to accept that 
adherence to the Rule of Law was not always in the public interest and that 
government could sometimes only succeed if it was prepared to do what 
was expedient, even if it were unconstitutional. 
Such conduct also reveals the extent to which Ball’s government felt 
justified in pursuing a controversial conception of the public interest 
notwithstanding legal and constitutional impediments. Had Ball respected 
the legal (albeit unenforceable) limitations upon his administration’s 
powers, he would have been compelled to inform London that the Island’s 
deficit could only be resolved with the continuing support of the British 
taxpayer. This would have been a disaster for his reputation, not least 
because London’s (mis)understanding of the financial state of the Island 
had originated in Ball’s own Memorandum of 26 December 1800.67
Moreover, the Proclamation of 8 March 1805 revealed how far he and 
Coleridge were prepared to go to fulfil Ball’s obligations to Camden, the 
Secretary of State. This was one of the morally-complex challenges that 
practical politics presented to Coleridge. As we shall see in Chapter 6, the 
outcome in this instrument marks a very different approach from that he 
advocated, so powerfully, in his political journalism in England. It raised 
questions about the moral legitimacy of governmental action, which, for 
Coleridge, now became a troublesome dilemma revealed to us in his 
private Notebooks.68 
Further Propaganda 
The preamble to the wine Proclamation impressed upon the Maltese the 
Civil Commissioner’s concern for the well-being of the inhabitants; and it 
served to remind them of the costly policies Ball has pursued to secure their 
67 Ball to Dundas, Kew, CO 158/1/12-25; See further, Chapter 2.
68 See e.g. CN 2, 2412 and CN 2, 2413.
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welfare. Coleridge recalled the reform of the courts, the continuing public 
works projects, the revival of the institutions such as the Monte di Pietà, the 
hospitals, almshouses, the orphanage and the monthly payments under 
the welfare scheme for the relief of poverty. 
Coleridge emphasised that the raising of revenue was not a matter 
of choice but of necessity. Ball, he explained, had been confronted by 
alternative means of achieving this: either to raise the cost of grain supplied 
by the Università, or to impose this excise duty. Some officials, including 
Eton, had favoured raising the price of grain in order to replace the lost 
capital.69 No doubt, Ball wanted to court popularity by signalling to the 
inhabitants that he had not chosen to tax a staple foodstuff. The moral 
justification for placing duties on alcohol consumption was more easily 
understood because Ball could be seen to be discouraging a vice, as well 
as burdening the drinking habits of foreigners in preference to those of the 
Maltese.70 
Coleridge stated that, subject to sufficient revenue becoming available, 
the intended spending priorities were: the alleviation of the financial 
hardship of certain private individuals whose income had been reduced, 
following the appropriation by the French of the capital they had deposited 
in the Bank of the Università; the increase in salary of deserving civil 
servants; and financial aid to the charitable institutions (which included 
the hospitals, the orphanage, and the Office of the Grand Almoner) giving 
priority to those institutions that were constructing publicly useful buildings. 
Coleridge also emphasised that the economic incentive, established by the 
duties, was an incentive to alter behaviour, most notably the reduction of 
excessive alcohol consumption.71 As we shall see, alcohol-fuelled violence, 
especially in the taverns, was causing disquiet on Malta, and had attracted 
other interventions from the British authorities.72 Controlling abuse of 
spirits was also high on Ball’s agenda.
For good measure, this list was reinforced by exploiting the simmering 
69 Eton to Sullivan, Kew, CO 158/2/308.
70 Each of these policy goals was favoured by the Royal Commission: Kew, CO 
158/19. 
71 Because of the political and legal sensitivity of this measure, Ball had con-
sulted widely prior to its introduction, including the Commander in Chief of British 
forces (Major-General Villettes), “the field officers” and the Chief Physician of the 
Medical Staff. We might expect their viewpoints to emphasise the importance of 
reducing alcohol consumption. See Ball to Camden above n. 50, 133-4. 
72 E.g. a Bando of 18 October 1802, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 
273 to restrain the abuse of pointed or sharp weapons often used in violent assaults. 
See generally, the consumer protection theme, below.
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dislike of foreigners on the Island73 who, as Coleridge seemed eager to point 
out, would be the most likely to bear, indirectly through consequential 
retail price increases, the burden of the new duties. It is typical of Coleridge 
that he appealed to reason in this way; but the explicit exploitation of the 
Maltese attitude to foreigners is a concern. Its explicit “targeting” of the 
duties, borne most heavily by foreigners, might have unwittingly suggested 
an official policy that foreigners were somehow less deserving than the 
Maltese. If so, Coleridge’s language in this Bando may, unintentionally, 
have provided an unfortunate context given the anti-Semitic unrest that 
broke out in May 1805.74 
Protecting Poor Families and Raising Salaries
Pre-eminent amongst the deserving causes that Coleridge identified, and 
given the most emphasis in the Proclamation, was the protection of certain 
poor families.
The issue, in this instance, was that the assets of the Università, including 
the capital sums placed on deposit by the inhabitants, had been looted and 
carried off by the French during their occupation. This had given rise to a 
major grievance amongst the Maltese because of an unfortunate gesture by 
the British military. 
The problem originated in the exclusion of Maltese officers from the 
negotiations for the French surrender almost five years earlier.75 The 
Maltese had understood that the French had offered hostages as a security 
to ensure that the sums taken from the Università, and elsewhere, would 
be reimbursed. The British military, who were, perhaps, concerned with 
upholding military customs, failed to make any provision for this in the 
73 It is unlikely that Coleridge would have regarded the few English persons on 
the Island as “foreigners”, although it is possible that, from the Maltese perspec-
tive, the English might have been growing as unpopular as some other nationalities. 
There is some evidence for this in a letter in which it was stated: “…the Maltese be-
gin to hate the English…” from Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/no folio 
reference. Maltese and English alike were, for some purposes, officially regarded 
as British subjects after September 1800: see the Treaty with the Dey of Algiers, 19 
March 1801. 
74 See further Public Order and Crime, below. 
75 The arrangements for the capitulation gave rise to a long term grievance 
amongst the Maltese: see the Petition of the Maltese to His Majesty King George 
III, 10 July 1811: Hardman, 509-511, and a more detailed account is offered by the 
Marchese di Testaferrata to Earl Bathurst (undated), January 1812, Hardman, 512, 
esp. 513 and also the Report of the Royal Commission, Kew, CO 158/19.
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surrender articles. The French officers were allowed to leave Malta with 
their “private property” (some of it looted from the Maltese) which was, 
conveniently, carried to French ports on British transports.76 This regrettable 
miscalculation resulted in financial misery for a number of Maltese 
who lived off the interest paid on the capital that they had deposited in 
the Università. For those dependent upon these interest payments, the 
economic bedrock of their lives had been destroyed. The Maltese naturally 
blamed the British administration for the negligence of their military. 
We can also note, en passant, that a further consequence of this theft had 
been that the Maltese, after 1800, were no longer prepared to invest their 
remaining savings in the Bank of the Università. Ball had been compelled 
to obtain funds from the British Treasury to underwrite it. Whilst this was a 
necessary step, it was not sufficient to restore the status quo, ante the French 
invasion. The Bank had to be able to draw upon the private capital of the 
Island, which meant that risk-averse potential depositors had to be assured 
that their funds would be safe. 
The British had underwritten the Bank by investing about £100,000 to 
restore its credit,77 and by 1804 it was considered possible to invite the 
deposit of new private capital. On 7 March 1804 Ball issued a Public Notice 
authorising the Bank to receive deposits and authorising the payment of 
interest of 3% thereon.78 This initiative succeeded in attracting deposits 
in excess of 925,000 scudi 79 repayable on demand. Interest was paid on 
these deposits until 20 March 1805 at which time the interest on them was 
declared to have ceased.
76 Although by Article 5 of the Articles of Capitulation the French Generals had 
given an undertaking that the property in question (which was not to be searched) 
did not contain any “public or private property”: Hardman, 320. A similar arrange-
ment was later to be agreed in the notorious Convention of Cintra, 1808. Under 
its terms, the French carried looted property away from Portugal on British ships 
after their defeat at the Battle of Vimeiro. The controversial Convention drew much 
criticism in Britain, not least from William Wordsworth who famously produced 
a critical pamphlet on the subject (Wordsworth W, Concerning the Convention of 
Cintra, London: Longman, Hurst, Rees and Orme, 1809). Unlike the French in Val-
letta, who were surrendering a fortress, the defeated French army under General 
Juno enjoyed a weaker bargaining position. The conduct of the British responsible 
for the Convention (including Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington) was 
investigated at an official inquiry, but all concerned were formally exonerated.
77 See Eton to Sullivan, Kew, CO 158/2/308.
78 Thornton, above n. 63, and Chapter 2, Kew, CO 163/33/25-6. Appendix 9 of 
Thornton’s Report contains a translation into English of the text of the Avviso that 
was signed by Alexander Macaulay.
79 Ibid.
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This was, of course, aimed at attracting new investment. It did nothing 
to address the plight of those whose capital had been taken by the French. 
Ball had received petitions requesting him to take steps to deal equitably 
with the affected individuals and, eventually, had little choice but to 
alleviate their distress. However, as we have seen, there may be more than 
a hint of opportunism in Coleridge’s Proclamation. Both Ball and Coleridge 
were prepared to deploy the justice of the claims of the poor (and those of 
other good causes) to persuade the Maltese to accept the excise duties – and, 
thus, the increased retail price rises – that would raise significantly more 
revenue than the meeting of these claims would require. 
The poor families were not, of course, the only intended beneficiaries. 
Ball took the opportunity to use some of the revenue raised for other 
(presumably popular) public purposes. As we have seen, public sector 
salaries were so low that some, albeit not many, employees boosted their 
income by diverting public funds, or as Maitland, the first British Governor 
called it, by drawing “unfair perquisites”.80 Ball had identified low salaries 
as a problem and now wished to provide targeted salary increases to 
“deserving” public employees. As we have seen, this included, in 1805, 
salary incentives for the President of the hospitals.81 
Increasing public sector pay was a necessary reform, but it seems that 
the strategy was not vigorously pursued at an operational level because the 
problem of low pay, particularly amongst the more numerous junior staff 
(and the illegitimate “perquisites”) was left to Maitland to address in 1814. 
Money continued to be diverted, and false entries made in the accounts. 
Inadequate remuneration may have been one reason for this corruption. 
Certainly, it remained an issue during Ball’s administration: and the failure 
to use the money raised by the wine duty to solve this problem reveals 
the extent to which Ball had his eye on the priority of placating British 
ministers by reducing the Island’s deficit.
The Operation of the Duties
The duties on wine and spirits were a tax on importation, rather than 
80 Maitland to Bathurst, 24 October 1814, Kew, CO 158/25/209, et seq., in which 
he reports that the salaries of junior staff had been much too low. He added that this 
problem had been so grave that it had been impossible for them to exist without 
fees or “unfair perquisites”. He accordingly raised their remuneration.
81 Significantly, this only amounted to £71 19s 6d per annum: see Macaulay to 
Ball, 10 September 1804, Kew, CO 158/9/51.
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consumption. This meant that the home-produced wine and spirits would 
not be subject to duty, which signalled that it could achieve a competitive 
advantage over imported products. This economic policy may have been 
intended to extend the benefits of a reviving economy from Valletta to the 
rural areas – wine production having increased during and since the days 
of the Order. 
In relation to the duty on spirits, the Proclamation imposed a duty levied 
according to volume, which was, thus, a tax on consumption. As we shall 
see, this was consonant with Ball’s policy of regulating the consumption of 
spirits, not least to prevent drunken violence by British soldiers. 
The Proclamation imposed a duty of six tari per barrel on all wine, 
regardless of its nature or quality, and thirty tari per barrel on spirits, the 
duty to be collected by the Università. Since there were no exemptions 
from the duty, it was a relatively simple tax to administer. The penalty for 
evasion was the confiscation of the entire quantity of wine or spirits on 
which the duty had not been paid. 
The Proclamation was careful to avoid commitments as to the detailed 
manner in which funds would be allocated. Ostensibly, this was so because 
the Administration was not in a position to forecast how much additional 
expenditure could be afforded until it was clear what revenue would 
be raised. At one level, this is unsurprising. It would have been highly 
unusual for any Administration to commit itself, in advance, to how money 
raised from taxation would be spent. But, as we have seen, Ball would 
have wanted to give himself a means of avoiding apparent commitments 
to future, additional, spending in order to disguise the problem that the 
revenue was needed to meet existing spending requirements. To have made 
binding commitments of significant, additional, expenditure would have 
frustrated this ultimate and overarching goal. If the Island was to remain a 
British possession, giving it a dominant military and commercial position 
in the central and eastern Mediterranean, the current account deficit had to 
be eliminated. 
Outcomes
Although ultimately effective in raising revenue, the wine duty Proclamation 
proved to be controversial and problematic. The principal concern was that 
the instrument created wider expectations than those that the British were 
prepared to honour. This problem began an unresolved controversy that 
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was to last into the twentieth century. The refusal to meet these expectations 
is further suggestive of the extent to which Ball’s true agenda prioritised 
British rather than Maltese concerns.
It will be recalled that the private investors in the Università were not 
the only ones to lose significant sums as a result of the French predations. 
The religious institutions, such as the convents, had also lost their deposits 
and other property. They had formerly received interest at a rate of 3% on 
their deposits, but this had ceased.82 Coleridge provided as follows:
His Excellency therefore wishes to advise, that it is his intention is to pay 
all individual owners of capital tied up in the bank of the above mentioned 
university, interest on their money at the rate of thirty tarì for every hundred. 
(Emphasis added).
In contrast, the religious foundations were only given a vague promise 
that help would be forthcoming – when it could be afforded. Coleridge 
made this clear as follows:
As soon as he is able, His Excellency shall not neglect to give the necessary 
help to places of worship, and to religious foundations.
This careful language, as well as subsequent events, revealed that Ball was 
not concerned with assuming a British responsibility for making restitution 
to all those who had suffered loss at the hands of the French; apart from 
addressing the deficit, his subordinate policy was essentially to moderate 
individual hardship.
However, the religious institutions were, subsequently, to argue that 
by paying interest on the capital, the British had acknowledged the debt 
owed to all those, including themselves, who had formerly had capital 
deposited in the Bank. The 1812 Royal Commission had also concluded 
that, by its conduct, Britain had assumed responsibility for a large debt, so 
the charitable institutions’ case was not completely unsupported.83
Their case was not, however, to succeed. By the terms of a Treaty of 25 
April 1818, the French were to be compelled to compensate British subjects 
who had suffered loss as a result of their actions. The private individuals 
amongst the Maltese, who had been amongst the first victims of the War, 
eventually received compensation, but this entitlement did not extend to 
the Maltese religious institutions. These were compelled to pursue their 
claims by diplomatic means, arguing, unsuccessfully, that the responsibility 
82 See Eton to Sullivan, above n. 77, 308 et seq.
83 Kew, CO 158/19.
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to make restitution lay with the British government.84 The funds lost were 
never recovered.
Conclusion
Ball’s general approach to tax policy was vindicated by the Report of the 
Royal Commission in 1812.85 It concurred in the view that any reversal 
of policy, so as to impose taxes (by which it meant those which did not 
have popular support), would have caused distrust and, worse still, would 
have led to renewed calls for a representative assembly constituted as a 
Consiglio Popolare. It had concluded that Ball had succeeded in winning 
popular support for the measures he introduced, and this, in part, reflects 
Coleridge’s skilled manipulation of government information. 
Table 2: 
Revenue raised by the duties imposed by the Proclamation of 8 March 1805
From To Revenue to Università (scudi)
25 July 1804 24 July 1805  48,107/10/7
25 July 1805 24 July 1806 109, 805/11/7
24 July 1806 24 July 1807  99,620/6/1
25 July 1807 31 December 1807 22,650/1/10
1 January 1808 31 December 1808 124,264/6/11
1 January 1809 25 October 1809 111, 823/5/6
26 October 1809 31 December 1809 21,374/6/14
1 January 1810 12 May 1810 31, 750/5/0
13 May 1810 31 December 1810 81,082/11/6
1 January 1811 31 December 1811 155, 939/10/1
Total 806, 420/3/3
Source: Report to His Excellency the Governor on the Accounts of the University of 
Valletta from 4th September 1800-31st December 1814 by W. Thornton dated 12 July 
1816, Kew, CO 163/33
84 Bonnici.
85 Ibid.
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5.4. Public Order and Crime
The Problem of Crime and Public Order on Malta 
1800-180686
The crime rate, whether against persons or property, appears to have 
increased from the onset of British rule in 1800. As early as 3 December 
1800, Major-General Pigot’s administration87 issued a Proclamation 
targeting “vagabonds” and “layabouts”,88 which meant persons without 
visible or verifiable legitimate means of support. These people were to 
be placed under supervision, questioned about their means and (if they 
lacked an income) given a maximum period in which to find employment. 
Should they not have succeeded in this, they risked permanent exile. If 
this Proclamation had been strictly enforced, exile must have been the 
fate of many unfortunate Maltese because the economy, at this time, was 
in ruins: unemployment, hunger, poverty and associated problems were 
evidence of a major social and economic crisis – as Coleridge later recalled 
in The Friend.89 However, it can be noted that, at this time (1800-1801), the 
authorities seem to have attributed the rising number of thefts to idle 
Maltese rather than to immigrants. 
Immigration increased and, with it, the competition for scarce jobs 
during the economic slump that followed the liberation. Maltese resentment 
was made worse by the belief, amongst the foreigners, that they were not 
subject to Maltese law. Alexander Macaulay, in his capacity as Public 
Secretary, intervened to clarify their obligations in a Public Notice dated 
23 July 1801.90 This was intended to make clear that foreigners were subject 
to Maltese jurisdiction and would be punished for offences committed on 
the Island. 
The steps taken by the administration to address the crime rate did not 
fully succeed and, by 1805, the number of offences, particularly offences 
86 See generally, Galea.
87 Major-General Pigot was in charge of a military administration of Malta from 5 
September 1800 until 14 May 1801 when Charles Cameron, the first Civil Commis-
sioner, was appointed.
88 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 156.
89 The Friend, 1, 567; see also Chapter 2.
90 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 205.
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against property, seems to have been causing discontent.91 Along with 
other accusations concerning the effectiveness of Ball’s administration, 
the crime rate was used by Ball’s political opponents, including William 
Eton, in an attempt to undermine ministerial confidence in Ball as the 
Civil Commissioner.92 Ball was forced to respond to these accusations in a 
detailed defence of his government.93 
The most commonly-committed offences seem to have been burglaries, 
and robberies,94 including highway robbery. Offenders seem either to have 
operated individually or in gangs, often perpetrating their crime in urban 
areas, where there more lucrative opportunities. After the offence, they 
would flee to the countryside. 
There is evidence that offences against the person were also common. 
The use of weapons in alcohol-related violence, in the taverns, was a 
significant problem which the administration was required to address. The 
authorities issued a Bando, 18 October 1802, to reinforce the prohibition in 
the Code de Rohan against the carrying of sharp weapons.95 This measure 
also prohibited shopkeepers from serving wine to persons carrying knives 
or having sharp weapons in their possession. 
Ball’s report to the Secretary of State, on the crime rate, is comprised, 
mainly, of assertions unsubstantiated by statistics.96 However, he did 
include some limited, but revealing, information that is corroborated by 
Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi. For example, Ball’s report revealed that, 
under British rule, there had been only five murders amongst the civil 
91 See Eton to Windham, 11 October 1806, Kew, CO 158/12 (no folio reference) 
and note the references to “frequent robberies” and “frequent murders” in Borg to 
Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/no folio reference. See also Ball to Windham, 28 
February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/53.
92 See Windham to Ball, 6 January 1807, quoted in Hardman, 499. and Eton to 
Windham, 11 October 1806, Kew, CO 158/12 (no folio reference).
93 Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/9 et seq.
94 This was conceded by Ball to Windham although with the caveat that by 1807 
no similar offence had been committed for “some months”: ibid at 83. An inter-
esting case involving robbery and homicide came before the Segnatura on 1 June 
1805 when four petitioners unsuccessfully sought to have their sentences of exile 
reduced. An interesting feature of this case was that it involved a claim for sanctu-
ary, and one of the grounds for the petition was that the Curia Romana had not 
delivered its verdict on the status of the sanctuary. Thus the case touched upon 
the relationship between the civil and ecclesiastic authorities: Registro de memoriali 
decretati  da sua Excellenza il Sig. Cavalier Alessandro Ball Regio Commissionario Civile di 
Sua Maestà Britannica, NAM LIBR 43/11 vol N.
95 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805,273. Code Du Rohan, translated by 
Lydia Davis, Book 5 Item 2, II.
96 Ball to Windham, above n. 93. 
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population. However, the conviction rate seems to have been poor because, 
according to Ball, the police had difficulty in obtaining sufficient evidence 
to sustain prosecutions.97 Ball revealed that only one offender had actually 
been hanged for murder (in 1802).98 
Ball’s hint at community solidarity, in sheltering offenders from the 
British authorities, provides an illuminating context to Borg’s accusation that 
offenders were, too frequently, remaining undetected and unpunished.99 A 
serious issue seems to have been the use, by Maltese suspects, of sanctuary 
to evade apprehension and trial. This drew explicit adverse comment from 
the Royal Commission of 1812.100 As we shall see below, there were other 
instances of “a code of silence”; and the possibility of witness intimidation 
cannot be ruled out. The fact that rewards had to be offered to informers 
implicitly recognised a lack of voluntary support for aiding the authorities 
in upholding the rule of law.101 
Immigration and Crime 
After the British took possession of Malta the population began to increase. 
This was a consequence both of increased immigration and decreased 
emigration. Galea,102 who focused on the crime problem during Cameron’s 
administration (1801-1802), linked the deteriorating crime rate, during 
this early period, to significant immigration; indeed, it is evident that 
the Maltese made this connection for themselves and quickly adopted 
a jaundiced attitude towards foreigners.103 Immigrants were widely 
97 Even where the identity of the offender was known, it was still possible to 
evade capture. This could only have been possible with local support. For example 
when Giovanni Vasallo, a shop worker, ran off after fatally stabbing a soldier out-
side a wine shop in Valletta on 30 September 1805 he was never caught despite the 
offer of a reward: http://website.lineone.net/~stephaniebidmead/chapter567.htm 
consulted 17 January 2007.
98 The conduct of the public execution reflected badly on the Administration. 
This was so because the public had been allowed to end the suffering of the offender 
by shooting him during the execution by hanging. Accidentally or otherwise, shots 
fired from the crowd hit both the executioner and his assistant killing the former 
and wounding the latter. See Ball to Windham, above n. 93 at 83.
99 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/no folio reference.
100 Kew, CO 158/19/ 24-28.
101 See below and note the evidence in the Avviso of 25 May 1805 that Borg, who 
intervened to save a perceived Jew from severe injury, seems not to have informed 
on the aggressors. See also Chapter 6.
102 Ibid.
103 It is unlikely that in this early period (1800-1802) there was much antipathy to-
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perceived as selfish opportunists who came to the Island for motives of 
personal gain.104 Immigration and crime, thus, became closely intertwined 
political issues. 
Most immigration strategies are formulated to take account of two 
dominant, although not necessarily coterminous, considerations: the first 
is the country’s labour or commercial needs; the second is security. Each 
of these may have become an issue on Malta. Increasing wage rates, which 
became an issue in 1805, suggest a shortage of labour that continued 
immigration might have alleviated.105 By that date, public disturbances, 
and the deep suspicion of foreigners amongst the Maltese, had already 
forced policy-makers to adopt less liberal policies. Although immigration 
was not prevented altogether, it was subject to ever-tighter controls. 
Coleridge’s Proclamation of 21 June 1805 was merely the latest in a series 
of interventions described below. Security had also become a major, and 
possibly the dominant, concern by the summer of 1805.
The benefits of immigration tend not to be evenly distributed. Most 
immigrants are low-skilled or unskilled workers whose presence often 
drives down the wages of similarly low-skilled domestic workers. They 
also increase the pool of labour thereby making competition for scarce 
jobs more intense. However, these trends operate to the advantage of 
those who can most benefit from the decreased cost of labour, such as 
businesses relying on unskilled or low-skilled labour. Low-skilled workers 
in the destination state, who can often compete on price only by taking 
lower wages, represent the most obvious group who lose out because of 
immigration. Ball’s evidence may suggest that this was very much the issue 
on Malta. He stated, in a despatch to Windham, that the disturbances that 
took place against the Jews, in May 1805, were perpetrated by the “lower 
orders” of Maltese society.106 Other evidence corroborates this. As we shall 
see, it was shop workers who acted, in concert, to abuse the Jew, Di Biaggii, 
on the afternoon of 18 May 1805. And, although poorly articulated, their 
concern can be read as signalling a fear of the threat that the Jews posed to 
them in their capacity as shop workers or artisans. 
After 1805, as the economy improved, complaints by the Maltese about 
the inflationary consequences of a rising population became yet another 
wards the British, although attitudes may have hardened by 1806: see Borg to Eton, 
30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/no folio reference.
104 Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, CO 158/19.
105 See Chapter 2.
106 Above n. 93.
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grievance against the new immigrants.107 Shortage of accommodation, and 
rising prices in particular, attracted adverse comment.108 This combustible 
mixture, of economic pressures, crime and a suspicion about the motives 
of many foreigners, resulted in severe social friction with which the 
administration, including Coleridge, urgently had to engage, not least 
when violence erupted against Jews. Deeply embedded anti-Semitism led 
to what Coleridge was to describe as a “persecution” of the Jews in May 
1805.109 
Official Action to Regulate Foreigners
By 1802 we can see a subtle shift in policy in the official attitude towards 
foreigners (other than the British). From this time, official action targeted 
foreigners, whether or not they were guilty of crime. The inference was, of 
course, that the Administration now shared the popular view that foreign 
visitors should be treated with suspicion. 
The Bando of 24 March 1802 stipulated that foreigners resident in hotels 
or houses had to report and be registered within twenty-four hours of 
arrival. It also required innkeepers, and others giving rooms to foreigners, 
to report, to government, their dealings with those foreigners.110 Any failure 
to comply was to be met with the draconian sanction of the innkeeper in 
question losing his or her licence. These measures were supplemented 
by a Proclamation of 4 May 1803 which required all foreigners to state 
their profession, and the reason for their stay on the Island, when they 
registered.111 This was intended to weed out the “ne’er do wells” and 
exclude those who had no means of support. 
This filtering and monitoring of foreigners suggested a cautionary 
approach, which might have reinforced some of the anxieties amongst the 
Maltese. But the British were not willing to allow this hostility to threaten 
the maintenance of law and order, for the authorities also acted to protect 
foreigners admitted to Malta. Of course, officials fully understood that 
commerce had to be promoted if the Island was to prosper and this meant 
interaction with neighbouring states. Bona fide foreigners, present on the 
107 Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/123, 131: the “general distress” 
caused by the economic collapse of 1800 “has already ceased”. He noted that there 
was a demand for labour and an increase in wages.
108 Royal Commission of 1812, Kew, CO 158/19.
109 See below.
110 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 239.
111 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 285.
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Island, had to be protected from any arbitrary “insults” and vigilantism 
committed on the Maltese streets. Cameron had issued a Proclamation of 
5 October 1801 forbidding such “insults” to Turkish merchants and their 
families.112 Even so, the local antagonism to foreigners was not eradicated;113 
and in 1805 its particular focus was the commercially-vibrant Jewish 
community. 
Ball’s despatches to London on the subject of law and order were, of 
course, designedly reassuring. He was eager to impress upon ministers 
that the crime and public order problems in Valletta were no greater that 
might have been expected in any British port city: but, he conceded that 
“bad characters” were always attracted to sea ports.114 By 1805 the trade 
focused on the port area was recognised as the motor of economic revival 
bringing much needed prosperity to the Island. This increasing affluence 
was, probably, a magnet for more “bad characters” to travel to the Island. 
By 1804-1805 the Maltese concern about immigration seems to have 
subtly shifted from the threat of crime to the problems caused by increased 
rivalry in trade. Immigration, of course, brought new skills to Malta; but 
it also brought increased competition for the local traders. Ball explicitly 
mentioned this in that part of his report to Windham dealing with the anti-
Semitic disturbances. 115
The Administration was aware of the benefits that would arise from 
immigration. Amongst the indirect benefits was the increased “tax take”, 
which increased public revenue. But this is not all because there are 
indications, in his Proclamations, that Coleridge was prepared to exploit, for 
British purposes, the Maltese dislike of foreigners in order to win support 
for certain unpalatable measures. As we have described, he explicitly stated 
that the excise duties, introduced in the Bando of 8 March 1805,116 would be 
a duty paid predominantly by “foreigners” because it mainly affected their 
drinking habits rather than those of the Maltese. The fact that foreigners 
paid more would have been particularly satisfying to the Maltese – as 
112 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 219.
113 Antagonism remained a feature of Maltese society by the time the Royal 
Commissioners reported in 1812: Kew, CO 158/19. By that date, the British seemed 
willing exploit it by shifting the tax burden towards foreigners rather than Mal-
tese, thereby achieving popularity as well as increased revenue – a process that 
Coleridge had begun in his wine duty Bando of 8 March 1805, see taxation theme, 
above.
114 Ball to Windham above n. 93 at 53. 
115 Ball to Windham, above n. 93.
116 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f.2.
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Coleridge well knew; and he did not hesitate to curry favour with the 
Maltese by pointing out that the Administration was enacting, indirectly, 
discriminatory measures that would harm Maltese interests much less than 
those of the foreigners. This is suggestive of some confused thinking about 
the best means of promoting effective community relations. We can only 
speculate as to whether Coleridge might have altered his public-relations 
spin on this tax had he known that the “insurrection” against the Jews 
would take place a little over two months later. 
Constitutional Principles: Public Order and Crime
The role of the Civil Commissioner in the operation of the criminal justice 
system on Malta is particularly controversial. At issue is the question of what 
influence he might have exercised over the punishments imposed in criminal 
trials. If he intervened in the criminal process it would raise controversial 
questions about the fairness of the trial, and of the independence of the 
judiciary, notwithstanding that the Maltese Constitution permitted such 
interventions.
According to a general theory concerning the separation of powers, 
the punishment appropriate to a particular offence should be a matter 
for the courts – to be decided according to the law rather than the official 
determination of the Executive. It implies the making of a prior law, an 
adjudication, the finding of guilt and the handing down, by a judge, of 
a penalty of a nature and severity that falls within legally-prescribed 
limits. Bureaucratic sentencing, outside the judicial process, violates these 
fundamental principles.
Under the Maltese Constitution, as we have seen, the principle of the 
separation of powers was entirely disregarded. The Constitution conferred 
upon the Civil Commissioner almost unlimited autocratic powers.117 The 
judiciary was not independent; and the Civil Commissioner exercising his 
powers in the Segnatura could overturn or set aside judicial decisions.118 Like 
the Grandmasters, the Civil Commissioner was the supreme magistrate and 
had the liberty to interfere in the criminal process. Grandmasters regularly 
intervened in the sentencing process. 
The British had undertaken to perpetuate the Maltese constitutional 
117 See Hardman, 6.
118 The Royal Commission report offers an account of the Civil Commissioner’s 
Constitutional powers: Kew, CO 158/19. These powers included reversing the de-
crees of the Tribunals.
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system: continuation was the central bulwark of Ball’s administrative 
strategy. Even so, this need not necessarily have compelled Ball to interfere in 
the judicial process. In other words, he could have exercised a self-imposed 
restraint so as to import into Malta a de facto respect for fundamental 
constitutional values with a view to raising the standard of government.119 
However, Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi, as well as other primary 
materials, reveal that these rule of law principles were not applied on Malta 
during this period and this will be examined below.
The failure to respect the separation of powers in the imposition of 
sentences, as evidenced in some of Coleridge’s Avvisi, is of interest given the 
emphasis he had placed upon respecting the doctrine in his earlier political 
journalism. The concentration of power in the hands of the French Consul 
was, he had argued, the fatal flaw in the French Constitution of December 
1799. This is important because Coleridge did not see the separation of 
powers as a British principle, but as a universal one.120 However, in his role 
as Public Secretary, Coleridge failed to persuade the Civil Commissioner 
to confine governmental action within the constitutional values that he 
(Coleridge) had earlier advocated; indeed, his later writing, in The Friend, 
approved of Ball’s actions.121 
We shall first consider the Avviso concerning extortion and then the 
Avvisi issued after the anti-Semitic disturbances before looking at other 
measures concerned with immigration and public security. 
The Avviso of 1 March 1805122 – Extortion
Public Notices announcing convictions were issued where there was 
a particular public interest in drawing attention to the offence and the 
punishment imposed. This Notice gave community-wide publicity to an 
important conviction of a named individual, Matteo Sacco, for extortion. It 
also contained an explicit warning that the public should be wary of Sacco 
following his release from gaol. But as we shall discover, the additional 
motive for the instrument was that it allowed Coleridge to portray the 
119 Coleridge might have made these arguments although, if he did, the evidence 
is now lost. The above is subject to the important caveat that constitutional values 
were under strain in Britain following the suspension of habeas corpus and the Act 
of Indemnity 1801 (see Chapter 1).
120 The separation of powers is not a defining characteristic of the British Consti-
tution.
121 The Friend, 1, 544.
122 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 1.
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Government as benign and responsive.
The Public Secretary’s decision to issue a Notice to inform the general 
public of the offender’s conviction would, by itself, damage the latter’s 
reputation. In providing the further explicit exhortation, that the inhabitants 
should be wary of him, suggests an official intention to ostracise the 
offender. According to one view, this can be seen as an example of Ball’s role 
as parens patriae (“father Ball”); by drawing the attention of the inhabitants 
to a corrupt rogue (who might try to re-offend in the future) Ball was 
protecting the Maltese from becoming his next victims. However, the 
effect of this warning, can be also seen as a further penalty over and above 
the punishment determined by the court. This is so because Coleridge’s 
warning would naturally tend to isolate the offender. Depending on the 
response of his fellow citizens, this might actually be more damaging to 
him than his term of imprisonment and the obligation to repay thirty scudi. 
It implied little faith in Sacco’s rehabilitation. However, the Notice did 
recognise the importance of corrective justice by requiring the offender to 
restore to the victim the sum extorted. There was, as Coleridge understood, 
an important principle of equality and rectification at issue here, namely 
that at Miccallef’s (the victim’s) expense, Sacco had unlawfully acquired a 
gain that he should be required to restore to Miccallef.
Sacco was imprisoned until the sum of thirty scudi, that he had extorted 
from Micallef, had been repaid. The obvious difficulty created by this 
punishment is that, whilst incarcerated, Sacco could not earn money. In the 
case of a poor offender without savings this could make repayment (and 
thus release) impossible. We do not know if Sacco faced this difficulty. 
The major reason why Coleridge decided to issue the Notice was that it 
provided an opportunity to repair some of the damage to Ball’s reputation, 
with the Maltese public described in Chapter 2. Since the offence related 
to a demand for money to procure from government a benefit, namely a 
recission of an order placing the victim in exile, he assured the inhabitants 
that they could petition the Civil Commissioner directly without incurring 
the expense of unnecessary (and dishonest) intermediaries. This affirmed 
the commitment made by Charles Cameron in the Proclamation, addressed 
to the Maltese Nation, in which he conveyed not only the “paternal care 
and affection” of the King for the Maltese people but also promised that: 
“(m)y door shall be open to all; I will hear everyone’s plea; I shall be ready to 
render justice…”.123 Coleridge clearly felt it necessary to associate Ball with 
123 See the Proclamation of 15 July 1801, Hardman, 358-9. W. Eton’s account is 
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this commitment. As we shall discuss in Chapter 6, this was a key component 
of Coleridge’s strategy to re-build Ball’s public reputation following a series 
of damaging decisions, not least the summary exile of a Maltese who had 
presented a petition to the Segnatura.124 Coleridge’s Notice of 1 March 1805 
reveals that the authorities knew that Ball’s conduct in the summary exile 
case, allowed Nationalists to condemn what they portrayed as his “despotic 
scourge” and “thundering vengeance” – a ruthlessness which, they alleged, 
had not even been possible under the worst of the Grandmasters. As we 
shall see, Coleridge’s assurances were the Administration’s riposte and a 
direct appeal to the public to place confidence in British prerogative justice. 
5.4.1. The Anti-Semitic Disturbances
The Avvisi Concerning the Anti-Semitic Disturbances 
We are now concerned with the Public Notices that were issued as a 
consequence of criminal behaviour connected with the unrest against 
the Jews. These matters were amongst the most difficult that the Civil 
Commissioner encountered during Coleridge’s period in office. A detailed 
examination, based on records not previously available, shows a series 
of actions demonstrating the difficulties of reconciling the priorities 
of government with the need to uphold the rule of law. It also reveals 
Coleridge’s use of government information in securing the dominant 
strategic goal of a stable society under British rule.
Context
Jewish immigration was resented by sections of Maltese society. Agitators 
keen to foment violence, exploited fear and distrust. The history of the 
Jews on Malta at this time is revealing. Ball reported, in 1807, that under 
the Order of St John, Jews had been excluded from residing freely on 
Malta,125 and Jewish visitors were subject to restrictions.126 This stance 
revealing. He stated that the Maltese petitioners risked punishment if they showed 
the “least freedom in remonstrating” Eton, vol. IV, 145 et seq. Fear of inviting the ire 
of the Civil Commissioner must have been a disincentive to use the Segnatura, and 
hence a reason why intermediaries such as Sacco had come to the fore. 
124 These were outlined in Chapter 2.
125 Almost the only Jews on the Islands during the government of the Order were 
captive slaves or others who concealed their faith.
126 The Edict of Expulsion signed in Palermo on 18 June 1492 excluded Jews from 
Malta after that date.
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was thought to have encouraged the popular view amongst the Maltese 
that Jewish immigration would be harmful to the public interest. This 
restrictive official policy on Jewish immigration was reversed under the 
British administration. One of the causes for the first migration was the 
outbreak, in Gibraltar in the autumn of 1804, of yellow fever. This caused 
an unknown, but significant, number of the Jewish community there to 
emigrate to Malta.127 Under British rule, Jewish immigrants were, thus, 
permitted to enter and settle on the Island; and these immigrants were, 
eventually, to prosper. But their early reception was troubled. 
The differences were partly cultural and partly economic, and each of 
these was inter-related. The reliance of the Maltese on the welfare systems 
of the Knights had produced a dependency culture. However, the Jewish 
immigrants of 1804 were of a different and more independent, enterprising 
outlook. Following their arrival they had set up their own businesses that 
competed with Maltese shopkeepers and others, particularly in Valletta. 128
This new competition made the British policy reversal unpopular 
amongst those economically threatened by it. Jewish entrepreneurs had 
a notable reputation for commercial acumen, which made some Maltese, 
with vested interests, antagonistic to the new settlers. It will be recalled that, 
at this time (spring 1805), the Island’s economy was only just beginning to 
recover from the severe economic collapse that had followed the blockade.129 
Any immigration policy likely to prejudice individual prosperity would 
have been particularly sensitive. It is also likely that the particular concern 
amongst the Maltese business community also implied a less well-defined 
popular prejudice, against the Jews, amongst the ordinary Maltese. This 
was capable of leading to violence. Mobs, that were prone to assault their 
victims, were operating on Malta – as Coleridge’s Avviso of 25 May 1805130 
indicates. Such was the anti-Semitic hysteria that merely calling someone a 
Jew could lead to that victim becoming subject to violence. As we shall see, 
any unpopular or suspected person was at risk of assault even if they were 
127 See Kew, CO 158/10/3; also Ball to Windham, above n. 93 at 67 in which he 
referred to the immigration in the following terms: “In the autumn of 1804….many 
persons of the Jewish persuasion took refuge on Malta”. (Emphasis added). It is 
possible that they arrived with a convoy under the protection of a Captain Mundy 
of the Hydra on 14 October 1804. 
128 Ball became aware of the jealousies that began to emerge between the Maltese 
and Jewish communities: above n. 93 at 67-8 where he refers to the “...fear amongst 
the Maltese that the Jews would divide amongst themselves the advantages of 
trade”.
129 Above Chapter 2.
130 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 9.
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not Jewish; in other words, labelling someone as a Jew, could be used as a 
pretext to incite violence against any member of the community. Although 
Jews were targeted some unpopular gentiles were also at risk.
The Events of May 1805 
Coleridge’s Notebooks contains two entries on this important subject. The 
first of these records states, “Latter end of May-&c-THE JEWS!”,131 and the 
second, probably written some weeks later, records, “Saturday 18 May 
1805-Valetta (sic)-the persecution of the Jews commenced”.132 A further 
Notebook entry records a massacre of Jews in Algiers that took place on 
Saturday, 29 June 1805, a day that became known within Jewish circles as 
the “Black Sabbath”.133 Referring to the mob violence in Algiers, Coleridge 
recorded “more than an hundred of that unhappy race massacred- their 
Bodies burnt”.134 This reveals that, in the early summer of 1805, racist 
violence against the Jews was not confined to Malta, although the immediate 
causes of the two instances of violence were different in each case.
Contrary to Ball’s intention to downplay the insurrection,135 there is 
ample evidence that the authorities were alarmed by it. Ball admitted that 
some of the most significant disturbances were orchestrated by a number 
of agitators who went from place to place, such as the taverns and shops, 
repeating the ancient blood libel that the Jews had abducted children to 
sacrifice in their religious rites.136 This is corroborated by court records. As 
we shall discover, one of the convicted offenders, Andrea Borg, had begun 
a rumour that Jews were prowling around looking for children to kill. No 
children had been reported missing, which suggests that the slanders 
131 CN 2, 2594.
132 CN 2, 2646.
133 CN 2,2668. The riots and murder followed the assassination of Naftali 
Buchnach or Busnach. Coleridge, who recorded that the assassination took place 
on 27 June 1805, spelt the name Bushnak: CN 2, 2668. 
134 CN 2, 2668.
135 Above n. 93 at 67-8. 
136 Ibid. The accusations made by the anti-Semites amongst the Maltese resonated 
with a version of the ancient blood libel levelled at the Jews. The defamation may 
have originated in the legend created by Thomas of Monmouth in ‘The Life and 
Passion of St William the Martyr of Norwich’ completed in 1173. The charge lev-
elled is normally that Jews kill an innocent Christian infant, usually male, so that 
the blood can be mixed with their unleavened bread at Passover. For an account 
of this origin of the libel, see Jacobs; also Anderson, and further Bennett. A general 
study of the nature, origins history and influence of this blood-libel in whipping up 
anti Semitic hysteria see Dundes.
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clearly resonated with some members of a resentful population who were, 
in the absence of hard facts, pre-disposed to display racist behaviour. 137
The evidence of what took place 18-19 May 1805 is not altogether clear. 
However, in an unsigned and undated letter (a copy of which may have 
been sent to the British Prime Minister) an anonymous individual alleged 
that a mob of about two thousand Maltese  assembled in Valletta and 
then “dispersed without doing any mischief”.138 Ball’s delayed response 
did not offer a firm denial.139 Instead, he described how the jealousies of 
tradespersons and others had led to problems for some of the Jews who 
were accosted by the demonstrators. This seems to be a reference to the 
events described below that took place in St Paul’s Street, Valletta, on 18 
May 1805. 
The low-level public disorder in St Paul’s Street cannot fully explain the 
haste and severity with which the authorities acted, so it is likely that a more 
dangerous demonstration of hostility had, indeed, taken place. Moreover, 
one of Coleridge’s Avvisi refers to a physical assault against an individual, 
believed to be a Jew, which, it alleged, took place in Mdina. The authorities 
clearly believed that outbreaks of violent disorder were spreading across 
the Island. Ball’s refusal to deny this, in his report to the Secretary of State 
(delayed until 1807 when he was forced to respond to allegations made 
against his administration), is also suggestive. However, as we shall see 
below, the Avviso in question misreported, and in some ways exaggerated, 
the events that actually took place in Mdina. 
We also have Coleridge’s subsequent testimony which suggests a threat 
of widespread and serious violence. In The Friend he described the anti-
Semitic disturbances as a “difficult emergency”.140 In an unpublished letter 
of 1820, written to a Jewish friend, he described his own role in preventing 
“an intended Massacre”. He claimed to have read to Dr Borg Oliviero, 
the Chief Justice, Chapter 11 of Paul’s letter to the Romans in order to 
emphasise shared human values.141 Coleridge’s later accounts suggested 
that the authorities believed that the insurrection might have become more 
widespread and even more serious. As it was, they responded with rapid 
137 NAM 92/04 1805 box 1.
138 The relevant part is as follows: “That in the beginning of June 1805 (sic) there 
was a tumult of 2000 persons in Valletta who however dispersed without doing any 
mischief”. Eton passed this information to Windham in a letter dated 11 October 
1806, CO 158/12 (no folio reference).
139 See Ball to Windham above n. 93 at 67.
140 The Friend, 1, 544.
141 CN 2, 2646n; “I also am an Israelite”.
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and severe punishments to quell that possibility – in other words to nip 
trouble in the bud.
Official action on Malta, to stamp out anti-Semitic violence, included 
two denunciatory Avvisi of 22142 and 25 May 1805.143 These notified the 
population of the severity of punishments meted out. As we shall see, there 
is evidence that Ball himself intervened to ensure that these exemplary and 
exceptionally draconian punishments were imposed. He was obviously 
prepared to regard the command in the Royal Instructions of 14 May 1801 
to indulge “the prejudices of the inhabitants” as having been overridden 
by the just claims of the Jewish population to the protection of their lives 
and property. 
But this is not to conclude that Ball ignored the Royal Instructions 
of 14 May 1801. He made some concessions to what Coleridge publicly 
acknowledged as the anti-immigration prejudices of the Maltese – a 
phrase which recalls the very words of the Instructions.144 This resulted 
in a Proclamation dated 21 June 1805 that imposed even more restrictive 
controls upon foreigners.145 When taken with the evidence of the Royal 
Commission of 1812 that there was still hostility to foreigners on the Island, 
this flurry of domestic measures qualifies the impression, created by Ball 
in 1807, that the problem of social friction leading to anti-Semitic violence 
was short lived.146 
As we shall see below, an Avviso, dated (Wednesday) 22 May 1805, 
announced the first convictions (fig. 10). Its date reveals how promptly the 
authorities responded to the unrest because, in only a few days, they had 
identified and located the culprits (Andrea Borg, Hasciach and Bonello), 
tried them, punished them and then drafted and promulgated the Avviso. 
The further Avviso, on Saturday 25 May 1805, which discloses weekend 
working, also corroborates the argument that officials had identified an 
emergency requiring timely action. Ball’s portrayal of an unrattled State is 
unconvincing. The absence of Notebook entries for ten days after 14 May 
142 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 8.
143 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 9. The date of issue was 25 May 
1805, not March 25 1805 as claimed by Kathleen Coburn: CN 2 (Notes), 2594.
144 In the Notice of 25 May 1805 Coleridge acknowledged the existence of a “pop-
ular prejudice” against the Jews.
145 Although Coleridge omitted to define “foreigners”: NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 
Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f14.
146 Above n. 93 although when Ball refers to the “whole affair” he seems to be 
referring exclusively to the riot rather than the underlying social problem. Even so 
it creates an impression which, whilst politically convenient, might not have been 
strictly accurate.
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1805 is also suggestive that Coleridge was preoccupied by official business 
connected with the disturbances.
Disturbances in Valletta, Saturday 18 May 1805
We can now question, in more detail, why the anti-Semitic allegations spread 
by Andrea Borg, Hasciach and Bonello did not explain all that took place 
on the afternoon of Saturday 18 May 1805 – the day the violence erupted. 
Surviving witness evidence shows that the disturbances arose as a result of 
more than one cause. This corroborates Ball’s account of the participation 
of the trades-people, who seemed to have felt that their livelihoods were 
threatened by the Jews.
In the late afternoon of 18 May 1805, in St Paul’s Street, Valletta, a Jew, 
10. The Avviso of 22nd May 1805 announcing the convictions of Borg, Hasciach 
and Bonello.
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known as Di Biaggii, was verbally abused by a group of boys. He had gone 
with a local man, Gauci, to inform the police (the Viscount).147 Di Biaggii 
and Gauci intended to return to the scene with the Viscount to remonstrate 
with the boys and warn them so that they should did not repeat their 
misbehaviour. However, the delinquents had fled by the time the three 
men returned to St Paul’s Street. Unfortunately, the incident was not over 
because a group of local shopkeepers and passers-by gathered. Amongst 
them, a youth called Paolo Catania, the son of a shoemaker, further insulted 
Di Biaggii, by asking him, “Do you still want to crap on our heads”.148 The 
words spoken were corroborated by another witness.149 
Whilst the true meaning of this insult can obviously be contested, one 
possible reading suggests that the aggressor was concerned that the Jews 
had achieved some threatening and dominant position. Had Paolo Catania 
been primarily concerned about possible child abduction then this anger 
would, almost certainly, have been expressed in other ways.
The group of hostile Maltese then reprimanded Gauci for having 
assisted Di Biaggii. A fight ensued in which Gauci was assaulted before 
making his escape pursued by “many people”. Presumably Di Biaggii also 
fled. It is indicative of the strength of opinion that any Maltese who assisted 
Jews were also likely to be attacked.
Disturbances outside Valletta 18-21 May 1805.
Elsewhere in the four cities, rumours were being spread that Jews were 
attacking Maltese victims. Conspicua seems to have been something 
of a “hot spot”. Andrea Borg admitted under interrogation that, whilst 
intoxicated, he had spread a rumour that Jews were searching for children 
to kill. Moreover, during the night of 18-19 May 1805, he allegedly entered 
a shop and asserted, to those inside it, that a Jew living in Conspicua had 
thrown a vase of flowers out of a window at him. Neither assertion was 
true; and Andrea Borg claimed, when questioned on 21 May 1805, that he 
had committed these acts simply because he was drunk and for no other 
reason.150
Other witnesses gave evidence of further trouble. On Sunday 19 May 
1805, at Rappello di Coradino on the road out of Conspicua, Nicolas Zammit 
147 As he was required to do under the terms of the Code de Rohan.
148 NAM 92/04 1805, 21 May 1805.
149 Statement of Joseph Pizzuto, ibid.
150 Andrea Borg’s statement, 21 May 1805 NAM 92/04, 1805, box 1.
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and another man encountered a twelve year old boy who was walking 
some distance behind two foreigners. The boy reported that the foreigners 
were Jews who had tried to harm him. Zammit also gave hearsay evidence 
that his wife had told him that a Jew had threatened one of their friends, 
and that he had reported this to the local Luogotenente.151 The authorities 
at first suspected Bonello (below) but the witness was certain that he was 
not the boy in question, following an identity parade.152 The conclusion, 
that other boys must, therefore, have been involved, naturally made the 
situation worse from the authorities’ point of view. 
Saverio Bonello (also a twelve year old boy) was a resident of Conspicua 
who had been arrested. He had falsely accused unknown persons of threats 
made against him; but he gave contradictory evidence. At first he stated 
that three men, believed to be Jews, had run aggressively towards him 
whilst he was fishing. He then described how he had been compelled to 
flee from the four men (sic) to escape. 
As we discuss below, Fortunata Tagliana also incited racist violence 
against a French prisoner of war at Notabile (Mdina), so the disturbances 
were not confined to the four cities. Her offence took place during the 
evening of 21 May 1805. 
Borg and Bonello must have been tried and convicted the same day that 
their statements had been taken, 21 May 1805, or , if not, no later than the 
following day, because this was the date on which Coleridge announced 
the convictions and sentences. This alacrity, especially when taken with 
what we know about Coleridge’s vast workload, again suggests a sense of 
urgency on the part of the authorities.
The Public Notice of 22 May 1805 
This Avviso notified the public of the punishment inflicted on three named 
individuals, Andrea Borg, Giovanni Hasciach and Saverio Bonello for 
having originated and spread the malicious anti-Semitic rumours. The 
notice announced that the offenders had been whipped and were shortly 
to be sent into exile. The petitions discussed below suggest that each of 
them was exiled to Gozo.
The Notice raises a number of constitutional and other issues. Firstly, 
the text suggested the offenders were sentenced as a result of the decision 
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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of the Civil Commissioner rather than a court of law, which, if true, would 
provide a strong example of the absence of a separation of powers in Maltese 
law. It would raise important questions about the right to a fair trial in 
Malta. Secondly, the Avviso does not record the offence of which they were 
convicted, and the question can be asked whether rumour-spreading was 
an offence known to the law. This engages the principle that no-one can be 
punished except for breach of an existing law: nulle peona sine lege. Thirdly, 
because the punishment was not in accordance with that prescribed for 
the offence under the Code de Rohan, there is a further controversy about 
respect for the rule of law under British rule. Finally, there is a concern 
about the separation of powers. 
Punishment by Law?
In any stable and peaceful society the state has a prima facie monopoly on the 
use of force. This is acceptable provided its coercive powers are exercised 
in the circumstances which the law allows and the punishments inflicted 
do not exceed those permitted by law. The rule of law thus requires that 
legitimate punishment can only be imposed in accordance with existing 
publicly-disclosed laws – in other words when an individual has committed 
behaviour that is legally proscribed. 
The requirement that official action should conform to existing legal 
rules is concerned with legitimacy and is, thus, a founding principle of the 
rule of law. It is a fundamental violation of the rule of law if the conduct 
punished is merely something of which the authorities disapprove but 
which violates no legal rule. Civil rights would cease to have any force if 
officials could punish any behaviour which caused them inconvenience or 
which they disliked. There would simply be no limit to the circumstances 
in which individuals could be punished. 
Moreover, in a system that conforms to these standards, the authorities 
cannot simply declare that henceforward certain conduct will be proscribed. 
Constitutionally-mandated processes must be followed before new legal 
rules can be established. New laws must be duly passed. 
The first question concerning Coleridge’s Notice is that it is silent on 
whether the convictions followed from a prosecution and judgment of a 
criminal court in accordance with an existing law. This is an important 
matter because the adjudication of legal rights is a matter for an independent 
judiciary that is not required to abide by the directions of politicians. In 
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this case the internal evidence from the Avviso, when taken in isolation, 
suggests that this was not fulfilled. The actor, explicitly named by Coleridge, 
in the criminal process was the Civil Commissioner. Coleridge recorded: 
His Excellency is determined to treat in the same manner all others who are 
discovered to have started, or who have been complicit in similar [i.e. anti-
Semitic] gossip. 
The impression created is that the accused were convicted and punished 
by Ball himself. In contrast, Ball’s report to Windham in 1807 emphasised 
that criminal liability, in cases arising from the persecution of the Jews, was 
determined by the judicial process: “some of the most guilty amongst the 
men”, he reported, “were tried, convicted and punished”.153 The more likely 
conclusion is, therefore, that these men were indeed tried before a criminal 
court. As we shall see, the determination of the appropriate punishments 
was a different matter. 
Code de Rohan
As far as the relevant law was concerned, Code de Rohan contained 
provisions against “slanderous publications’154, and it is likely that the 
court decided that this provision governed the conduct of the accused 
in this case. The punishments imposed on these defendants, which were 
deliberately severe (whipping and exile) are, however, controversial. 
As we shall see below, in the case of female offenders, the Code de Rohan 
permitted a number of possibilities to be considered. These were either 
internal exile (to the “villages” or to Gozo) or overseas exile ”outside the 
Dominion”; but no similar provision existed in the case of male offenders. 
The prescribed punishment for males convicted of spreading slanderous 
publications155 was that they
shall incur the penalty of ten years, or even life in the galleys. …. If for some 
reason they are unable to row in the galleys, they must be punished with the 
whip, and must then serve on public works for the rest of their life, or for ten 
years, depending upon the seriousness of the offence.156
Punishment by the whip and the imposition of life-time exile was, in the 
case of the male offender, outside the scope of the Code (if, as we assume, 
153 Above n. 93 at 67-8.
154 Book 5 item 3, no 5.
155 See para. VII.
156 Book 5, item 3, no 5.
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the charges brought related to “slanderous publications”).157 This suggests 
two possible conclusions. The first is that the sentences were unlawful in 
so far as the court exceeded its authority under the Code de Rohan; or, 
alternatively, that the Civil Commissioner had exercised his recognised 
constitutional authority and intervened in the judicial process so as to 
increase the sentences. 
Ball’s Role
Of the two possibilities, the latter (i.e. Ball’s intervention) is the only one 
that would conform to the Maltese Constitution, albeit inconsistently 
with the rule of law. In his report to Windham in 1807, Ball, significantly, 
revealed how the criminal justice system worked. The information he 
disclosed allows us to infer that he at least claimed a power to interfere in 
the outcome of cases. The critical passage is as follows:
In all criminal cases, in particular, the whole proceedings are laid before me 
as soon as the trials are finished; and where … there appears any difficulty 
in the case, it has been my practice to take the opinion of an English barrister, 
(who, Ball reported, gave advice upholding the judge in all but one case).158
In 1805, the Maltese petitioned the Crown for certain constitutional reforms.159 
The petition, inter alia, sought relief from the Civil Commissioner’s power 
to sentence in criminal cases. In a forceful passage it requested that: “..the 
sentence (of the court) may be mitigated but not augmented by the Civil 
Commissioner and that those sentences may be pronounced in open court 
and not first submitted to the Civil Commissioner”. (Emphasis added)
The evidence of the Avviso suggests that in the cases of Andrea Borg, 
Hasciach and Bonello, Ball exercised his power to determine the sentence, 
for, in translation, it will be recalled that Coleridge recorded that: “His 
Excellency is determined to treat in the same manner all others who …
[offend]”. Thus, Coleridge identified the Civil Commissioner rather than 
the court as the actor responsible for punishments in all other cases. 
But that is not all because there is other evidence that the criminal 
157 Contrary to para. V of Part III of the Code.
158 Ball to Windham above n. 93 at 51. The use of the word “upholding” also 
implies that Ball’s exercised a superior, reviewing role in the hierarchy of courts 
because his decision to “uphold” the decision (taken on the advice of the English 
barrister) implies a power to over-turn.
159 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated): Kew, CO 
158/10/151 (1805).
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judges acted on Ball’s instructions in sentencing these particular offenders. 
This evidence relates to a subsequent trial which also arose from the anti-
Semitic disturbances (the Fortunata Tagliana trial, the outcomes of which 
are considered below). In that case an official recorded: “This (punishment) 
is in line with the order given yesterday by His Excellency to the Judge”. 
11. The letter from the official of the Corte Capitanale which reveals that the Civil 
Commissioner had instructed the judge to sentence Fortunata Tagliana to exile 
in Gozo.
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(Emphasis added – see fig. 11). 
Ball’s undoubted interference in the Tagliana trial is likely to explain the 
punishments in the trials of Borg, Hasciach and Bonello. As said, within the 
terms of the autocratic Maltese Constitution, this was not unconstitutional 
behaviour, but it is further evidence of a legal system that signally failed to 
meet what today we should regard as the minimum standards of fairness. 
It also revealed Ball’s double standards. 
In The Friend, Coleridge portrayed how, when he was in command 
of a ship, Ball was a just law-giver. British seaman under his command 
were entitled to be punished according to the Articles of War in order to 
avoid “arbitrary” decision making.160 This meant that punishments under 
his command were only inflicted in accordance with rules that had been 
publicly declared in advance; and Ball’s officers had no discretion to vary 
the prescribed punishments. Above all, it reveals that their commander 
understood that justice could only be achieved through a system rooted in 
the rule of law – punishment according to rules known in advance – and 
the principle of a fair trial. Thus, it speaks volumes that Maltese civilians 
were not always treated according to these “fairness” standards. “Justice” 
in their case was embodied in the will of their governor who punished 
them according to undisclosed standards that were notably inconsistent 
with, and which prevailed over, the published laws. 
Thus the evidence suggests that notwithstanding Coleridge’s awareness 
of the importance of maintaining the separation of powers for the 
preservation of civil liberties – the observance of which by the British 
(Imperial) Government he had insisted upon in his journalism – Coleridge 
was either unable or unwilling to persuade the Civil Commissioner to 
show restraint by allowing the courts to determine the penalty without 
interference. 
In fairness, Ball might have felt that intervention was permitted under 
the terms of the Royal Instructions, dated 14 May 1801,161 that explicitly 
required him to continue the system of executive intervention that applied 
under the Grandmasters.162 However, whilst the Maltese Constitution (and 
thus the Royal Instructions) might have permitted Ball to direct the judges, it 
160 The Friend, 1, 169-70.
161 See Hardman, 350 et seq.
162 The relevant part of the Instructions dated 14 May 1801 stated: “You will there-
fore understand that the administration of justice and police is, as nearly as cir-
cumstances will permit, to continue to be exercised in conformity to the Laws, and 
Institutions of the antient Government of the Order of St John”.
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was not a requirement that he do so in any or every criminal case. In other 
words, he might have shown restraint in order to uphold the fundamental 
values of fairness and the rule of law that he recognised and had practised 
during his naval service. The circumstances of these cases suggests that 
Ball chose to intervene to augment the punishments in ways that he had 
denied himself and his officers whilst at sea. Thus, the outcomes of cases 
were, arguably, tainted by the Civil Commissioner’s political sentiment that 
repressive measures were necessary in order to maintain law and order. 
When Coleridge later complained of the sordid nature of politics163 he may 
have had this example in mind. 
The Avviso of 22 May 1805 and New Offences
There is also evidence in the Notice that Coleridge purported to extend 
Article V of the Code de Rohan so as to criminalise certain anti-social 
behaviour arising from the disturbances. This strategy was intended to 
punish, firstly, those individuals who repeated the false rumours and, 
secondly, those who were present during the relation of such rumours, 
who either did nothing to “undeceive” the listeners, or did not inform the 
Tribunal of the Grand Court.164 Thus, the Notice purported to announce an 
extension of the criminal law. 
As we have explained, the principle of nulle peone sine lege requires that 
an individual be punished according to an existing law. Since Coleridge’s 
Avviso, a Public Notice, was not a law-making instrument, it was incapable 
of making the necessary reform – that required a Bando. The mere 
announcement of a new offence, by Notice, amounted to the Administration 
punishing conduct of which it disapproved. 
Coleridge’s apparent willingness to have individuals punished without 
a legal justification for the punishment is a surprising lapse given his 
awareness of these fundamental constitutional values. Thus, we have 
163 See Chapter 1, pages 43 and 44.
164 This arguably extended Para. V of Part III of the Code de Rohan, which states: 
“Anybody who invents or composes slanderous publications, or who sticks up post-
ers containing libellous, abusive or offensive material, shall incur the penalty of 
ten years, or even life in the galleys. All their advisors, composers, supporters, par-
ticipants and people who fixed up the posters will suffer the same penalty”. It is 
not obvious that these words unambiguously impose a duty on persons hearing 
false rumours to “undeceive” other listeners who happen to be present. Just one 
objection to Coleridge’s interpretation is that to be a “participant” the person would 
arguably have to spread the rumour, not merely hear it spoken in conversation.
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further evidence that, in his official capacity, Coleridge was not able to 
practise or respect the constitutional morality that he espoused in his 
political writings. 
“Malicious Rumours” and “Undeceiving Listeners” 
In the Notice, Coleridge described the new offence as one of “spreading 
malicious rumours” not “maliciously spreading rumours”. “Malicious” 
was intended to be synonymous with “false” or “false and damaging”. 
Since a malicious (false) rumour can be spread unwittingly, a person could 
be liable for the innocent repeating of information that happened to be 
false. Thus, the offence, under the Code de Rohan, of spreading malicious 
rumours was likely to catch more rumour mongers within its net than one 
that required malicious intent. Moreover, the new offence was not confined 
within the context of the emergency. It applied to any false story.
However, in relation to the other purported new obligation, to 
“undeceive” other listeners, evidence of knowledge, on the part of the 
accused, that the information was false, would be required before a 
prosecution could succeed.165 
This Avviso created impossible burdens for individuals because it 
assumed that those hearing certain information – listening to rumours 
– would be able to differentiate between fact and falsehood. This was 
a prerequisite because the obligation to “undeceive” logically arose 
only when an individual (in the company of others) was confronted by 
information that they could identify as false. Information conveyed to them 
which was true clearly did not give rise to any obligation to “undeceive”. 
However, what about information that was actually untrue but which the 
listeners nonetheless found credible?
The weakness of Coleridge’s strategy in this respect was exposed in Ball’s 
1807 report to the Secretary of State. As Ball understood it, the problem 
was that a large number of the Maltese were “gullible” to the point that 
they were prepared to demonstrate against individual Jews as a collective 
response to invented information that the Jews sacrificed children (when 
none had been abducted). If Ball’s version of events is reliable, it would be a 
naïve official who believed that the less-educated Maltese could distinguish 
fact from fiction or rumour from truth.166
165 Although, as already indicated, no such offence was properly known to the 
law.
166 Coleridge’s assessment was that the ordinary Maltese (the peasantry) suffered 
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Coleridge’s reform placed the Maltese in some jeopardy. If, for example, 
they heard information in the market place which they believed to be 
true, but which was, in fact, false, they risked punishment for failing to 
”undeceive” (although, as we have seen, there was no properly enacted and 
existing law requiring them to do this) . The only practical way of avoiding 
that liability would be to decline to listen to any information on sensitive 
subjects – in this instance any information touching upon the Jewish 
community. “Listeners” would find this a necessary precaution in order to 
avoid the risk that information conveyed to them might prove to be untrue. 
Before leaving this poorly drafted section of the Avviso it is worth 
recalling that Coleridge explicitly ordained that minors would be liable 
to the same penalties as adults for the offences described within it. Given 
that adults clearly had difficulty in distinguishing fact from fiction (e.g. the 
belief that Jews sacrificed children), the policy of criminalising children 
regardless of their age seems harsh and ill-judged. For example, if a child 
of five unfortunately found itself in the company of adults spreading 
malicious information, the child would, according to the Avviso, be 
criminally responsible unless he or she spoke out against the rumour, and 
informed the Tribunal. Just one objection to this would, of course, be that 
a young child would neither understand the difference between malicious 
rumour and truth and, even if they did, they would probably never have 
heard of a Tribunal let alone been able to access it. If the terms of the Avviso 
were intended to be applied as literally drafted then such measures would 
be unjust to the point of fanaticism. If this outcome seems improbable, it 
is important to recall that Ball banished a twelve year old boy (Bonello) to 
Gozo for spreading false rumours.
Whilst it can be readily appreciated that the British authorities had a 
duty to stamp out anti-Semitic violence, the steps taken to do this seem 
harsh. Bonello’s case offers little prospect that the Avviso would have 
been leniently applied in the case of minors. For this reason, as well as its 
other unreasonable burdens and its dubious status as a legally effective 
instrument, it stands out as further evidence that the legal system on 
Malta fell below the minimum standards of constitutionalism and fairness 
expected of a more fully developed system infused with the values of the 
rule of law. 
from “childish ignorance”. The Friend, 1, 536.
224 Coleridge’s Laws
Aftermath
On 19 June 1805, Maria Bonello, Saverino’s [Saverio’s] mother, successfully 
petitioned the Civil Commissioner sitting in the Segnatura to have the 
sentence on her son rescinded. The grounds on which she pleaded for 
clemency were that the boy, who was then on Gozo, now lived in extreme 
poverty and went hungry. In short, she argued that he was “deprived 
of every human comfort”. Given that exile had been Ball’s preferred 
punishment for the troublemakers, her chances of success might not have 
been considered to be encouraging. However, the Civil Commissioner did 
show clemency to the boy.167 
Andrea Borg also tried, at first unsuccessfully, to have his sentence 
overturned. On 29 May 1805, he petitioned Ball, in the Segnatura, to rescind 
the order that he be exiled.168 Following Ball’s rejection of this first petition, 
he submitted a second on the grounds that he was, by then, starving on 
Gozo and needed to return home to look after his ”poor” mother. These 
grounds were strikingly similar to those that had won Ball over in Maria 
Bonello’s petition. Moreover, it is interesting that Andrea Borg’s second 
application was made after Maria’s had already succeeded. No doubt his 
advisers sensed that Ball was now more amenable to show mercy. And so 
it proved because, on 26 June 1805, the Civil Commissioner granted Borg’s 
second application. His act of clemency appears to have been conditional 
because, on 2 July 1805, Borg’s formal retraction of his evidence was read to 
the assembled crowd in Conspicua.169 This seems to have been a condition 
of his returning home to the City. It may also confirm that Conspicua had 
been a “hot spot” of trouble during the disturbances since retractions do 
not appear to have been publicly declared elsewhere.
No reason for Ball’s volte face in these cases is recorded, but it can be 
speculated that if, by then, the emergency was over (as Ball later claimed170) 
he probably judged that there was no longer a need to make an example 
of a small boy and a starving man. The danger of widespread violence 
had passed; and Ball perhaps sensed that there were compelling political 
reasons for a show of compassion to combat the combustible complaints 
167 The petition can be found in the National Archive of Malta, NAM 92/04 1805, 
box 07; and the decision in the case is recorded in NAM LIBR 43/11 vol N.
168 Registro dei Memoriale e Decreti da Sua Excellenza il sig Cavalier Alessandro 
Ball Regio Commissionario Civile di Sua Maestà Britannica NAM LIBR 43/11 vol N.
169 NAM 92/04 1805 box 1.
170 Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807 above n. 93.
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that he was a “despot” whom the Maltese had come to fear.171 
The Avviso of 25th May 1805172
This was the second Public Notice arising from the anti-Semitic disturbances. 
Here, Coleridge notified the inhabitants of the severe punishment meted 
out to a named individual, Fortunata Tagliana, who had, according to 
Coleridge, been convicted of inciting anti-Semitic violence that resulted in 
an assault, by a gang of assailants, on a French prisoner of war. Surviving 
court records suggest that she was convicted of “insulting” the Frenchman 
and spreading malicious rumours.173 As we shall discover, Coleridge’s 
Notice may have been neither a comprehensive nor accurate account of 
the facts.
This Public Notice further recorded the financial reward paid by the 
authorities to another named individual, Francesco Borg, who intervened 
to rescue the victim. 
Unlike the earlier case of the convicted offenders, Andrea Borg, 
Hasciach and Bonello, there is evidence that Fortunata Tagliana was tried 
and convicted by the criminal court. However, as we have described, 
there is unambiguous evidence that the court was acting on the Civil 
Commissioner’s instructions when it imposed the sentence. 
The sentence of permanent exile was, no doubt, intended to be an 
exemplary punishment: Coleridge had already made clear, in the terms 
of the Public Notice of 22 May 1805, that sentences for the spreading of 
false rumours would be severe and be imposed regardless of age. However, 
Fortunata’s exile to Gozo is distinguishable from the punishment meted 
out previously to Andrea Borg, Hasciach and Bonello because hers was 
within the range of permitted punishments under the Code de Rohan. 174
The promulgation of the instrument on a Saturday, rather than on a normal 
working day, lends further credence to the argument that the persecution 
of the Jews had caused considerable anxiety. The administration clearly 
believed that the public interest required the earliest possible dissemination 
of the news of her conviction. In accordance with government orders the 
Notice was published, and its contents disseminated, the following day, a 
Sunday. 
171 See Chapter 2.
172 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f.9.
173 NAM 92/04 1805. 
174 Item III, para. VII.
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The offences committed by Fortunata Tagliana in Notabile (Mdina) 
reveal that violent anti-Semitic sentiment had spread beyond Valletta and 
the three cities (where most of the Jews had settled). It also indicates the 
intensity of racial hatred: her mere denunciation of the French prisoner of 
war as Jewish was sufficient to persuade the attackers to pursue him. 
Coleridge’s Strategy
The Avviso is of particular interest because it revealed Coleridge’s approach 
to significant government information at a time of public emergency. In 
common with other Avissi it performed an important political function. 
First, it communicated information that was essentially irrelevant to the 
purpose of denouncing an attack upon a Frenchman. In particular, it 
engaged the audience in Fortunata’s motive – the cause of her actions – as 
well as the methods she employed to achieve her ultimate purpose. This 
important information reveals something of Coleridge’s style, which has 
a narrative quality not usually associated with similar official instruments 
that were principally concerned to publicise the outcome of a case. 
Another important feature of the Notice is that the information it 
contained is misleading. This may have been deliberate, or simply a 
consequence of the over-hasty response to what the government saw as 
a crisis. Certainly, the Notice differed, in important respects, from the 
witness testimony. Even if Coleridge had access to the court records, the 
discrepancies, some of which are potentially of great significance, are 
difficult to explain. 
The Notice recorded that Fortunata encouraged the attack because she 
wished to pursue a grievance with a female neighbour “with whom she was 
in disagreement”. According to Coleridge’s text, she did this by inducing 
others – the “delinquents” – to “beat up” and stone a French prisoner of 
war who was claimed to be a Jew. 
The extensive witness evidence, although not wholly consistent, offered 
a markedly different account. All witnesses agreed that the Frenchman 
entered the neighbour’s house, accompanied by a blind Maltese man, 
in order to buy poultry and eggs. The witnesses also agreed that, as the 
Frenchman was leaving by the front door, Fortunata was on her roof 
terrace and that she began to call out that a Jew had entered the neighbour’s 
house (the house of Anna Singlia). According to one account, Fortunata, 
was reported to have accused the supposed Jew (the Frenchman) of 
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doing magic; according to another, of intending to slit the arteries of the 
inhabitants. Importantly, these accounts also revealed that, as well as 
calling on her neighbours to attack the Jew, Fortunata came down into the 
street and threw stones at him. This evidence is particularly important 
because it altered the criminal nature of her conduct. It is not simply that 
she incited violence intending it to be perpetrated by others, but rather that 
she initiated that violence and took part in it herself. This evidence made 
her offence more serious and perhaps explained why she was exiled for 
life. It is all the more remarkable that these, critically significant, facts were 
omitted by Coleridge from his Notice.
But this is not all. According to Coleridge, it was the “delinquents”, 
and not Fortunata, who stoned the French prisoner. However, according 
to the latter’s own testimony, the only stones were thrown by Fortunata. 
The other assailants merely threatened to punch him. Following Francesco 
Borg’s intervention, he escaped unharmed. 
As stated above, Coleridge’s Notice explicitly connected the attack on 
the Frenchman with a disagreement between Fortunata and Anna Singlia. 
There was a suggestion of a “vendetta”. Coleridge’s emphasis on this 
motive was not a casual one. Not only was Fortunata a threat to her fellow 
citizens, she was also cruel and manipulative. Coleridge inferred that she 
was so evil that she thought it acceptable to have a third party assaulted 
simply to cause distress to a neighbour. 
However, the “vendetta” was Coleridge’s own invention: there is no 
evidence of it in any of the witness statements. Anti-Semitic sentiment 
alone caused and motivated Fortunata’s behaviour. This was, of course, a 
most serious matter and, arguably, sufficient to convey his message without 
embellishment. So why did Coleridge go further and invent the “vendetta”? 
The answer to this is elusive, but one possibility is that the supposed dispute 
with the neighbour suggested even greater malevolence because it involved 
cunning manipulation. In other words, in choosing those particular means 
of distressing her neighbour, she had been willing to have an unconnected 
third party stoned. It portrayed even greater Machiavellian ruthlessness. 
The “vendetta” also created an additional victim from within the Maltese 
community (the neighbour). Did Coleridge feel that this was important 
to win greater public support for her conviction? Was her anti-Semitic 
behaviour not enough to secure public revulsion? If so, and Fortunata had 
to be portrayed as a threat to her “own” community as well as to the Jews, it 
suggests that anti-Semitic sentiment must, indeed, have been widespread. 
228 Coleridge’s Laws
The stated purpose of the punishment (exile for life) was to cure 
Fortunata of her anti-Semitic attitudes. In that sense, its dominant purpose 
was, ostensibly, rehabilitative; but, somewhat contradictorily, the Notice 
records that there were no Jews on Gozo; and the possibility of readmission 
to Maltese society was precluded, unless the exile was rescinded. Despite 
its stated purpose, the punishment was predominantly designed to remove 
Fortunata from Malta to protect community relations. The severity of the 
punishment also revealed an intention to deter others. 
The Notice contained certain paradoxes concerning the reward granted 
to Francesco Borg, who intervened to rescue the Frenchman. The fact that 
a reward was conferred implies a recognition of exceptional conduct – in 
this instance the courageous and independent action Borg had undertaken 
when he intervened to confront, alone, the numerically superior “two or 
three delinquents” who were (according to Coleridge’s version) stoning the 
victim. The offer of a reward, by itself, commended Borg for his conduct. 
Curiously, the Notice continued that the Civil Commissioner was 
displeased at “having” to reward Borg for doing no more than his civic 
duty. Moreover, the Notice, somewhat bizarrely, emphasised that this 
displeasure was even greater than that Ball had suffered when having to 
punish Fortunata for her incitement of violence. 
This somewhat astonishing statement was, perhaps, designed to be a 
standard-setting measure. Perhaps it was intended to remind society that 
intervention to prevent assault is a normal civic duty. If so, the strategy 
seems clear: Ball and Coleridge intended to encourage individuals to act on 
their own initiative either to prevent or to restrain any further anti-Semitic 
violence. However, the manner in which this was achieved, in particular 
by the grudging statement concerning the reward, cannot have acted as 
an incentive to others to confront those actually using, or prepared to use, 
violence against Jews. 
The conclusion, that the reward was reluctantly granted, is reinforced 
by the emphasis Coleridge placed on reserving rewards for cases of greater 
merit. It is possible to ask what cases might be more meritorious? After all, 
according to Coleridge’s account, Borg was depicted as having moral and 
physical courage to intervene against a gang who were stoning an innocent 
victim. The impression created is that the gang might have turned upon 
him, so Borg had showed conspicuous bravery to save, from serious harm, 
a member of an unpopular minority.
However, the facts were not as Coleridge would have the Maltese 
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believe, and the suggestion is that Coleridge knew this. Borg made no 
claim to intervene in a stoning; and the victim, the Frenchman, testified that 
the group of assailants merely threatened to punch him, and that he escaped 
uninjured. This places Coleridge’s remarks about reserving financial rewards 
for more meritorious conduct into context. A conclusion to be drawn from 
this might be that Borg was not rewarded for any outstanding courage in 
confronting a dangerous mob, but rather to signal an appropriate official 
approval of those who challenged the “popular prejudice” of anti-Semitism. 
The Public Notice is also of interest for its obvious omission. It does not 
record what punishment, if any, was meted out to those whom Coleridge 
alleged perpetrated the alleged assault upon the Frenchman. The Avviso is 
also conspicuously vague as to whether there were two or three attackers 
(the witness evidence is not). The impression Coleridge created was that 
the “delinquents” were never identified and that they ultimately escaped 
justice.
In fact, the witness evidence is clear. It identified and named all those 
who pursued the Frenchman, which meant that the authorities would have 
had no difficulty in apprehending them had they wished to do so. The 
reason they were not arrested is that their conduct was not sufficiently 
serious to justify prosecution. Apart from Fortunata’s conduct, a blow was 
threatened, but none was actually inflicted. It was Fortunata who was the 
most serious offender: she incited violence; she initiated and took part in it 
herself. In fact, she was the only individual who threw stones at the victim. 
This must have been the reason why she alone was prosecuted. Coleridge 
again misrepresented the facts.
Are the inconsistencies the result of the haste with which the Notice was 
prepared and promulgated? Did Coleridge resort to invention to ensure 
Maltese support for Fortunata’s conviction? If so, why not refer to the 
stoning that she alone perpetrated? These are difficult questions. Certainly, 
it would seem to be the case, that Coleridge knew more of the factual 
background than the Notice, in its terms, revealed, and that Coleridge may 
well have manipulated information to further the government’s purpose 
in portraying anti-Semites, such as Fortunata, as malicious individuals 
who acted not to only harm unpopular Jews but also their fellow Maltese. 
Coleridge used information to reinforce the appropriate conclusion that it 
was in the interests of all inhabitants to suppress anti-Semitism. Whether 
Coleridge deliberately misled the inhabitants is open to speculation. If he 
did not deliberately mislead then the conclusion must be that either he or 
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his staff did not take sufficient care to ensure the accuracy of the information 
he communicated. 
5.4.2. Immigration and the Detection of Crime
Proclamation of 21 June 1805 – Immigration and Crime175
This Proclamation was aimed, on the one hand, at the regulation of 
immigration and the presence of foreigners on the islands, and, on the 
other, the registration of vehicles and vessels. According to the preamble, 
the common theme of these two, apparently distinct, policy goals was the 
reduction of crime.
Contrary to Ball’s assertion, in his despatch to Windham,176 that the 
insurrection was a matter that was soon forgotten – one that blew over 
within a few days – it seems likely that the authorities understood that the 
destabilising social friction resulting from immigration required further 
official action. The control of immigration had, since 1801, been a matter 
upon which the civil (rather than the military) authorities could legislate.177 
Even so, the moral basis of the intervention in 1805 is perplexing. 
The problem of unemployed foreigners having been forced into crime 
had been, in the former days of the economic slump, a pressing political 
issue that justified the early interventions by the authorities; but these new, 
far-reaching legislative controls on foreigners, including foreigners already 
present on Malta, (many of whom must have satisfactorily demonstrated 
their peaceful intentions) requires special justification. This is especially so 
when much of what took place in May 1805 was a consequence of racist 
agitation resulting from simmering anti-Semitism. Why did Ball appear to 
indulge this sentiment?
The first possibility is that, as a pragmatist, Ball might have acted in 
the belief that this Bando was necessary to preserve public order. We have 
described evidence that the authorities were more unsettled by what took 
place than Ball’s despatch of 1807 acknowledged; and Coleridge’s own 
evidence suggests that the authorities actually believed that a massacre had 
narrowly been avoided. Ball might have decided that the new regulations 
would be a proportionate response to the threat of insurrection; after all, 
he did not re-instate the former ban on Jews living on Malta. And in Ball’s 
175 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 14.
176 Above n. 93.
177 Hobart to Cameron, 2 September 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/207 et seq.
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defence we must not overlook ministerial directions, which he was bound 
to follow. He was, it will be recalled, ordered to maintain the popularity 
of his administration even if this meant indulging the “prejudices” of the 
Maltese.178 If Coleridge hesitated at the moral problems posed by policy-
making driven by indulging racial prejudices, the business of government 
may have been thought to make such compromises expedient and 
even necessary. Thus, the actions of government in the aftermath of the 
disturbances of May 1805 might have been on Coleridge’s mind when he 
expressed contempt for political morality when he left office.179
Coleridge’s Bando introduced tighter controls on immigration, more 
extensive powers to monitor the foreigners present on the Island, and 
strengthened the power to deport. It was a further step in tightening the 
regulations to which foreigners had been subjected on the Island since the 
first Bando on the subject in 1802.180
Curiously, Coleridge also used this Bando to introduce new measures 
concerning other matters. Gigs for hire, carts, ferry boats and fishing 
vessels had to be registered under a new system thereby ensuring that the 
authorities could identify them and their owners. This might have served a 
number of purposes that included crime prevention and detection. Bearing 
in mind the apparent problems of gaining witness evidence in many cases, 
Coleridge may have wished to make it easier to identify miscreants. It is 
unclear why Coleridge decided to bring all these matters within a single 
Bando. 
Immigration and Foreign Visitors 
As we have seen, under existing regulations, the authorities had the power 
to require overseas visitors to state their occupation and the purpose of 
their visit. This allowed the Administration to exclude persons who had 
no bona fide purpose on the Island, or those who might have been tempted 
into crime if they had no obvious means of earning their livelihood. 
Coleridge’s Bando allowed the authorities to take even more extensive 
178 Cameron’s Royal Instructions of 14 May 1801 had instructed him as follows: 
“No alteration should be made in the modes, laws and regulations according to 
which the civil affairs and the Revenue of the Island have been heretofore managed 
unless the same shall appear ...to be evidently beneficial and desirable, as to leave 
no doubt of its expediency or of it being generally acceptable to the wishes, feelings 
and even prejudices of the inhabitants”. (Emphasis added).
179 See Chapter 6.
180 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 273.
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powers, including the power to limit the numbers of foreigners present on 
the Island, by means of a permit system, and introducing, for the first time, 
a maximum duration for the visit. 
Significantly, the regulations forced foreigners already present on 
the Island (including the Jews) to obtain a permit in order to continue 
residing there. This signalled a recognition that the existing population of 
immigrants required control, albeit for political reasons. 
The rationale of Coleridge’s Bando was that immigration and settlement 
would only be permitted when it served a public interest as identified 
by the authorities. It offered the public assurance (if nothing more) that 
the authorities were acting to protect the Maltese from foreign criminals, 
carpet-baggers, opportunists and or anyone who would disturb the stability 
of Maltese society. 
The Bando introduced a requirement for all overseas visitors to obtain 
official permission in order to stay on the Island. Those not registered 
were prevented from obtaining accommodation. As said, it re-iterated 
the requirement of earlier Bandi (see above) that the grant of permission 
depended on the overseas visitor satisfying the authorities of the reason 
for their presence on the Island. However, it introduced a major reform. 
Even in cases in which the purpose was either innocuous or conducive 
to the public good, the Maltese authorities now took a further power to 
determine the maximum limit of the visit. Longer term visits (longer than 
four months), became a matter for the discretion of the Civil Commissioner. 
Thus, the Civil Commissioner would have the power to determine which 
foreigners could reside on Malta. 
Before examining the Bando in more detail it is important to state that 
the instrument does not define who are foreigners and, thus, who might 
be regulated. Whether, for example, the term “foreigner” included British 
subjects is unlikely because the Maltese were, in law, British subjects, 
although this was not publicly admitted by the British during this period. 
The Registration System
Every foreigner wishing to remain “for a period of time” on the Island had 
to obtain a permit. This requirement extended to all foreigners already 
resident on the Island as well as future immigrants. 
Somewhat confusingly, the penalty for non-compliance was inserted 
into Article 2, which dealt with particular categories of foreign visitor 
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and foreign residents. However, it is likely that Coleridge intended this 
provision to apply generally, for there was no other provision dealing 
with penalties for breach. Foreigners without a permit (including existing 
foreign residents) would be subject to a fine of ten oncie and immediate 
deportation. They would, thereafter, be subject to permanent exclusion 
from the Island. This was a severe penalty. It can readily be understood that 
the existing foreign residents, already present on Malta in June 1805, must 
have been extremely anxious to obtain a permit. If this had been refused, 
the prospect of immediate deportation would, inevitably, have caused 
hardship especially to those with non-liquid assets on the Island.
The permit system was to be operated by both the President of the 
Grand Court of Valletta and the Chief of Police, who had, jointly, to sign 
any permit issued. Where they thought it appropriate to do so, they could 
consult with the Civil Commissioner. 
The involvement of the Chief of Police, in particular, suggests that 
the authorities were concerned about foreigners who visited Malta with 
criminal intent. One purpose of the registration scheme was, clearly, to weed 
out criminal elements before they entered Maltese society. This concern can 
also be seen in the information that the foreigner was required to provide, 
which includes his or her real name. This provision suggests that foreigners 
intent on wrongdoing had previously entered the Island using aliases. 
The Bando was highly prescriptive in the demands it placed upon the 
licensing authorities. They were obliged to meet every day, at ten o clock in 
the morning, to consider the cases of the foreigners who had arrived that 
day. It is unclear what legal consequences would follow if they failed to 
meet as required. 
The regulations specify, in detail, how two, distinct, registers  relating 
to the foreigner’s admission to Malta were to be maintained, one by the 
President of the Court and the other by the Chief of Police. The  information 
included the identity of the foreigner, and, of course their reason for being 
present on Malta. It was also noted which documents the authorities had 
inspected to establish the foreigner’s credentials. The form of the entries 
was also stipulated in precise detail. 
Most importantly, the Chief of Police’s register was required to record 
the date on which the foreigner quit the Island and whether the permit 
had been surrendered. This clearly allowed the authorities to monitor the 
number of foreigners present on the Island. 
The information concerning the date of departure and surrender of the 
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permit had to be communicated “by hand” to the President of the Grand 
Court. For reasons that are not obvious the regulations did not explicitly 
require the President to record this “exit” information in his register, 
although presumably, the President would, naturally, have wished to keep 
a record of the information he received from the Police. 
Limitations on Entry to Malta
In order to obtain a permit, the overseas visitor had to provide the authorities 
with the information required by the Bando which was recorded in the 
register as well as on the face of the permit. 
Included in this information was, in the words of the Bando, the amount 
of time that the foreigner “wishes, and is able to remain on the island”. This 
should not be read as allowing the foreigner to determine the length of the 
permitted stay on the Island – i.e. a duration determined according to his 
or her wishes. Articles 4 and 7 of the Bando made it clear that the permitted 
duration of the visit was a matter for the Maltese authorities, and even they 
did not have unlimited discretion in this respect. Article 4 stipulated that 
the maximum duration of the permit, in the first instance, could only be 
two months and was renewable, by the President and Chief of Police, for 
a period of no more than two further months. Any stay longer than four 
months was a matter for the Civil Commissioner. This, of course, placed 
effective control, of settlement on the Island, within British rather than 
Maltese hands. Clearly, the authorities were unwilling to allow foreigners 
to take up permanent residence or to operate businesses based on the Island 
without being able to satisfy the Civil Commissioner that their presence 
was conducive to the public good. 
The reference to the period of time the foreign visitor would be “able” 
to remain on Malta is perhaps a response to the problems caused when 
foreigners had arrived on the Island lacking independent means of support. 
Coleridge was required to ensure that the authorities could enquire into the 
length of time during which any foreigners could provide for themselves.
The Civil Commissioner’s discretion to grant or refuse a (residency) 
permit, for a visit in excess of four months, was unlimited. He could take 
into account any information or any suspicion that he considered relevant. 
The Registro dei Memoriale e Decreti provides unambiguous evidence that a 
more stringent and discriminating approach was being taken with these 
applications after the coming into force of Coleridge’s Bando of June 1805. 
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Many applications by foreigners for an extended residency (or, alternatively, 
for naturalisation) were rejected, albeit that some were granted. Those 
whose applications succeeded were, however, only granted a permit to 
remain during the Civil Commissioner’s pleasure. Removal was possible at 
any time in his discretion: no right of residency was thus created.181 
The regulations provided that those foreigners already on Malta, when 
the registration system came into force, would have to “try” to obtain the 
necessary permit within eight days. It was not made clear, in the Bando, 
what would satisfy this obligation. It certainly reveals that not having the 
permit after the expiry of eight days would not necessarily be an offence 
provided an attempt had been made to get one. However, the reality was 
that each foreigner was liable to a fine and deportation if a permit was 
refused. 
The Regulations were obscure in their scope. For practical reasons, not 
all foreign visitors were required to obtain a permit. Given that a distinction 
was to be drawn between those who were regulated and those who were 
not, it became imperative to distinguish between them. The Bando merely 
states that those wishing to remain “for a period of time” must register 
and remain in possession of a permit. This is plainly intended to alleviate a 
burden upon both the foreigner and the Maltese administration by making 
provision for certain short-term visitors. But it is unclear what duration of 
visit triggered a requirement to register. This represents a further, obvious, 
defect in the scheme of regulations. Given the draconian penalties for 
not obtaining a permit, this lack of clarity might have encouraged many 
to obtain a permit to safeguard themselves. If so, the problem, with this 
cautionary approach on the part of visitors, would have been that the 
administration would have had to process more cases than might have 
been intended. 
Frequent overseas visitors to the Island were required to obtain a permit 
“immediately after their arrival” or risk a penalty of being fined ten oncie 
and permanent exclusion from the Island. 
In common with other Bandi, the fine was to be used to reward informants 
who offered information about unregistered foreigners. The need for paid 
informants implicitly acknowledged that incriminating information would 
not otherwise have been given to the authorities. Given the popular feeling 
181 See e.g., the application of Diego Decandia, 29 August 1805, in the Registro dei 
Memoriale e Decretati above n. 68. This was subject, of course, to a successful applica-
tion for naturalisation, such as that presented by Domenico Amadori on 31 August 
1805, ibid.
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against foreigners, it is unclear why Coleridge doubted the willingness 
of the Maltese to inform: presumably, unregistered foreigners would 
have been identified as troublemakers that the Maltese would wish to see 
deported.
As we have seen, it is clear that the authorities wished to know who 
was on the Island at any one time because, when they left the Island, the 
foreigner had to return his permit to the Chief of Police. By the simple 
method of recording the number of permits issued (and not returned) the 
authorities intended to know, at any given time, the number of overseas 
visitors present. Of course, this depended on ensuring that the foreigner 
would surrender the permit on leaving the Island. Failure to do this 
was made, under Article 5, a grave matter since the offender would be 
permanently excluded from the Island. This was a mandatory sentence; 
there was no discretion to impose a lesser exclusion. 
This provision, requiring surrender, also had the effect of removing the 
permit from circulation, thus preventing it being passed on to a potential 
wrongdoer who could then claim entry. Doubtless, Coleridge had the 
unfortunate experience of the “Mediterranean passports” in mind when he 
drafted this provision.182
Unregistered Foreigners
To make it difficult for foreigners to evade the registration system, the new 
regulations provided that lodgings could not be “given” to an unregistered 
foreigner, nor any house rented to him. The terms of the Proclamation 
were particularly harsh because the penalty for an offending landlord 
was a mandatory life-time exile from Malta. Moreover, this was, from the 
landlord’s viewpoint, an especially draconian measure because a landlord 
had no defence when he had been shown a false permit. This meant 
that the risk of deception was borne by  landlords. Coleridge’s Bando, 
accordingly, advised landlords to check the authenticity of the permit with 
the authorities. It seems that proof of having taken this step was the only 
defence when a landlord unwittingly let a room to an unlicensed foreigner 
who presented a false permit. 
Thus, the regulation placed under the strict control of the authorities, 
the presence of all but a very few short-term visitors to the Island. They 
could ascertain, from the number of permits issued, how many foreigners 
182 Considered below under “Passports”. 
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were on the Island; the registers recorded why each individual was present 
and how long they were permitted to remain. Permission to remain would, 
normally, be for a maximum of four months unless the express permission 
of the Civil Commissioner was obtained. This gave the Maltese some 
assurance that immigration would potentially be controlled and policed. 
Gigs for Hire, Carts, Ferries and Fishing Boats
Coleridge’s Bando also created a vehicle and vessel registration scheme 
for Malta. This involved the keeping of three sets of registers. The first 
maintained by the President; the second lodged with the Government 
office but updated by the President; and the third maintained by the local 
lieutenants of the casals and the fiscal lawyer of the maritime court. 
The owners of vessels and vehicles had to obtain a number for their 
vessel or vehicle from the President of the Court. The number, painted in oil, 
was then displayed on it. The President was required to stipulate the place 
where the number had to be displayed. He had to maintain a register of the 
numbers allocated and in the format required by the regulations (see Reg. 
11). The register had to include the name of the proprietors, their country 
of origin or place of residence. Any sale or transfer was intended to result 
in a new entry in the register but, in what appears to have been a startling 
error, Coleridge did not require the sale or transfer to be notified either by 
the seller or buyer/transferee. Presumably, the authorities discovered this 
information during their monthly inspections (below). This is interesting 
because the burden of detecting changes in ownership fell upon the 
authorities. An alternative system might have required the owners to notify 
a transfer of ownership, which would have alleviated the burden upon the 
authorities. 
The number was to be reallocated if the vehicle or vessel was destroyed.
Records containing similar information were to be maintained by the 
local lieutenants in the casals and the fiscal layer of the maritime court. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the role of the fiscal lawyer of the maritime court 
was not confined to the registration of vessels. In so far as he had to register 
the number of gigs for hire and the number of carts, reg 15 treated the 
fiscal lawyer similarly to the lieutenants of the casals. Presumably, this 
was intended to create a national register of the carts in addition to the 
local registers. Each month these office-holders were required to inspect 
the vehicles/vessels to make sure their numbers were still legible and 
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update the record to reflect changes in ownership etc. The identities of all 
owners and the condition of the numbers had to be reported monthly to 
the Government.
A copy of the register kept by the President had to be submitted to the 
government within one month; and this copy, held by the government, had 
to be updated regularly thereafter ensuring that it corresponded with the 
copy maintained by the President. 
Drivers and operators were also to be issued with a card showing the 
number. This, of course, meant that the authorities who stopped a vehicle/
vessel and its driver would have some prima facie indication as to whether 
any suspected vehicle or vessel was being lawfully operated. 
A failure to comply either with the registration requirement (the 
obligation to obtain a number) or to carry the card bearing the number 
when the vehicle or vessel was in use183 would result in a fine. This was 
stipulated to be six oncie for a first offence. There was no discretion to 
impose a lesser penalty. 
A second offence would result in the mandatory confiscation of the 
vehicle or vessel, which was to be sold following its confiscation. There was 
no express prohibition on its re-acquisition by its offending former owner. 
Three oncie from the proceeds of sale were to be given to the informant 
who notified the authorities of the offence – a familiar device in Maltese 
legislation, and perhaps a measure necessary to encourage reluctant 
witnesses.
Enforcement Agency
The President of the Grand Court was given responsibility for overseeing 
the implementation of this Proclamation, as well as a number of others 
to which Coleridge referred. These included the Proclamation of 3 
December 1800 which regulated “layabouts” and “vagabonds”184 as well 
as the Proclamation of 12 November 1804 which was concerned with the 
participation of women in politics. Unfortunately, no record of this latter 
measure can be found in the archives of the National Library of Malta.
The day to day enforcement activity became the responsibility of the 
Grand Viscount, or his lieutenant, the Maestro di Piazza, as well as various 
other captains and viscounts. These were essentially officers of the local 
183 The language of the Bando suggests a wider obligation requiring the card to be 
carried at all times (regardless of whether the vessel/vehicle was actually in use).
184 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 156.
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law enforcement to whom offences had to be reported under the Code de 
Rohan. We have seen, earlier, how the Jew, Di Biaggii, went to complain 
to the authorities about the taunts and insults he endured from the boys 
in St Paul’s Street, Valletta. He had gone immediately to the Tribunal and 
returned to the scene with the Viscount. 
Responsibility for enforcing earlier regulations for the highways 
had already been imposed on the Maestro, so, to that extent, this Bando 
was broadening the jurisdiction of an existing structure concerning the 
transport system. For example, it was the Maestro who enforced powers 
and duties under the Bando of 29 August 1801,185 which was concerned 
with removing street nuisances and obstructions. These new regulations 
gave further powers in relation to vehicles.
5.5. Corruption
Introduction
The problem of corruption, particularly amongst officials in the various 
Maltese departments of state, including the Università, has been noted 
elsewhere.186 It was an insidious and threatening problem for Ball’s strategy 
of Government since the central goal of British policy was aimed at winning 
and retaining popular support for his Administration.187 Corrupt practices 
threatened to undermine this because, by their very purpose, they were 
intended to distort the manner in which a public body ought to function 
when performing its legal and administrative duties. This problem, clearly, 
had the potential to combine with other causes of disillusionment with 
the British Administration and, thereby, further undermine public trust in 
government. 
Sufficient evidence survives to reveal suspicions about official 
behaviour on Malta. For example, the conclusions from Thonton’s analysis 
of the affairs of the Università, between 1800 and 1814, are not convincingly 
explained by official incompetence alone.188 The inference is that either theft 
185 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 213.
186 See Chapter 2 and the taxation theme. 
187 It will be recalled that Ball’s Instructions were to “attach” the Maltese to British 
rule: Secretary of State to Ball, 9 June 1802, Kew, FO 49/3/51.
188 Thornton identified “fictitious entries” where the books did not balance. See 
Thornton, Report to His Excellency the Governor on the Accounts of the University of Val-
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or other forms of dishonesty were a problem in this department. It seems 
that Maltese officials illegitimately diverted public money for private 
purposes in the knowledge that the British Treasury would ultimately 
replace it. The British had signalled to the Maltese, at the time of Treaty 
of Amiens in 1802, that British interests would be prioritised even if this 
meant damaging those of the Maltese. Some Maltese officials – we do 
not know how many – might have been tempted, in what perhaps came 
to be regarded as a cynical relationship, to siphon off funds to make the 
most of the opportunities presented by British rule.189 Such conduct might 
well have had the tacit support of a population that, as we shall see, was 
perhaps not always sympathetic to British goals.190 So much for theft, what 
about bribery? 
We cannot be certain how deep-rooted attempted bribery had become 
by the time Coleridge was on the Island, but we do know that Aloisia 
Caruana’s case – the subject of Coleridge’s Avviso – was not an isolated 
one. Ball reported to London, in 1807, that he had banished, to Barbary, two 
inspectors of the public market each of whom had accepted bribes.191 
Corruption
Bribery can be regarded as a means to persuade an official not to perform 
his or her public duty. If it succeeds an individual can attain a priority for 
their selfish interests that it might not otherwise have obtained, and this 
can be damaging to the public interest in rational and fair administration. 
Moreover, if there is a widespread perception that “justice” can be bought 
and sold, disputes will be resolved outside of the court structure. The State’s 
monopoly on the use of coercive powers would break down: vendetta and 
vigilantism would replace adjudication. 
In some cases, and Coleridge’s Avviso deals with one of them, the 
initiative to depart from formal processes comes from the individual, at 
other times it comes from the public official. In the latter case, officials 
illegally demand money, from members of the public, for their services. 
Because the victims are members of the public, frictional effects are almost 
letta from 4th September 1800-31st July 1814, Kew, CO 163/33/9.
189 Such opportunism also extended to ordinary Maltese. See for example Col-
eridge’s Public Notice of 20 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 
12, which is concerned with civilians profiting by obtaining money by deception 
under the enlistment system, see the military discipline theme, below. 
190 See for example the military discipline theme.
191 Ball to Windham, 28 February 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/91.
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inevitable, not least where many individuals cannot afford the price 
demanded. The case of the corrupt Maltese market inspectors was likely to 
have fallen into this latter category. 
Coleridge’s Avviso 14 June 1805192 – Attempted 
Bribery
This Notice recounts that Aloisia Caruana was imprisoned for having 
attempted to bribe the Penal Judge of the Grand Court of Valletta, with 
an ounce of Sicilian gold, in order to ensure a favourable outcome in her 
appeal. It seems that she had already been convicted of a criminal offence; 
and the judge whom she attempted to bribe, one Doctor Vincenzo Caruana 
Zerafa, had been listed to hear her appeal. There was no suggestion that 
Zerafa had accepted the payment; it had merely been offered. Presumably, 
the judge had then taken action to have her punished. Thus, in one sense, 
the Notice is not simply concerned with announcing the punishment of an 
offender; it also records the moral integrity of the Maltese judiciary and 
invites public support for the criminal justice system.193 
This Avviso had a wider significance because it was issued in the weeks 
following the anti-Semitic disturbances during which the Administration 
had interfered in the judicial process to exact a higher sentence for convicted 
offenders. As we have seen, this interference had caused significant alarm 
in Malta. It became one of many complaints about Ball’s administration 
that was recounted in a Petition to the Crown. Ball and Coleridge may have 
issued this Avviso to stress the integrity of the Maltese judiciary and to re-
build confidence in it.194
Punishment
The sentence imposed on Caruana – an indeterminate but brief incarceration 
– suggests that her offence was not regarded as particularly heinous. By 
contrast, the sentence of banishment imposed on the market officials was 
of a different and altogether more reprehensible character because they 
192 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 11.
193 The tactic of naming the judge in this instance safeguarded his judicial reputa-
tion, but Coleridge might have achieved greater confidence in the judicial system 
had he not chosen to do so. This would have created a stronger inference that the 
Maltese judges were incorruptible.
194 See Chapter 2. 
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had betrayed the trust reposed in their office. The authorities distinguished 
between the offering and acceptance of corrupt payments and treated more 
harshly the abuse of public office by those officials who allowed themselves 
to receive bribes. Even so, an ounce of gold must have represented a 
significant sum as it is hardly conceivable that Caruana would have 
attempted to bribe an appeal court judge with a trivial sum of money. 
The sentence imposed on the offender raises some interesting questions 
about the judicial process on Malta in 1805. We have already mentioned 
that the Notice does not specify the duration of the period for which she 
would be incarcerated. The formula employed was that she would continue 
to remain in prison for “several days”. The reason why the period of the 
detention was not stipulated is unclear. One possibility is that Coleridge, 
deliberately or otherwise, refrained from giving specific information, 
although it is difficult to imagine why this could be sensitive.
Another possibility is that the sentence to be served was not actually 
fixed at the start of the sentence and so Coleridge could not include it in the 
Avviso. Her release date might have depended upon the discretion of the 
penal authorities, possibly even upon that of Ball himself since he had an 
absolute discretion to release prisoners.195 It appears that this prerogative 
power was exercised in consultation with the Chief Justice or the pro-
seggretario, Zammit,196 and, if so, Coleridge would not have wished, by 
means of a prior public announcement, to pre-empt their decision in this 
matter.
Public Relations
It is highly significant that Coleridge recorded that the confiscated property 
was to be distributed amongst the poor, although this distribution had not 
taken place at the time the notice was promulgated. Since this information 
was, essentially, extraneous to the deterrence, it is likely that Coleridge 
included it for the deliberate reason that he did not wish to miss a valuable 
public relations opportunity. He had clearly realised that he could use this 
Avviso to present Ball as he wished to be presented – as a just and kindly 
governor.
One resentment that endured after the uprising concerned the harsh 
195 There appears to have been a custom that at Christmas and Easter prisoners 
might have their sentences reduced, or even that they might be released. See Sul-
tana, 322-3.
196 Sultana, ibid.
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sentences that Ball had demanded from the judiciary. As we have described, 
a boy of twelve was amongst the banished; and Ball had declared that, in 
future, he would punish minors with an equal severity to adults. This, 
perhaps, explains why Coleridge emphasised the steps Ball would take 
to protect the weaker members of society. He would also have wanted to 
remind the Maltese that Ball was concerned about their economic welfare, 
since the uprising had, in part, been motivated by fear of renewed poverty 
resulting from competition in trade. Thus, the Avviso represented an 
attempt to re-engage with a number of Maltese concerns after the civil 
disturbances of the previous month. It is another example of an Avviso 
being used to stimulate public approval of Ball, and it is one of many that 
served Coleridge’s broader political agenda of retaining popular support 
for British rule. 
5.6.  Consumer Protection
Introduction
In this section, we shall consider Coleridge’s measures to regulate the 
availability of strong spirits, to impose inspections on wine, to control sales 
of unripened fruit and to warn of counterfeit coinage. 
The purpose of consumer protection laws is to correct market failure. 
In other words, the legislator will have identified trading practices that 
require State intervention. This is achieved by making regulations to 
protect consumers. 
Laws are often introduced to safeguard the economic interests of 
consumers, for example, by prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices or to 
protect health and safety either by removing dangerous goods and services 
from the market place or, alternatively, by restricting their availability.197 
Some of Coleridge’s Bandi, such as those concerning spirits, also indirectly 
served public order purposes by reducing alcohol-related crime. 
It is important to understand which purpose a law is intended to serve 
before we can judge the competence and coherence of its drafting. If, for 
example, its concern was health and safety, we would assess the measure on 
its potential to remove the dangerous commodity from use. Alternatively, 
197 As was the case in relation to spirits, where the authorities regulated the quan-
tity available: See further below. 
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if the measure was intended to prevent shopkeepers confusing customers 
(as in the case of the unripened fruit in the Bando of 5 August 1805198) we 
would expect the measure to permit consumption, but to regulate the 
circumstances in which the goods are displayed – e.g. by requiring clear 
labelling. However, for the reasons set out below, the drafting of Coleridge’s 
consumer-protection measures sometimes suffered from confusion about 
what evil was to be eradicated. 
A preliminary matter of interest is that Coleridge’s legislative agenda 
did not extend beyond correcting certain particular, and quite narrowly 
defined, examples of market failure. For example, he targeted the sales of 
unripened fruit, rather than imposing a general duty upon sellers to ensure 
that all food offered for sale was fit for consumption. This suggests that 
neither Coleridge nor Ball had a broader political ambition to introduce 
general principles of consumer protection that would apply to all 
transactions. This is unsurprising at this date in history. The approach to 
regulation was minimalist, which indicated that policy-makers favoured 
a conception of the State’s role in regulating commerce that promoted 
freedom of contract – an ideology that normally expected consumers to 
safeguard their own interests without expecting the state to perform 
this role for them. Regulations were, thus, reserved for cases that caused 
particular difficulties. 
The hesitation in using criminal penalties is another significant feature 
of Ball’s approach, which was not confined to consumer protection. As we 
have seen, there was also a notable failure to criminalise the continued 
use of studded cartwheels even though they damaged the roads.199 The 
penal code seems to have been reserved for the most serious abuses, which, 
naturally, required the making of value judgements. However, where 
criminal penalties were available they could be mandatory and severe. 
5.6.1. The Regulation of Spirits in the Bando of 22 
March 1805200
Introduction
The British authorities had already identified excessive alcohol consumption 
198 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 19.
199 See Bando 29 January 1805, which is considered under the reconstruction 
theme.
200 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
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as a policy problem by the time Coleridge drafted the Bando of 22 March 
1805. He had already made reference to this in a Bando of 8 March 1805 
dealing with the re-imposition of the wine tax. Unlike the later instrument, 
(22 March) the 8 March 1805 Bando did not have public health protection 
as its primary purpose. It merely used the Administration’s concern over 
excessive consumption of alcohol as an additional means of making the 
argument for the re-introduced excise duty. As we have seen, the real 
purpose was to raise revenue to finance the Island’s deficit.201
The timing of the controls on alcohol is of critical interest because, in the 
spring of 1805, a large contingent of British troops had arrived on the Island 
in readiness for an expedition to defend Sicily. The troops were garrisoned 
on Malta until November 1805. The potential availability of cheap, low 
quality, liquor was a problem for the military authorities, who were not 
only concerned about drunkenness and discipline, but also violence 
between the garrison and civilians. Alcohol abuse by British troops, and 
others, had already prompted such earlier Bandi as the instrument of 24 
November 1801202 and a further measure banning alcohol sales to anyone 
carrying a knife.203 There were also fatal assaults inside and outside bars.204 
It is significant that Ball wrote to Camden that Coleridge’s Bando of 22 
March 1805 had the support of military commanders, including Major-
General Villettes, Commander-in-Chief of British land forces on the Island. 
The Chief medical officer had also welcomed the measure, which Ball 
emphasised, in his despatch to London, would place stricter controls on 
the trade in spirits than on wine.205 
As in other Bandi, there is, thus, strong evidence to suspect that 
Coleridge’s statement of the purposes of the regulations were neither 
comprehensive nor objective. According to the published text, he chose 
to emphasise that the planned restrictions would maximise welfare, in 
particular public health, by limiting the quantity and regulating the quality 
of the product accessible to the retail market. However, when the law is 
examined alongside the surviving records of licence applications it is clear 
201 See taxation theme.
202 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 224. This prohibited the sale of 
wine, brandy or rum to the English soldiers living in the city of Notabile and Bos-
chetto.
203 Bando, 18 October 1802, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 273.
204 See e.g. the fatal stabbing of a British soldier by a Maltese in September 1805: 
http://website.lineone.net/~stephaniebidmead/chapter567.htm, consulted 16 De-
cember 2008.
205 Ball to Camden, 19 April 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/133-4.
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that the purpose of regulation was to make it very difficult for British 
military personnel to gain access to strong liquor. The publicly-stated (but 
not comprehensive) reasons for the enactment of the Bando is another 
example of an appeal to win the consent of the Maltese to a regulatory 
measure. By presenting it as one designed to ensure their safety and well-
being Coleridge was suggesting a congruence between the British and 
Maltese interests in this matter. As in other instruments, we find Coleridge 
obfuscating the policies underlying the measure. His opening paragraph 
might be seen as propaganda or “spin”: 
The attention of His Excellency the Royal Commissioner has been drawn 
to the abuse of spirituous liquors, and to the damaging effect that they 
have on health. He has therefore, willingly undertaken the task of trying to 
find a way to limit this problem and with this aim in mind he proposes the 
following decrees, and orders their strict observance.
Regulation of the Supply Chain 
Coleridge decided to reject the use of a price mechanism to limit demand 
for spirits. Price alone would not achieve the various public-policy goals 
that Coleridge wished to pursue. He brought under the control of the State 
the entire system for the import, manufacture, distillation, distribution and 
sale of spirits. These extensive layers of controls were seen to be necessary 
to achieve a number of further goals, including preventing low quality, even 
dangerous, spirits entering the market;206 preventing undesirable persons 
importing, manufacturing or distributing liquor; reducing the quantities 
produced; regulating the premises entitled to sell alcohol;  regulating those 
approved to sell spirits to the troops.
The Bando is a labyrinthine and complex instrument lacking in both 
clarity and legal certainty. It has many of the hallmarks of inexperienced 
authorship.
Coleridge drafted a sophisticated regulatory system that would bring 
the entire supply chain of spirits under the control of the authorities. 
Importers, distillers, manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers 
are all regulated in different ways. His special concerns were to regulate 
the quality and quantity of spirits sold and especially to control the retail 
trade. As we shall see, these activities were the focus of criminal penalties 
(in contrast to unlicensed wholesaling that was not).
206 It is noteworthy that the inspector was the Chief Physician.
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The production of spirits was placed under a particularly restrictive 
regime. First, the distillation of wine to produce brandy was separately 
regulated (see reg 4) and required a special licence from the President of 
the Grand Court. The authorities were clearly concerned to control the 
amount of distilled spirits entering the market place because Coleridge 
required the licence to state the maximum amount permitted to be distilled. 
Presumably, the authorities wished to know what quantities were available 
to be purchased. Moreover, if fewer establishments were licensed than 
previously, the product could become more scarce which would encourage 
the price to rise. This could be expected to reduce demand for it and so 
further restrict consumption.
Other manufacturers had to obtain their licence by way of a special 
decree from the Civil Commissioner. A surety of fifty oncie had to be 
provided, which was probably intended to prevent back-street or small-
scale operations. Surviving records suggest that applicants were required 
to apply to the Civil Commissioner in the Segnatura.207 
Importers, wholesalers, distributors and even retailers were required to 
have a licence, issued by the President of the Grand Court of Valletta, for 
their activities, which would identify them as the licensed person by virtue 
of regulation 1. Any person even receiving spirits would require a licence. 
Thus, any person taking delivery of spirits fell within the licensing system. 
What is more, shopkeepers, innkeepers and publicans could only trade 
with an additional “special decree” from the Civil Commissioner. 
The number of persons eligible for a licence was limited, presumably 
to prevent the proliferation of persons engaged in the trade. The fewer 
persons who operated within it, the more easily abuse could be detected. 
Under regulation 3 licences to import, unload or take delivery of spirits 
were restricted either to those who were already licensed to produce spirits 
or, alternatively, to apothecaries. This meant that wholesalers who would 
either have to be licensed apothecaries or licensed manufacturers. 
But Coleridge was not content that each wholesale distributor should 
have a licence. He wanted to ensure that no unregulated sales were made 
by wholesalers selling to unlicensed or shady operators, that is, persons 
outside the regulated supply chain. To make sure of this he made it an 
offence for a wholesaler to sell to anyone other than a licensed retailer.
207 NAM 92/04 1805. For example, Giuseppe Camilleri was granted a licence to 
run a bar (tavola) on 3 March 1801. 
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Retail Outlets
Coleridge particularly wanted to control the retail outlets. In addition to 
the licence from the President of the Grand Court, innkeepers, publicans 
and even shopkeepers also had to possess and an additional “special 
decree” from the Civil Commissioner. They also had to be well known and 
of good repute – a requirement intended to deter back-street and shady 
dealers. In deciding whether to grant this licence the Civil Commissioner 
was required to consult with the President of the Court. This reveals that 
Ball did not wish the licensing of the retail chain to fall under the exclusive 
control of Maltese judicial administrators, but, nonetheless, wished to 
obtain their advice. 
Military and Wine
There were special regulations for retail sales in the four cities and Vilhena 
and for sales to military personnel. Within these districts, the retailers were 
obliged (under reg 9) to specialise, and, thus, to decide whether to sell either 
wine or spirits. This restriction did not apply elsewhere on Malta. This is 
unsurprising because the four cities would be an obvious destination for 
troops seeking rest and relaxation. But this is not all because a special 
licence had to be acquired to sell spirits to soldiers. Producers of spirits,208 
confectioners, and shopkeepers, as well as the owners of cafés, inns and 
taverns were eligible to apply for special authority which, if granted, would 
permit them to sell spirits to soldiers. 
In practice, very few retailers succeeded in their applications. The 
surviving records reveal that when retailers applied for their wine or spirits 
licences, these were almost always granted subject to a standard condition 
that spirits could not be sold to either soldiers or sailors.209 The standard 
condition was only omitted if the retailer merely wanted to sell wine to the 
military.210
208 Coleridge would seem to have overlooked the foregoing provision that pre-
vented manufacturers from selling other than to licensed retailers – i.e. precluding 
direct sales to the public. 
209 The condition also required the licensee to observe all other provisions of the 
Bando.
210 See e.g. Rovario Farrugia’s application (wine only), 5 April 1805. The terms 
of this and the other licences can be seen in NAM LIBR 43/11: Registro de memoriali 
decretati  da sua Excellenza il Sig. Cavalier Alessandro Ball Regio Commissionario Civile 
di Sua Maestà Britannica, vol. N. The first of many applications was presented on 2 
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Coleridge required the shops, inns and taverns that were licensed to 
sell wine or spirits to soldiers to display a sign on their doors. Of course, 
within the four cities they could only sell either wine or spirits, and the 
sign would indicate which beverage could be supplied to soldiers. This 
saved the retailers from having to refuse troops – possibly drunken troops 
– who entered their premises and demanded alcohol of a type they were not 
licensed to sell. The signs must have been intended to remove this potential 
flashpoint.
The Licensing Authorities
Identifying the authority responsible for the licensing the various activities 
was far from straightforward and was suggestive of Coleridge’s lack of 
expertise and possibly his lack of attention to detail. 
In the case of importers, distributors and anyone taking delivery of 
spirituous liquor, the responsible licensing agency was the President of 
the Grand Court of Valletta. This judicial officer had the power to grant 
licences, at his discretion, “wherever required”. The Regulations failed to 
state any eligibility criteria for the licence, so Coleridge must have intended 
that anyone who applied for a licence should receive one. This suggests that 
the authorities simply wanted to know who was engaged in the regulated 
activities.
It is less clear who had the power to grant a licence to sell spirits to 
soldiers, although it can be inferred that it was the Civil Commissioner. 
Nonetheless, Coleridge ought to have made this explicit. 
The Civil Commissioner was the relevant authority in the case of 
manufacturers of spirits (other than those distilling spirits from wine). He 
was not explicitly restricted in the factors he could take into account in 
reaching his decision whether to grant or refuse a licence, except that he 
had to inform and consult the President of the Grand Court who might, in 
practice, have provided advice as to the suitability of an applicant.
Producers were to be “held to account” for the quantity of liquor 
imported, manufactured or distilled. This was a strictly-regulated matter so 
that those who obtained their special decree from the Civil Commissioner 
would discover that the maximum quantity they could produce and sell 
would be regulated. 
Presumably, a licensee could, subsequently, apply to the court to have 
April 1805.
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the amount imported manufactured or distilled varied if opportunities 
increased but this was not made clear, nor was it clear upon what criteria 
the maximum amount was to be determined. Presumably, the purpose of 
any upper-limit was to control the appropriate maximum volume of spirits 
available for sale on Malta. 
Record Keeping
Coleridge used the licensing system to keep track of those engaged in the 
import, manufacture, distribution and sale of liquor. Licences awarded 
to importers, distillers (from wine), wholesalers and distributors had to 
be entered in a register, maintained by the President of the Grand Court, 
which was available for inspection at the Tribunal of the Grand Court. 
Like the wholesalers, the retailers also had to present themselves to the 
President of the Grand Court so that their licences could be registered. It is 
unclear what purpose this served. If it was to reinforce the provision that 
a shopkeeper or innkeeper or tavern keeper had to be of good repute, it 
seems ill-conceived. If the President had reason to doubt the reputation of 
those before him when they presented themselves, it would appear to have 
been too late for him to intervene because, by then, they had their licences 
from the Civil Commissioner. 
The manufacturer’s licence, granted by way of special decree by the Civil 
Commissioner, was not explicitly required to be entered into the Register, 
although it may have been Coleridge’s intention that comprehensive records 
be maintained. Certainly, the Civil Commissioner, in exercising his powers, 
had to notify the President of the Court and one probable reason for this – 
which Coleridge did not make clear – was that the President should know, 
for record keeping purposes, which persons had been granted a producer’s 
licence by the Civil Commissioner. 
The register was to be open to inspection “whenever required” at the 
Tribunal of the Grand Court. The interpretive ambiguity surrounding this 
is obvious and begs the question whether there were restrictions upon the 
conditions of access. Did this regulation mean unrestricted public access? 
Did the legislator intend to make it available to any curious member of the 
public? The regulation was also silent on the times during which inspection 
was possible. Coleridge chose to leave these matters to be decided by the 
administrators, and ultimately, the courts.
A failure to maintain the register or a failure to permit access to it was a 
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breach of public duty, but it is not stipulated as a criminal offence.
Manufacturers also had to keep business records of all sales made, to 
ensure that they were not exceeding the permitted maximum. The records 
would also allow the authorities to monitor to whom sales were made and, 
thus, to oversee the supply chain. 
Inspections and Quality
There must have been problems with the quality of liquor sold on Malta 
because one of the key regulations that Coleridge introduced required 
quality controls. The Chief Physician had to certify that the spirits intended 
for sale were of a satisfactory quality. All liquor produced on the Island 
was subject to this inspection, and it was an offence to sell it without the 
appropriate certificate of approval. This is consistent with Coleridge’s 
preamble which states that the authorities were concerned about the effect 
of spirits on the health of the population. No doubt, it would also have been 
of concern to the military commanders who were, of course, concerned to 
maintain the efficiency of the armed forces. 
Penalties 
The Bando was highly selective about which activities it sought to 
criminalise. It is revealing that most, but not all, of the new offences were 
aimed at breaches of the regulations concerned with retailing. Interestingly, 
the Bando contained twelve articles, of which only the breach of articles 
six to eleven carry criminal penalties. For example, it was not an offence 
to trade, as a wholesaler or distributor of spirits, without a licence. It is 
unclear whether this was an oversight on Coleridge’s part. 
Similarly, a producer who manufactured spirits without a licence (i.e. a 
licence granted by special decree from the Civil Commissioner) committed 
no offence. However, such a person would have been required to forfeit the 
surety of fifty oncie deposited with the Treasury. 
The Bando created various offences. It became an offence to operate as an 
unlicensed shopkeeper, innkeeper or tavern keeper or for retailers within 
the four cities to sell both wine and spirits, or to sell spirits to soldiers 
without a special licence. It was also an offence for them not to display 
the required notice on their doors. Also liable to a criminal penalty was 
conduct exceeding the upper limits on the amount of liquor permitted to 
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be imported, distilled or manufactured. Similarly, the producers would be 
liable if they sold spirits without a prior inspection by the Chief Physician. 
The Bando stipulated the penalties for offenders. The standard 
punishments were severe. There was a mandatory, fixed, penalty of 
fifty oncie payable to the Treasury. Failure to pay would lead either to 
imprisonment or compulsory public service. In addition, the offender 
would, permanently, lose their right to continue in business. Presumably, 
this could be achieved by the simple expedient of removing their licence 
following conviction, although this would not seem to be the intended 
process. Thus, a forfeiture of the business would appear to be the result of 
a judicial act (conviction), rather than an administrative one (removal of 
the licence).
Inspections of Wine – the Avviso of 22 March 1805211
An Avviso of 22 March 1805, issued on the same day as the Bando regulating 
spirits, was intended to reinforce an existing custom requiring the pre-sale 
inspection of wine by State officials. A further customary power allowed 
officials to adjudicate on the quality of wine in case of disputes. The purpose 
of this customary scheme was to prevent the consumption of poor quality 
wines that would be injurious of public health.
In this brief Avviso Coleridge warned that the officials accompanied 
by the Chief Physician would, in future, conduct random inspections of 
shops and warehouses belonging to wine merchants. The Notice reminded 
them of the State’s role in this respect and emphasised that the “Royal 
Commissioner” (sic) was anxious not to have to punish offenders. This 
was clearly intended to give the merchants advance notice of enhanced-
enforcement activity with the inference that they should remove inferior, 
and, thus, illegal products immediately so as to avoid infraction.
The Avviso stated that wine of insufficient quality would be confiscated. 
Presumably, this was the customary penalty, and Coleridge’s Avviso merely 
re-stated this. If confiscation was a new penalty, falling outside the scope 
of the custom, it ought to have been enacted within a Bando rather than 
introduced, administratively, by means of an Avviso. This was necessary 
to avoid offending the principle of nulle poena sine lege – that there should 
be no punishment that is not imposed in accordance with an existing law. 
211 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 6.
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Unripened Fruit: the Bando of 5 August 1805212
The retailing of unripened fruit had been the subject of earlier legislation 
which had been brought into effect prior to Coleridge’s arrival on the Island. 
In a Bando of 13 May 1803,213 the British administration had imposed a 
general prohibition on the sale of unripened fruit. Although this was of 
universal effect, binding everyone on the Island, its primary focus was, for 
obvious reasons, the activities of shopkeepers and allotment-holders. The 
purpose of this law was to remove unripened fruit from the market place. 
For reasons that remain unclear, the authorities obviously regarded the 
prevention of sales as a serious matter of public concern. It seems that by 
1805 the Maltese had discovered means of circumventing the earlier law.
Coleridge’s law revealed that the mischief, at which the 1803 Bando was 
aimed, cannot have been fully addressed by the prohibition on sales alone. 
The difficulty seems to have been in the drafting of the 1803 Bando which 
emphasised the sale of unripened fruit as the trigger of criminal liability. 
This created a loophole because proving a contract of sale was a requirement 
for a successful prosecution. Advertising, display or offering for sale were 
all activities that the 1803 Bando failed to penalise. The requirement for the 
contract of sale caused two problems. Firstly, there would have to have been 
a victim, that is to say a consumer, who had actually bought unripened fruit 
from the seller before the seller could have been convicted of an offence. As 
we have seen, victims were not always eager to give evidence. Secondly, 
the 1803 measure failed as a preventative measure – it was not primarily 
designed directly to prevent such sales but to punish them once they had 
occurred.
A further loophole arose because the acquisition of the fruit by other 
means than sale would not have been unlawful. Although we do not know 
what evasive measures were employed, any transfer of unripened fruit 
from seller to buyer, in the absence of a contract of sale, would have been 
lawful. 
This means that the litmus test for the 1805 law was whether it 
successfully avoided the need for a “victim” and eliminated the possibilities 
of evasion. But, to answer this question, it is important to understand what 
the purposes of regulation were, and the curious drafting renders any 
conclusions on this tentative and problematic.
Coleridge’s aims were somewhat obscure because it is unclear whether 
212 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 19.
213 No Bando of this date can be discovered in the National Library of Malta.
254 Coleridge’s Laws
he wanted to remove unripened fruit from the market place or merely to 
make sure that traders did not confuse buyers in the way they displayed 
their products.
When considered along with the Bando of 1803, Coleridge’s Bando results 
in a scheme comprising both contractual and pre-contractual elements of 
regulation. As we have seen, the 1803 Bando was a prohibition on the selling 
of unripened fruit (i.e. a contractual restraint); the 1805 Bando extends this 
prohibition, controlling pre-contractual behaviour by eliminating certain, 
but not all, displays of unripened fruit. The lack of a general prohibition 
of the display of such fruit is confusing if the purpose was to remove the 
product from the market place, why did Coleridge not simply prevent the 
sale and display of unripened fruit? If it was permitted to display it, why 
was it not permitted to sell it?
Confusingly, the illegal behaviour comprised the display of unripened 
fruit “next to other saleable goods”. This strongly suggests that Coleridge’s 
intention was to prevent sellers confusing their customers by mixing 
ripened and unripened fruit or by displaying them side by side. Displaying 
unripened fruit separate from other fruit was not illegal (although selling 
it would have been).
This means that, because Coleridge’s Bando did not altogether remove 
unripened fruit from the market place, the law still failed to rectify a 
major weakness of the Bando of 1803. This may imply some uncertainty 
about the true purpose of the later Bando. In particular, the transfer and 
consumption of unripened fruit, in certain circumstances, remained lawful. 
For example, unripened fruit could have been offered as a gift. This means 
that Coleridge’s law would not have been sufficiently robust to eradicate all 
possible evasive practices. 
It is, however, clear that the targeting of pre-contractual behaviour (certain 
types of display) would have made prosecution more straightforward, 
since the need to prove a contract of sale would have been removed. It 
also avoided the need for a “victim”. In particular, it would have not 
have been necessary for the buyer to give evidence. This is, perhaps, the 
real purpose of the Bando which seems to provide further evidence that 
Maltese made reluctant witnesses.214 We must be careful not to placemore 
importance upon this slight evidence than it warrants, but it may hint at an 
uncooperative public either sceptical about the benefits of enforcing laws 
such as these or simply too afraid to give evidence against their neighbours 
214 See the Public Order and Crime theme above. 
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on a small island. 
The drafting of the enactment is interesting. The first issue is that there 
is no definition either of “fruit” or of “ripeness”. In the case of “fruit”, is 
a botanical definition to be applied, or one understood by the reasonable 
person? Opinions may vary, for example, on whether tomato is a fruit 
or a vegetable; similarly strawberries and rhubarb may be regarded for 
some purposes as “fruit” although scientifically they might be classed as 
vegetables. 
Similarly, whether fruit was “unripe” within the meaning of the Bando 
was not defined. It would, presumably, have been a question of fact for the 
criminal court. This would entail an assessment of its colour, flavour and 
texture. These would have to have been optimal in fruit judged to be ripe. 
Whether the fruit was ready for harvest might also have been a relevant 
factor, but not a decisive one because fruit can be harvested when not fully 
ripe.
Penalties
The Bando of 1805 stated that the penalties it enacted were in addition to 
those available under the 1803 Bando. 
The additional penalties were severe and mandatory. There was no 
judicial discretion to impose a lesser sentence, for example, by taking into 
account any mitigating circumstances, or other considerations that might 
affect the justice of the case. This, perhaps, reveals the dirigiste instincts 
of the British administration vis a vis the Maltese courts, in so far as they 
wanted to control the outcome of cases following conviction. This is a 
matter considered further in Chapter 6. 
The penalties are not without their controversies and, indeed, certain 
obscurities.
The additional penalties were to be imposed regardless of how much 
unripened fruit was displayed. As mentioned, there was no discretion to 
impose a more lenient penalty for less serious cases, nor power to impose a 
higher sentence for repeat offenders.215 
The various mandatory punishments were to be imposed according to 
the seller’s activities. They included a life-time ban on the “right to run a 
shop”, or, in the case of an agriculturalist who did not own land, a life-
215 No doubt the possibility of a life-time ban was intended to prevent re-offend-
ing, but see further below.
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time ban on the right to work a plot of land. These measures seem to have 
been intended to remove, from the offender, the opportunity to retail 
unripened food in the future. Offending landowners, as opposed to those 
who worked the land, seem to have been treated more leniently. In their 
case, the mandatory sentence was one month’s imprisonment at their own 
expense, after which they could resume cultivation and then retail their 
produce. The reason for the distinction between the criminal responsibility 
of owners and workers is obscure.
Notwithstanding the severity of these punishments, there remained 
means by which convicted offenders could, in future, become involved in 
the retail supply of foodstuffs. Under the two Bandi, when taken together, 
a convicted shopkeeper could not be prevented from owning a shop, only 
from running it. Employing a manager, or other staff, would still have been 
possible. Similarly, an agriculturalist (not being an owner of land) could be 
deprived of his right to work a plot of land, but not it seems, to own other 
land which might be leased to a tenant. Perhaps the reason in this case 
was that the produce would, normally, belong to the tenant rather than the 
landlord. 
The convicted landowner, once released from serving a term one month’s 
imprisonment, could return to work the land.
An obscurity concerns the case of the convicted agriculturalists (who did 
not own land). Did Coleridge intend the prohibition to be a life-time ban on 
working the land personally? As drafted, the Bando seems to have permitted 
a convicted farm tenant to employ workers to work the land on his behalf, 
in which case the produce of the land would be owned and controlled by 
the convicted individual. This may be an oversight on Coleridge’s part. 
The concern, that convicted landowners, condemned to a term of one 
month’s penal servitude, should meet the expenses of their incarceration, 
was no doubt intended to increase the severity of the penalty. It might also 
suggest a concern to minimise, so far as was possible, the burden upon 
the public revenue. Ball was, at this time, heavily engaged in the corn 
speculation designed to raise significant funds for the general revenues of 
the Island. The pressing financial constraints upon government, as well as 
the political pressure to balance the budget, must have been very much to 
the fore during this period.216
216 See Chapter 2. 
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Conclusion
The Bando is of interest because of its apparent temerity. It stops far short 
of creating a general scheme for consumer protection. It does not, for 
example, bring into law a general requirement that fruit sold must be fit 
for purpose. Instead, like the companion measure of 1803, it was narrowly 
focused upon one type of produce (unripened fruit) and regulated only 
one type of their display (display next to other saleable goods). It suggests a 
highly cautious approach, to the regulation of the free market, in the public 
interest. Regulation seems to have been ad hoc, relatively unsystematic and 
a response to particular problems as they arose.
If it was designed as a health and safety measure it would have been 
of limited success because the Bando did not preclude the acquisition of 
unripened fruit by means other than sale. If it was designed to avoid the 
confusion of the consumer where ripened and unripened fruit were mixed 
or placed closely together, it suffers from over-reach because it rendered 
illegal certain displays where no confusion could occur – for example 
where unripened fruit was displayed next to other saleable goods of a 
completely different type. 
The small but significant advance it enacted was that it removed the 
need for a victim, since sellers displaying goods in a prohibited manner 
would be liable to a criminal penalty. No proof of sale was necessary. 
The Bando must have been difficult both to interpret and to apply since 
it lacked a clear definition of the produce falling under its regulation. It also 
suffered from significant obscurities in relation to the penalties it imposed. 
5.6.2. The Avviso 12 June 1805217
Aim
The purpose of this Avviso was to draw attention to counterfeit coinage in 
circulation. It also imposed certain obligations on those who received or 
came across false money.
Analysis
The Avviso warned that false money was often, but not exclusively, found 
217 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 10.
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in the form of silver one-scudi coins imprinted with the image of the former 
Grandmaster Rohan (sic) (Emmanoel de Rohan, 69th Grandmaster of the 
Order of St John, 1775-1797). Coleridge misspelt his name. 
Although the Avviso indicated that forged coins were not confined to 
one-scudi pieces, it did not alert the population to what other types of false 
money might be in circulation. To that extent, this omission would weaken 
the usefulness of the Notice. 
The Avviso also created obligations on those to whom false coins were 
passed or were attempted to be passed. These were stated to be as follows:
Should anybody come across such a coin, he shall be obliged to deliver it at 
once to the Tribunal, or to the local lieutenant, indicating who gave it to him, 
or tried to give it to him, so that he may be brought to justice.
The recipient’s primary obligation was to inform either the Luogotentente 
(i.e. the local village magistrate) or the Tribunal of the identity of the 
person who passed or who attempted to pass the coin. This had a number 
of purposes. This was a necessary safeguard to protect the innocent who 
might, otherwise, have been found in possession of false money and 
wrongly accused. 
But this is not all because the Notice also made clear that the purpose of 
gaining information about the identity of the passers of false money was to 
gather evidence for intended prosecution. The obligation to notify one of the 
named authorities not only acted as a safeguard for the innocent receiver of 
forged money but also had the further purpose of making them become an 
informant against those persons responsible for passing or attempting to 
pass false coins. Thus, a person who, innocently, accepted a false coin could 
expect to find themselves not only explaining to the authorities how they 
came across it, but also informing against the person who passed the coin. 
This might be expected to extend to giving evidence against them in court. 
From the point of view of the Administration, this coercive strategy 
would have seemed a useful and effective one, likely to expose the forgers, 
since anyone knowingly in possession of a false coin would have been 
obliged to come forward. Those who chanced to receive false coins and 
who might well have found themselves in a moral dilemma might, however, 
have viewed this course with less enthusiasm. Should they avoid becoming 
an informant, by not declaring their possession of the false coin, and run 
the risk of prosecution themselves if it were discovered? Or should they 
obey the requirements of the Public Notice and hand it in and identify the 
person who passed it to them. The latter course would clearly run the risk 
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of possible retribution and vengeance from the forgers. 
No doubt, the authorities believed that the affected Maltese who received 
forged money would resolve this difficulty by coming forward. As we have 
seen, the use of Maltese as informants against wrongdoers amongst their 
fellow citizens was a commonly-employed strategy in the Bandi and Avvisi, 
and so a requirement not only familiar to but also accepted by the Maltese. 
However, the Notice contained an obvious logical flaw in relation to the 
requirement that the false coin be delivered up. It stated: 
Should anybody come across such a coin, he shall be obliged to deliver it at 
once to the Tribunal, or to the local lieutenant, indicating who gave it to him, 
or tried to give it to him, so that he may be brought to justice. 
Anyone coming across a false coin was required to deliver it to the 
authorities immediately, naming the person who gave it to him or who 
“tried to give it to him”. In the latter instance, where a culprit had tried to 
pass a false coin to an intended recipient, but the latter had not accepted it, 
the intended recipient was, obviously, unable to deliver the coin up to the 
authorities. 
5.7.  Regulation of Trade
The Purpose of the Notice
Coleridge issued two Public Notices on 22 March 1805.218 The one with which 
we are presently concerned was intended to promote the cotton industry, 
whilst the other, which we considered in the “consumer protection” section, 
governed inspections of wine.219 The purpose of the cotton Avviso was to 
reinforce the existing controls on the production of cotton. As we shall see, 
the Order of St John had, formerly, legislated to ensure the quality of the 
product, and Coleridge intervened to maintain the standard. His Notice 
reminded the population that disobedience of the existing regulations, 
which prohibited the manufacture of cotton otherwise than with seeds or 
218 This was a busy time for Coleridge because he also issued was also a signifi-
cant and detailed Bando regulating spirits on that day: LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 
AL 1814 f.4.
219 See NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f.5 (cotton); ibid. f.6 (inspec-
tions of wine). For a study of the cotton trade, see generally Debono from which 
much of what follows is derived.
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with wool, was an offence. 
The Cotton Trade 
The central role that cotton production and manufacture had played in 
Malta was  considered in Chapter 2. 
When Coleridge was on the Island, the cotton industry, and, thus, the 
livelihoods of as much as half of the population, had come under severe 
strain. Moreover, the industry was in a state of transition.220 Hard-pressed 
producers were, at first, tempted to compromise quality to boost profits. 
This tactic was not new: regulatory intervention had been necessary, as 
early as 1777, to ensure that producers were not tempted to increase their 
short-term profits by producing inferior cotton – mixing it with cheaper 
alternatives.221 Although improving, the economic and international 
situation had clearly tempted Maltese producers to revert to their former 
cost-cutting techniques, in particular by spinning cotton in ways prohibited 
by Maltese law. 
Coleridge intervened to halt this, in order to maintain the legally-
required standards. This was a timely, and appropriate, intervention 
to ensure that the product retained its market appeal. Increasingly, the 
Maltese producers had to add value to the product, which they could now 
only sell, within the domestic market, by weaving it into cloth. 
The finished product was increasingly sold to foreigners (mainly British) 
who were now present on the Island in larger numbers. In the spring of 
1805, for example, a large number of British troops, under the command 
of Lieutenant-General Sir James Craig, had arrived in readiness for an 
expedition to Naples. As demand for finished goods rose, so the number 
of looms on the Island also increased. The Island’s prosperity, which the 
export ban had seriously threatened, began to improve when rising wages 
began to take effect. 
An Avviso not a Bando
Coleridge’s Notice announced an “order” of the Civil Commissioner 
purporting to alter the punishments for the “extract[ion of] cotton not 
manufactured with seeds or with wool, without a specific licence”. As the 
220 Debono.
221 See the Proclamation of 1777 regulating the production of Gozitan cotton and 
preventing its mixture with foreign cotton: NLM LIBR/MS Bandi 1772-1779, 429.
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Notice made clear, the offence had already been enacted in Maltese law; 
Coleridge merely announced an increased punishment for offenders. The 
question raised by this is whether it was constitutionally appropriate for 
Coleridge simply to announce this new punishment in a Public Notice 
rather than legislate to introduce it by means of a Bando? The principle 
of nulle poena sine lege, which requires that legitimate punishment can 
only be imposed in accordance with existing, publicly-disclosed laws, is 
particularly at issue. Coleridge’s drafting suggests that either he did not 
fully appreciate these rule of law values or, if he did, he was not able to 
persuade the Civil Commissioner to respect them. 
Further Issues
The newly prescribed sentence was to be a one month’s term of imprisonment. 
The Maltese criminal court was not entrusted with a discretion to impose 
an alternative sentence which, as we have seen in other instances, meant 
that it could not take into account mitigating circumstances and so impose 
a lesser term or a fine. In addition to the jail term, the offender would have 
all illegally-cultivated cotton confiscated. 
The enforcement strategy was similar to that found in other measures 
creating criminal offences, which also relied heavily upon information 
supplied by informants. The controversial nature of this strategy will be 
considered in Chapter 6. As in other instruments,222 the informants were 
encouraged to give information by the promise of financial gain. One 
quarter of the cotton confiscated was to be given by the offender, to the 
informant, as a reward for information given. It is unclear what legal 
consequences would follow from a refusal to comply. Moreover, if the 
purpose was to keep the poor-quality cotton out of the market place, the 
requirement for the offender to give one quarter of it to the informant 
would have been counter-productive. An obvious alternative, which might 
better have fulfilled the public interest, would have been to offer a reward 
for information.
It is somewhat perplexing to discover that this responsibility, to hand 
over the informant’s share, lay with the offender rather than a court official. 
If literally interpreted, the Notice seems clear on this point: “… furthermore, 
[the offender] shall suffer the confiscation of all the cotton grown illegally, 
222 See e.g. the Bandi of 29 January 1805/MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805 f.356; 431 
II/3, 50, and 21 June 1805, LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 13.
262 Coleridge’s Laws
one-quarter of which he must hand over to the informant”. (Emphasis 
added).
Since the entire illegal crop was to be confiscated, it would seem more 
logical for the informant to be given his reward by the authorities rather 
than the offender. However, Coleridge’s preferred solution apparently 
compelled the offender and informant to have contact. At the very least, 
this could have been unpleasant. In a extreme case it could have been 
dangerous since the offender would have the opportunity to exact revenge 
upon the informant who had given information to the authorities. More 
problematically, from the authorities’ viewpoint, the unpleasant process 
was likely to have been a disincentive for the informant to co-operate in a 
prosecution. Coleridge’s approach would appear to give rise to substantial 
practical difficulties. As a relatively early example of his legal drafting, it is, 
perhaps, evidence of Coleridge’s inexperience and a lack of familiarity with 
Maltese behaviour. 
The instrument does not explicitly stipulate that the informant was to be 
rewarded only where information led to conviction. Nevertheless, this must 
have been the intended meaning since the informant received a share of the 
cotton that the court ordered confiscated. It is an elementary consequence 
that a confiscation order could only be made after a conviction. An 
informant would, therefore, receive nothing if the accused were acquitted, 
despite having run the risk of giving information to the authorities and, as 
would have been likely, having given evidence in open court. 
Finally, the Notice offered a public undertaking from the Civil 
Commissioner that, should it be in the public interest to do so, and the crop 
for the current season proved to be plentiful, licences for the extraction of 
cotton would be granted to ensure plentiful supply of the raw material for 
the inhabitants earning their livelihood from cotton spinning. 
This is a highly contingent promise and it is evident that the judgement 
about where the public interest lay and consideration of the state of the 
crop, would be made by the Civil Commissioner in his discretion. It will 
be recalled that a decision that the Civil Commissioner reached in his 
discretion could not be challenged in the Maltese courts.
This part of the notice only had effect in the 1805 season and would 
have lapsed thereafter. This meant that no representation about future 
government behaviour had been made in respect the following seasons.
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5.8.  The Harbours
The Avviso of 9 March 1805223 – Mooring Rope
In this brief Avviso, Coleridge acted to safeguard navigation in the Grand 
Harbour. The safe passage of shipping both to and from Valletta was, 
naturally, a matter upon which Malta’s prosperity and security depended, 
not least because the Island had to import food and serve as a base for 
vessels of the Royal Navy (fig. 12). Maintaining the channels for safe 
navigation was, pre-eminently, a matter of governmental concern.
Harbour matters fell within Coleridge’s supervisory remit, and reports 
seem to have been produced in considerable quantity. His private Notebooks 
record them as one of the vicissitudes of office, which produced a pang 
of guilt when he considered using them as tapers. An entry of February 
1805 records, “I am almost ashamed to confess to myself what pulling back 
of Heart I feel whenever I wish to light a candle or kindle a fire with a 
Hospital or Harbour Report and what a cumulus lie upon my Table, I am 
not able to conjecture what use they can ever be…”224 A nocturnal entry of 
Sunday 12 May 1805 records that harbour reports were spread out on a 
table at the Treasury, which suggests that they had not been filed at the end 
of the working day.225
This Avviso drew to public attention, the steps that the authorities had 
taken to warn shipping of a small area of shallow water that had been 
discovered in a dangerous place near the entrance to the Grand Harbour 
close to Fort St Elmo. To warn navigators, a thick rope had been attached 
to an anchor that had been sunk onto the seabed. The floating rope was 
intended to alert shipping to the danger.
It seems that the purpose of the rope was not immediately obvious 
to navigators, and that some Maltese were using it either to tie up their 
boats or for other unspecified purposes. As a result, the anchor was being 
dragged away from the site of the danger, and the warning, thereby, 
rendered useless. 
Coleridge issued the Avviso to explain, to the inhabitants, the reason 
for placing a rope and anchor in the harbour, and indicated to them 
where this device could be located (presumably to avoid confusion with 
223 NLM LIBR/MS 431 2/3 Bandi 1804-1808, 97.
224 CN 2, 2446. With considerable prescience, he recognised that what might ap-
pear to him to be useless might be invaluable to others. 
225 CN 2, 2583.
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genuine mooring ropes). No punishment was fixed for misusing the rope. 
However, the Avviso warned that anyone who did abuse the rope would 
be greeted “by rifle shots” for which they would only have themselves 
to blame. Presumably, the garrison of the Fort had been ordered to open 
fire upon anyone misusing the rope, although this is not made clear in 
the instrument. Whether these shots were intended to be warning shots 
or the use of deadly force is also unclear. If the latter, it suggests that the 
authorities were exasperated by the behaviour of harbour users. Even so, 
lethal force would seem to have been a disproportionate response. 
The Avviso of 21 June 1805226 – Licensing of 
Ferryboats in the Grand Harbour
This Notice served a number of purposes connected with the licensing 
and night-time operation of ferryboats in the Grand Harbour. It also 
clarified the existing regulatory scheme in response to a turf war between 
the Lieutenants of the Cities of Vittoriosa, Senglea and Cospicua (fig. 13) 
concerning their respective jurisdictions and their entitlement to receive 
the small dock charges paid by the night-time ferryboat operators. This 
Notice accompanied a more wide-ranging Proclamation, also issued on 21 
June 1805, which, as we have seen, ordered that the ferryboats (and others) 
226 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814,13.
12. The Naval Arsenal in the Grand Harbour, Valletta. Lith. by C. de Brocktorff 
[1838].
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had to be registered and display a registration number.227 The registration 
requirement applied regardless of when the ferryboats operated. 
In this instance, Coleridge’s notice made it clear that the authority 
responsible for licensing the night-time ferry boat operators was the 
Lieutenant of Vittoriosa, but “ordered” that the dock revenues flowing from 
their operation should be divided equally between the respective districts.
Licensing Scheme
He also ordered that the Lieutenant of Vittoriosa could only grant a 
night-permit to boatmen of whose honesty he was “convinced”. This 
was obviously intended to remove the “fly by night” operator. However, 
it is interesting that Coleridge’s public protection policy did not extend 
to regulating the safety of the vessel, which ought to have been a critical 
concern had the measure been primarily for the protection of the public.228 
The inference is that there was no problem with badly maintained vessels 
operating at night in the Grand Harbour. 
State Liability 
Coleridge also provided that the Lieutenant who negligently granted a 
licence might also be liable for damages to any third party suffering loss 
as a result of the illegal behaviour by a licensed operator. Presumably, 
Coleridge meant that the Lieutenant would be responsible for loss resulting 
from the illegal actions of dishonest operators. This is interesting because it 
reveals that a claim for damages would lie against the public authority for 
the negligent exercise of the licensing power. 
The usual defendant in third party claims arising from a maritime 
accident would be the ferryboat operator who was responsible for causing 
the loss. However, the ferry boat operator might not be as “valuable” a 
defendant as a public authority. Because the damage that might result 
from a maritime accident could be significant, it could readily exceed the 
resources of the defendant personally to meet the potential liability. The 
Notice, therefore, provided that a victim of a maritime accident, who 
sustained loss, could, in certain circumstances, bring a claim against the 
licensing authority. In other words, the effect of the measure was to make 
227 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 ,14, see the Public Order and Crime 
theme, above.
228 Although a Bando might have been necessary to achieve this.
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the State the insurer against loss caused by dishonest operators where the 
Lieutenant had issued a licence without having made proper enquiries into 
the honesty of the operator. 
It is an interesting and puzzling question why “honesty” rather than 
reasonable competency was made the appropriate medium whereby 
compensation could be granted. One possibility is that Coleridge wanted 
to restrict liability to cases where the administration was at fault. He may 
have felt that a failure to inquire into an applicant’s honesty would be a 
straightforward surrogate measure for fault. But this is open to the obvious 
criticism that fault lies in any negligent operation of the licensing power: 
Coleridge need not have restricted the regulations to cases where dishonest 
operators slipped through the regulatory net. Unqualified operators should 
also have triggered state liability.
The result, in practice, of this emphasis upon dishonesty would have 
been somewhat arbitrary. Losses caused by incompetent (honest) operators 
would not fall upon the State, whereas those dishonest operators who were 
negligently licensed would. The transfer of risk lacks a clear rationale.
Thus, Coleridge’s policy was unclear. A more properly-developed 
scheme would have emphasised the competence of the operator and the 
safety of a vessel operating at night, which this Notice conspicuously failed 
to do. 
13.  The Grand Harbour from Valletta towards Fort St Angelo and Vittoriosa. 
Kalkara creek lies to the left of the Fort whereas Dockyard creek lies to the 
right. The British naval dockyard first operated from the latter.
 Thematic Analysis of the Proclamations and Public Notices 267
5.9. Passports
Introduction
The maritime trade conducted by Maltese vessels was fundamental to 
the wealth and security of the islands, not least because the Maltese were 
reliant upon imported food supplies. The proximity of the piratical Barbary 
states posed a threat to navigation. Maltese ship owners wanted to ensure 
that the protection of the Royal Navy was available to them and, as we shall 
discover, Sicilian and Neapolitan masters sought similar protection. 
Vessels, whether British or Maltese, trading from Maltese ports were 
required to sail under a pass that was issued by the Public Secretary’s office. 
This pass was normally valid for one voyage to an identified port. Once the 
vessel returned to Malta, the pass was to be handed back to Government and 
was available to be issued to another master. Given the small tonnage of the 
vessels of this period, sea journeys for the import of food and other goods 
were frequent. A significant part of Coleridge’s official role thus involved 
the issue of passports. Following ministerial intervention, he issued a 
Notice, on 25 June 1805,229 to regulate entitlement to British protection on 
the high seas. The Notice is also of interest because it reveals Coleridge’s 
broader political agenda in boosting Ball’s reputation with the Maltese
Authority for Passports
From the outset of British rule, the subject  of passports had, for a variety of 
reasons, been a vexed and controversial matter. The first problem had been 
an internal dispute as to who had responsibility for their issue. The later, 
and more embarrassing problem for the British, was whether the Civil 
Commissioner had acted lawfully when issuing passports to foreign ships’ 
masters. Ball’s policies had given rise to a serious international incident, 
and even the risk of war. 
Identifying the appropriate authority responsible for the issue of 
passports was, at first, controversial within the demarcation dispute that 
erupted when the civil administration was split from the military. As we 
have seen, the appointment of Charles Cameron as Civil Commissioner 
in May 1801 marked the beginning of British civil administration on 
229 Avviso, 23 June 1805 (date of 23 crossed out and 25 substituted) LIBR/MS 430 
2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 15.
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Malta. The civil authorities, which naturally did not have any authority 
over military affairs, were directed, by the terms of the Royal Instructions 
of 14 May 1801,230 to work closely with the military. In other respects, 
the Instructions were obscure, and this soon resulted in the important 
functional dispute between Major-General Pigot and Civil Commissioner 
Cameron. Responsibility for a number of centrally-important issues was 
disputed, including the role of the military in the promulgation of new 
laws, the control of the police in Valletta,231 the admission of foreigners and, 
importantly in the present context, the issue of British passports.232 It fell to 
Lord Hobart to resolve the impasse. He decided that each of these matters 
would fall within the jurisdiction of the civil authority.233 On the subject 
of passports, his lordship explicitly instructed that “All passports except 
to officers holding military commissions ... should proceed from the Civil 
Commissioner, and shall be signed by the Secretary of Government”.234 
Thus it was that, when in office, Coleridge had to assume the burdensome 
task of issuing passports to intending overseas travellers.235
Entitlement to a Passport
The question of who was entitled to British protection had also become 
controversial. Prior to Coleridge’s arrival on Malta, a serious diplomatic 
incident had arisen over the unlawful issue of British passports to foreigners. 
The aftermath of this furore was still in progress when Coleridge served 
as Public Secretary; indeed, he was involved, along with others, in the 
re-alignment of policy and the limiting of the damage done. The events 
that gave rise to this incident could be traced to the time French-occupied 
Valletta surrendered to the British  in September 1800.
International Incident
As we have described in, Chapter 2, the purpose of the siege of Valletta, and 
the blockade of the Island, was to starve the French garrison, besieged in 
230 Kew, CO 158/1/ 53 et seq.
231 Pigot to Cameron, 2 July 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/119.
232 Ibid.
233 Hobart to Cameron, 2 September 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/207.
234 Hobart to Cameron, ibid., 209.
235 Although the text of the Avviso of 25 June 1805 (below) suggests that entitle-
ment was determined by a decision of the Tribunal, not Coleridge, which must have 
eased his administrative burden.
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Valletta, into submission. The very object of the strategy was, thus, to run 
down the food supplies. Naturally, at the moment when collapse occurred 
there would be a starving populace. As matters unfolded, there was but 
eight days stock of grain in Valletta when the French capitulated. 
The urgent crisis236 could only be solved by importing grain, but the 
problem was that the French had destroyed the Maltese vessels to use them 
for firewood. In this, emergency, the new British administration had to turn 
to Neapolitan and Sicilian vessels to import grain to feed the population.237 
When the Sicilian and Neapolitan owners demanded the protection of 
the British Crown to protect their vessels against the piracy of the Dey of 
Algiers, Ball acquiesced since, in his view, the emergency justified it. It was 
important to ensure that the food supplies carried in these vessels reached 
an Island desperate for food and incapable of meeting more than one third 
of its own requirements. Ball was aware that the predations of the Barbary 
pirates238 were a notable hazard given the widespread shortage of grain in 
the Mediterranean between 1799 and 1806, which would have made the 
cargo highly prized. The security of the Island, as well as that of the crews 
depended upon the safe completion of the voyages – not least by avoiding 
their capture by pirates either for ransom or for sale as slaves. 
Ball, therefore, instructed Alexander Macaulay, Coleridge’s predecessor, 
to issue passes, valid for one sea voyage, to foreign nationals.239 Although 
Ball seems to have been made a scapegoat for this unlawful act, he later 
claimed that Lords Keith and Nelson also issued passes to Neapolitan 
Masters. Ball’s defence was that this was a policy of last resort agreed with 
and implemented by the most senior military commanders in the region.240 
Ball’s further argument was that the vessels would be crewed by the Maltese 
and, thus, would fall within the spirit of international law.
236 It might be asked why a stock of grain had not been brought into the Island in 
readiness for the surrender. The absence of such preparations suggests either a lack 
of forward planning or the suddenness of the French collapse.
237 As Coleridge described in the text of the preamble to this Avviso of 25 June 
1805, LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 15.
238 The term “Barbary States” refers to the territory between seaports of Tangiers 
and Tripoli. Britain and other nations trading in the Mediterranean paid the Dey 
tribute in order to ensure the safe passage of British vessels. The purpose of the 
Treaty, of 19 March 1801, was to extend this protection to the Maltese. 
239 Sultana, 9.
240 Ball to Cartwright, 9 September 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/239, 240.
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The Legal Context
Shortly after Malta fell into British hands a Treaty, dated 19 March 1801, had 
been concluded between the Dey of Algiers and the British Government. 
This ended, as far as the Maltese masters were concerned, the threat from 
pirate ships of the Dey. Maltese vessels were no longer liable to be captured 
and their crews held in captivity as slaves. The Treaty, eventually, secured 
the release of Maltese prisoners held by the Dey, and it prevented further 
attacks on Maltese ships.241 However, the Dey had not undertaken to restrict 
his activities in relation to Neapolitan and Sicilian ships and a state of war 
continued to exist between these States and the Divan. This is important 
for what follows.
The Capture and Imprisonment of Maltese Crews
Unfortunately for Ball, four Sicilian242 vessels, bearing Ball’s passports, were 
captured by cruisers of the Dey in 1803, and their crews, including Maltese 
citizens, imprisoned for ransom, in Algiers. The official British response 
was a belated volte face concerning passports. Despite private misgivings 
that he, formally, expressed in writing to Ball,243 Macaulay promptly issued 
an Avviso, on 28 October 1803,244 regulating the issue of passports to 
make sure that they were only issued to those with entitlement, namely 
British subjects (including the Maltese). The preamble indicated that the 
authorities were already aware of “abuses” whereby passports were 
being unlawfully used by foreigners. Of course, by 1803, Ball was able to 
ascertain that the Island had sufficiently recovered to enable the Maltese to 
import grain and other foodstuffs on their own behalf. Merchant capacity 
241 An Avviso of 5 February 1803 announced the release of one hundred and sixty-
four Maltese prisoners from Constantinople: NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2; Bandi 1790 AL 
1805, 175.
242 Sultana, 165. We may also note the seizure of Neapolitan vessels used to trans-
port supplies to the Islands during the siege: Ball to Cartwright, 9 September 1805, 
Kew, CO 158/10/239, 240 where it was revealed that the Sicilian and Neapolitan 
captives, as well as Maltese slaves, were still being detained. Dr Moncrieff to Ball, 13 
October 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/247 et seq. referred to negotiations for the release of 
Sicilians. He reported that the Maltese slaves had been released. Ball to Castlereagh, 
26 December 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/227 revealed that negotiations had not yet been 
concluded. 
243 Ball to Cooke, 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/187, 191. This was, according to 
Ball, the only occasion on which Macaulay formally dissented from Ball’s policies. 
244 NLM LIBR 431/1 Bandi 1800 AL 1803, 309.
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had increased, given the arrival of vessels that had been purchased with 
the aid of British funds, and the 1801 Treaty meant that navigation was, as 
far as Maltese vessels were concerned, reasonably safe. Thus, the practice 
of issuing passports to foreign vessels ceased.245 Even so, Ball was nervous. 
As late as 1803 he ordered that any master whose vessel encountered 
interference, from cruisers of the Dey, should report the incident to the 
Public Secretary.246 Moreover, there was still a problem with the passports 
in circulation amongst the foreign owners; and the crisis caused by the 
capture of the Maltese crews remained unresolved.
The British decided to test the will of the Dey. In January 1804 Nelson 
appeared off Algiers with seven ships of the line in an effort to persuade 
the Dey to release the Maltese prisoners and pay compensation for the 
seized vessels but the Dey refused to co-operate because, he argued, the 
British had not been entitled, under the terms of the Treaty of 1801, to issue 
passports to his enemies, the Sicilian Masters.247 Nelson left empty handed. 
Although Ball wanted to treat the seizure of the Sicilian vessels as an act 
of war, Nelson held the unequivocal opinion that British passports did 
not entitle the Sicilians to British protection.248 British ministers sided with 
Nelson and open warfare was avoided.
The Secretary of State, Lord Camden, decided to adopt a compromising 
stance and to pursue better diplomatic relations with the Dey. He shared 
Nelson’s conviction that Ball had acted unlawfully in granting passports to 
persons not entitled to them.249 Ball, in effect, suffered a reprimand for his 
original policy. Hereafter, he was to be supplied with new, “Mediterranean” 
passports under the instruction that they were only to be granted to British 
subjects including Maltese owners. Neither the Sicilians nor the Neapolitans 
were to be entitled to them. 
Nonetheless, a significant number of the “old” passes remained in 
circulation because the owners of Sicilian vessels had refused to surrender 
them to Macaulay. Coleridge’s Notice of 25 June 1805 even suggested that 
there were other kinds of evasions intended to continue British protection for 
foreign vessels. These included applications made under false credentials, 
or deviations from the named port of destination, or even “sham” sales. The 
245 See also Ball to Cooke, 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/187.
246 The Avviso of 22 October 1803, NLM LIBR/MS 430, Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 314.
247 Sultana, 20, 24 and 155.
248 Sultana, 165.
249 Sultana, 256. Interestingly, a dispatch from Ball to Cartwright implicated Lords 
Nelson and Keith in the issue of the “emergency” passports: Ball to Cartwright, 9 
September 1805, Kew, CO 158/10.
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latter were arrangements under which Sicilians and others had purported 
to sell their vessels to Maltese owners, (thereby entitling them to British 
protection) whilst, in fact, retaining ownership. These passports had to 
be called in as soon as the new, Mediterranean, passes arrived. By March 
1805250 Ball was still awaiting the arrival of the new passports that had been 
despatched from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty in London. 
Coleridge’s Notice of 25 June 1805 reveals that they had reached the Island 
by that date. 
The Notice of 25 June 1805 – Passports
In this Notice Coleridge recalled many of the events surrounding the 
problematic passports, including the reasons why Ball had been compelled 
to issue them after the surrender. He described how Macaulay had issued 
a proclamation, in October 1803, explaining that no further passports 
would be issued. Naturally, as Coleridge explained, this had not addressed 
the problem of the passports that were still, fraudulently, in circulation. 
Coleridge‘s Notice thus cancelled all the existing passports and required 
intending travellers to obtain one of the new Mediterranean passports. 
The effect, for those holding the “old “ passports, was significant because 
Coleridge warned that these would no longer guarantee British protection. 
He reminded them that the Dey would not restrain his ships from capturing 
and enslaving Maltese crews aboard vessels that were not entitled to the 
passports they were carrying. Ball, he added, would not take any steps to 
secure their release if this misfortune befell them. 
It is interesting that Coleridge cancelled the “old” passports with 
immediate effect (i.e. on 25 June 1805), but the Notice was not published 
until the following day, 26 June. It is not known whether this resulted in 
any hardship. 
Analysis
This Notice shares a similar narrative style to the Notice of 25 May 1805, 
announcing the conviction and sentence of Fortunata Tagliana.251 In each 
of these instruments, Coleridge included significantly more information 
than was necessary in order to announce the outcomes of an administrative 
250 Sultana, 305; see also Camden to Ball, Kew, 27 March 1805, Kew, CO 159/3/161.
251 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 9. See the Public Order and Crime 
theme, above.
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decision. Had he not been concerned with a broader political agenda then 
some very limited factual information would have sufficed. In relation 
to the passports, this information was straightforward and could have 
been briefly stated – the existing passports were cancelled and would no 
longer entitle the holders to British protection. Anyone who disregarded 
this would be at risk of capture. Finally, he might have stated that new 
Mediterranean passports should be obtained by those intending to travel 
overseas. It is, however, of central interest that Coleridge went beyond this 
minimum so as to recount, in some detail, the history of the events which 
made the latest intervention of the authorities necessary. More importantly, 
he offered some explanation of the reasons underpinning official decision-
making. Why was this additional material included?
Coleridge’s major objective was to vindicate Ball’s actions which, as 
we have seen, had been both contentious and unlawful. Coleridge’s 
wider objective was to deflect criticism for what might, otherwise, have 
been attacked as a serious misjudgement and to restore his superior’s 
credibility. In this Notice, Coleridge entered the realm of the propagandist, 
deftly shaping the government’s message. Damaging information was 
suppressed, and the effect was deliberately misleading, not least because 
Ball was presented as the benign actor who was the sole decision-maker. 
Ball’s political weakness was also disguised.
The manipulation of information began early in the text with the 
proffered excuse that, when Ball had given passports to foreign nationals, 
he had acted from the highest of motives in solving the crisis following the 
capitulation and, at all times, for the benefit of the public.252 This was given 
some prominence by Coleridge to avoid inconvenient conclusions about 
the illegality of past governmental action. Coleridge faithfully portrayed 
Ball’s defence, of necessity, in the face of the criticism arrayed against him 
and, by implication, Coleridge was arguing that the Civil Commissioner 
had shown courage in putting the welfare of the Maltese above his own 
career even if it meant breaching international law by offering passports 
to foreigners.
Given the lack of our own national ships, and the urgent need to assist the 
transport of goods, His Excellency was obliged, in those early days following 
the surrender of these cities, to distribute certificates which promised British 
Protection to various foreign vessels. The governors of the Barbary states 
252 Ball was now prepared to be open with his superiors about his decision: Ball to 
E. Cooke, 21 July 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/ 93.
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agreed to respect this measure, which was dictated by the necessity of the 
situation.
This passage also disclosed something of Coleridge’s own engagement 
with morality and law in governmental action. His appeal to a superior 
moral order revealed that Coleridge had been forced to confront the 
predicament that arises when just and pragmatic solutions collide with legal 
norms. Coleridge’s intellectual engagement with public life had already 
revealed the need to develop a conception of morally-just administration. 
He had, earlier, considered whether government could ever, legitimately, 
use expediency to vindicate its departure from positive laws. An undated 
Notebook entry, of late January 1805, witnessed Coleridge reflecting upon 
the “’betwixt and between” of positive law & the dictates of right reason” 
in the work of the Court of Vice-Admiralty.253 
The essential premise of Coleridge’s vindication of Ball, in the public 
notice of 25 June 1805, was that a responsible, benign, government cannot 
always deliver good and effective administration within the formal 
constraints of the Rule of Law, and that public action can be justified even if 
a departure from positive legal norms is required, to achieve an important 
public benefit. 
Coleridge’s text continued by laying the blame for the policy failure at 
the door of foreigners (persons neither English nor Maltese) who “abused” 
the system even to the extent of making dishonest, false, sales to disguise 
the true ownership of their vessels. It was these dishonest foreigners who 
had destroyed Ball’s necessary system and Coleridge was unambiguous 
about where the Maltese should lay the blame.
The juxtaposition of the dishonest, selfish foreigner with the courageous 
and selfless Civil Commissioner was a particular feature of Coleridge’s 
technique. Coleridge was, of course, tapping, once more, into the Maltese 
suspicion of “foreigners”, for political ends. Only a few days earlier he 
had issued the Bando enacting new laws subjecting foreigners on the 
Island to much stricter controls and the passports Avviso reinforced the 
government’s message that these people were suspect opportunists. The 
aim was, of course, to win sympathy for Ball. He had done his best to feed 
the inhabitants, and, in return, he had been duped and embarrassed by 
untrustworthy, scheming, foreigners. It was a message that Coleridge must 
have believed the public would accept. 
Throughout Coleridge’s text, Ball was presented as a benign actor 
253 CN 2, 2413.
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controlling events. Naturally, Coleridge would not have mentioned that 
the political decision in this matter had been removed from Ball’s hands. 
It was an obvious obfuscation, but one for which Coleridge can hardly be 
blamed. Similarly, the suggestion that the Dey and his spies had merely 
become “suspicious” about vessels bearing the old passports. The Dey’s 
actions went beyond merely suspecting impropriety: he had used force. No 
mention was made about Maltese crews who had already been captured 
and whose release Ball was struggling (so far unsuccessfully) to achieve. 
But the danger that the Sicilian vessels faced was the true reason why 
Coleridge warned them of the risk of capture. Coleridge chose not to 
reinforce his message by revealing the truth about the hostages because it 
would have disclosed British weakness and would damage prestige. Even 
Nelson’s squadron had not been able to rescue  captured Maltese crews, 
which meant that Ball would be politically and militarily powerless to 
intervene successfully against a recalcitrant Dey if yet more individuals fell 
into his hands. Coleridge disguised this impotence by suggesting that Ball 
did not intend to intervene to save law-breakers from captivity. The careful 
use of language implied an act of free will. 
Negotiations, to have Maltese crews released and returned to Malta, 
succeeded in October 1805.254 However, the Neapolitan captives had still 
not been released by the end of the year, although Ball continued to express 
optimism that their release could be obtained.255
5.10.  Military Discipline
Introduction
In the aftermath of the capitulation of the French occupation forces in 1800, 
a military government, under Major-General Pigot, had been created to 
administer both the civil and military affairs of the islands. As we have seen, 
this arrangement was unpopular with the Maltese and, as soon as the risks 
to British long-term interests had been understood by the Secretary of State, 
the civil and military functions were separated. Cameron’s appointment as 
254 Dr Moncrieff to Ball, 13 October 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/247 et seq. 
255 Ball to Castlereagh, 26 December 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/227. He referred in this 
despatch to Neapolitan holders of British passports still held by the Dey of Algiers. 
They had been in captivity since the time Ball had had to use foreign vessels to sup-
ply the Island. 
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the first Civil Commissioner, in May 1801, resulted from this policy shift, 
which placed the responsibility for “civil” affairs under his jurisdiction. 
Pigot retained control of the military.
In practice, this, apparently, straightforward demarcation had been 
obfuscated in the Royal Instructions, resulting in intractable disputes 
between Cameron and Pigot. As we described in Chapter 3, the responsibility 
for policing and for passports had each given rise to disagreement. 
By the time Coleridge held public office, Pigot had been replaced by 
Major-General Villettes. However, the working relationship between Ball 
and Villettes may also have been strained. Lord Windham eventually 
received an allegation from a Maltese agitator, Vincenzo Borg, that 
Villettes and Ball were not in “harmony”.256 Sultana has also concluded 
that in the summer of 1805 there was tension between the military and 
civilian authorities,257 and the most likely causes of friction were the 
requests from the military that the civil government take the unpopular 
measures necessary to ensure military efficiency. Although the evidence in 
Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi suggests some close co-operation, the text of 
these instruments, by itself, does not reveal how willingly this assistance 
was offered, or what arguments may have preceded the promulgation of 
the desired measures. 
In 1805, the major problem was that civilian behaviour, such as the abuse 
of the enlistment system and the sheltering of deserters, could only be 
remedied with the aid of the civilian authorities, (because, ex hypothesi, the 
military usually had no jurisdiction over the conduct of Maltese civilians). 
The army expected the civil administration to deal with these sensitive and 
difficult problems. Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi reveal that Ball had agreed, 
although, in the case of the fugitives, it would require some political 
sensitivity if Ball were to avoid the resentment of an unsympathetic civil 
population. 
Plans to Recruit 
Following the British decision not to implement the Treaty of Amiens 1802, 
the Neapolitan and Sicilian troops who had served alongside their British 
counterparts, in the liberation of Malta, were expelled. As a consequence, 
the British military authorities became concerned at a shortage of 
256 Borg to Windham, 30 May 1806, British National Archive, Kew, CO 158/12 no 
folio reference.
257 Sultana, 347. 
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manpower. The British garrison (which was also required to defend 
Gozo) comprised only the Royal Artillery, the 20th (East Devonshire), the 
27th (Inniskilling), 35th (Dorsetshire) and 61st (South Gloucestershire) 
regiments, with a combined strength of about 3,800 enlisted troops.258 The 
authorities decided that a regiment of Maltese infantry should be raised. 
However, the terms under which they would serve were controversial. One 
reason for this was the proposal to merge two corps of Maltese militia (then 
under the command of Maltese officers) into one Regiment. This was to be 
placed under the command of British officers. There had been an exchange 
between Ball and Lord Camden concerning the terms of service. Ball, in a 
memorandum drafted by Coleridge, had proposed an alternative plan. He 
advocated that the new Regiment should be placed under the command of 
aristocratic Maltese – a proposal that was fully consistent with Ball’s general 
staffing policy.259 However, Camden had insisted that British officers rather 
than the local nobility should command the corps. 
The Royal Regiment of Malta 
The Royal Regiment of Malta was created in December 1804 and Villettes 
appointed its Colonel.260 Coleridge was, later, to allege that the merger 
of the local militia into the new Corps took place merely to give Villettes, 
who had influential friends in the War Office, the command of a regiment 
and for no other reason.261 Coleridge also, somewhat forcefully, expressed 
qualms about the moral legitimacy of recruiting fifteen hundred soldiers 
to serve in any part of the Empire not least because of the relatively tiny 
population of Malta.262 
Recruitment began in earnest in March of the following year, with 
the intention that the unit would take part in an expedition, under the 
command of Lieutenant-General Sir James Craig, to Naples.263 As we shall 
258 1804: See http://website.lineone.net/~stephaniebidmead/chapter567.htm, con-
sulted 5 January 2007.
259 Ball’s staffing policy is described in Chapter 2. For Coleridge’s involvement in 
policy discussion, see: to Robert Southey, circa 24 December 1809 CL 3, 265.
260 See generally, http://website.lineone.net/~stephaniebidmead/ “A History of the 
British Army in Malta”. Consulted 5 January 2007.
261 To Robert Southey, circa 24 December 1809, CL 3, 265.
262 To Robert Southey, ibid. This decision was, he argued, “cruel” and “shameful” 
(emphasis in the original).
263 Eight thousand British troops were sent to Malta in readiness for the campaign 
in 1805: Camden to Ball, 29 March 1805, Kew, CO 159/3/170. Part of the Kingdom 
of the Two Sicilies had been occupied by the French when they entered Naples. See 
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see below, there were soon problems with desertions. Action to recapture 
fugitives was urgently required lest the Regiment should not be available 
for its planned deployment. In fact, the expedition eventually sailed 
without the Royal Regiment of Malta, in November 1805, because the corps, 
(its strength no doubt still depleted by the unresolved desertions) had not 
yet achieved combat readiness.264 
To stimulate recruitment, the Maltese were offered a bounty of ten 
guineas to enlist for general service for an unlimited period or seven 
guineas for seven year’s general service. By May 1805 these payments had 
attracted three hundred and sixty-seven new recruits, which rose to a total 
of four hundred and fifty two months later.265 However, as Coleridge’s 
Avviso of 20 June 1805266 (Abuse of the enlistment money) revealed, some 
civilians were abusing the bounty system by taking the enlistment money 
and using it without any intention of submitting to military service. 
In the end, the Royal Regiment was not placed on the strength of the 
British army until 1807, which is, perhaps, suggestive of the difficulties 
caused by the desertions and the impact upon recruitment of the 
unpopularity of the decision to require general service.
Desertions
A widely-debated question concerned the terms of service and, in particular, 
where the Royal Regiment could be required to serve.267 The thorny issue 
was whether Maltese troops were only to be deployed in the defence of 
Malta – which was acceptable to the Maltese themselves, because most of 
them then in service had come from the local militia – or whether they 
were to be recruited for (unpopular) general service anywhere within 
the Empire. Ball, who had been aware that the Maltese would not readily 
assent to general overseas service, had strongly resisted any policy to send 
them overseas other than as a garrison force.268 Coleridge later expressed 
generally, on the proposed offensive strategy in the Mediterranean, Holland et al. 
Sicily was eventually occupied by British forces for eight years after January 1806.
264 Rather surprisingly, Coleridge later claimed to know little about the Regiment 
on the grounds that he had left the Island before the Regiment embarked on its mis-
sion: to Robert Southey, circa 24 December 1809, CL 3, 265.
265 Above n. 260.
266 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 12.
267 Sultana, 231, 318-9.
268 Ball to Camden, 22 April, 1805, Kew, CO 158/10/ 151. Coleridge also claimed 
to have written a memorandum on the subject on behalf of the Civil Commissioner: 
To Robert Southey, circa 24 December 1809, below n. 271.
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his support for Ball’s preferences in this matter arguing that the decision to 
require general service had been “cruel”.269 The Secretary of State was not 
to be moved: he had already determined that “general service” – with all 
that entailed – would be required.270
In a letter to Southey, written when the Regiment was blamed for the 
loss of Capri in 1808, Coleridge criticised the ministerial decisions that had, 
in effect, overruled Ball. Coleridge argued that the Maltese troops, the large 
majority of whom were married, would have fought bravely if fighting at 
home; but, he remarked that they could not be expected to fight abroad 
where their interests were not at issue.271 
As Sultana indicated, Coleridge had altered his views on some of these 
issues. Coleridge had earlier argued that soldiers fight better away from 
home.272 This volte face may indicate the extent to which Coleridge had 
assimilated the views of the Maltese “establishment”, in particular those of 
the Civil Commissioner.
Thus, the signal that the British sent was that they were willing to use 
the Maltese as warriors in any British cause. Locally, this was both resented 
and feared. As a consequence, in 1805, troops were deserting the regiment 
in significant numbers and disappearing into the countryside.
A likely reason for the resistance to overseas service in the British 
army was that it recalled past experience, which made the Maltese 
fearful. Many of their friends and relatives had been forced to serve in 
the French Revolutionary army, with fateful consequences. Long after he 
had relinquished his public office in Malta, Coleridge, recalling first-hand 
information from a “survivor”, recounted how, in 1798, Napoleon had 
addressed the Maltese regiment and invited them to serve with him in the 
expedition to Egypt. Napoleon had appealed to them to add “glory” to 
their “freedom” and to share the “immortal wreaths of fame”.273 Not one 
of the Maltese volunteered, whereupon the survivor recounted that the 
Maltese were surrounded by a French regiment and forcibly taken to troop 
ships for embarkation. 
Their reluctance to serve Napoleon may, of course, have been 
symptomatic of a reluctance to serve in the military of the French invader: 
269 To Robert Southey, above n. 12.
270 See above n. 268, where Ball makes reference to and quotes from the Secretary 
of State’s earlier letter to him dated 13 February 1805.
271 To Robert Southey, circa 24 December 1809, CL 3, 265.
272 Sultana, 326.
273 The Friend, 1, 258. 
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but this possible interpretation can be contested. Napoleon was only on 
Malta for a brief period (9-14 June 1798) at which time the French were still 
perceived as liberators. The more likely explanation of these events is that 
the Maltese were simply reluctant to risk their lives in an imperial cause that 
did not serve their interests. The wisdom of this distrust was subsequently 
born out when the fate of the Maltese conscripts was revealed. 
Coleridge’s account, in The Friend, alleged that the unfortunate Maltese 
had been placed in front of French soldiers, not only as shields but also 
to prevent desertion.274 Whatever the truth behind these assertions, there 
is no doubt that the British administration on Malta was fully aware of 
the casualties that the Maltese suffered. Macaulay had reported to Ball, in 
January 1804, that of the eight thousand Maltese men conscripted by the 
French army for Egyptian service, few returned.275 Such a recent disaster 
can hardly have been an inducement to the Maltese to serve in the armed 
forces of another imperially-ambitious State.
Thus, the British insistence upon terms of service that were unacceptable 
to the Maltese was the immediate, and perhaps unsympathetic, cause of the 
significant desertions from the regiment with which Coleridge had to deal. 
As a first step, Coleridge issued Avvisi making public the Civil 
Commissioner’s insistence that the population should seek out the 
deserters.276 At this stage, the intention was to motivate potential informants 
by offering a reward for information leading to arrest. But, in addition, and 
somewhat controversially, the first Avviso also warned that punishments 
would be imposed on those who assisted the deserters. It is not clear 
whether aiding them was an offence contrary to existing Maltese law, so 
this threat was constitutionally controversial. The second Notice (5 August 
1805)277 purported to clarify existing laws in order to deny the fugitives 
sustenance. When these Avvisi failed to persuade the Maltese, Coleridge, 
with more than a hint of desperation, resorted to legislation imposing new 
criminal penalties. The problem of desertion was, however, unresolved by 
the time he left the Island in September 1805.
Desertion was not, however, the only problem the British encountered. 
Maltese civilians were taking the bounty proffered for enlistment and then 
refusing to serve. This was also a problem Coleridge had to deal with and 
we shall consider this problem first.
274 Ibid., 259.
275 Macaulay to Ball, 25 January 1804, Kew, CO 158/8/19.
276 Avviso, 15 July 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 17.
277 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814,18.
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The Avviso of 20 June 1805278 – Enlistment Money
The recruitment campaign, which began in March 1805, soon ran into 
unexpected difficulties. On 20 June 1805 Coleridge was forced to issue a 
public notice condemning the fraudulent practice by which civilian men, 
who pretended to be interested in enlistment, accepted the enlistment 
money only to use it as an interest free loan with which to gamble. Having 
accepted the bounty, they would, unlawfully, refuse to proceed with 
enlistment. Of course, they hoped to escape enlistment by repaying the 
bounty and the required penalty, but this depended, of course, on having 
won their bets. 
To combat this opportunism, Coleridge announced a more vigorous 
enforcement, of the existing regulations, available under the articles 
of War. This scheme employed a “cooling off period” after the payment 
of the bounty. An intending soldier had to be taken before an official or 
magistrate and sworn in; but under the articles of War this process was not 
to take place earlier than twenty-four hours and not later than forty-eight 
hours after receiving payment. In other words, the articles of War enabled 
an individual who had second thoughts about military service to repay 
the enlistment money together with a ten scudi penalty and, thereby, avoid 
enlistment without committing an offence. 
The restriction that Coleridge imposed was that the repayment of the 
enlistment money and the ten scudi penalty had to occur within twenty-
four hours of the enlistment money having been accepted. This meant that 
the unsuccessful gambler would have little opportunity to recoup the lost 
stake and win the ten scudi necessary to escape military service.
The problem with this restriction is that it appears to contradict other 
terms of the articles of War, notably the earlier provision that the cooling-
off period could be as long as forty-eight hours. The internal consistency of 
the Regulations is problematic. 
The Avviso of 15 July 1805279 – Deserters
Large-scale desertions were a problem for the authorities that were not 
confined to the Royal Regiment of Malta. Surviving witness testimony 
reveals that desertions of up to twenty men at a time were taking place 
during July 1805 – the foreign soldiers of the Corsican regiment bribing 
278 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814,12.
279 Avviso 15th July 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 17.
282 Coleridge’s Laws
Maltese boat owners to take them overseas.280 
Coleridge’s Public Notice of 15 July 1805 was intended to secure 
the recapture of fugitives from the Royal Regiment of Malta. Normally, 
desertion would have been a matter exclusively for the military but, as 
mentioned above, civilians, who were usually beyond the reach of the 
military jurisdiction, were assisting the soldiers, and so the matter was 
passed to the Public Secretary. The Avviso gave formal notice that those 
who aided the deserters would be severely punished. 
The (successful) desertions were to continue throughout the summer, 
which reveals that the authorities had great difficulty in eradicating the 
support networks which made evasion possible. As we have seen, the total 
strength of the Regiment increased by a mere eighty three men in the two 
months from May to July 1805, despite the offer of a very tempting bounty. 
Although it is unclear whether these limited numbers included those who 
had now deserted, the statistics suggest slow progress in building and 
maintaining the fighting strength of the Corps. If these enlistments did 
include some or all of the now deserted troops then the actual numbers 
available for service would have been significantly fewer than the nominal 
strength. The reaction of the authorities suggests that British policy was 
being seriously undermined. 
Coleridge’s text was carefully constructed. The deliberate intention 
was to suggest to the civilian inhabitants that the fugitives were armed, 
dangerous and desperate, which implied that it was in everyone’s interest 
to get the men back to barracks as soon as possible. He also claimed that the 
fugitives were causing a disturbance to the population. However, if these 
disturbances ever took place, it is possible to be sceptical about the scale of 
the threat suggested. The evidence from the various Bandi and Avvisi is that 
family and friends, who had no wish to see “their” soldiers sent overseas 
to risk their lives in the service of a foreign power, actively supported 
the fugitives. If the absconders really had been isolated, threatening and 
aggressive we can surmise that they would soon have been turned over 
to the military, not least because the authorities had promised a reward to 
informants for information leading to arrest. 
The facts speak for themselves. The confinement of the deserters on a 
small island upon which they would, inevitably, have been pursued, with 
some determination, by the military authorities, reveals that they had 
support from friends. In the intense heat of summer, they would quickly 
280 NAM 92/04 1805. 
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have been forced to obtain water. Since there are no rivers on the Island, 
their supply problems, in the absence of civilian aid, would have been 
insurmountable. If it occurred at all, the disturbance to which the Avviso 
refers may have been isolated attempts to obtain supplies from unwilling 
property owners; but there is no convincing evidence of widespread 
threatening behaviour of a kind that would destroy public sympathy for 
their plight. As said, the portrayal of the fugitives as armed and dangerous 
may have been little more than a concoction of the authorities designed 
to whip up public anxiety. If so, it is possible to interpret the language of 
this Avviso (15 July 1805) as another example of Coleridge’s propaganda. 
And it failed. In the Bando of 2 September 1805,281 Coleridge was eventually 
forced to concede that “hospitality” in rural areas had been offered to the 
deserters. This admission is revealing.
Constitutional Issues
Constitutionally, the Avviso of 15 July 1805 was controversial because it 
purported to announce that the offering of assistance to any deserter, or 
failing to inform the authorities of their whereabouts, would lead to “severe” 
punishment. It also purported to impose new duties: the Maltese were 
required to make all efforts to discover the whereabouts of the deserters 
(and inform on them). 
It is not a Bando and thus could not, by itself, alter Maltese law. Moreover, 
there is no reference in the text of the Notice to an already existing law that 
would entitle the authorities to do impose a lawful punishment; indeed, we 
can be reasonably certain that no such law existed because Coleridge was 
compelled to promulgate a measure creating new offences in the Bando 
dated 2 September 1805. As we describe,282 it is a violation of the Rule of Law 
and, in particular, of the principle nulle poena sine lege, if conduct of which 
the administration merely disapproves can be subjected to punishment. 
Punishment can only take place in accordance with the law. 
The Avviso of 5 August 1805283 – Provisions for 
Deserters
The Notice of 15 July 1805 plainly failed in its purpose. On 5 August 1805, 
281 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 21.
282 See Chapter 6.
283 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 18.
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Coleridge was compelled to issue a further Notice that sought to prevent 
the supply of provisions to the deserters as a way of denying them the 
means of subsisting outside the military system. This Notice of 5 August 
1805, by “reminding” the public of the terms of a Proclamation of 3 April 
1801,284 targeted a particular form of “help” – ostensibly the purchase of 
goods by soldiers and, in particular, bread. When taken together with 
Coleridge’s earlier instrument (Notice of 15 July 1805) the authorities can 
be seen to have pursued a strategy to deny the deserters both shelter and 
sustenance, whether donated or sold; in other words, the civil authorities 
wished to starve the soldiers back to barracks. 
The political sensitivity of the problem and, in particular, the desire to 
avoid resentment, was revealed by Coleridge’s statement in the August 
Avviso that the Civil Commissioner wished the population to be aware of 
the laws so as to avoid the need to inflict punishments. As elsewhere,285 
Coleridge did not miss this opportunity to present the Civil Commissioner 
as a benevolent Governor who made efforts to educate the population 
about the measure rather than punishing them for its contravention. This 
was pursued, no doubt, to boost Ball’s public image at a difficult time 
when there must have been some friction between the authorities and the 
communities in which the deserters had (successfully) taken refuge. 
Coleridge’s Avviso of 5 August 1805 was not an overtly law-making 
measure: Coleridge appears to have thought (or at least claimed to 
believe) that he was merely reinforcing prohibitions already enacted in 
the Proclamation of 3 April 1801. However, for reasons that are not clear, 
Coleridge whether deliberately or otherwise, fundamentally misstated the 
meaning of the 1801 Proclamation. 
In translation, the 1801 Proclamation states:
In order to prevent any further abuses, His Excellency orders that anyone 
who dares to buy any goods from a soldier should be punished not only by 
the loss of both the purchased article and the money which he paid, but also 
by a fine decided by the Grand Court, which will be fixed depending upon 
the type and circumstances of the offence committed. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the 1801 Proclamation criminalised purchases from military 
personnel (“soldiers”) whereas Coleridge, incorrectly, stated that the 
measure prevented any purchase by soldiers.286 The explanation for this 
284 NAM LIBR 431 1/3 Bandi 1800 AL 1803, 69.
285 See Chapter 6.
286 The Proclamation of 1801 prevented soldiers selling arms and other military 
equipment to civilians.
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error is elusive. One possibility is that Coleridge did not investigate the 
language of the Law of 1801, for himself.287 If he did examine it, he may 
have misunderstood the original Italian, or had it misrepresented to him by 
an official. His Notice suggests that this official may have been Ball himself 
since he attributed the mistaken belief, about the significance of the 1801 
Proclamation, to Ball. 
However, the alternative possibility is that Coleridge deliberately 
misstated the law so that it, conveniently, appeared to criminalise sales to 
soldiers. In other words, the misconstruction of the 1801 Proclamation may 
have been deliberate in order to appear to furnish the Administration with 
the necessary legal norm that enabled them to block supplies to deserters.288 
Whichever is the proper explanation, it is undoubtedly true that Coleridge’s 
Avviso misstated the legal powers available to the Administration. 
However, it is highly doubtful that any Maltese would have been taken 
in by this tactic, because soldiers regularly and, uncontroversially, bought 
goods from the public, including goods made from the locally-produced 
cotton, for which they were the major customers in 1805.289 Moreover, 
Coleridge had recently issued a Proclamation which regulated the sale of 
spirits to soldiers,290 so Coleridge’s Notice of 5 August 1805 was manifestly 
inaccurate and would have fooled no-one. From the Maltese perspective, 
the pretence that sales to soldiers had been illegal since 1801 was simply 
foolish and preposterous. Thus, Coleridge’s thin ruse must have seemed 
rather desperate. It is, however, suggestive of the extreme anxiety 
experienced by the British administration. The ridiculous tactic may have 
contributed to the loss of public confidence that eventually led to Ball’s 
administration being caricatured and lampooned on the streets.291
It should also be emphasised that the purported extension to the 
criminal law (i.e. the attempt to criminalise sales to soldiers) raised legal 
and constitutional complexities. Any attempted prosecution would not 
only violate the fundamental principle of nulle poena sine lege, but would 
also result in an acquittal, since no offence known to the law would have 
been committed by a person selling goods to a deserter. 
287 In his Notebooks Coleridge recognised that failing to look at the available evi-
dence was “Imprudence”: CN 2, 2439.
288 It needs to be emphasised that this could only be effective as a public relations 
exercise; it could not change the law. 
289 See the regulation of trade theme discussed in Chapter 5.
290 Proclamation of 22 March 1805, discussed under the consumer protection 
theme, above. 
291 Borg to Eton, 23 July 1806, Kew, CO 158/12, no folio reference.
286 Coleridge’s Laws
In summary, one revealing conclusion is possible: the glaring failure to 
have due regard to the Proclamation of 1801 meant that Coleridge’s Notice 
of 5 August 1805 fell below the standards of good and efficient government. 
Its suggestion, that sales to soldiers had been prohibited since 1801, was 
ludicrous and the measure represents an ill-prepared and ill-judged 
instrument that could only have damaging consequences for the reputation 
of Ball’s government.
 Bando of 2 September 1805292 – Assisting Deserters 
Unsurprisingly, the second instrument failed to curb the spate of desertions, 
which, by early September, remained, “frequent”. Coleridge’s final step, 
indeed his final Bando on Malta, was to introduce a new law punishing 
civilians for assisting deserters. Thus, the Proclamation of 2 September 
1805 rendered liable to a criminal penalty persons offering shelter or other 
support to soldiers who had deserted the Royal Malta Regiment. This step 
must have been necessary to redress the earlier bureaucratic bungling.
The prohibition in the Bando of 2 September 1805 was an inclusive one 
forbidding the inhabitants from giving either shelter or assistance to any 
deserters. The penalty for breach of this injunction was a fine the amount of 
which was to be determined by the Tribunal. 
It is highly unusual in Coleridge’s Bandi that no mandatory fine was 
created for these offences: in this case the fine to be ascertained by the 
judiciary with the direction that all the circumstances of the case and, in 
particular, the identities and, presumably, the relationships of the people 
involved, should be taken into account. Mitigating circumstances could, thus, 
be submitted in an attempt to win leniency, and the judges would have been 
obliged to hear such submissions before passing sentence. This signalled 
that Coleridge recognised the conflicting loyalties that some families might 
have encountered. For example, wives who hid their husbands, or children 
who were found to have taken food to their fathers, might have been more 
leniently treated. The direction to the judges, to take all circumstances into 
account, signals an official concern with justice rather than merely with 
punishment. These considerations were, no doubt, intended to reduce the 
antipathy towards the administration that the decision, to order overseas 
military service (which had sparked the desertions), had caused. 
This democratising technique, of leaving punishment to be determined 
292 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 21.
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by the Maltese (through their judiciary), contrasted with some other 
legislative measures we have examined. As we have seen, the stipulation of 
a mandatory penalty is normal in Coleridge’s legislation, thereby removing 
discretion from the local judges. 
Conclusion
In these laws and public notices we, once again, encounter Coleridge dealing 
with a difficult administrative problem that went to the heart of British 
strategic interests in Malta. British unpopularity could threaten long-term 
possession of the Island, and so the problems surrounding the relationship 
between civilians and military had to be handled with sensitivity. 
As the summer progressed there was rising official anxiety that the 
Royal Regiment of Malta was not combat ready and this was not the only 
regiment afflicted with large-scale desertions, as embarkation and combat 
drew closer. The measures taken to capture the deserters show more than 
a hint of desperation. In particular, the Notice of 5 August 1805 seems 
to have been hastily drawn up and incompetently drafted. Its assertion, 
that an earlier law penalised sales to soldiers and had done so since 1801, 
was, plainly, ridiculous. We cannot know whether Coleridge was ordered 
to attempt this ruse or whether it merely resulted from a mistake, either 
by Coleridge himself or his advisers. Whatever the explanation for this 
dangerous misrepresentation, the Notice of 5 August 1805 is a revealing 
example of the standards of public administration at a time when the civil 
authorities were clearly under urgent and unrelenting political pressure 
from the military. The unwise decision to issue it can only have damaged 
the public reputation of the government.
Once the need to enact a properly-framed law had been understood, 
Coleridge issued the Bando of 2 September 1805. By this date, Coleridge 
realised ,and had to admit, that the deserters had public sympathy. It is 
only at this point that we can identify a change in strategy. The decision 
to confer discretionary sentencing powers upon the Maltese judiciary 
suggests a more compromising stance and a more emphatic concern with 
justice. Coleridge understood the problem of divided loyalty and wanted 
to ensure that Maltese judges were sensitive to this when sentencing. 
6. An Assessment of the 
Proclamations and Public 
Notices
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Coleridge’s achievements in the 
Proclamations (Bandi) and Public Notices (Avvisi). Firstly, we shall consider 
Coleridge’s manipulative use of government information. Secondly, we 
shall consider the consonance of these instruments with his earlier 
journalism and with the requirements of the rule of law, such as publicity, 
comprehensibility and the use of discretion. We shall also examine some 
of their common features, such as the use of informants, and the criminal 
penalties imposed. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the extent 
to which Coleridge’s laws were influenced by wartime conditions.
A Conflict of Interest
Coleridge held office on Malta at a moment in history when British colonial 
policy had undergone a significant and complex shift. At the close of the 
eighteenth century, Britain had lost confidence in the wisdom of exporting 
its legal, political and cultural values and superimposing them on overseas 
territories.1 As Coleridge was to discover, one consequence of the new model 
of colonial government, which continued the constitutional arrangements 
of the former sovereign in conquered territories, was that British colonial 
governments were forced to administer colonies within a legal and political 
framework very different from that which existed in Britain.2 Politicians 
were, inevitably, compelled to determine whether civil society should be 
1 Generally, see Manning.
2 For a general introduction to the geopolitical context, see Rapport.
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governed within the framework of local positive laws and values or whether, 
as Burke had suggested in the notorious impeachment of Hastings, the 
former Governor of Bengal, justice, in public affairs, should be understood 
as a matter of conscience – in effect, that empire should be an ethically 
informed project presided over by a progressive and liberal metropolitan 
state.3 Government in Malta was, therefore, predicated upon assumptions 
about difference, namely that the Maltese legal and constitutional system 
could be worked effectively without a need for close conformity with the 
standards that were required by the English common law. How Coleridge 
responded to this challenge is of compelling interest. As we have seen in 
Chapter 1, his early journalism displayed an awareness of the importance 
of the rule of law. Importantly, he regarded this as embodying universal 
standards. How the Bandi and Avvisi, promulgated by him, conformed to 
these standards deserves consideration which is given in this chapter. But 
first, we shall consider Coleridge’s propaganda role in seeking to establish 
the legitimacy of British rule on Malta.
As we have described, in Chapter 2, a large number of government 
policies were flawed either in conception or execution. The orchestrated 
complaints of the nationalists, although motivated by a desire to have Ball 
recalled, were not all without substance. Grievances simmered over breaches 
of perceived promises, to share prize money, after the fall of Valletta –  the 
Segnatura was, consequently, flooded with complaining petitions; there had 
been a harsh crackdown after the anti-Semitic disturbances, in which Ball 
had interfered with the judicial process, to impose exemplary sentences 
which went beyond the criminal Code; free speech had been suppressed; 
taxes had been levied, notwithstanding a formal pledge to uphold a 
Maltese system that did not permit regular taxation; crime rates were high 
and witnesses were not coming forward to give evidence; the community 
supported deserters from the military who feared being sent on overseas 
service; bread was formally declared to be only fit for hogs, and so it went 
on. One of Ball’s detractors noted that Ball’s administration was lampooned 
for incompetence. Of course, this correspondent was politically motivated, 
with an axe to grind, but the frustration he recorded is likely to have been 
substantially true. Any argument that, in 1805, Ball was still enjoying the 
reputation and esteem he had won during his first administration is simply 
unconvincing.4 There was discontent amongst the Maltese which had led 
3 Marshall (ed.), vol 5; Ahmed, 28.
4 Cf. Staines.
290 Coleridge’s Laws
to protests on the streets of Valletta. Even in London, ministers hesitated to 
have full confidence in him.5 Ball had, as it were, suffered a steep slump in 
his popularity, albeit, as matters turned out, a temporary one. 
Ball’s unpopularity in 1805-1806 mattered because, given 
his autocratic powers, he was a powerful emblem of British rule 
since all governmental action was taken in his name. All the major 
policy decisions were taken by him and communicated in his name 
(as Coleridge emphasised in The Friend).6 Coleridge’s task was of 
strategic significance. He used government information to try to 
make Ball and his administration popular; and in doing so he was 
attempting to dispel the notion that Britain’s Civil Commissioner was 
just another, autocratic, alien power whose presence on the Island 
was merely as exploitative and, as some alleged, more tyrannical, 
a rule than under the worst of the Grandmasters. Coleridge had to 
craft government information in order to suggest that British rule 
was perceived as benign, legitimate, and founded upon a supposed 
concurrence of British and Maltese interests.
Coleridge as Advocate for the Legitimacy of British 
Rule 
The concept of legitimacy offers a solution to a political problem 
governing the relationship between power and obedience. It thus governs 
the relationship between those governing and those being governed. 
Legitimacy also sustains legal credibility and contributes to the justification 
for political action. A system of government can be regarded as legitimate 
if it responds to widely accepted social needs and preferences. This is 
so because government involves the direction of public affairs in order 
to advance the common good. As we have seen, for pragmatic British 
politicians, achieving and maintaining legitimacy was essential to the 
stable long-term government of an overseas possession with a unique 
constitutional, political and social structure.
The problem for colonial administrators was that a structural fissure lay 
at the heart of the colonial project: the inherent conflict of interest between 
the colonial territory and the Imperial power. The dominant strategic 
5 See Chapter 2.
6 The Friend, 2, 552-4.
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function of colonial government on Malta was to control the territory as a 
secure military base, which, from the British point of view, meant that all 
governmental power was to be retained under British control. This strategic 
policy conflicted with, for example, the political aspiration of the Maltese 
to share governmental power. Political dissent was vigorously suppressed, 
together with Maltese civil and political rights (e.g. the right to a fair trial). 
Coleridge seems to have realised that the legitimacy and popularity of 
Ball’s administration depended upon achieving a recognised congruence 
between the values of the British civil administration, its policies and those 
of the wider Maltese social system. The Civil Commissioner’s instructions 
required Ball to win the hearts and minds of the Maltese – to “attach” them 
to British rule. This meant that upholding the public reputation of the 
administration was, necessarily, a strategically-significant endeavour. In 
Ball’s opinion, Coleridge had clearly understood that information could be 
used as a powerful policy instrument.7 
In the absence of other mechanisms, designed to elicit Maltese popular 
opinion before a law was introduced, the measure itself could sometimes 
furnish a useful means for the ex post facto persuasion of those regulated. 
Coleridge’s instruments were not merely rules; they were also explanations, 
justifications and, sometimes, even ingratiations aimed at securing political 
support not only for obedience to the measure, but, ultimately, for British 
rule. They are exercises in government communication intended to win 
public support, influence Maltese opinion and alter behaviour. But they are 
not uncontroversial because the manner in which consent was invited, the 
partial nature of the information, how it was selected and presented, and 
above all, the underlying motivation of government, pose ethical questions 
about Coleridge’s actions. 
Ethics
We must not overlook Coleridge’s function as a senior British official. 
Naturally, he would be required to favour and emphasise the British 
perspective and British interests. He could hardly be expected to be 
indifferent towards British policy goals, indeed, he was required to act as an 
advocate for them. But did Coleridge’s behaviour go beyond the reasonable, 
even if zealous, advocacy of Ball’s policies? Did he provide information that 
7 In September 1805 Ball had sought to retain Coleridge’s services for the gov-
ernment and he emphasised the role Coleridge could play as a propagandist and 
political journalist (see Chapter 1). 
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was strictly truthful in content, but was, nonetheless, intended to mislead?8 
Many students of his work might consider that he was, at the very least, 
highly selective in the information that he disclosed. More troubling was 
that some of the information he communicated was inaccurate, possibly 
designedly so. Some statements seem to have been deliberately misleading; 
others may (according to a more generous interpretation) have been merely 
careless or incompetent. 
In principle, there is a fundamental distinction between information 
that is honest, comprehensive, fair and accurate and information that is 
biased, incomplete, or intended to mislead. This distinction lies at the heart 
of integrity in public office. Thus, how Coleridge deployed government 
information is important to an understanding of his experience of ethics in 
public administration. The record does not disclose the highest standards 
in public office and this illuminates Coleridge’s dilemmas in reconciling 
himself to the demands of practical politics. 
There is ample evidence that Coleridge was aware of the morally-complex 
nature of the public office he had assumed. His Notebook entries reveal 
that this analysis began whilst he still held office. Within a few days of his 
appointment as Public Secretary, he was already asking the fundamental 
question, “Wherein is Prudence distinguishable from Goodness (or Virtue) 
– and how are they both nevertheless one and indivisible” (emphasis in 
original).9 This was Coleridge’s central dilemma. His experience of public 
office, and reflections upon it, eventually led him to reject a utilitarian 
conception of political morality. Governmental action should not merely 
be concerned with the consequences of a political decision but also with 
the impulses that directed and motivated it. A concern with actions and 
consequences should not make government indifferent to considerations of 
morality. Coleridge concluded that these “inward” motives contributed the 
essence of morality to the outward expression of public policy.10 
For Coleridge, writing after his Malta period, an exclusively empirical 
justification of public action was not the appropriate standard by which 
governmental decisions should be judged. This is made clear in his 
conclusions concerning the British policy that led to the Treaty of Amiens 
1802. From the British point of view, the terms of the Treaty had been hugely 
8 For a discussion of ethics in modern governmental communication see Yeung.
9 CN 2, 2412, 23 January 1805.
10 The Friend, 1, 314. It is revealing that in his Notebook Coleridge had interested 
himself in the relationship between positive law and “the dictates of right reason = 
inter Jus et aequitatem”. CN 2, 2413.
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advantageous because they brought an end to the costly hostilities with 
France. For the sake of our peace, Malta would be sacrificed. In particular, 
the Maltese were to be forced to accept the return of the despotic Order of 
St John. This would mean not only that the archipelago would fall under 
French influence, but that it would also expose the Maltese people (who 
had rebelled against their former French occupiers) to the risk of reprisals.11 
Coleridge’s experience of framing Bandi and Avvisi raise similar problems 
and are also likely to have been in his mind when he later rejected utilitarian 
principles. We can surmise that it was his disappointment with the ethical 
standards of colonial administration that led him, upon his return to 
England, to express such powerful condemnations of the “wickedness” 
of colonial government.12 Fairness, truthfulness, accuracy, objectivity and 
comprehensiveness, in government communication, would have been of 
concern to Coleridge. 
Ball as an Icon of British Values
Coleridge’s major task was to restore public confidence in Ball. He had to 
re-create a mythology of Ball as a wise, caring and selfless public official 
in order to re-connect with the tide of popularity, earned during the 
Maltese Uprising (1799-1800), that had led Ball to become known amongst 
them as “father Ball”.13 Since legislative judicial and executive power was 
concentrated in Ball’s office, Ball was the high-profile embodiment of British 
values. The Bandi and Avvisi, could be used to promote this. For Coleridge, 
the Civil Commissioner needed to be not only a mere office-holder but also 
an icon. This was an integral part of retaining Maltese confidence in the 
administration. Thus, Coleridge lost no opportunity to present his superior 
as having a virtuous and prelatic concern for his people. When he warned 
the inhabitants about the circulation of counterfeit coinage he was careful 
to attribute kindly and paternal concern to Ball: 
[The Civil Commissioner] wishes to avert the Public of this so that everybody 
is properly informed, and may then make every possible effort not to be 
tricked. 14
He also strove to counter the stentorian and autocratic public image 
11 Coleridge concluded that the Treaty besmirched British national honour: The 
Friend, 1, 571.
12 To Daniel Stuart, 22 August 1806 CL 2, 1178.
13 The Friend, 1, 555.
14 (1774) 1 Cowp. 204, 209; 98 ER 1045, 1048.
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that Ball was acquiring by suggesting that Ball did not have a monopoly 
on wisdom. The opening passage of his first Bando is interesting because 
it represents Ball as “hoping” that he had exhausted all policy options in 
maintaining the roads – a formula which hints, to the Maltese, of a sense of 
self-doubt and which, thus, projects Ball’s humanity:
Given the great benefits to be gained from having a road network which is 
maintained in a good condition, His Excellency the Royal Commissioner 
wishes to relay to the Public his hope that, in seeking to obtain this important 
objective, he does not neglect any of the ways in which it may be achieved (Emphasis 
added)15
There are also appeals to the Civil Commissioner’s “duty” to the 
governed, and to his inexhaustible selflessness. These can be seen as direct 
responses to the fault-line underpinning the colonial relationship which 
was first made so evident to the Maltese after the Treaty of Amiens, and 
which Ball had revived by his actions in the early part of 1805. In The 
Friend, Coleridge revealed an awareness of the damage that the Treaty 
had caused to relations between Malta and Britain when the latter had 
pursued its selfish interests at the expense of the former. In an effort to 
counter this damage, His Excellency was depicted as working tirelessly for 
public causes.16 Coleridge was, therefore, to suggest a close nexus between 
British and Maltese policy; indeed that Ball would work tirelessly for their 
“happiness”17 – a formula which Coleridge understood would suggest 
giving precedence to their preferences rather than others. It inferred that 
Maltese interests had been, and would continue to be, prioritised. 
Devotion and Selflessness
Coleridge carefully associated Ball with a moral order to counter the 
Maltese opinion that Ball was merely an oppressive instrument of selfish 
British colonial ambitions. Religious imagery was deliberately employed 
because it would strike a powerful cord with the pious Maltese. In the 
Bando imposing the duty on wine and spirits,18 Coleridge emphasised 
Ball’s “sacred duty” and stressed that the Commissioner worked tirelessly 
for the happiness of the Maltese people. 
15 Bando, 29 January 1805, NLM /MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356; 431 II/3, 50.
16 The Friend, 1, 571; Bando 8 March 1805 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 
1814, 2. 
17 Bando, 8 March 1805, ibid.
18 Ibid. See further below.
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This inexhaustible, selfless devotion had been emphasised a few days 
earlier in an Avviso of 1 March 1805 when Coleridge represented that, “His 
Excellency devotes all his time to helping public matters”.19 This Avviso 
had, ostensibly, been issued merely to notify the public of the conviction 
of one Sacco for extortion. Had Coleridge confined himself to that subject 
alone the reference to Ball’s devotion would have been quite superfluous. 
Its inclusion reveals that Coleridge was seizing each opportunity to boost 
Ball’s image. The idea of Ball’s devotion was clearly a point that Coleridge 
felt deserved repetition, which invites the suspicion that he knew that, at 
this moment in Maltese history, the population needed to be convinced. 
The repression of political free speech, particularly the banishment of 
the petitioner before the Segnatura who requested political reform, was a 
shocking event for the Maltese, and was featured as a major grievance later 
presented in a Petition to the Crown. The Maltese nationalists, thereafter, 
felt disenfranchised and powerless, because political speech seems to have 
been relegated to the streets. The anti-Semitic demonstrations in Valletta 
and the lampooning, in graffiti, of Ball’s administration,  suggest that the 
old avenues, by which autocratic power was managed, had been closed by 
the British. The Maltese were, no longer, prepared to risk banishment by 
approaching the Civil Commissioner with their political concerns. 
Such was the breakdown in trust that, Coleridge had to respond. He 
seems to have seized the first opportunity he could. The Avviso of 1 March 
1805 was used to emphasise Ball’s commitment to open and consultative 
government. The Civil Commissioner, Coleridge declared, “is always 
ready to listen to petitions from anybody”. Thus, although the Avviso 
was, ostensibly, a minor announcement about a named individual who 
had been imprisoned for extortion, its true significance was central to the 
government’s wider political agenda, not only in regaining public trust in 
Ball, but also the constitutional role of the Segnatura as a mechanism by 
which individual complaints could be heard in safety and addressed by 
government
Criminal Penalties
The Bandi and Avvisi reveal the reluctance of the British to use the criminal 
law in cases where official action against widespread law-breaking would 
19 In fact, this approach is an extension of a style that can be found in earlier 
British Bandi produced under the hand of Alexander Macaulay in which there are 
references to the wish of His Excellency to “govern wisely”.
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antagonise Maltese public opinion and provoke dissent. We have described, 
in Chapter 5, how Ball would have preferred to endure the politically 
embarrassing cost of repairing the roads rather than use criminal penalties 
to ensure that damaging wheels (used by the majority of Maltese) were 
removed from use (even though the damage they caused was expensive 
to repair). This reluctance is all the more evident given the extremely 
difficult budgetary crisis and the cost of maintaining the road network, 
which might, otherwise, have been reduced substantially and quickly. In 
fact, it is an indication of Ball’s political weakness: he simply dared not risk 
prosecutions of large numbers of Maltese, not least the poorer members 
of society, who would have been forced either to buy new wheels or face 
a fine. Coleridge’s language suggested a merciful, paternal care, in so far 
as the kindly voice behind the Avviso (ostensibly Ball’s) is concerned, to 
guide citizens as to their duties rather than allowing them to offend and 
be punished. This is a theme that emerged in many of Coleridge’s Notices. 
The Avviso of 22 March 1805 employed a similar strategy. Here Coleridge 
stated: 
Given that he cares as much about the protection of trade as he does about 
the merchants themselves, His Excellency the Royal Commissioner is very 
much hoping to avoid the necessity of punishing anybody, or of making 
anybody suffer [a penalty].
The Avviso of 14 June 1805 revealed that Coleridge was willing to repeat 
the political message:
… His Excellency...believed it necessary to use this notice to avert the 
Public of this case, hoping that it shall serve as an example to avoid similar 
punishments in the future. 
Coleridge clearly considered it consistent with the desired public image, 
of the kindly “father Ball”, that the latter could, somewhat patronisingly, 
remind the populace of their duties so that they could comply with the law 
and avoid getting into trouble. Thus the Avviso of 25 May 1805, following 
the anti-Semitic disturbances, closes with:
Now that the senseless pleasure in inventing malicious slander has stopped, 
and the people have realised their own foolishness, and how damaging their 
credulity can be, His Excellency hopes that the nation shall again enjoy its 
former peace, regardless of those who are envious of its happiness. There 
should therefore be no more need to punish anybody…
The emphasis on Ball’s stated unwillingness to punish is a careful 
response to the concerns which were later to emerge in the Petition of the 
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Maltese to the British Crown in 1805. It will be recalled that this cited Ball’s 
“thundering vengeance” and “despotic scourge” – which imply the opposite 
of restraint.20 We do not know whether Ball was aware of the Petition, 
but there is a hint that Coleridge understood the scepticism that existed 
amongst the Maltese. In the Avviso of 5 August 1805, Coleridge seemed 
to acknowledge that Ball’s public reputation had been severely damaged 
by his use of criminal punishments (and the power of banishment). As 
in the other instances, he reiterated the Civil Commissioner’s distaste for 
punishment. However in this instrument, Coleridge conceded, frankly, that 
Ball’s claims to restraint required “proof”, without which there would be 
lingering doubts about the Commissioner. The Avviso included the words 
“[the] ...proof of his desire to prevent, rather than to punish crimes”. 
Ball as War Leader
Another technique was to depict Ball as the Maltese had first known him – a 
decisive military commander. Coleridge carefully emphasised the priority 
that Ball accorded to the safety of the Maltese and his personal sacrifice in 
prioritising their interests. Coleridge claimed that Ball was willing to take 
these steps notwithstanding the interests of his own career and reputation. 
In summary, Ball, selflessly, pursued Maltese interests even to the point of 
breaching the international legal order. Nothing would stand in the way of 
his duty to his people.
The Avviso in question concerned passports. As we have seen, in 
Chapter 5, Coleridge, effectively, appealed to the Maltese to revive Ball’s 
earlier image, as an heroic and successful war leader, by using the narrative 
about Ball’s courage in securing food for a starving population. Ball was 
presented as an heroic war leader who took serious personal risks to protect 
the Maltese (for which they should be grateful). In rather stentorian tones 
Coleridge reinforced this image by pronouncing that Ball would not assist 
those who chose to defy him. He was presented as a strong, courageous 
and selfless protector of the Maltese, but also as a leader who demanded 
obedience.
Political Advocacy 
Apart from promoting Ball’s public reputation, Coleridge had to win 
20 Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated): Kew, CO 158/10/151.
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the political argument for each measure he announced. In other words, 
Coleridge was required to convince the Maltese of the case for each new 
law that Ball introduced. In this way, the project to win back trust in the 
Civil Commissioner was buttressed by more explicit reasoning within 
the instruments themselves. Each strategy was intended to suggest the 
congruence of Maltese and British purposes and values. Coleridge’s 
task, essentially, embraced an endeavour to make this obvious and more 
convincing to the Maltese.
If Coleridge’s motive was to win ex post facto popular consent for a 
measure, it is disappointing that, at times, he did not refrain from some 
dubious practices to get it. There are numerous difficulties with his use 
of government information. Many of the policies, which Coleridge was 
advocating, were introduced for more than one reason. Amongst the 
various motives, some may have been represented as primary or dominant 
and others as subordinate. In other words, had the subordinate motives not 
been present, the measure in question would still have been introduced. 
Moreover, when all the reasons underpinning a policy are taken into 
account it is apparent that some (whether dominant or subordinate) 
would have been more palatable to the Maltese than others. As we shall 
see, Coleridge suppressed the unpopular reasons, which are often the 
dominant reasons, and over-emphasised those that were subordinate 
yet more popular. This was done to avoid betraying an obvious lack of 
correspondence between Maltese and British interests. If the true reasons 
for a policy had become publicly acknowledged, it would have undermined 
the legitimacy of British rule; Coleridge recognised the need to obfuscate 
the true purposes of measures which predominantly benefited Imperial 
interests. 
This is not simply because the use of information involved inappropriate 
emphasis and a lack of objectivity. Some measures contained statements of 
fact there were simply untrue. As we have seen, we do not know whether 
this was a deliberate and dishonest attempt to mislead the Maltese, but if it 
was not, the error was certainly convenient and served policy goals. Thus 
as we shall see, Coleridge and Ball did not always furnish information that 
was honest, comprehensive, fair and accurate. 
Fairness and Accuracy 
Coleridge’s first Bando of 29 January 180521, which regulated the manufacture 
21 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356; 431, II/3, 50. 
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of cart wheels, included significant justificatory (and exhortatory) material. 
This was because Ball refused to punish the continued use of certain 
detrimental wheels, and, therefore, Coleridge had to persuade the Maltese 
to abandon them voluntarily. Here Coleridge was concerned to show the 
Maltese that their self-interest aligned perfectly with the interests of the 
British administration. However, the measure was a fair and accurate 
statement of policy.
Incomprehensive Information
The Bando of 22 March 1805,22 which regulated spirits, was different. 
There, we witnessed Coleridge deploying information which was not 
comprehensive and doing so with an inappropriate emphasis. His stated 
reason for the Bando was that regulation of alcohol was necessary to 
safeguard health. This message would, of course, have fortified the 
desired image of Ball as a paternal, beneficent lawgiver. However, we 
have suggested that the dominant motive behind this instrument was the 
urgent need to address military discipline and community safety given the 
presence on the Island of eight thousand troops of the expeditionary force. 
This is not altogether surprising. Had the measure been more accurately 
depicted, it might have alarmed the population and caused resentment 
towards the troops on the Island. 
A similar issue concerning emphasis and comprehensiveness arose in 
relation to the excise duty on wine. Here the major reason underpinning 
the enactment of the duty, reducing Malta’s financial subsidy from the 
British Treasury, would, if publicly known, highlight the structural conflict 
in colonial rule. In other words, policies such as this, designed to serve 
British interests, ipso facto burdened the Maltese by transferring wealth 
from Malta to Britain. Coleridge and Ball were, naturally, concerned that 
this information should not enter the public domain. As we have seen, 
Coleridge emphasised that the revenue raised would fund additional 
spending. This was undoubtedly true, but incomplete. The significant 
omission was misleading – that the majority of the funds raised would 
be devoted to addressing the deficit and funding existing expenditure. 
Coleridge’s selective use of information helped maintain the fiction that 
the legislation exclusively served Maltese concerns – the deserving causes 
– and that the Bando of 8 March 1805 was imposed for the benefit of the 
22 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
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Maltese people. Far from achieving a genuine legitimacy, Coleridge seems 
to have been compelled to co-operate in manipulative behaviour. 
The Bando of 8 March 1805 also revealed other disquieting strategies 
because it disclosed Coleridge’s apparent willingness to exploit Maltese 
racist sentiment where it served British imperial purposes. He deliberately 
assured the Maltese that the re-introduced excise duty would be indirectly 
discriminatory against (unpopular) foreigners, since it was they, and not 
the Maltese, who comprised the largest group of consumers of wine. The 
hypocrisy of this propaganda would be revealed within a few months when 
the Administration was forced to inflict exemplary punishments upon anti-
Semites such as Tagliana, Borg, Hasciach and Bonello. Ball and Coleridge 
were, then, quick to seize the moral high ground by declaring Ball’s 
displeasure about rewarding a courageous Maltese who had, supposedly, 
prevented the stoning of a victim. The point Ball wished to make, at that 
moment, was that standing up for the dignity and civil rights of foreigners 
was a civic duty and not an act that deserved a pecuniary reward. The 
striking language used in this later Avviso implied that all persons had a 
moral obligation to protect foreigners. The double standard is glaring. 
Even more concern, about manipulation and concealment, can be 
raised regarding the instruments concerned with the recapture of the 
army deserters. Coleridge had portrayed the enlisted men as a threat to 
community safety. The aim was to encourage informants to betray the 
whereabouts of the missing soldiers to the authorities. To promote his 
message he had adopted an alarmist tone by proclaiming that the men were 
“…now armed and roaming the countryside, disturbing the population”.
As he must have known, the deserters had only been successful in 
evading capture because they had the support of family and friends who 
did not wish their relatives to be sent on overseas service. The suggestion 
that the deserters were a danger to public safety was demonstrably fictitious. 
Moreover, this episode also raised other controversies about Coleridge’s 
approach. One particular issue is that the Public Notice of 5 August 180523 
contained information that was objectively false. 
As we have seen, Coleridge, whether deliberately or carelessly mis-
described the effect of a Proclamation of 1801, in order to suggest that those 
inhabitants who sold goods to deserters would be liable to punishment. 
His strategy at this time was to force the community to withdraw basic 
supplies from the deserters and starve them back to barracks. To do this he 
23 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 19.
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made unambiguous representations to the Maltese about the criminal law 
on harbouring, and aiding and abetting the deserters. That must have had a 
chilling effect upon those selling food to the deserters. However, his public 
statement that those selling bread to soldiers risked prosecution under the 
law of 1801 was simply nonsense.
As we have seen, this was not the only bizarre instrument promulgated 
on that day: the unripened fruit Bando24 was also problematic. Even if the 
convenient misstatement was the result of negligence rather than a deliberate 
intention to deceive, it is an inescapable conclusion that Ball’s civil service 
did not invariably attain the highest standards in public administration. 
Was Coleridge so ill and exhausted that his effectiveness in office was 
impaired? Was he simply beyond caring? As the troops’ embarkation date 
drew nearer, was he under such pressure from Ball and the military that he 
and they felt justified in making any false statement that might assist in the 
recapture of the men? If it was, indeed, a deliberate deception, it was clearly 
desperate and even dangerous because the Proclamation of 1801 was a 
public record. Once the truth about the earlier instrument was realised, the 
falsehood would have been publicly revealed. Significant public damage 
to the integrity and reputation of Ball’s administration must have resulted. 
But this is not the only instance in which Coleridge’s published texts 
raise concerns about accuracy and a possible lack of truthfulness. In the 
Avviso of 25 May 1805, which announced the exile of Fortunata Tagliana, 
Coleridge emphasised that her purpose in orchestrating an attack on a 
suspected Jew was to harm her neighbour, with whom she had a grievance. 
This was inaccurate. There are at least two possible explanations for this. 
The first is that Coleridge was not fully briefed: events were moving at such 
a pace that he may not have seen the witness statements. If that was so then 
the inaccuracies were explained by, and lent credence to, the British view of 
the events as a dangerous emergency.
An alternative possibility was that the inaccuracies were deliberate and 
helped Coleridge’s to control the Administration’s message. As we have 
seen, the emphasis upon Fortunata’s vendetta with her neighbour may 
have been politically convenient because it portrayed her as a threat to the 
Maltese community as well as the Jews. Coleridge seems to have depicted 
her conduct in a way that was intended to justify, in Maltese eyes, the severe 
punishment that she received at Ball’s direction. 
24 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 19.
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Conclusion: Propaganda? 
Arriving at unambiguous conclusions about Coleridge’s work is a 
complex task. Modern conceptions of an impartial and professional civil 
service were, of course, inapplicable in Malta at that time. In particular, 
the obligation, contained in the modern Civil Service Code, to maintain 
integrity, impartiality and honesty, was for the future. The purpose of the 
twenty-first-century propriety conventions is to make sure that information 
should be used for government and not for party purposes. This normative 
framework delineating the modern boundary between legitimate use of 
information for explanatory purposes and its illegitimate use for party 
propaganda purposes had not been developed. And even if it had existed 
in 1805, it would not have been applicable in the context in which Coleridge 
worked. 
It must be recalled that Coleridge was not appointed to be impartial, 
independent and judicially-minded. Nor was he a civil servant who lacked 
a political role. He was a salaried politician/administrator and a senior 
member of an administration required to prioritise the strategic interest 
of the British Empire. His superior, the Civil Commissioner, was bound, 
by the Royal Instructions, to pursue the dominant strategic goals set for 
him by the Secretary of State in London. Pre-eminent amongst these was 
to make his administration popular. No guidance was offered as to how 
this popularity was to be achieved, nor were limits set on the tactics to be 
employed. Coleridge had to work within this political structure to serve the 
goals prescribed for him. What the Bandi and Avvisi so often reveal is the 
limited freedom of action Coleridge had to implement laws that conformed 
to standards he had advocated in his political journalism. Thus, in public 
office, because he was responsible to Ball, and subservient to the goals of 
British policy, he was not always able to introduce, into practical politics, 
the ethical and constitutional values for which he had earlier argued.
That said, not all the techniques employed in Coleridge’s Bandi and 
Avvisi are controversial. Some of the instruments are simply explanatory. 
Examples include the Bando of 29 January 1805 (which appeals to self-
interest to avoid damage to the roads) and the Avviso of 1 March 1805 to 
the extent that it merely reminds the population about the constitutional 
right of petition. 
In a different category are his instruments which use carefully crafted 
language to present Ball in a positive light – to boost Ball’s public image. 
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“Spin” that merely amounts to placing policies and actors in a positive, 
favourable light is commonly accepted even in modern government 
communication. It does not necessarily offend the modern propriety 
conventions, even if it does lack objectivity. Misleading information, by 
contrast, raises ethical questions. Because Coleridge’s texts were congruent 
with, and directed by the overriding policy to attach the Maltese to British 
rule, Ball’s constitutional position made him an emblem of that rule and an 
embodiment of its values. It was necessary to make him popular in order 
to make the government popular. 
However, Coleridge’s use of information went beyond merely presenting 
information in a positive light – he communicated incomplete information. 
A political choice was made as to what information to reveal and what to 
withhold. Whilst the content, of all of the limited information eventually 
communicated, might have been true, the effect, when judged in the light 
of what was omitted, meant that the instrument was calculated to mislead 
the inhabitants. In the examples given above, Coleridge can be seen as 
advocating the government’s viewpoint rather than merely explaining 
policy. He was seeking to alter Maltese behaviour for politically-sensitive 
reasons that could not be disclosed. Coleridge’s purpose was polemical in 
the sense that it revealed partisan and selective advocacy for the policy 
introduced. The intention in these instruments was clearly to delude the 
population. The Maltese consent that he aimed to secure was neither 
properly informed nor genuine. 
In yet more extreme instances, the information he communicated 
was inaccurate and possibly even untruthful. Here Maltese opinion was 
manipulated in ways that demonstrated an attempt to change opinion or 
alter behaviour regardless of the means necessary to achieve it. It is in this 
context that Coleridge’s work is most problematic. We encounter this tactic 
where the stakes were at their highest, for example in relation to the new 
excise duties and the recapture of the deserters. We can be less confident 
about Coleridge’s motive in the case of the deserters, although certainly 
the administration was at its wits end having failed by all other means 
to recapture them. Either there was a deliberate intention to deceive the 
Maltese about the criminal law (that selling food to soldiers was punishable 
behaviour) or Coleridge made an avoidable but careless mistake. This latter 
possibility, if it was true, means that Coleridge was simply negligent. If 
so, it would be consistent with his exhaustion and low morale in the late 
summer of 1805. 
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Undoubtedly, Coleridge was troubled by his experience in government. 
A political actor, concerned with developing a theory of principled 
governmental action would, naturally, have had qualms about the ways 
in which information had been used to shape opinion, alter behaviour 
and secure an apparent consent to British rule. The private admission that 
he now knew “by heart the awkward & wicked machinery, by which all 
our affairs abroad are carried on”25 in part derives from his experiences of 
drafting and promulgating the Bandi and Avvisi. 
6.1. Constitutional Questions
Introduction
Coleridge’s struggle, to maintain the legitimacy and acceptability as 
well as the interests of British rule, caused him to seek justifications for 
departures from constitutional norms that he might, otherwise, have been 
disposed to defend. In his political and journalistic writings, published in 
the years prior to embarking for Malta, there is evidence of an interest in 
constitutional government, which was based upon assumptions about the 
rule of law and the separation of powers through balanced government. 
The question raised by an analysis of the Bandi and Avvisi is whether such 
assumptions, expressed from the critical perspective of the journalist-
commentator, could survive and be adhered to whilst holding public office, 
given the consultative role he had and the reliance placed upon his opinion, 
by the Civil Commissioner?
The Morning Post
Coleridge’s understanding of constitutional doctrine, some years prior to 
his going to Malta, is revealed through his work as political leader-writer, 
special parliamentary correspondent26 and critic for The Morning Post – a 
paper generally unsympathetic to the government. Important issues he 
commented upon included, for example, the introduction of the French 
constitution, 1799, which placed power in the hands of Napoleon,27 and 
25 To Daniel Stuart, 22 August 1806, CL 2, 1178.
26 See Erdman. 
27 EOT, 31-57.
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Addington’s ministry and the peace policy, 1801-1802.28
As we saw, in Chapter 1, these writings included a sustained attack 
upon the French constitution. It will be recalled that the grounds were, in 
particular, that power was to be vested in the Chief Magistrate (Napoleon) 
without adequate restraint. A constitutional theory can be inferred from 
this attack. It looks for the separation of powers and a system of “checks 
and counterpoises”29 to include (though must not be based upon) popular 
representative institutions. Coleridge noted that the formal constraint 
on power in the French constitution lay with the people but it was, for 
Coleridge, a bogus, abstract, democracy which, in practice, excluded the 
poor and whose influence was easily avoided by elites.30 But Coleridge did 
not uphold universal suffrage and direct democracy. He stood for a system 
where the popular will could be a factor in limiting executive power and 
providing political energy but a factor that was itself to be limited by 
the constitutionally decisive and conserving role of property interests.31 
The French constitution created a system of democracy, which, on the 
face of it, because it was indirect, was preferable to universal franchise. 
Upon examination, however, the popular institutions and the system of 
choosing representatives turned out to be bogus “ornamental outworks 
of military despotism”32 because, in the end, the real benefits of indirect 
popular influence upon government were lost. It was the executive, and 
its creatures, which, in the final stage, were to select the members of the 
national assembly. Thus Coleridge, at this time, accepted the importance 
of having ways for all citizens to express their interests politically, but not 
in a way that was decisive. Stability and good government depended on 
maintaining property interests in the political system as the predominant 
check on the executive. These articles also made it clear that Coleridge 
was alive to the difference between appearance and reality; contrasting 
the justificatory language, in which power was exercised, with its reality. 
These perspectives can be compared with his defence, in Malta, of a system 
devoid of any representative institutions, as well as the justificatory and 
rhetorical role he performed in the drafting of some of the Bandi and Avvisi.
28 EOT, 276-311.
29 EOT, 57.
30 “a mere trick of French politeness”, EOT, 48.
31 “We are fortunate enough to live in a country in which, for all its defects, the 
national character is made up, though in different quantities, by all these three prin-
ciples, the influence of a Court, the popular spirit, and the predominance of prop-
erty”. Ibid.
32 EOT, 53.
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From these constitutional writings, a strong belief in the principle of 
political liberty can be inferred. In passages from The Morning Post articles 
of December 1801 and March 1802, for example, Coleridge’s objections to 
emergency measures, such as Pitt’s suspension of Habeas Corpus, come over 
as strong and principled in the sense that suspending Habeas Corpus and 
other measures was wrong in principle and could not be justified even in 
times of emergency. Some of the old groupings in opposition to Pitt were 
now allied to Addington and, in government, they reintroduced some of 
Pitt’s measures.33 In Coleridge’s view, this was an over-reaction to the weak 
French threat.34 However, this was not the crucial point. Coleridge implied 
that the existence of a threat was not a sufficient justification. Liberty is 
a constitutional principle that is to be defended against the executive 
claims that public emergencies justify its limitation.35 It is this principled 
confidence in opposing emergency powers that was, perhaps, most strongly 
challenged by his government experiences in Malta.36
The Morning Post Principles and the Maltese 
Constitution
Coleridge might have looked upon the Maltese constitution with some 
consternation. Our discussion in Chapter 3 reveals how, in vesting 
supreme autocratic powers in the Grandmasters (and, later, the Civil 
Commissioners) the constitutional system did not embody contemporary 
conceptions of limited government. As we have seen, the power of the 
Civil Commissioner was unrestrained: he could pass laws on any subject 
matter, could appoint to any public post, and could overturn the decisions 
of the courts. There was no independent judiciary, the Civil Commissioners 
were not answerable to the Maltese courts for their decisions (although the 
English courts, through legal fictions, could and did obtain jurisdiction), 
and directions to the judiciary about criminal punishment in particular 
cases could be issued under the instructions of the Civil Commissioner. We 
have seen how, in at least one case arising from the insurrection against 
33 EOT, 305.
34 “it had mistaken a bull-frog for a bull”, EOT, 279.
35 EOT, 284, where Coleridge acknowledges the courage of those who opposed 
Pitt’s oppressive laws and, even in “the trying hour”, persisted in acknowledging 
and proclaiming “the divinity of [liberty’s] mission”.
36 See also the discussion of Coleridge’s apparent acceptance of the need for in-
formants, below.
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the Jews, Ball directed the criminal judge to impose a more severe sentence 
than that permitted under the Code de Rohan. This may have been action 
that lay within his powers, but it established beyond doubt that the Maltese, 
unlike their fellow British citizens, would not benefit from an independent 
judiciary, for their civil justice system was firmly under political control 
and direction. 
However, it is highly significant that such conduct breached Ball’s 
own standards of justice (as well as Coleridge’s). As we have seen, when 
writing retrospectively in The Friend,37 Coleridge presented Ball as a 
model law-giver. We have already described how, as a naval commander, 
Ball published a code of disciplinary offences, along with the prescribed 
punishments, formally set out, in advance, for each type of military offence. 
No officer was permitted to depart from the published rules when inflicting 
a punishment. Thus, Ball linked justice with certainty and punishment only 
took place in accordance with published norms. In setting this standard of 
adjudication he had wished to avoid the perception that punishments were 
arbitrary, or that they could be varied. 
This makes a surprising and controversial contrast with Ball as Civil 
Commissioner. In this office, Ball lapsed into a system where “justice” 
was merely the will of the governor, and where published norms could 
be ignored if he thought circumstances merited it. For example, there is 
good evidence that he was willing, if the occasion demanded, to impose 
penalties beyond those allowed in the Code de Rohan without going 
through the processes of changing the law.38 Thus, the Maltese were not 
treated in accordance with standards of fairness extended to Royal Navy 
crews. The significance of this is all the greater when it is recalled that the 
crews were under military discipline in war time. Even this emergency 
did not, in Ball’s opinion, justify a departure from minimum standards of 
fairness for British seamen.
However, this standard of adjudication was not to be applied to the 
civilians of Malta, and the decision relating to Borg, Hasciach and Bonello 
speaks volumes about Ball’s true approach to government. It reveals to us 
how even the civil justice system was recruited to serve imperial purposes39. 
Thus, Coleridge’s account of Ball as a naval commander, in The Friend, 
which he related in order to depict Ball’s approach to civil government, is 
not only seriously misleading, but also a particularly striking example of 
37 The Friend, 1, 169-70.
38 See Chapter 5.4: Public Order and Crime.
39 Ibid.
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Coleridge continuing the propagandist role he developed in Malta even 
after he had left the Island and was reflecting retrospectively upon his 
experiences there. 
In fact, the evidence of Coleridge’s response to what happened on Malta 
is difficult to interpret and is not straightforward. As we have seen, his later 
private correspondence suggested profound disquiet about governmental 
practices on the Island. It would reflect his struggle between his preference 
for principled governmental action and a system capable of responding to 
all contingencies – the darker world of practical politics. But he also refers 
to the “wisdom” of action, a likely reference to the anti-Semitic uprising 
which Ball dealt with by taking apparently unlawful actions. Coleridge’s 
choice of words suggest his agreement with the policies pursued and his 
support for action that lay outside the prescribed normative framework. 
Coleridge’s apparent willingness to support, in Malta, the political 
direction of the judicial process, as well as his stout defence of Ball’s unlawful 
policy of granting passports to foreigners, does not sit happily alongside 
his fierce and, by implication, principled criticism of, for example, the re-
suspension of Habeas Corpus by Addington’s administration, mentioned 
above. Coleridge seems to have accepted in Malta something he apparently 
rejected in London, that a government’s perception of emergency could 
justify restricting liberty and limiting the normal processes of law. The 
reasons are not clear: could it have been an early expression of support 
for British colonial power that allowed him to advocate disproportionate 
and pre-emptive force by the British, in order to retain unimportant 
overseas territories,40 or was it an acceptance that the subject Maltese 
were less deserving of constitutional morality than other British subjects? 
There is no clear explanation. Perhaps the most likely explanation is a 
proto-Machiavellian acceptance, based upon experience, of the moral 
compromises required for effective government.
6.2. Coleridge’s Laws and the Rule of 
Law
The General Principle
The rule of law implies that a person should be legally (as distinct from 
40 The Friend, 1, 298 et seq. 
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morally) bound only by the law and not by the discretionary judgements of 
officials if made without legal authority. It is not enough for a public official 
to act in pursuit of his or her conception of the public interest. Actions must 
be capable of being authorised under rules of law; and it is to the judges, 
and the judges alone, that the identification of those social rules which 
count as legal rules and which are to be the necessary and sufficient guides 
to official conduct, is entrusted. 
By the twenty-first century, the rule of law had, become a complex 
body of open-textured obligations and values.41 Even in the eighteenth 
century the general idea of the rule of law was accepted as an important 
constitutional value.42 Douglas Hay,43 for example, suggests that the idea of 
law was central to the ideology of Georgian England by which the rule of 
property was sustained.
Though an important legitimating principle, the rule of law had not, in 
the early nineteenth century, been given the developed and particularised 
theoretical exposition that it currently (in the twenty-first century) enjoys. 
Nevertheless, Dicey’s assertion of the “rule or supremacy of law”,44 a late 
nineteenth-century abstraction from constitutional history, contrasts the 
rule of law with arbitrary government. The underlying idea is that one of 
the weapons against arbitrariness is to authorise government only on the 
basis of legal rules ultimately determined by an independent judiciary.45 At 
the very least, this is a formal constraint upon the exercise of power. The 
Coleridge Bandi exemplify some interesting tensions with this simple idea 
41 See, for example, the survey of the rule of law in the twentieth century by 
G. Marshall, in Bogdanor, 56-7; “open texture” (following the definitions of H.L.A. 
Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), Chapter VII/I: pp 
124-36) implies a core meaning (that government is entitled to act only if author-
ised by a rule, whatever its content, identified by the courts as a rule of law) and 
a penumbra of extended meanings and glosses which are attached to the term in 
different contexts through which procedural and substantive content to the term is 
added. 
42 See Van Caenegen, 17-21, outlining a series of political and intellectual proc-
esses beginning in the early thirteenth century. In England the classic authority for 
the subordination of government to law as laid down by an independent judiciary 
is Entick v Carrington (1765), 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (see Chapter 2). Thomp-
son, 263, referring to Douglas Hay’s researches accepts that “law assumed unusual 
pre-eminence[ in Eighteenth Century England]…[it was the] central legitimising 
ideology…England is saturated with the notion of law…Royal absolutism was 
placed behind a high hedge of law”.
43 D. Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’, 17-64.
44 Dicey, 107.
45 E.g. Entick v Carrington (1765), 19; Howelll’s State Trials 1029.
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of the rule of law
Rules and Discretion
The opposition of the rule of law with arbitrary government means that 
legal rules should be appropriately specific about the powers granted to 
public officials and the offences for which punishment can be imposed. The 
rule of law is challenged by legal rules which grant indeterminate, personal 
discretion to officials. If the rule of law means governance on the basis of 
rules, it should mean that the point and bite of the rules should be precise 
enough to both limit the administrator and to be followed by the citizen.
One of the noticeable characteristics about the Coleridge Bandi is that 
they are remarkably different in terms of the degree of official discretion 
that they allow. The usual approach is a wide-ranging discretion, such as the 
discretion of the court over the way in which the wine trade was licensed.46 
In contrast, many of the criminal sentences imposed were fixed, with no 
judicial discretion to vary them. Most of them do not have any leeway 
for adjusting the penalty to the degree of wrongdoing by the defendant 
or to his or her circumstances. Today, such automatic punishments raise 
serious difficulties (under the European Convention of Human Rights, for 
example) but even in the eighteenth century, common law judges would 
have resisted this restriction of their discretion.
In contrast, in terms of the procedural detail they laid down, it is 
striking how detailed some Bandi appeared to be. The best example is in 
the Bando of 21 June 1805.47 This imposed a duty on foreigners to register 
with the courts. Apparently, as a matter of legal obligation, it required the 
President of the Court and the Chief of Police to meet every morning; and 
the time of meeting was expressly stipulated to be 10 o’ clock. The names 
of the permitted foreigners were then to be entered into a book which the 
officials had to carry. The required entries recorded the names of permitted 
foreigners, and the dates when they left the Island. But this was not all 
because the Bando continued that this and other information was to be 
placed on the same page but separated by a margin. The following extract 
illustrates the minutiae of state control: 
They should make clear notes in the margin of all observations relating to 
the person, to the reason for their arrival and residence on the island, and 
46 Bando of 22nd March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
47 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814,14.
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to the permit granted as a result, and they should provide details of the 
documents examined. Then, in a separate column, but on the same page, the 
Chief of Police should note in the above mentioned book the departure of 
the foreigner, and whether or not he gave back his permit.
Similarly prescriptive regulation characterised the vehicle and vessel 
registration scheme. The President had to keep a register of carts, gigs, 
ferry boats and fishing boats; the Administration also interested itself in the 
details of how the entries were recorded. The Bando specified that each boat 
or vehicle was to entered on a separate page. This extraordinary concern 
for detail is itself a challenge to the rule of law since, by its elimination of 
discretion and flexibility, it creates a legal duty that is not a practicable 
reality to put into effect. Any failure to meet these detailed requirements 
and, presumably, the absence of remedy thereto, would bring the law into 
disrepute.48
Comprehensible
If behaviour is to be governed by law, it must follow that the laws must be 
“followable”. At the very least, their requirements must be comprehensible 
and capable of being acted upon.49 Coleridge’s laws, however, contain a 
number of provisions that fail the test of comprehensibility. It is impossible 
to tell, with any degree of certainty, sufficient to guide conduct, what is 
required or is prohibited by the instrument. 
An Avviso of 22 March 180550 is an example. It announces that random 
quality inspections of wine will be carried out. First, it is an Avviso and, as 
such, was not a law amending instrument. If that had been the intention, 
a Bando was the appropriate instrument. An Avviso merely indicated 
how the laws were to be applied in particular situations. However, the 
text of this Avviso did not refer to any law that was being applied; rather 
it referred to “a well known and long-established custom” of inspection. 
Such a reference did not meet a requirement of certainty. Matters get worse 
because the point of the Avviso was to announce not only that a regime 
of inspections will begin, but also to threaten the confiscation of bad wine 
48 In the absence of any requirement for notification, it is also quite unclear from 
the Bando how the authorities would become aware of the sale or transfer of a reg-
istered vehicle or vessel. 
49 This requirement is treated here as a logical requirement of legal rules aim-
ing to govern behaviour. It is not historically specific. The idea has, of course, been 
given a full theoretical exposition in the twentieth century by Lon Fuller (see Fuller). 
50 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 6.
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which failed the inspection. The Avviso also referred to the Commissioner’s 
(His Excellency’s) desire not to “punish” anyone. Again, it is quite unclear 
what, if any, authority the Commissioner, or, indeed, a court, would have 
to exact punishment. So, we have here a notice which fails the rule of law 
test in two ways. Firstly, it fails the publicity test in the sense that, unless it 
is itself a legal act, it fails to identify the law which authorises the actions 
being proposed (see below). Secondly, it fails the certainty test in that it 
makes no clear distinction between criminal and civil law. 
Similar issues arise in connection with the Avviso of 22 May 180551 
concerning the punishment of Borg, Hasciach and Bonello for spreading 
false rumours. The Notice threatened severe punishment for certain 
individuals who did not “undeceive” listeners to false rumours. It is not 
possible to infer the existence of a criminal offence. There is no way of 
knowing objectively under what conditions a rumour may have been false, 
so as to trigger the duty to inform; nor any indication of how a false rumour 
was established. The concern is that wide, discretionary power, to impose 
punitive sanctions, was created for the benefit of the executive, but in a way 
that was, in effect, uncontrollable by the courts.
A similar problem arose in relation to the threat to punish those who did 
not hand in counterfeit coins.52 No references were made to the legal basis 
of any offence and the duty imposed was not specified, for example, in 
terms of the state of mind and the degree of knowledge that was necessary 
to justify a punishment. On the face of it the Avviso was an exercise of 
arbitrary power.
Even where the Avvisi were merely bureaucratic measures making 
arrangements for how claims against the Administration were to be settled, 
clarity was sometimes lacking. An example is the Avviso of 8 March 
180553 dealing with distribution of prize money still outstanding from 
the surrender of Valletta in 1800. Coleridge included in the distribution 
those whose claims had not been settled in an earlier distribution of 1803. 
Nothing in the Avviso made it clear how these claims were to be resolved, 
nor what evidence had to be produced.54 
Thus, any legal analysis of “Coleridge’s laws” cannot but be struck by 
these lapses of clarity, certainty and authority that characterise some of the 
Bandi and Avvisi. Obligations were apparently imposed which were quite 
51 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 8.
52 Avviso, 12 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 10.
53 Avviso, 8 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 3.
54 Avviso, 19 August 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 20. 
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unclear in their particular application and which (regarding certain Avvisi) 
did not disclose the legal authority by which they were authorised. 
Publicity
If “law” represents the principle of governance on the basis of rules, then 
publicity and promulgation are two of the necessary conditions for law’s 
authority. In other words, the law must be communicated to those to whom 
it applies. Enforcement is also at issue because all citizens are assumed to 
know the law and ignorance of the law does not provide an excuse. Such 
principles would not only be unreasonable but also ineffectual if there was 
not some form of process by which laws are publicised. Publicity is, thus, 
part of the process of legitimation. 
Coleridge’s laws were announced and displayed in local ceremonies 
which took place in customary locations in the four cities and Floriana, 
and in some instances, at farmhouses in rural areas. Annotation at the 
bottom of each instrument recorded that the ceremony of promulgation 
had taken place. This recorded how and when the instrument in question 
was brought to the attention of the public and the means used, such as the 
beating of drums or the playing of trumpets. No doubt the fanfare had 
been intended to draw a crowd to ensure the widest possible dissemination 
of the information contained in the measures. 
An example of the annotations relating to publication is as follows: 
Today [date] it has been read, published and displayed in the usual places of 
these four cities and Floriana, to the sound of trumpets and in the presence 
of a great number of people.55
It seems that there were no legally-mandatory procedural requirements 
governing either the publication ceremonies or even a mandatory 
requirement to record that they had taken place. The annotations and the 
events they described appear to have had no legal significance other than 
to place on record the fact that publication in accordance with existing 
custom and practice had taken place. No legal obligations seem to have 
been involved. The only reference to any “duty” to record the fact that a 
ceremony had actually occurred concerned the case of one Avviso (25 May 
1805).56 In this case, a letter “requesting” publication came from the Public 
Secretary’s office. This letter may simply have been a re-enforcement of 
55 Bando of 8th March 1805, NAM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 2.
56 LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 9.
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customary practice rather than a constitutional requirement.57 Interestingly, 
the absence of annotations as to promulgation is a common feature of 
earlier Bandi (pre-Coleridgean) and this does not appear to have affected 
their validity as recognisable and enforceable laws. 
During Coleridge’s Malta period, the laws and public notices were 
promulgated in Italian. Although this conformed to established local 
practice, (and was consonant with the “continuity” strategy) it raised 
important questions, not least because the majority of the inhabitants 
spoke the Maltese tongue; indeed, two thirds of them probably spoke 
no other language. Thus, the laws were published in a language that 
the majority of those bound by them did not understand. This has been 
considered in Chapter 4. However, the failure of the British administration 
to communicate its laws effectively in the language spoken by the majority 
of its population seems explicable only in the context of its overwhelming 
desire to continue, in so far as was possible, the laws and customs of the 
ancien regime. 
6.3. Enforcement and Forms of 
Punishment
The Use of Sanctions
We have noted, above, instances in which Ball was reluctant to impose 
criminal penalties upon the population, hoping instead that a warning 
Avviso would encourage the inhabitants to comply with the law. Where 
Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi did disclose a willingness to compel behaviour 
under threat of a criminal sanction, the different forms of enforcement, 
permitted by the Bandi, are an interesting feature of his approach. The 
Bandi created a range of both positive and negative obligations, which 
were enforced by a range of penalties, although no clear distinction was 
made between criminal, civil and administrative penalties. 
57 See annotation of Avviso 25 May 1805 (LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 9) 
which includes the words: “Today, the 26th May 1805 it has been read and published 
to the sound of drums as requested by the letter from the Government Offices… “ 
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Capital Punishment
Punishment needed to be lawful. Punishments authorised by the Code 
de Rohan included capital punishment. This was imposed relatively 
infrequently and only for the most morally-heinous crimes such as 
murder committed during a deliberate attack, parricide (execution was 
then followed by severing the perpetrator’s hand, if death had been by the 
sword, and burning of body and hand) and parent killing (Book 5 item 3). 
Coleridge’s Bandi did not create capital offences. There was, however, one 
unexplained reference to the danger of being shot. This was in an Avviso 
of 9 March 1805.58 As we have described, this concerned the misuse of a 
critical navigational aid moored in the Harbour. The Avviso explained 
the purpose of the rope and so removed any excuse a person may have 
for misuse. The Avviso ended: “and any person who continues to misuse 
this marker will have only themselves to blame if they are greeted by 
rifle shots”. The implication of this was quite unclear: whether the rifle 
shots were a punishment or came from sentries seeking to deter unlawful 
immigration or avoidance of quarantine or from unspecified others. Any 
legal documents, whether advisory or mandatory, that contain such vague 
and uncertain threats are open to criticism on those grounds.
Prison
The threat of imprisonment is found in the Coleridge Bandi. The Bando of 
22 March 180559 created a range of legal obligations in relation to trading 
in wine and spirits, such as the need to obtain a licence. The penalty was, 
initially, a fine, but non-payment could lead to imprisonment. The term 
was not specified, but an alternative (presumably at the discretion of the 
court) was six months on public works. This was within the lower end of 
punishments (in the Code, for example, a year on public works was part 
of the punishment for placing slanderous or abusive placards in public 
places). Imprisonment of one month was imposed for extracting cotton 
inappropriately (Avviso of 22 March 180560), one month in prison “at his 
own expense” if an owner of land sold unripened fruit (Bando of 5 August 
1805).61
58 NLM LIBR /MS 431 2/3 Bandi 1804-1808, 97.
59 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
60 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 5.
61 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 19.
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Public Works
Being put to public works is another major punishment in the Code. It 
could be used for vagabondage or for aggravated brawling, for example. In 
the Coleridge Bandi it is used once – as a punishment for the non-payment 
of the fifty oncie fine that could be imposed upon unlicensed producers, 
wholesalers or retailers of unlicensed liquor under the Bando of 22 March 
1805.62
Fines
Fines are widely used in both the Code de Rohan as well as the Coleridge 
Bandi. A twenty oncie fine could be imposed upon craftsmen who 
manufactured wheels in a way damaging to roads (29 January 180563); fifty 
oncie had to be paid by sellers of liquor (producers, wholesalers, retailers) 
who were not licensed under the terms of the Bando of 22 March 1805.64 
A ten oncie fine was to be imposed, as well as a deportation order, upon a 
resident foreigner who failed to obtain a resident permit.65
An important characteristic of the system of fines was that the discretion 
of the sentencing judge to fix the amount was frequently removed. In other 
words, a fixed fine, rather than a scale, was imposed upon rich and poor 
alike. There was no attempt at proportionality through equality of burden, 
nor was the court permitted to take into account the circumstances of the 
offence, nor of the offender, nor any mitigating circumstances, nor was 
there judicial discretion to impose a higher sentence than that stipulated, 
for repeat offenders.
One explanation for not allowing judicial discretion was that the British 
wished to control the fate of convicted persons rather than leave it to 
their fellow Maltese. Ball, indeed, exercised his powers under the Maltese 
constitution to impose higher sentences than those prescribed, where he 
considered it to be appropriate.66 Another reason was that a fixed penalty 
offered certainty. This recalled Ball’s approach to punishment whilst he 
served as a naval captain (discussed above).67 The Maltese would understand 
62 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
63 NLM LIBR/MS 430 1/2 Bandi 1790 AL 1805, 356; 431 II/3, 50.
64 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
65 Bando, 21 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 14.
66 See the Avviso of 22 May 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 8.
67 Coleridge informs us in The Friend, 1, 169-170 that Ball would not allow pre-
scribed fixed penalties imposed for disciplinary offences to be varied by any officer, 
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what would happen to them if they offended and, perhaps, would be less 
willing to pursue a more lenient sentence through the petitioning process 
discussed in Chapter 2.
The only exception arose in connection with the army deserters who 
were still successfully evading capture in September 1805 notwithstanding 
earlier Avvisi designed to secure their return to barracks. By then it must 
have been very clear to the authorities that the deserters were calling upon 
a network of local supporters to assist them. No doubt in many cases these 
were friends, family and relations. Ball allowed the Maltese judiciary to 
determine the sentences of those convicted of aiding and abetting the 
deserters. In pursuance of this decision, Coleridge explicitly directed the 
judiciary to take into account the identity of those involved, which was, 
no doubt, a signal to the judges to recognise the conflicting loyalties of 
the families. Besides, allowing the judiciary this exceptional sentencing 
discretion distanced the administration from the penalties imposed: 
this was a Maltese matter. It may also have helped erect a limited cordon 
sanitaire around Ball (and the British military) in respect of a policy that 
was controversial and unpopular.
Exile
Exile was a draconian punishment in the Code de Rohan that was also used 
in the Coleridge Bandi. In the Code it could be used against vagabonds, 
manufacturers of weapons without a licence or aggravated fighting. 
Delinquent women could be exiled to Gozo. In the Bando of 21 June 1805,68 
exile would be the chosen punishment for a Maltese inhabitant who 
rented accommodation to a foreigner without a permit. It is arguable that 
at least some of the uses of exile authorised by the Code are preventative 
measures which remove hooligans from the country; more fearsome but 
similar in purpose to the way, in twenty–first-century Britain, a football 
supporter’s order can prevent a person leaving the country or an anti-
social behaviour order can limit the places a person can inhabit. In this 
respect the Royal Commission of 1812,69 discussing the autocratic powers 
of the Civil Commissioner, noted that he enjoyed the power of exile “by a 
simple warrant to that effect”. This was understood to be a preventative 
power since it was available where the perceived safety and tranquillity 
including himself as captain. 
68 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 14.
69 Royal Commission of 1812, 236.
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of Malta so required. An example of this prerogative act was the exile of 
the petitioner to secure the safety of the islands to which reference was 
made in the Petition of the Maltese to the British Crown in 1805. The use of 
exile in the Avvisi of 22 and 25 May 180570 (announcing the punishments of 
Tagliana, Borg, Hasciach and Bonello for spreading false rumours), on the 
other hand, was clearly a judicial punishment. 
Administrative Penalties
If there is uncertainty as to whether a penalty is a criminal punishment 
or a preventative measure, there is more uncertainty on a range of other 
enforcement measures which, no doubt, are distinctly disadvantageous 
to the individuals involved but appear to be administrative penalties. 
An administrative penalty is one imposed with the aim of ensuring 
the effectiveness of some regulation or order. It prevents activities 
continuing which should be properly authorised and, thereby, maintains 
the effectiveness of the order. The penalty, therefore, engages only with 
the activity regulated and is distinguished from a punishment in that a 
punishment is aimed at retribution, deterrence or reform rather than 
achieving the particular state of affairs aimed at by a regulation. 
Thus, the Bando of 22 March 1805 created offences concerning the 
importation and production of spirits. The punishment for breaking these 
regulations was a fine of fifty oncie and imprisonment for an unspecified 
period, or six months service on public works if the fine was not paid. 
In addition, though, the offender could lose his livelihood since he was 
also made to suffer the “permanent” removal of the right to run a shop or 
business.
Three such administrative measures were used in a series of trade and 
consumer protection measures enacted on 22 March 1805. These were the 
permanent confiscation of wines which failed health inspections;71 loss of a 
licence to sell wine on anyone who breached a range of licence conditions;72 
confiscation of illegally grown and unlicensed cotton.73 
70 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 8; NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 
1805 AL 1814, 9.
71 Avviso, 22 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 6.
72 Bando, 22 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 4.
73 Bando, 22 March 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 5.
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Informants
The Bandi and Avvisi attest to the widespread use of rewarded informers 
to enforce the criminal justice system. In the absence of an organised police 
force (the modern Malta police force dates from July 1814) one way of 
seeking to enforce the law was through the use of informers. 
However, making the system work clearly presented problems 
because the Maltese seem to have been reluctant to inform on their fellow 
citizens. For example, the unenthusiastic public response to informing the 
authorities about fugitives, or the whereabouts of military deserters, clearly 
caused official exasperation. Even the need to re-draft the law governing 
unripened-fruit sales so as to avoid the need for a victim (and thus the need 
for witness evidence relating to a contract of sale) permits the inference 
that, on a small island, community solidarity, possibly enforced by witness 
intimidation, was a difficulty impeding law enforcement.74 Borg complained 
to Eton that the high crime rates, especially of robbery, were a problem, and 
that the assailants went undetected; and a possible explanation for this may 
have been the reluctance of witnesses and neighbours to come forward.75 A 
financial inducement to inform may have been the only possible means of 
encouraging individuals to give evidence against their neighbours. 
Informers were rewarded by being granted a share of the gains achieved 
by their actions. There was clearly an incentive for bounty hunting with all 
the issues that can bring with it: e.g. false evidence by the informer and 
the danger of entrapment. Such concerns do not seem to have entered into 
the consideration of Coleridge or the Civil Commissioner. Thus, those 
inhabitants who informed on craftsmen making wheels to a forbidden 
pattern would receive ten oncie, half of the fine (twenty oncie); the other 
half going to the Treasury. Those who informed on those illegally growing 
cotton would receive one quarter of the confiscated cotton. Those who 
informed the Civil Commissioner of the hiding places of deserters from the 
Maltese Regiment would be given a “suitable reward”. Ten scudi would be 
paid to a person who informed on a foreigner living illegally.76 
In some circumstances, Sir Alexander Ball showed himself to be opposed 
to the informer/reward system. This was not necessarily because of fear 
74 It is interesting that Gauci was reprimanded by the shop workers for protect-
ing a Jew by helping him to obtain police assistance. This hints at a community pre-
pared to insist on its own standards of behaviour, which may have been standards 
other than those intended by the British authorities. 
75 Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/no folio reference.
76 Bando, 21 June 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814,14.
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that the evidence would be unreliable and the innocent convicted; rather it 
was the sense that informing was a public duty and should not be further 
rewarded. He seems to have felt it inappropriate to reward someone for 
merely fulfilling a civic obligation. In the “Fortunata Tagliana” episode, in 
particular, it was made clear, through the Avviso of 25 May 1805, that not 
only was the Civil Commissioner displeased at having to punish Fortunata 
herself but (according to a literal reading) he was even more displeased at 
having to reward Francesco Borg, the informant, for doing his normal duty 
and not acting beyond it. Ball communicated his displeasure at rewarding 
behaviour that fell within his conception of a normal civil responsibility.
Informing was not always just a voluntary, rewarded, activity. It could 
also become a legal obligation. In the Avviso of 15 July 1805,77 severe 
punishment was promised for those who failed to inform the authorities 
of the whereabouts of deserters from the Maltese Regiment. Coerced 
informing was necessary, it seems, because it is most likely that many of 
the deserters were willingly supported and nurtured by their families. 
Whipping and exile was threatened for those who did not report to the 
courts false rumours or who did not try to undeceive those spreading false 
rumours.78 
There were some startling contrasts here with Coleridge’s views, 
expressed in 1801, on the use of informants by Pitt and the threatened revival 
of the practice, by Addington, through the enactment of a Bill of Indemnity. 
This measure was to indemnify those concerned with detaining political 
opponents after the suspension of Habeas Corpus in 1793.79 At that time, 
Coleridge condemned the use of informants in strongly partisan words. 
It was hardly honourable, likely to lead to alarmism and over-reaction by 
government, to corruption even, if well motivated,80 to the entrapment of 
others and to state crimes immune from prosecution. In Malta, by contrast, 
he co-operated in the laws requiring the use of informants and their reward 
and was even prepared to make informing a legal duty.
Coleridge and a Civil Administration at War
To what extent can it be argued that wartime conditions justify and 
77 NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 17.
78 Avviso, 22 May 1805, NLM LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814, 8.
79 The Bill is said to have “established espionage by law” (EOT, 1, 284, emphasis 
in original). The passages referred to are EOT, 1, 281-5.
80 “When the authors of acts, like these [Bills of Indemnity] seem inclined to 
shake hands with freedom, we dread the poisoned gloves of Italy”. EOT, 1, 284.
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explain the constitutionally and legally controversial actions of the British 
administration on Malta?
Coleridge’s own account offers some hints of the strain upon the civil 
government of a territory at the centre of the Mediterranean theatre of 
operations. By the summer of 1805 the Island had been filled with troops 
preparing for an expedition, under Lieutenant-General Sir James Craig, to 
open a new front in Naples. Recruitment to the Royal Regiment of Malta was 
expected to provide significantly more troops, but to the embarrassment of 
the civil authorities who could not persuade Maltese civilians to deliver 
up the deserters, the unit was by no means at combat readiness despite 
the approaching date of the offensive. Expectation and nervousness must 
have been contagious. For Coleridge, the raucous sounds of the increasing 
military presence had now become a “torture”.81 He was ill, overworked 
and clearly strained.
However, these were not the only reasons for tension within the civil 
administration. Ball had gambled the credibility of his administration on 
the corn mission as a last attempt to fulfil expectations in London that 
he could balance the Island’s budget: but this mission was already going 
awry. Admiral Lord Nelson was at sea; ever more prizes were being 
adjudicated in the Vice-Admiralty Court in Valletta; the British had not yet 
been victorious at Trafalgar and an invasion force, protected by the French 
fleet, still threatened at home. Maltese dissatisfaction with government was 
deepening, and there had been, during that spring of 1805, grave public 
disturbances against the Jews. No doubt, the civil administration was 
nervous, even to some extent, alarmed. But to what extent did these tensions 
and uncertainties explain or justify the departures from appropriate legal 
norms?
Much depended upon the nature of the measure in question. However, 
it would not be possible either to explain or justify all controversial 
governmental behaviour by reference to the conflict or a state of emergency. 
Malta was not, for example, under martial law: the constitution was still 
in force, the courts still sat and judges and administrators applied Maltese 
laws. Unlike in England, where the government had enacted special 
“emergency” powers, removing the right of the subject to challenge, in the 
courts, their arrest and incarceration, Ball had not felt any need to enact 
emergency legislation on Malta. It was, therefore, the particular political 
context, more than fears about the general military situation, which 
81 CN 2, 2614.
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informed Ball’s strategy for government.82 
Nevertheless, the political and military issues were complex and often 
intertwined because Ball’s assessment of the value of the Maltese archipelago 
originated in its military value. It was, indeed, this military agenda that 
ultimately lay behind many of the policies of the civil government. Ball’s 
immediate problems resulted, as we have seen, from the Secretary of State 
instructing the Civil Commissioners, in 1801, to achieve Maltese consent to 
British rule, if necessary by indulging their prejudices. Stability, despite the 
maintenance of an exclusive British control over Maltese public life, had 
been the dominant objective. Thus there had been no contradiction between 
crushing anti-Semitic violence (and punishing other forms of anti-Semitic 
agitation) whilst also subjecting foreigners to more extensive regulation 
purely on the grounds of nationality. Similarly, Ball’s willingness to banish 
political opponents was also aimed at removing potentially de-stabilising 
agitators.
Thus, the major characteristics of Ball’s polices, as implemented in 
Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi, were not adequately explained as immediate 
responses to the military conflict, although his ultimate desire to retain Malta 
as a military base could not be discounted. The war neither explained nor 
justified many of the departures from appropriate legal or constitutional 
standards. The internal inconsistency of some of the Bandi and Avvisi, 
the lack of clarity in their draftsmanship were pre-eminent examples of 
problems that might well have arisen from Coleridge’s authorship in more 
stable and peaceful times. 
Often what was at stake was the identification and pursuit of the “public 
interest”. We frequently found that this “public interest” was  coterminous 
with British interests, and where they conflicted with those of the Maltese, 
the former were routinely prioritised over the latter. This occurred most 
significantly in the British refusal to establish the Consiglio Popolare (i.e. 
the refusal to share power with the Maltese); but this priority was also 
present in some of the Bandi and Avvisi. Coleridge tried, for example, to 
persuade the Maltese that the new excise duty had been for additional 
public spending; as we have seen, it had been to meet the demands of the 
British Treasury. And the fiasco over the recruitment to the Royal Regiment 
of Malta had been caused by the decision to disregard the willingness of 
the Maltese to serve only as a local defence force. In each of these examples, 
Ball had been responding to the objectives set for him by the Secretary of 
82 This is more fully explored in Chapters 2 and 3.
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State, in the Royal Instructions, and later despatches, rather than any war 
time emergency.
The one instance in which Ball might have pleaded that a state of 
emergency existed that justified actions not normally consistent with rule 
of law standards would have been in relation to the severe punishments 
imposed upon the anti-Semitic agitators. This argument might have 
arisen, in particular, in the case of the youth, Bonello, aged twelve, and 
the increased penalties for his co-defendants. The decision to exile these 
offenders, when taken with the other terms of the Avviso that reminded 
the public that children would indeed be treated as harshly as adults, did 
signal official disquiet and even alarm. But even in these extreme cases 
Ball would not have claimed to have acted outside the law. If challenged 
he would have argued that the power to augment a criminal sentence was 
vested in him under the terms of the Maltese constitution, and that he was 
not using a perceived emergency as a justification for departing from the 
Code de Rohan. 
Conclusion 
In Coleridge’s Bandi and Avvisi we have a rich and fruitful insight into the 
workings of a “colonial” legal system. Pre-eminently the legal system, like 
the political one, was, ultimately, an instrument of British policy and served 
British imperial purposes. Maltese interests were vindicated only if they 
were consistent with those of the Imperial power. 
Given the overarching policy of “attaching” the Maltese to British 
rule, most notably expressed in the “continuation” strategy, this tension 
was dangerous. If exposed as acting selfishly, the British would lose the 
support of Maltese public opinion; and the future of the territory as a 
British possession would be jeopardised. It was a tension that had to be 
recognised and managed. This required deft political accomplishments, 
but not necessarily moral integrity. Here must have lain Coleridge’s central 
dilemma. 
Coleridge, as acting Public Secretary, was principally responsible for 
presenting the British administration, and each of the legislative measures 
it proposed, as benign and designed to protect and benefit Maltese society 
and its fundamental values. His ability to present the laws as congruent 
with the interests of Maltese society would have been seen by his fellow 
officials as crucial to the continued British presence on the Island. Moreover, 
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in these Bandi and Avvisi, Ball was heard, but only through Coleridge’s 
voice. Ball’s reputation rested significantly upon Coleridge’s skills as a 
draftsman and propagandist.
Despite his earlier writings upon constitutional morality, we discover, 
in the Bandi and Avvisi, a more ambiguous and elusive Coleridge. He 
supported harsh measures against anti-Semites, even children; he disguised, 
from the Maltese, the reasons why new duties were to be imposed; he 
proscribed future conduct and announced new punishments without 
apparent legal justification; he encouraged, even compelled, the use of 
informers; he obfuscated the important distinction between a Proclamation 
and a Public Notice; and he launched a sustained public relations 
campaign to preserve Ball’s image as a “father” to “his” people. Some of 
his drafting was so obscure as to be virtually meaningless; sometimes what 
he demanded of officials was so unnecessarily demanding that compliance 
would have been almost impossible. Rule of law values such as nulle peona 
sine lege, and the independence of the judiciary were often outweighed by 
expediency. Coleridge, not least in his praise of Ball, if not in his expressed 
support for Ball’s polices, was complicit in those acts, even if he was not 
complacent about them.
But, on the other side of the coin, we also find Coleridge as a skilled 
propagandist. Whilst he could manipulate public opinion by crude 
obfuscation, he could also produce powerful moral argument to instil 
outrage against offences and offenders. Coleridge is both more comfortable 
and more successful when securing deterrence by argument and reason. 
In a time of public anxiety about the violence between foreigners and the 
inhabitants, this was essential opinion forming, and it would have been far 
more valuable to the British authorities than the levelled muskets of the 
military garrison. This explains why Ball was, in September 1805, keen to 
have Coleridge return to Malta as editor of Il Cartaginese.83
83 Wordsworth Trust, Grasmere, manuscript WLMS A. Ball, Alexander, Sir.
 Appendix 1. Translations of 
the Proclamations and 
Public Notices
By Dr Lydia Davis
PROCLAMATION
29 January 18051
Given the great benefits to be gained from having a road network which 
is maintained in a good condition, His Excellency the Royal Commissioner 
wishes to relay to the Public his hope that, in seeking to obtain this important 
objective, he does not neglect any of the ways in which it may be achieved. 
The type of wheel found on gigs and carts today, constitutes the principle 
reason behind the deterioration and ruin of the roads. Therefore, His 
Excellency orders and commands that from now on, all similar wheels must 
be made to fit a model which will be delivered to all respective craftsmen. 
Furthermore, he orders that the nails that cover the circumference of the 
wheel should not stick out from the iron rim. Craftsmen who breach these 
rules will be ordered to pay a fine of twenty oncie for each offence, one half 
of which will be paid to the treasury, and the other half which will go to 
the informant.
His Excellency hopes that the majority of those who own gigs and carts 
will, in light of his wishes and of their own comfort, try to alter the wheels 
of their vehicles, even if they have only recently been made. One therefore 
expects from now on, to have the satisfaction of seeing the introduction of 
1 In each case the date has been added by the present authors for ease of refer-
ence 
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a general system for making wheels that, whilst sparing the streets, will 
also be of some advantage to the owners of gigs and carts. It is easy to 
see how, when the large and projecting nail heads give continual jolts to 
gigs and carts, or to people or goods carried in the vehicles, they damage 
that same gig or cart even more quickly, and, above all, destroy the iron 
rims of the wheels, which receive the knocks at first hand. These projecting 
nail heads cause discomfort to the passenger, damage any goods which are 
being transported, and exhaust the animals all the more, since they act as 
numerous points of resistance, working contrary to the moving force.
Government Offices 29 January 1805.
Samuel T. Coleridge, Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner.
G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary.
Today the 1 February 1805 it has been read and published to the sound of drums, 
and similar notices have been displayed in the usual and customary places of this 
city… its suburb and in individual farm houses, ut q: p felicem Micalles Bann 
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
1 March 1805
Matteo Sacco of Senglea has been imprisoned for having extorted 
thirty scudi from Ignazio Miccallef of Birchircara, under the pretence of 
obtaining for him the permission to return from exile. He shall continue 
to remain in prison until he has repaid the sum extorted. His Excellency 
hopes that this notice will encourage the Public to be wary of this man in 
the future, and that it will warn sellers of tobacco, who resemble him, not 
to dare to scrounge money from the credulous public under the pretence 
of protection. His Excellency, who devotes all his time to helping public 
matters, and who is always ready to listen to petitions from anybody, does 
not see why the offence of promising, or of seeking protection in this way, 
or in other similar ways, has not entirely ceased. 
From the Government Offices 1 March 1805
Samuel T. Coleridge, Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner. 
G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary
Today the 2 March 1805, it has been displayed in the usual and customary 
places of this city and its suburb, ut q: Francesca Ebejer 
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
8 March, 1805
Let all those concerned be informed that next Sunday, 10 March, the 
appropriate local lieutenants will carry out the distribution of payments 
due to the Maltese people, which is part of the gift of His Majesty for the 
actions taken during the surrender of Valletta. 
During this distribution, no distinction will be made between Corporals 
and soldiers, nor between those who served only for a short period of time 
and those who remained in service right up until the surrender of the city. 
Neither will there be a distinction made between Sergeants and any other 
officials above the rank of Corporal. In order to avoid any confusion, the 
same rules as in previous distributions will be applied and they will only 
be extended to those who, during other similar payments, have shown 
themselves to have been worthy of participation in a Royal donation. 
The right to participate is also extended to those who can prove on 
the spot, and with correct documentation, that they have previously been 
unjustly excluded from participating in a similar event, as set out in the 
rules adopted for such distributions, and according to the laws established 
by the notice of 11 December 1803. 
Such claimants should submit their appeals within the period of one 
month beginning on the date mentioned above, 10 March. After this time 
has elapsed, no appeal or request for any reason will be accepted from 
anybody. 
From the Government Offices 8 March 1805.
Samuel T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary
Today the 9 March 1805 it has been displayed…
Ut q. Felicem Micalles Banns
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PROCLAMATION 
8 March 1805
From the first moment of his ascension to the civil government of 
this island, His Excellency the Royal Commissioner has esteemed it his 
sacred duty to occupy himself tirelessly with ways in which to make the 
inhabitants happy, and how to give assistance to those who have suffered 
greatest damage during the French invasion, and to those who due to 
general circumstances were either born or fell into poverty, and to those 
who, having no means of supporting themselves, apart from some civil 
employment, base all their hopes for a decent style of living on a monthly 
honorarium. 
The Tribunal has been rearranged as have several public projects. Public 
works have continued uninterrupted and a monthly distribution of charity 
has been set up. The Monte di Pietà, the hospitals, homes for the poor, for 
orphans and for students have been restored. The main area of enthusiasm 
is currently the Bank of the University of these Four Cities, as His Excellency 
remains most attentive to the situation of those families who keep all their 
domestic aspirations alive with the capital that they have invested in this 
post. 
Wishing, therefore, to increase support for so many poor families, and 
bearing in mind that wines and liquors of the kind usually found in Malta 
are in general consumed by foreigners, it is hoped that it will be in the 
public interest to increase the scarcity of these products, as this shall force 
immoderate drinkers to lower their consumption. It is, therefore, evidently 
better to generate a small increase in the price of wine and liquor, than 
to decide to increase the price of grain. His Excellency has also decided 
to reintroduce the duty that was once paid for the importation of wine, 
bringing into effect the following orders.
1. From today onwards, anyone wishing to import wine must pay duty 
of six tari per barrel.
2. That this resolution is intended to include all types and quality of 
wine without any exception. 
3. That all types of liquor require duty of thirty tari for whatever quantity, 
corresponding to a measure of one barrel.
4. That no place or person for whatever reason may be, or intend to be 
exempt from the payment of this duty as set out above.
5. That the exaction of such duty should be entrusted to the above 
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mentioned University.
6. That the penalty of any contravention shall be the confiscation of the 
entire quantity of wine found to be illegal.
The employment of the money raised by these taxes cannot be detailed 
before the exact figure is known. His Excellency, therefore, wishes to advise, 
that it is his intention is to pay all individual owners of capital tied up in the 
bank of the above mentioned university, interest on their money at the rate 
of thirty tarì for every hundred, without taking into account the interest 
rate that was agreed at the time of the deposit.
It is, furthermore, the intention of His Excellency to increase the salaries 
of those employees whom he considers worthy of such a raise, and to give 
some financial aid to charitable institutions, particularly those which are 
involved in constructing buildings which will be of benefit to the public. 
The first payment of the interest mentioned above will be that of 
one semester, and will be paid six months after the publication of this 
proclamation.
As soon as he is able, His Excellency shall not neglect to give the 
necessary help to places of worship, and to religious foundations.
From the Government Offices  March 1805.
 S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Dr. G.N. Zammit -Assistant Secretary
Today  March 1805 it has been read, published, and displayed in all the usual 
and customary places of these 4 cities, and Floriana, to the sound of drums and in 
the presence of several people.
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
9 March 1805
In the entrance to the Great Port on the side of Sant’Elmo, an area of 
shallow water has been discovered which, although very small in size, is 
dangerous nevertheless. In order to warn any ships and boats which may 
have to pass this point, an anchor has been thrown down, which is attached 
to a thick cord that can be seen floating. 
Some people, however, imagining this marker as being for some other 
purpose, have misused it, taking it for themselves to use as a mooring berth. 
By doing this they transport the cable and anchor, and move it away from 
the correct place, thereby impeding it from doing its job. 
In order to prevent this inconvenience, His Excellency has ordered that 
this public notice should serve to inform the public about the true state of 
affairs, in such a way that no-one will now be excused, and any person who 
continues to misuse this marker will have only themselves to blame if they 
are welcomed by rifle shots. 
Government Offices 9 March 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Dr. G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary
Today the 9 March 1805 it has been fixed in the usual and normal places of these 
four cities, and Floriana in the presence of several people…. 
332 Coleridge’s Laws
PROCLAMATION 
22 March 1805
The attention of His Excellency the Royal Commissioner has been drawn 
to the abuse of spirituous liquors, and to the damaging effect that they have 
on health. He has, therefore, willingly undertaken the task of trying to find 
a way to limit this problem and with this aim in mind he proposes the 
following decrees, and orders their strict observance.
1. He orders and commands that no-one may import, unload or take 
delivery of spirituous liquor of any kind without a written license that 
refers to the person who wishes to receive the goods.
2. That the above mentioned license may be granted whenever required 
by the President of the Grand Court of Valletta. The President should then 
make a note of it in the register, which can be opened whenever required in 
the Tribunal of the Grand Court mentioned above.
3. That as this license deals with alcoholic spirits, it should not be 
awarded by the above-mentioned President unless done so in moderation 
to apothecaries, and to those who have a license to produce liquor. 
4. That any distillation of wine in order to produce spirits or brandy 
(acquavita) is strictly forbidden without a special license from the same 
President, which specifically expresses the quantity to be distilled. 
5. That nobody may produce spirituous liquors without having been 
licensed by a special decree from His Excellency in communication with 
the Grand Court of Valletta, and without having informed the President 
of the same Grand Court. In addition, the licensee must have provided 
a suitable guarantee to pay fifty oncie to the treasury in the case of any 
contravention of the law.
6. That any producer of liquor must be held to account for the quantity 
of liquor that he was licensed to import, manufacture, or distil. He may 
not sell any quantity of liquor to any person without first undergoing an 
inspection to verify the quality of the liquor to be sold. This should be 
carried out by the Chief-physician, who must certify in writing that the 
liquor is of sufficient quality so as to pose no risk to health. 
7. That once the liquor has been certified as of good quality, the 
manufacturer may not sell it at retail, or to anyone else except for those 
who have obtained the necessary license and are authorised to sell it at 
retail to the Public, heads of family, and people of good character. Every 
manufacturer is obliged to keep a record of all sales that he makes within 
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the limits of both this article, and the preceding one. 
8. That no shop-keeper, inn-keeper or publican may sell wine or 
spirits unless he is well-known, of good character, and in possession of 
the previously mentioned license granted by a decree of His Excellency, in 
conjunction with the above mentioned Grand Court. 
9. That no person within these four cities, and in the Vilhena district 
shall be licensed to sell, or to display as if for sale, both wine and spirits at 
the same time, but must choose either one or the other. 
10. That on the door of every shop, inn or tavern, there must be a written 
sign, visible to everybody, which states whether or not the premises is 
licensed to sell wine and spirits to soldiers. No producer, confectioner, or 
proprietor of a shop, café, inn or tavern, may sell sprits to soldiers without 
an express license for this purpose. 
11. That whoever is licensed to sell spirituous liquors either resale or 
wholesale, must present themselves to the President of the Grand Court in 
order to make a note of it in the register. 
12. That any contravention of the preceding articles from number 
6 to number 11 should be punished by a fine of fifty oncie paid to the 
treasury. Any non-payment will be punished with imprisonment or six 
months service on public works. Furthermore, the offender shall suffer the 
permanent removal of their right to continue in business, or to run a shop.
From the Government Offices 22 March 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary of the Royal Commissioner. 
Dr G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary
Today the 24 March 1805, it has been read and published to the sound of drums, 
and copies have been displayed in the usual places of this city, its suburb and in 
individual farmhouses … ut q: per Felicem Miccalles Bann: 
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
22 March 1805
Although the laws of the land forbid the extraction of cotton which 
is not spun either with seeds, or with wool, his Excellency the Royal 
Commissioner is, nevertheless, displeased to hear that some people, in the 
hope of making a profit, are daring to break the law.
Wishing, therefore, to put an end to such incidents, and to punish the 
audacity of these offenders, he orders that whoever shall dare to extract 
cotton not manufactured with seeds or with wool, without a specific license, 
shall be punished with one month’s imprisonment, and that furthermore, 
he shall suffer the confiscation of all the cotton grown illegally, one-quarter 
of which he must hand over to the informant.
Meanwhile, His Excellency promises to grant some licences for the 
extraction of a certain amount of cotton if the universal public good so 
demands, and if this year’s crop proves to be plentiful, in such a way that 
there will be no lack of material for people used to earning a living by 
spinning cotton. 
Government Offices 22 March 1805
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Dr G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary
Today the 24 March 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places of this city 
and its suburb.
 Translations of the Proclamations and Public Notices 335
PUBLIC NOTICE 
22 March 1805
It is a well known and long-established custom that all wine should be 
subject to examination by sworn-in officials responsible for food quality 
and control, both before being sold, and if any doubts are raised as to its 
quality. 
Given that he cares as much about the protection of trade as he does 
about the merchants themselves, His Excellency the Royal Commissioner 
is very much hoping to avoid the necessity of punishing anybody, or of 
making anybody suffer even slightly. He, therefore, wishes to inform 
all concerned, that from time to time, officials accompanied by the chief 
physician will carry out random inspections in shops and store houses 
belonging to wine merchants. Any wine which is found to be of insufficient 
quality, and therefore damaging to health, will be permanently confiscated. 
Government Offices 22 March 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary of the Royal Commissioner
Dr. G.N. Zammit Assistant Secretary
Today the 24 March it has been displayed in the usual places of this city and 
its suburb. 
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
22 May 1805
Let it be known that Giovanni Hasciach from the city of Pinto, Andrea 
Borg, and the youth Saverio Bonello from Cospicua have been whipped, 
and will soon be sent into exile for having invented and spread malicious 
rumours which disturbed the peace of the inhabitants. His Excellency is 
determined to treat in the same manner all others who are discovered to 
have started, or who have been complicit in similar gossip. This includes 
those who have repeated these rumours in normal conversation, and those 
who, finding themselves present during the relation of such rumours, did 
not attempt to undeceive the listeners, or to inform the Tribunal of the 
Grand Court of Valletta.
As this is a situation which regards the peace of the public, the principal 
aim of any civil society, no status or condition of person, and not even 
minors, shall be exempt from the severity of the punishment.
Government Offices 22 May 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 22 May 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places of this city, and 
its suburb. Ut q.& ..Felicem Micalles Bann.. 
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
25 May 1805
On 22 May this year, Fortunata Tagliana from the Notabile suburb 
marked out as a Jew one of the French prisoners stationed in the little wood, 
who had gone into the house of a woman living near her, with whom she 
was in disagreement. She caused this man to be followed, and he was 
beaten up and stoned by two or three delinquents who came running after 
hearing her cries.
Francesco Borg, from the same district, was woken up by the commotion 
and ran to the area. Far from following the example of the others, he 
managed to undeceive the pursuers, and by this means he rescued the 
pursued man.
Fortunata Tagliana has been banished permanently to the island of Gozo, 
where, having no opportunity to meet any Jews she will be able, with the 
change in air, to find a cure for her fanaticism.
Francesco Borg has been rewarded with twenty-five scudi for his good 
conduct on this occasion.
His Excellency is disappointed that he has found it necessary to punish 
Fortunata Tagliana for her attempt to exploit a popular prejudice. He is 
even more displeased that he has had to reward the act of duty carried 
out by Francesco Borg, as if it were one of particular merit. Now that 
the senseless pleasure in inventing malicious slander has stopped, and 
the people have realised their own foolishness, and how damaging their 
credulity can be, His Excellency hopes that the nation shall again enjoy its 
former peace, regardless of those who are envious of its happiness. There 
should, therefore, be no more need to punish anybody, and rewards will be 
reserved for those of greater claim and greater merit.
Government Offices 25 May 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner.
Today, the 26 May 1805 it has been read and published to the sound of drums as 
requested by the letter from the Government Offices… Copies have been displayed 
in all the usual places of this city and its suburb, and in individual farm houses. Ut 
q: Felicem Miscalles Bann.…. 
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PUBLIC NOTICE
12 June 1805
His Excellency the Royal Commissioner has learned that there are false 
coins in circulation, found especially in silver pieces of one scudo with the 
imprint of the Grand Master Rohan. He wishes to avert the Public of this 
so that everybody is properly informed, and may then make every possible 
effort not to be tricked. Should anybody come across such a coin, he shall 
be obliged to deliver it at once to the Tribunal, or to the local lieutenant, 
indicating who gave it to him, or tried to give it to him, so that he may be 
brought to justice. 
Government Offices 12 June 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 13 June 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places….ut 
q..Philippum Frendo Servum... [illegible]
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
14 June 1805
Aloisia Caruana has been imprisoned for having dared to offer to Doctor 
Vincenzo Caruana Zerafa, the Penal Judge of the Grand Court of Valletta, 
an ounce of Sicilian gold which she hoped would encourage him to look 
favourably on her appeal. She will continue to remain in prison for several 
days, and, furthermore, she will suffer the loss of her monetary offering 
which will be distributed to the poor.
The insult that this woman made to the Tribunal showed her to be 
clearly of the most offensive opinion, that any difficulties raised in her 
appeal could be alleviated by the contemptible methods which she tried to 
use – a belief which certainly deserved the most severe punishment. Given 
that is the job of His Excellence to instruct each and every person in his 
duty, he believed it necessary to use this notice to avert the Public of this 
case, hoping that it shall serve as an example to avoid similar punishments 
in the future. 
Government Offices 14 June 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner 
Today the 16 June 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places ut q…Philippum 
Frenco Servum [illegible]
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PUBLIC NOTICE
20 June 1805
The Royal service requests that an end is put to the continual thefts 
carried out by people who pretend to enrol in the army, take the money 
and then use it for gambling or for some other underhand scheme, with 
the hope of being able to return it within the appointed time. It should, 
therefore, be noted, that the following decree, extracted from the articles 
of War, otherwise known as Martial law, will in future be fully applied on 
these islands.
“Whenever any person receives money for enlistment, within the next 
forty-eight hours, but not sooner than twenty-four hours (unless through 
his own choice), he must be taken before a magistrate or an official who 
is appointed to swear in soldiers. Before this official the person will either 
declare his consent, or else may freely make clear his dissatisfaction at his 
enlistment. In case of the latter declaration, he must repay the enrolment 
money, and after making an additional payment of ten scudi, he shall 
be immediately freed from his obligations in the presence of the above-
mentioned magistrate or official. 
However, if the person indicated above should refuse, or should neglect 
to repay the above-mentioned money within the aforesaid period of twenty-
four hours, this person will be treated as enlisted, and as if he had given his 
full consent to the appropriate official as laid out in this document.
Government Offices 20 June 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 22 June 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places: ut q: Philippum 
Frendo Servum [illegible]
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PUBLIC NOTICE
21 June 1805
His Excellency the Royal Commissioner wishes to clarify various 
doubts which have been raised regarding the authority of the Lieutenant 
of Vittoriosa to allow ferry-boats to work at night inside the Grand Port, 
and also regarding the duties of the night captains with respect to the 
lieutenants. He therefore orders
1. That the Lieutenant of the City of Vittoriosa should continue to give 
the usual permission to ferry-boats to work during the night. The customary 
small dock-charges should be divided up equally between himself, and 
the two lieutenants of the cities of Senglea and Cospicua, who themselves 
must remain on the alert for any possible breaches of the law committed by 
boatmen authorised in this way. 
2. That the above mentioned lieutenant of Vittoriosa should only grant 
the above-mentioned permit to boatmen of whose honesty he is convinced, 
so that he does not expose himself to being held responsible for any damage 
which results from the illegal behaviour of anybody to whom, through his 
own negligence, he has issued a license. 
3. Finally, he orders that all night captains should extend the usual 
courtesies towards all lieutenants, and that together with the people who 
make up the patrols, they should perform the rounds every night, providing 
mutual help to one another whenever necessary. 
Government Offices 21 June 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner.
Today the 23 June 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places ut q Felicem 
Micalles Bann [illegible]
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PROCLAMATION 
21 June 1805
His Excellency the Royal Commissioner, has observed that despite 
the proclamations issued up until now, which deal with foreigners, carts, 
boats, and other issues which involve the police, and which have as their 
objective the preservation of good order and the prevention of crime, he 
has not yet managed to create a system which is as smooth running and as 
comprehensive as he would have wished. Therefore, in addition to those 
regulations already fixed as laws of the land, and to the proclamations 
already made, he orders 
1. That every foreigner wishing to remain for a period of time on these 
islands must be in possession of a written permit signed by both the 
President of the Grand Court of Valletta, and by the Chief of Police. The 
permit should give details of the real name, surname, and home-country of 
the foreigner, as well as his business, and the amount of time that he wishes, 
and is able to remain on the island. 
2. That every foreigner already resident in these islands must try to 
obtain the above mentioned permit within eight days. Any foreigners 
who come and go frequently, should obtain this permit immediately after 
their arrival, and should they fail to do so, they will be subject to a fine of 
ten oncie and be ordered to depart immediately and prohibited from ever 
returning. Out of the above mentioned ten oncie, ten scudi will be paid to 
the person who informed the Tribunal of the offence, even if he is a minister 
of the Tribunal himself. 
3. That the above mentioned President and Chief of Police, may only 
award this permit to a foreigner that is able, using the correct documents, 
to distance himself from any suspicion, and to cite a feasible reason for his 
entry into this island, and of the need to remain here for some time. 
4. That the above mentioned President and Chief of Police may only 
award this permit for a period of two months, which they may then extend 
for the same period of time again in one or more instalments as the situation 
dictates. Should the foreigner wish for permission to reside for longer than 
four months, he should apply to His Excellency. 
5. That any foreigner about to depart must submit his permit to the 
Chief of Police. In the case of any infringement of this law, he will suffer the 
penalty of being denied future permission to disembark in these islands. 
6. That no inhabitant of any status or condition has permission to give 
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lodging, or to rent houses to foreigners, either for their use or for others, 
without having first ensured that the person in question is in possession 
of the above mentioned permit. In the case of any infringement of this law, 
the offender shall be sent into exile. No-one shall be exempt from this law, 
not even those who claim to have been tricked by being shown a permit 
granted to someone else, as it is easy to obtain the truth of the matter by 
appealing to the above mentioned President and Chief of Police. 
7. That the above mentioned President and Chief of Police, shall meet 
every day at ten in the morning in the Grand Court of this city Valletta, and 
there they shall together review the foreigners who have arrived that day. 
After ten o’clock on the morning of the previous (sic) day, they shall decide 
whether to grant them permission to remain on the island, and for how 
long. They should make their decision together, with the participation of 
His Excellency wherever the circumstances of the case make this necessary. 
8. That the above mentioned President of the Grand Court and Chief 
of Police both carry a book in which they describe in alphabetical order all 
the travellers who arrive. They should make clear notes in the margin of 
all observations relating to the person, to the reason for their arrival and 
residence on the island, and to the permit granted as a result, and they 
should provide details of the documents examined. Then, in a separate 
column, but on the same page, the Chief of Police should note in the above 
mentioned book the departure of the foreigner, and whether or not he gave 
back his permit. He should then send by hand all the necessary information 
to the President of the Grand Court, specifying whether or not the above 
mentioned restitution of the permit was carried out. 
9. That all gigs for hire, all carts, all ferry-boats and fishing boats, must 
display in a visible place, a number painted in oil, which distinguishes them. 
This number and the place where it should be painted will be assigned by 
the above mentioned President of the Grand Court, although it must be 
painted at the expense of the owner of the boat, gig or cart, by any person 
whom he wishes to employ. 
10. That any driver of gigs or carts, and all boatmen, and those who 
work on fishing boats in place of the proprietor, should preserve the 
original number which was assigned by the President in the form of a card 
or parchment, which must always be carried in their pockets. 
11. That the above mentioned President should have a register of all the 
numbers given to carts, gigs for hire, ferry-boats and fishing boats, together 
with a note of the proprietor, their name, surname, nickname, and home 
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country or place of residence. One page should be allowed for each number 
so that in each page it is easy to note all the passengers and all the changes 
in ownership of the boats, carts and gigs as they happen. Note should also 
be made if one of the vehicles is destroyed or if it is missing for some reason, 
and in this case, the vacant number should be reserved for the next boat, 
cart or gig which has need of one. 
12. That in case of infringement of articles nine and ten as stated above, 
the proprietor of the gig, cart or boat should pay the penalty of six onze for 
the first offence, one half of which should be given to the informant. For the 
second offence he shall suffer the confiscation of the cart, gig or boat, from 
the sale of which three onze shall be given to the informant. His Excellency 
desires that the responsibility for the gig, cart, or boat is entirely that of the 
proprietor, and that the absence of the driver, boatman or sailor, may not 
be used as an excuse. 
13. That the same President is charged with the task of watching over 
the implementation of this present proclamation, and also of the laws and 
the proclamations already published with respect to foreigners and to the 
numbering of gigs, carts and boats. This should also include that section 
of the proclamation of 3 December 1800, which regards layabouts and 
vagabonds, and the proclamation of 12 November 1804 which deals with 
women in politics, and also all the concerns raised in relation to the job of 
Maestro di Piazza.2 The President should ensure that the Grand Viscount, 
or his lieutenant, the Maestro di Piazza, and the captains and viscounts are 
on the look out to ensure that these laws are observed. In the case of any 
infringement of the law on the part of these junior ministers, the President 
should appeal, as in the past, to the Tribunal of the Great Court of Valletta 
so that the cases can be dealt with appropriately. 
14. That the same President, within the space of one month, must give 
a copy of the books which he has made as a result of the above mentioned 
orders, to the Government Office. He should then keep updating the notes 
held in the office, making sure that he adds any extra information so that 
these copies correspond exactly to the books which he himself holds. 
15. That the fiscal lawyer of the maritime court, and every local lieutenant, 
is obliged to keep on their person an up-to-date register of the numbers of 
gigs for hire, and of all the carts in his district which should contain all 
the notes specified in article 11. Every month he is obliged to identify all 
2 No record of the Proclamation of 12 November 1804 has been identified in the 
National Library of Malta. It appears not to have survived.
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owners of these gigs and carts, and the condition of their numbers, and he 
must then make the appropriate written report in the Government offices. 
Government Offices 21 June 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commission
Dr. G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary
Today the 23 June 1805 it has been read, published and displayed in the 
usual and customary places of these four cities, Valletta, Senglea, Conspicua and 
Vittoriosa and in Floriana to the sound of trumpets and in the presence of several 
people…Salvatore Cortina night-captain of this G.C.
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
25 June 1805
The attention of His Excellency has been drawn again to the fact that, 
despite the effective measures which have been implemented at various 
times in order to deal with the problem, passport-holders have continued 
to abuse and exploit their rights to hold passports of this island.
Given the lack of our own national ships, and the urgent need to assist 
the transport of goods, His Excellency was obliged, in those early days 
following the surrender of these cities, to distribute certificates which 
promised British Protection to various foreign vessels. The governors of 
the Barbary states agreed to respect this measure, which was dictated by 
the necessity of the situation. 
Once the abuses began, His Excellency began to wish to deny the 
validity of the above-mentioned documents. However, as the circumstances 
mentioned continued to remain the same, he tried to deal with the problem 
by introducing by-laws and some new restrictions aimed at providing a 
remedy for the problem. As even these new by-laws then proved to be 
ineffective, His Excellency had to take the decision not to issue any more 
passports, nor to promise British protection to any vessels which were not 
actually Maltese or English. This arrangement was made known to the 
public with the proclamation of 28 October 1803. Unfortunately, not even 
this system has been enough to remove every infringement of the law.
It has been discovered that on several occasions, foreigners may 
have made a false sale of ships to a Maltese subject, an event which has 
disappointed the Tribunal entrusted with the job of verifying the pertinence 
of all vessels which require passports. 
This discovery has obliged His Excellency to take the decision to deny 
the usual passports to all vessels, and to order that any authentic English 
or Maltese vessels of any description must obtain special passports made 
from parchment, called “passports of the Mediterranean”. It is hoped that 
the surety that will result from the receipt of these passports, will make 
any abuses of the law stop at once. Therefore, from today onwards, the old-
style passports will not guarantee any vessel which leaves from this port.
His Excellency hopes that with such a move, all breaches of the law 
will stop at once, above all because all those whom it concerns shall be 
much less willing to take risks. He wishes to inform everyone that the 
governors of Barberia have become suspicious, and have employed spies 
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everywhere in order to make sure of the authentic and true pertinence of 
those vessels which travel under the protection of the above mentioned 
passports. Any foreigners who abuse the law risk not only the loss of their 
boat and its cargo, but even the possibility of being captured and enslaved. 
His Excellency does not intend to engage himself in any manner to help 
those whom he deems to have broken the law in any way. 
Government Offices 25 June 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Dr G.N. Zammit - Assistant Secretary.
Today the 26 June 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places of this city and 
its suburb. Ut q. p Felicem Micallese
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
15 July 1805
Some people enrolled in the Royal Maltese Regiment have deserted, and 
are now armed and roaming the countryside, disturbing the population.
His Excellency wishes to put a stop to this problem, and, therefore, 
orders everybody to make all possible effort to discover their hiding places. 
He promises a suitable reward to whoever shall provide the relevant official 
with information leading to the arrest of these deserters. In addition, he 
wishes that any person who provides help for these deserters, or anyone 
who knows where they are hidden but fails to immediately inform the 
Tribunal or the appropriate lieutenant, should be severely punished.
Government Offices 15 July 1805.
S.T.Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 17 July 1805 it has been displayed in the usual places of this city, its 
suburb and in individual farm houses. Ut. q; p Mariam Zammit …[illegible]
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
5 August 1805
His Excellency the Royal Commissioner recognises that, although the 
proclamation of 3 April 1801 expressly forbids the purchase of any item by 
soldiers, it is often generally supposed by many people that the purchase of 
bread is not included in this. As proof of his desire to prevent, rather than 
to punish crimes, His Excellency has, therefore, ordered that this notice 
be published, in order to make clear to those who question whether bread 
and other things are included in the above mentioned prohibition, that the 
general prohibition on purchasing goods, obviously includes everything.
Government Offices 5 August 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 8 August 1805 it has been read and published to the sound of drums 
and copies have been displayed in the usual places of this city, its suburb and in 
individual farm houses. ut. que; Felicem Micalles Bann…[illegible]
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PROCLAMATION
5 August 1805
Following the proclamation published on 13 May 1803, in which 
everyone, including the owners of allotments, was prohibited from selling 
unripened fruit, His Excellency the Royal Commissioner wishes and orders 
that the above mentioned proclamation is further extended to include 
those who display unripened fruit of any sort either inside or outside the 
shop, next to other saleable goods. In addition to the penalty set out in the 
above mentioned proclamation, the guilty party will suffer the penalty of 
permanent exclusion from the right to run a shop, or work a plot of land. If 
they are the actual owner of one or more plots of land, they shall suffer the 
penalty of one month’s imprisonment at their own expense. 
Government Offices 5 August 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 8 August 1805 it has been read and published to the sound of drums, 
and copies have been displayed in the usual places of this city, its suburb and in 
individual farmhouses, ut q p. felicem Micalles Bann… 
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PUBLIC NOTICE 
19 August 1805
It should be noted that next Thursday, 22 August, the distribution will 
begin in the Government Offices of the payments due to those people who, 
during the month fixed in the notice of 8 March 1805, applied to obtain 
their share of the royal donation. 
The above mentioned distribution must be finished by the following 
Thursday, 29 August this year. Consequently, anyone who does not arrive 
to make a claim during these stated eight days shall lose the payment 
allocated to him. 
In order that no person should show up unnecessarily, it should be noted 
that people should only apply, if their applications were supported by a 
statement from a lieutenant or from another similarly responsible official. 
Government Offices 19 August 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary of the Royal Commissioner.
Today the 21 August it has been read and published to the sound of drums, 
and copies have been displayed in the usual places of this city, its suburb and in 
individual farm houses, ut: q Felicem Micalles Bann.
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PROCLAMATION 
2 September 1805
Desertions by Maltese Soldiers continue to be frequent despite the 
strenuous measures adopted. This is principally due to the hospitality 
which these soldiers find in various farm-houses, where they are welcomed, 
aided and sometimes even assisted with things which, were they to be 
deprived of, would perhaps dissuade them from deserting, or ensure that it 
would not be long before they returned to their regiments or were arrested. 
Given this situation, His Excellence the Royal Commissioner orders that no 
inhabitant may give shelter or assistance to any of these deserters, under 
the penalty of being punished with a fine decided by the Tribunal, which 
should correspond to the circumstances and people involved. 
From the Government Offices 2 September 1805.
S.T. Coleridge Public Secretary to the Royal Commissioner
Today the 5 September 1805 it has been read and published to the sound of 
drums, and copies have been displayed in the usual places of this city, its suburb 
and in individual farmhouses, ut q: Felicem Micalles Bann…[illegible]
 Appendix 2. The British 
Occupation of Malta
The French Invasion
In June 1798, during the course of the ill-fated expedition to Egypt,1 French 
forces invaded Malta. These were met with only limited resistance and the 
Order quickly surrendered. 
By the time of the invasion, the Order had been in serious decline. Firstly, 
the Maltese regarded it as autocratic and oppressive, not least because it 
refused to share political power with them. Secondly, in 1792, the French 
had confiscated its assets, in France, from which it derived significant 
revenue. This meant that the Island was almost bankrupt.2 The paternalist 
welfare policies that we considered, in Chapter 2, were no longer affordable. 
Within Malta, political support for the continued rule of the Order was in 
doubt. 
On its arrival in Malta, the army of Revolutionary France was seen by 
many of the Maltese as an army of liberation and they looked forward to 
enhanced civil and political rights under French government. Many of 
the knights fled to St Petersburg others, presumably French, accompanied 
Napoleon to Egypt. After electing the Russian Emperor, Paul I, to be their 
Grandmaster, the Order came under his protection in the hope that under 
his influence they could, eventually, be restored to power in Malta. The 
actions of the occupying French forces soon caused considerable discontent 
amongst the Maltese people. Their commander, General Claude-Henri 
1 The expedition was precipitate because the French had not first established 
maritime supremacy. This was to prove their undoing. A British fleet had been dis-
patched to the Mediterranean, inter alia, to protect Ireland against a French inva-
sion. French forces had landed in Wales in 1797, which caused considerable alarm, 
including the “Spy Nosy” affair in which the Home Office placed both Wordsworth 
and Coleridge under observation. See Holmes, 1989, 159-60. 
2 At the outbreak of the Revolution the Order had supported King Louis XVI.
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Belgrand de Vaubois, ordered the confiscation of church plate; money was 
removed from the Maltese treasury and public bank (the Università); the 
Islanders were taxed. Coleridge reported that men of the Maltese regiments 
were forced to serve in the French forces in Egypt. He had been informed 
that they were placed in front of French troops and used as cannon fodder.3 
The Insurrection
On 2 September 1798, the Maltese, numbering only about three thousand 
“badly armed” men,4 rose up against the occupiers. The immediate cause 
of the revolt may have been the attempted seizure of church property at 
Rabat. The timing of the popular uprising probably had more to do with the 
news, which had reached the Island a few days earlier, of the destruction 
of the French fleet by Lord Nelson’s forces at the Battle of Aboukir Bay. The 
Maltese must now have realised that the British had naval supremacy, and, 
with the French expeditionary forces stranded in Egypt, the local garrison 
could not easily be assisted and reinforced – it was, in effect, cut off. 
When the uprising broke out, French forces, possibly comprising 
about seven thousand troops under Vaubois,5 withdrew into the fortress 
of Valletta. The fortress was impregnable to attack from the available land 
forces of their enemies so the withdrawal was consistent with military logic. 
Safe inside their walls, the French garrison could either make sorties or 
await relief. The strategy also meant that the burden of feeding the rural 
population was imposed upon the insurgents. 
The Maltese adopted the strategy of siege, placing their forces around 
the fortress of Valletta on the landward side. However, in the short term, 
that tactic resulted in a stalemate since they lacked the strength to storm the 
fortifications, and possessed no heavy weapons with which to demolish the 
walls. But that was not all. By abandoning the greater part of the Island and 
its population, the French commander had also reduced the demands upon 
his food stores. He also removed the Maltese population from Valletta, and 
the three cities, in order to eke out the food stores available to his forces.6 
The siege, then, could be endured for much longer than had the French 
3 CN 2, 2138.
4 Ball to Dundas, 6 March 1801, Kew, CO 158/10/15.
5 Ibid. There are doubts concerning the accuracy of Ball’s account because, on 21 
December 1798, General Vaubois claimed to have had a mere 3,822 men under arms 
excluding the sick: Hardman, xxi.
6 Proclama, 15 December 1798, NLM LIBR/MS 430 1 Bandi 1790 AL 1805.
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attempted to retain control of the whole Island. It was an astute tactic. In 
one sense, the Maltese revolt had been counter-productive because, in its 
absence, the Royal Navy blockade would probably have succeeded in forcing 
a capitulation by March 1799.7 This question of tactical effectiveness would 
have lasting consequences because it was to influence how the narrative 
of the liberation would be constructed. Whether the British were merely 
“auxiliaries” to a Maltese effort (and, thus, later wronged the Maltese by 
excluding them from the articles of surrender), or whether the effective 
military efforts were exclusively those of the British was a lingering and 
bitter controversy.
In order to achieve the complete capture of the Island, the Maltese 
insurgents needed military assistance. This aid was obtained from King 
Ferdinand IV of the Two Sicilies who had allied himself with Russia, 
Austria and Great Britain against the French. On 9 September 1798 Maltese 
Deputies also applied to Nelson for his assistance.8 Nelson responded 
by ordering four ships of the line, under Portuguese command, to assist 
the Maltese. He also directed that arms be landed from the British ships 
“crippled” after sea battle at Aboukir Bay. On 19 February 1799 the Sicilian 
King formally expressed his agreement that British forces should protect 
Malta.
Early in the campaign Nelson had replaced the Portuguese naval 
commander with Captain Alexander Ball (as he then was) of the Alexander, 
a 74 gun ship of the line. Ball was ordered to pursue the blockade with 
three other vessels.9 Nelson later informed the Emperor of Russia that Ball 
was “an officer not only of the greatest merit, but of the most conciliating 
manners” and well suited to the task of commanding the squadron of 
British and Portuguese ships and liaising with the insurgents. Ball, of 
course, became a significant figure in the early history of British possession 
of the Island and in Coleridge’s accounts of his time on Malta.10 
Ball was later required to organise the civil government for that part 
of the Island liberated from the French. Thus, September 1799 saw the 
beginning of Ball’s first period of government of the Island. However, it must 
7 According to Bosredon Ransijat, President of the French Commission of Gov-
ernment, who was besieged in Valletta: B. Ransijat, Journal du Siege et Blocus de Malte. 
Imp. De Valade, Paris, an. IX, 17 (Journal of the Siege and Blockade of Valletta) 
quoted in Hardman, 332.
8 After defeating the French at Aboukir Bay Nelson had returned to Sicilian wa-
ters to defend the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies against likely French aggression.
9 Terpsichore, Bonne Citoyenne and Incendiary.
10 See generally, The Friend, 1; also Kooy, 2003, 441; Kooy, 1999.
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be emphasised that in his governmental capacity, he was a representative of 
the Neapolitan Court, not the British Crown.
Apart from ensuring the administration of civil government in the 
liberated part of the Island, Ball had to organise the military effort and 
resolve disputes between the Maltese and their allies. During the prolonged 
stalemate morale fell, and it was Ball’s responsibility to keep up flagging 
spirits. Ball recounted to Coleridge how onerous he found his diverse and 
difficult roles.11 
Nelson’s correspondence with Paul I of Russia offered assurances that 
Britain would make no claim to the Island. British presence on the Island, at 
this time, always acknowledged King Ferdinand as the legitimate sovereign. 
Neapolitan troops were deployed against the French during the siege and 
the Neapolitan flag was ordered to be hoisted on the Island. 
By June 1800 the blockade of the Island was causing difficulties for 
the French garrison. At this crucial moment, Major-General Pigot arrived 
with two further British regiments. Napoleon must have believed that 
capitulation was inevitable so he played an astute hand. He seized the 
opportunity offered to cede Malta to Russia, calculating that this would 
cause tension between the allies, giving Russia a legitimate claim to Malta 
vis-à-vis Great Britain. This act affected British colonial policy in Malta after 
1800 because Britain was forced to regard the governmental arrangements 
as temporary, pending a final settlement at international level. Formal 
recognition of this emerged, for example, in the administration of justice 
that would not be formally vested in His Majesty. No public statements 
were made asserting that the sovereignty of Malta was vested in Britain. It 
was only when Russia gave up its claim in 1812 that this policy changed. 
However, in private and even in some diplomatic exchanges, British 
officials regarded the Crown as sovereign in Malta after 1800.
The French Surrender
The fortress of Valletta, faced with famine, eventually offered terms 
of capitulation which were agreed by the British alone and signed on 
5 September 1800. It followed negotiations conducted by the English 
Commanding Officer, Major-General Pigot, without reference either to 
the Maltese or to the Civil Governor, Captain Ball.12 Pigot did not sign the 
11 The Friend, 1, 561.
12 Probably because General Vaubois would not have recognised the Maltese in-
surgents. Moreover, Ball had been appointed by the King of Naples, and the Con-
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articles offered on behalf of His Britannic Majesty and his allies.13 This was 
a surrender to Britain alone – the Maltese were treated a third parties. 
This exclusion from the capitulation caused much bitterness amongst 
the Maltese.14 It was not simply a matter of pride that their brothers in 
arms had appointed themselves as the senior partners in a military alliance, 
prepared to exclude their fellow combatants from the rituals of victory. 
The Maltese considered that the British bungled the arrangements under 
which the French left the Island. Not least amongst these injustices was the 
failure of the British to accept the French offer of hostages15 as a guarantee 
that assets taken from the Università and other public intuitions such as 
the Monti di Pietà would be compensated. Moreover, the British did not 
insert any clause in the articles of capitulation indemnifying the private 
property rights of the Maltese in this respect.16 Their Maltese allies must 
have been even more astonished and angry that the British furnished 
transports to carry the garrison and its spoils to French ports, including 
money plundered from the Island. 
As we shall see, the failure to consult the Maltese and act 
upon their views contributed to certain unnecessary but intractable 
political and administrative problems that were instrumental in 
tainting the first decade of the British administration of the Island. 
As we have seen, one of Coleridge’s most important laws – the 
Proclamation of 8 March 1805 – was ostensibly introduced to assist 
those civilians who suffered loss as a result of these events.17
The revolutionary Congress of the Maltese was dissolved immediately 
after the surrender. Ball continued for a brief but highly significant period 
gress of the Maltese, neither of which were recognised as legitimate by the French.
13 Article 11 of the Articles of Capitulation which explicitly excluded other troops 
(Appendix to Stoddart CJ’s reports, Kew, CO158/91; see also Hardman, 322.
14 According to Coleridge, their feelings had been “insulted”, and this “alienated 
their affections. He emphasised Ball’s part in arguing that, as a question of “plain 
justice”, the Maltese should have been included: The Friend, 1, 563.
15 Kew, CO 158/19; also Marchese di Testaferrata to Earl Bathurst, January 1812, 
Hardman, 512.
16 Article 12 did not require the French to furnish compensation. The British 
agreed to uphold lawful property transactions effected during the occupation. The 
clause does not require restitution for money and goods taken by the French. Arti-
cle 12 stated: “All alienations or sales of moveable or immoveable property whatso-
ever, made by the French government while in possession of Malta, and all transac-
tions between individuals, shall be held inviolable”. Answer Art 12 “Granted, as far 
as they shall be just and lawful”.
17 Although as we shall see the Bando had other purposes. See taxation theme, 
Chapter 5.
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(until February 1801) to act as the Civil Governor of the Island. It was in 
this six month period that he initiated many of the policies that would 
characterise British administration of Malta. These were driven by his 
ambition that the Island should remain in British hands, for which it would 
be necessary to gain the support of the Maltese. 
The reasons for Ball’s recall, despite his popularity with the Maltese, need 
to be explained. His presence on the Island had been under the authority 
of the Neapolitan Crown and tended to suggest its continuing sovereign 
rights. His presence was, thus, inconsistent with the policy of the British 
military authorities that would recognise no foreign power as having a 
claim to the Island. But, there may have also been a more prosaic reason. It 
seems that his relationship with Pigot was strained;18 Pigot appears to have 
wanted to bring the civil administration under his authority and this view 
was briefly accepted by Whitehall. 
Military Government 
Rumours had circulated that the British government would adopt a military 
government following the capitulation. At the time he was preparing to 
return to his ship, Ball reported to Dundas that the rumours were causing 
“dissatisfaction” amongst the local population whom he represented 
as being unanimously in favour of the establishment a civil authority 
distinct from the military. The Maltese were anxious that under a military 
government they would be vulnerable to the same oppression that had 
occurred under the Order of St John. Ball’s own opinion, as the former Civil 
Governor, was that a military governor would not have the opportunity to 
devote himself properly to civil affairs. Given the strength of feeling locally, 
Ball urged that the civil and military power be separated.19 
Although a military government, under Major-General Pigot, was at first 
installed, its tenure was but a brief one. It was terminated when Charles 
Cameron was appointed Civil Commissioner on 14 May 1801. 
The First Civil Administration
The use of the title “Civil Commissioner” (as opposed to “Governor) was 
symbolic rather than substantive. It was generally reserved for cases where 
18 There is a suggestion of tension in Pigot to Sir Ralph Abercromby, 5 September 
1800, quoted in Hardman, 324; see also Pirotta, 53.
19 Ball to Dundas, 6 March 1801, Kew, CO 158/10/15.
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some lesser title than “Governor” was appropriate. It did not, necessarily, 
imply that the office-holder would enjoy fewer powers, but rather that 
political reasons existed for avoiding the use of the alternative title.20 In 
the case of Malta this choice of title was certainly not unconsidered. When 
Sir Alexander Ball (who succeeded Charles Cameron)21 requested that 
he should officially be styled “Governor”22 his request was denied. It 
was not until 1813 that a proper, so called, “Governor” was appointed. 
For internal political reasons, Ball chose to style himself to as the “Royal 
Commissioner” – a title that he considered had more dignity than the 
title “Civil Commissioner” and one that emphasised the constitutional 
relationship between his office and the British Crown. 
Malta and the Treaty of Amiens
In March 1801 the Addington Ministry took office in London. Almost 
immediately it opened negotiations with France to conclude the war. 
Central to these negotiations was the question of Malta. It was now seen as 
a strategically-significant Island controlling access to the Levant, to Egypt 
and, thus, the overland routes to India. 
France wanted to see the Order of St John restored so as to ensure that 
Britain did not retain possession of the Island. In turn, Britain wished to 
deny Malta to France. 
The policy of temporary occupation became obvious in the terms of the 
Preliminary Treaty of Amiens concluded in October 1801. In this agreement 
the British government undertook to permit the restoration of the Order of 
St John to Malta under the protection of Russia. This settlement was acutely 
unpopular in Malta. Cameron reported to Lord Hobart that a mere rumour 
of the agreement “has occasioned most violent fermentation” locally.23 The 
Maltese remonstrated that, as France had confiscated the French property 
of the Knights in 1792, in effect, France would have an indirect control of 
Malta.24 They were also concerned about possible reprisals against their 
people. 
A deputation was sent to London to remonstrate with the British, but 
20 See Roberts-Wray, 306. The actual power conferred was a matter for the Com-
mission and Instructions under which the Governor/Civil Commissioner acted.
21 Cameron was recalled by a despatch of 9 June 1802: Kew, CO 159/3/84.
22 Ball to Windham, 27th August 1806, Kew, CO 158/12/153. Ball made the case for 
a pay rise and to have his office entitled “Civil Governor”.
23 Cameron to Hobart, 23 October 1801, Kew, CO 158/1/335.
24 Hardman, 410-5.
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they were arguing against a fait accompli. Lord Hobart replied to them, 
by a letter dated 20 April 1802, that the abandonment of Malta was “an 
indispensable sacrifice” necessary to secure a general peace.25 In return for 
an assurance that the settlement for Malta would include a guarantee of 
greater political freedom for the Maltese, the deputies were persuaded to 
accept the restoration of the Order.26 
This undertaking was reflected in the terms of Article X, of the definitive 
Treaty of Amiens of 27 March 1802, which was intended to deny Malta both 
to France and Britain and also to confer greater rights upon the Maltese. The 
Treaty provided for the restoration of the Order, the neutrality of the Island, 
the withdrawal of British civil and military authorities, the establishment 
of a Neapolitan garrison (which was intended to be present only until the 
Order could raise sufficient forces to garrison the islands27) and enhanced 
political rights for the Maltese, particularly in so far as the Grandmaster of 
the Order was to be elected from amongst the native Maltese. This was a 
particularly significant extension of the political rights of the Maltese vis a 
vis the Order.
Russia had not played a part in the negotiation of the Treaty and, 
subsequently, expressed its discontent at the civil and political guarantees 
for the Maltese.28
Ball’s Second Administration 1802-1809.
Ball returned to the islands in July 1802 having succeeded Cameron as Civil 
Commissioner. He was additionally styled ‘minister plenipotentiary to the 
Order of St John’. His primary task was to implement the Treaty of Amiens. 
The restoration of the Order was still deeply opposed by many, if not 
all, significant opinion in Malta. On 15 June 1802 a Declaration of Rights29 
was issued under the authority of the Congress of the Islands of Malta and 
Gozo declaring that the ‘King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland is our Sovereign Lord, and his lawful successors shall, in all times 
25 Hardman, 424-5.
26 Coleridge condemned the Treaty on moral grounds as an unjust and inhu-
mane instrument that disregarded the national honour of the Maltese: The Friend, 1, 
571.
27 The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies had effectively become a vassal sate of France. 
French forces were in central Italy; and there was suspicion that the Neapolitan 
troops would be indirectly under French control.
28 Hardman, 444-7.
29 Cm 9657 Appendix F; see also Frendo. 
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to come, be acknowledged as our lawful sovereign’.
The Treaty of Amiens was never implemented (a major dispute was that 
the British refused to evacuate Malta because of French aggression) and 
the war with France resumed in May 1803. At that time, Ball was appointed 
‘Civil Commissioner’, and he successfully obtained the removal of 
Neapolitan troops. Ball continued as Civil Commissioner in this, his second 
administration, until his death in October 1809. Ball’s successor was the 
military commander, Major-General Hildebrand-Oakes who was himself 
replaced in 1813 by Sir Thomas Maitland, the first to be described by the 
British as ‘Governor’. Malta then became a colony of the British Empire.
14. Memorial to Sir Alexander Ball, 1757-1809, Lower Barrakka Gardens, Valletta.
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